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ABSTRACT:
This dissertation examines the rise of the modem fiscal state, which enabled the state to
use centrally collected revenues from indirect taxes to mobilize financial resources either
through long-term borrowing or issuing paper notes. The modem fiscal state greatly
enhanced state capacity and stimulated financial development; it thus represented a
crucial stage in the transformation from early modem to modem state and economy. My
comparative analysis of England, Japan, and China shows multiple sequences and
outcomes. All three cases had well-established early modem states and sophisticated
market economies. Under the pressure of increasing spending demands, state actors
conducted similar experiments, such as short-term borrowing, issuing of paper notes, and
the collection of taxes upon domestic consumption. England became a modem fiscal
state by the 1750s when its government used the revenues from excises and the customs
to service its massive long-term debt. Japan made the leap in the late 1880s when tax
revenues were employed to back up paper money, i.e., banknotes issued by the Bank of
Japan. China, however, failed to develop into a modem fiscal state.
I put forward a temporally-based causal mechanism which resulted from the interactions
between a profound state credit crisis and socio-economic conditions. Such credit crises
were caused by excessive dependence upon fictitious credit instruments such as bills of
short-term borrowing unfunded by tax revenue in England or non-convertible paper notes
in Japan. As these credit crises were an unintended consequence of earlier policies or
events, they were exogenous to subsequent institutional development. As a problem that
had to be solved, they forced experimentation, "selected" effective institutional
arrangements and competent financial officials, and facilitated a continuous learning and
accumulation of effective elements in a process full of uncertainties. Socio-economic
conditions, such as the size of consumption and the degree of concentration of
production, were important to sustain this process in which various elements came to
form a mutually reinforcing system. The lack of such an interactive process is used to
explain the absence of a modern fiscal state in China. This institutional model reconciles
the uncertainties and multiplicity of possible outcomes in the early stages of the process
and the eventual observed outcome. This dissertation contributes to the study of
institutional dynamics, which aims to understand how specific institutions emerge and
consolidate.
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Chapter 1 Introduction: the Rise of the Modern Fiscal State and its Implications for
the Political Economy of the State
I. Introduction
We are living in an age of great institutional transformation. The transition to democracy
and market economy involves issues of how to establish and consolidate new political
and economic institutions. Facing the challenge of globalization, advanced industrial
economies are also adjusting their institutions in both production and provision of social
welfare. There are several important lessons drawn from the study of institutional
change. First, institutions are deeply embedded in particular socio-economic
environments, and thus no institutional model is universally optimal across contexts.'
Second, institutional change is a temporal process in which several factors interact with
one another: different ideas, aspirations and interest concerns among actors, various
institutional arrangements, and variations in the socio-economic structure.2 Politics,
moreover, plays a crucial role, because various institutional arrangements have different
impacts on the interest redistribution in society.3
For the embeddedness of institutions in advanced market economies, see Suzanne Berger and Ronald
Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); J. Rogers
Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of
Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
2 For a discussion of the interactive nature of institutional change, see Avner Greif, Institutions and the
Path to the Modern Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 14-20; Paul Pierson,
Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2004), chapter 5.
3 For emphasis on the politics of distribution of interests that is involved in institutional change, see Jack
Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
However, social scientists are ill-equipped to explain the emergence and consolidation of
specific institutional arrangements over time in the highly interactive and political
process of institutional change. The literature of institutionalism is overwhelmingly
concerned about how particular institutions affect policy outcomes or shape actors'
preference. Yet the powerful analytical tools used to understand how institutions
function in politics and economy do not address the dynamic question of how institutions
4
emerge and consolidate. Moreover, the process of institutional change often covers a
long time span, which cannot be handled by methods or theories with a short time
horizon.5 Finally, interactions among actors, institutional arrangements, and the socio-
economic environment often endogenously generate unobservable factors that
significantly affect the eventual institutional outcome. As a result, the observed
institutional outcome is often one among the multiplicity of possible outcomes, rather
than an inevitable one of prior causal factors. How can we find a causal mechanism that
not only has the necessary temporal dimension to cover the course of institutional change
but also can explain the observed outcome out of the multiplicity of possible outcomes
during interactive process of institutional change?
4 On the importance of studying institutional change and development over time, see Kathleen Thelen and
Sven Steinmo, "Historical institutionalism in comparative politics," in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and
Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 16-22; Paul Pierson, Politics in Time, p. 103; and
Barry R. Weingast, "Rational Choice Institutionalism," in Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner eds., Political
Science: The State of the Discipline (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), p. 675.
5 Regarding temporality in causal explanations of socio-political processes, see Paul Pierson, Politics in
Tim, chapter 3; Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, "Historical Institutionalism," in Ira Katznelson and Helen
Milner eds., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), p. 698;
Andrew Abbott, Time Matters: On Theory and Method (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001).
6 Ira Katznelson, "Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan
S. Zukerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), pp. 93-94; Peter A. Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative
Research," in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the
Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 382-384; Charles Tilly, "Mechanisms
in Political Processes," Annual Review ofPolitical Science, 4 (2001), p. 25.
In this dissertation, I investigate a phenomenon of institutional transformation in public
finance which I term the rise of the modem fiscal state. I characterize the modem fiscal
state as a state that has the institutional ability to use the tax revenues it collects in an
amalgamated way to mobilize long-term financial resources from the markets, through
either long-term borrowing or issuing paper money. Compared with a state which has
not yet developed such an institutional ability, the modem fiscal state achieves an
economy of scale in using its tax revenues to mobilize financial resources. In so doing, it
greatly increases the spending capacity of the state and fundamentally changes the
interactions between the state and economy. By examining the dynamic process of how
the modem fiscal state emerged over time in specific historical cases, we can better
understand how the state and economy interact in building effective institutions to collect
taxation and manage state finance. This may be helpful not only to students of the past
but also to governments in developing countries and emerging market economies that are
experiencing similar processes.7
In order to identify a causal mechanism that leads to the rise of the modem fiscal state, I
choose three cases for comparative historical analysis: England between 1642 and 1752,
Japan between 1868 and 1895, and China between 1850 and 1911. These are special
cases in the study of the state and economy. All had long and continuous histories as
7 For discussions of the consequences of a lack of effective state institutions in taxation and finance in
emergent market economies, see David Woodruff, Money Unmade: Barter and the Fate ofRussian
Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); John L. Campbell, "An institutional analysis of fiscal
reform in postcommunist Europe," Theory and Society, Vol. 25, No. 1 (February 1996): 45-84.
sovereign territorial states.8 The state as a political entity had become highly
institutionalized in England by the seventeenth century, and in Japan and China by the
nineteenth century. In this sense, they are quite different from many new states that came
into being only after the end of colonialism in the twentieth century.9 Meanwhile, they
also had sophisticated market economies. The degree of monetarization in economic life
was quite high in Japan and China by the nineteenth century, and was comparable to that
found in England by the early eighteenth century.
Nonetheless, these three special cases have general significance for the study of
institutional transformation as they all experienced, at different times, an inadequacy of
the existing institutions of public finance to the greatly changed socio-economic
environment. The traditional reserves of revenue such as the domain revenue in England
and the land tax in Japan and China became insufficient to meet the ordinary spending of
the state. Yet the state did not have an institutional ability to extract revenue from the
expanding commercial sectors. The exhaustion of old institutions appeared particularly
serious in England between the 1600s and 1620s, in Japan between the 1820s and 1860s,
and in China between the 1820s and 1850s. In the process of searching for new methods
and institutions, state actors in all three countries conducted many similar experiments,
such as short-term borrowing, the collection of taxes from domestic consumption, the
issuing of state fiduciary credit instruments such as paper notes, etc. The outcomes at the
8 England, Japan, and China in the eighteenth century were also empires which included territories under
different administrative and legal institutions: Scotland and Ireland in the case of England; Mongolia,
Manchuria, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Tibet in the Qing dynasty, and Hokkaido in Tokugawa Japan. I
therefore use the term of state in reference only to England (instead of Britain), Japan proper, and China
proper. Major institutional changes in public finance happened within the territory of the state.
9 See the discussion of these "new states" that formed after the World War II in Edward Shils, Political
Development in the New States (Paris: Mouton, 1968).
end of each episode to be examined varied. While England and Japan transformed - by
different means - into modem fiscal states, China did not. Analyzing the three historical
cases allows us to investigate complete processes of institutional emergence and
consolidation and of failure. This privilege is not available to the study of contemporary
institutional changes, which are still on-going.
The rest of this chapter goes as follows. In section II, I discuss the institutional features
of the modem fiscal state in more detail, as well as its implications for the study of state-
economy interactions. In section 1II, I examine some important parallels in the
development of the state and market economy in England, Japan, and China, which
constitute the common background against which we may compare their subsequent
institutional transformations in public finance. In section IV, I analyze the general
institutional features of the modem fiscal state which are common to both England in the
1750s and Japan in the 1890s, two countries in quite different domestic and international
circumstances. The perspective of the modem fiscal state also casts new light on the
collapse of state power in China in the late nineteenth century. In section IV, I discuss
the difficulties in explaining the rise of the modem fiscal state and the variations of
outcome across the three cases.
II. The concept of the modern fiscal state and its implications:
The existing literature on the state ignores the modem fiscal state. The Weberian
definition of the state as the political organization which monopolizes legitimate coercive
force over a given territory says nothing about the institutional character of the state in
public finance.' 0 From the economic point of view, Weber defines the modem state by
its capacity to achieve monetary consolidation, or the monopoly of the creation of
money." This definition is too strong, as even England, the undisputable leading country
in the development of modem capitalism, did not achieve monetary consolidation until
the second half of the nineteenth century.' 2
From the perspective of public finance, the literature on state-building usually makes a
distinction between the fiscal state (or tax state in Schumpeter's term), which rests upon
revenue obtained from taxing the economy, and the domain state (or demesne state),
which draws income primarily from crown-owned property such as estates, forests,
mines, and so on. The transition from domain state to fiscal state was a significant
change in early modem Europe as taxation redefined the interaction between state and
society.13 As the generic feature of the domain state is to derive revenue from sources
other than regular taxation, it may exist in the age of industrial economy when the state
rests upon revenues from state-owned enterprises. In light of this broadly definition, the
domain state remained persistent in Prussia, where it derived the majority of its revenue
10 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 78.
"1 Max Weber, Economy and Society, volume I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 166.
12 Throughout the entire eighteenth century, the English economy suffered from a serious shortage of
currency, particularly currency of small denominations. This was mitigated mainly by privately minted
copper money and privately issued and locally circulated "token-money." See Patrick K. O'Brien, "Central
government and the economy, 1688-1815," in Roderick Floud and D. N. McCloskey, eds., The Economic
History ofBritain Since 1700, volume I, Second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
pp. 235-40; Peter Mathias, "The people's money in the eighteenth century: the royal mint, trade tokens and
the economy," in Peter Mathias, The Transformation of England: Essays in the Economic and Social
History of England in the Eighteenth Century (London: Methuen, 1979).
13 For the discussion of the domain state, see Richard Bonney, "Revenues," in Richard Bonney ed.,
Economic Systems ands State Finance (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), especially pp. 447-63.
See also the detailed case-study of the transition from domain state to fiscal state in Western Europe in
Richard Bonney ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, 1200-1815 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
originally from state properties and later from state-owned enterprises, in particular,
railways.14 In the twentieth century, former socialist countries are essentially domain
states as the state derives the majority of its income from directly managing state-owned
enterprises; and the petrol-states are also typical domain states. 15
In the study of late development, Kiren A. Chaudhry contends that the lack of necessary
administrative institutions to collect tax revenue often forces the state in many developing
countries to directly own and manage industrial enterprises for revenues. 16 This policy is
basically a replica of the domain state. However, only a few countries in the world are
(un)lucky enough to have an industry of natural monopoly, such as petroleum and natural
gas, from which the state can generate large revenues through direct management at low
administrative costs. For the rest, mismanagement and inefficiency in running state-
owned enterprises often make this substitute for the building of tax institutions ineffective
in practice. In this light, one important issue for a developing country is how to build
efficient tax institutions to meet state spending while allowing economic actors to deal
with risks and opportunities in running enterprises for profit, in other words, how to build
a fiscal state.' 7
14 For discussions of the domain state in Prussia from the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century,
see D. E. Schremmer, "Taxation and public finance: Britain, France, and Germany," in Peter Mathias and
Sidney Pollard eds., The Cambridge Economic History ofEurope, volume VIII (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), pp. 411-455. For the fiscal importance of railways to the Prussian and later
German state, see Richard Tilly, "The Political Economy of Public Finance and the Industrialization of
Prussia, 1815-1866," Journal of Economic History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1966), p. 493; and Rainer
Fremdling, "Freight Rates and State Budget: the Role of the National Prussian Railways, 1880-1913,"
Journal ofEuropean Economic History, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 1980), p. 32.
15 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox ofPlenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1997).
16 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers," Politics
and Society, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 1993), p. 252.
17 In this light, the ongoing process of post-communist transition is also a transition from the domain state
to the fiscal state.
Thus far, the concept of the fiscal state has been defined solely by the source of the
state's income, i.e., tax revenue. This conceptualization, however, is too broad and
includes some quite different kinds of economies. For example, a fiscal state, by
definition, may rest upon taxation in kind, or in coin, or in paper money. Yet it is
obvious that the relationships between the state and economy are quite different in nature
among these three kinds of fiscal state. Even more importantly, the existing definition of
the fiscal state does not distinguish among the different ways that the state uses its tax
revenues. For this reason, I make a further distinction between the modernfiscal state
and the traditionalfiscal state. The former uses its tax revenue as a means to leverage
more financial resources through long-term liabilities, while the latter uses its tax revenue
mainly as income to meet its current spending. The traditional fiscal state is not a static
concept as it may use some of its tax revenue to raise short-term loans in emergencies.
But once the emergency has passed, it clears its debt and goes back to its previous
condition. These two kinds of fiscal states are quite different both in their fiscal
operation and in their interactions with the market.
The central institutional feature of the modem fiscal state is the establishment of an
institutionalized connection between the amalgamated tax revenue of the state and its
long-term participation in the financial markets. Such a connection can be realized either
through the state's long-term borrowing or through issuing paper money, which is a de
facto long-term state liability. In both cases, the modem fiscal state uses its collected tax
revenue not as simple income but as security to sustain the creditworthiness of its long-
term borrowing or its issued paper notes. In other words, it uses its tax revenue to
leverage more financial resources from the economy.
The successful operation of a modem fiscal state depends upon two important
institutional components. First, it should have a stable and highly centralized means to
collect at least the majority of tax revenue. This enables the central government to use
the collected revenue as a whole to achieve an economy of scale in using tax revenues to
mobilize financial resources from the markets. Centralized collection also helps ensure
predictable inflows of revenue into the central government, which is crucially important
to safeguard the creditworthiness of state's long-term liabilities in the financial markets.
Second, it should possess effective institutions to manage government expenditures and
borrowing so as to ensure that they would be secured by anticipated receipts of tax
revenue or to safeguard the convertibility of the issued paper notes.
The close connection of the modem fiscal state with the economy through these long-
term liabilities and centralized tax collection makes the smooth operation of the modem
fiscal state contingent upon two necessary economic conditions. First, it is impossible to
attain a highly centralized collection of tax revenue if taxes are collected in kind or if the
collected revenue is transported in the bulky form of specie. A centralized taxation
system is impractical where it takes months to send the collected tax revenue from
localities to the central government and another several months for the central
government to assign revenues to cover local government expenditures. The use of credit
instruments such as bills of exchange to remit the collected revenues and government
funds is thus a necessary condition for building the modem fiscal state. Moreover, the
speedy transmission of tax revenue to the central government helps ensure the
predictability of the coming of revenues, which boosts the confidence of creditors and
ordinary holders of the state's paper money.
Second, it is necessary to have a variety of sources of tax revenue, including both direct
taxes (the land tax, income tax, property tax, etc.) and indirect taxes (taxes upon
consumption and the customs). Such diversification of the tax base can make the modem
fiscal state less vulnerable to fluctuations in the economy and thus further safeguard the
creditworthiness of its long-term liabilities in the markets. Moreover, indirect taxes,
particularly the consumption taxes on liquor and tobacco, are elastic in yield and
politically less costly to collect because they fall not directly on individual consumers but
rather on big producers and wholesalers who can transfer the tax burden to consumers
through raising retail prices. In contrast, direct taxes such as the land tax and property tax
are either inelastic in yield or politically difficult to collect as they target powerful social
groups. In this light, the modem fiscal state is unlikely to appear in an economy which
has neither inter-regional financial networks to transfer money through credit instruments
nor a tax base to tap indirect taxes.
Although the rise of the modem fiscal state is dependent upon the economy, its
emergence in turn changes that economy and state-economy interactions. This is because
the scale and regularity of the state's tax revenue are unrivalled by those of any private
economic actors. In particular, before the age of mass communication, information
regarding the creditworthiness of the state could reach much larger segments of society
than could similar information about private financiers, which was generally confined to
their specific trading or personal networks. The long-term involvement of amalgamated
tax revenues in the financial markets greatly stimulates the effective use of credit
instruments such as paper notes and state bonds. In other words, the rise of a modem
fiscal state may prompt a coin-dominated economy to transform into a credit-based one.
As the state establishes the institutional ability to mobilize financial resources from the
markets, it vastly increases its spending capacities. This was a salient advantage in the
ruthless power struggles in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, the
maintenance of the modem fiscal state depends heavily on keeping a balance between the
tax revenue and the state's long-term liabilities. The state actors who manage public
finance thus have a strong motivation to try to accurately estimate taxation potential and
the elasticity of major sources of revenue. They also have incentives to encourage the
expansion of the economy as it directly means the growth of tax revenue and state ability
to mobilize funds. Therefore, the interaction between the state and economy in the
modem fiscal state is more intensive than that found in previous states. The rise of the
modern fiscal state represents a "great transformation" in both the state and economy. In
order to further illustrate this point, let us first examine the relationship between the state
and economy in England, Japan, and China before their transition to the modem fiscal
state.
I1. Parallels in the state and economy: early modern England, Japan, and China
In England, an early modem state was well-entrenched in political life by the early
seventeenth century. According to the English historian Michael J. Braddick, it had the
following institutional characteristics. First, the central government was the ultimate
source of political power and the final arbiter of the legitimization of the use of political
power in localities. It also claimed the sovereign power in coinage and foreign affairs.
Second, the execution of political power was centrally coordinated through highly
impersonal, formal, and institutionalized ways, which were mainly embodied in the
procedures of issuing, transmitting, and preserving government documents. Third, the
organization of the central government became more institutionalized and differentiated,
and the regular administration of government was handled by officials rather than by the
king or his personal retainers. In the early modem English state, the monarch was a
sovereign subject to the constraints of both formal institutions of government and
informal conventions, such as "taking counsels" from Privy Council and Parliament. In
consequence, the centrally-coordinated network of political power which imposed a
unitary judicial and administrative conformity upon society reflected the will of the state
rather than of the personal will of the monarch.18
Braddick's characterization of the early modern state in England sheds new light on our
understanding of the state in Japan and China in the eighteenth century. When we
envision the early modern state along the lines described for England, we find similar
phenomena in eighteenth-century Japan and China. In the case of China, because the
central coordination of political power in administration was carried out through highly
18 Michael J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England c. 1550-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), chapter 1.
formal and complex institutions consisting of six ministries and the Grand Council, it
makes little sense to talk about the emperor's personal rule.' 9 The highly centralized
political system was also flexible in the actual execution of political power as the central
government permitted a certain degree of administrative autonomy to provincial
governments operating under very different socio-economic conditions. 20 As an
example, although coinage of copper cash remained the sovereign power in theory, the
central government granted provincial governments the autonomy to mint copper cash
with various content and fineness of copper according to their respective conditions to
accessing copper supply. But provincial governments must report to the Board of
Revenue the model of minted copper cash and annual amount of mintage; and the
purchase of copper of provincial mints was under strict supervision of the center.
Moreover, the government allowed foreign currencies, particularly the Spanish and
Mexican silver dollar, to widely circulate in coastal provinces for the sake of the
"people's convenience" (minbian). The state only required that foreign silver dollars be
converted into the official silver tael when paying taxes. This resembled the situation in
eighteenth-century England in which the central government allowed foreign coins and
private token money to circulate in the English economy.
19 See the emphasis on the relative autonomy of the state apparatus from society and the impersonal nature
of bureaucratic posts in William T. Rowe, Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in
Eighteenth-Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 330-331. The development of
centralization in bureaucracy or the political system (zhongyangjiquan in Chinese) can be traced back to
the Tang-Song period. Note this development is more about the role of the central government in
coordinating the use of political power and in adjudicating its legitimacy, which formally distinguished the
state apparatus from both the ruler and the ruled, than about the state's ability to control society. See the
description of this political development in China in Wu Zongguo, ed., Zhongguo gudai guanliao zhidu
yanjiu [A Study of the Development of Bureaucracy in Ancient China] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe,
2004), chapters on Sui-Tang and Song.
20 In eighteenth-century China, provincial governors often asked for adjustments of the policies issued by
the central government so as to suit the particular conditions in their provinces. The central government
often allowed, and sometimes even encouraged, such adjustments in economic and social policies. In the
administrative terminology at the time, this was called yindizhiyi (to adjust a policy according to local
conditions).
State formation in Japan can be traced back to the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries. In the eighteenth century, the political authority of the shogunate (the
Bakufu) in Edo (Tokyo) grew steadily in both administration and regulation, even though
the emperor in Kyoto remained the nominal sovereign. The shogunate became the
ultimate arbitrator of the legitimacy of the use of political power in localities. 22 The
shogunate itself also became more institutional and bureaucratic so as to handle
increasingly complicated administrative and legal matters.23 The monetary consolidation
achieved in the eighteenth century was particularly impressive. In 1636, the shogunate
began to mint official currency, forbade the use of foreign currency (particularly Chinese
copper cash) in Japan, and declared counterfeiting of currency a capital crime.24 Through
the recoinage in 1736 (Genbun kaityfl), the shogunate stabilized the value between the
21 Mary Elizabeth Berry, "Public Peace and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early
Modern Japan," Journal ofJapanese Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1986): 237-71; Eiko Ikegami, The
Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge, MA.:
Harvard University Press, 1995), chapters 7 and 8. For a succinct introduction of the emergence of the
shogunate as the central government in the execution of state power in Japan between 1680 and 1750, see
Takano Toshihiko, "18 seiki maehan no Nihon - taihei no naka no tenkan [Pre-eighteenth century Japan: a
realm in the great peace]," in Iwanami koza Nihon tsishi, Vol. 13, Kinsei 3 (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten,
1994).
22 For the emergence of the shogunate as the central power in eighteenth-century Japan, see James W.
White, "State Growth and Popular Protest in Tokugawa Japan," Journal ofJapanese Studies, Vol. 14, No.
1 (Winter 1988): 1-25; and Takano Toshihiko, "18 seiki maehan no Nihon - taihei no naka no tenkan," in
Iwanami koza Nihon tsishi[A General History of Japan], Vol. 13, Kinsei 3 (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1994).
23 For a succinct introduction to the bureaucratization of the Tokugawa shogunate and the codification of its
legal system in the first half of the seventeenth century, see Tsuji Tatsuya, "Politics in the eighteenth
century," in John W. Hall ed., The Cambridge History ofJapan, volume 4, Early Modern Japan
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 432-456. For a recent stress on bureaucratization,
such as the formalization of administrative and legal precedents, systematic use of formal documents in
administration, and the separation between the shogunate's public governance and the Shogun's private
affairs in the Ky~ho Reform (1716-1736), see Oishi Manabu, "Kyh5 kaikaku no rekishiteki ichi [The
historical place of the Ky6h5 Reform]," in Fujita Satoru, ed., Bakuhansei kaikaku no tenkai [The
Development of the Reforms in the Bakufu-han System] (Toky6: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 2001), pp. 31-
51.
24 Yasukuni Ryoichi, "Kahei no kin6 [Functions of currency]," in Iwanami koza Nihon tsishi[A General
History of Japan], Vol. 12, Kinsei 2 (Toky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1994), pp. 155-6.
standard gold coins and the supplementary silver and copper coins. 25 In 1772, it began to
mint denominated silver coins (nanryJ nishugin) and circulate them gradually in the
economic circle of western Japan centered in Osaka, which had previously been
dominated by silver by weight. 26 The issue of paper notes by domain governments in the
eighteenth century had to receive permission from the shogunate. Moreover, these paper
notes were denominated in units of small currency minted by the shogunate and were
used mainly to alleviate the inadequacy of small cash in local transactions.
Although these three states are all recognizably early modern in light of the nature of
political power, their structures of public finance were distinct. In England, there was a
discernable trend toward the fiscal state in the period between 1336 and 1453 when the
royal government increasingly relied upon direct and indirect taxes to raise its income. 2 8
Nonetheless, the English state that formed in the sixteenth century and became firmly
established in the early seventeenth century was essentially a domain state. The crown's
ordinary revenue came from royal estates, the customs, and the Crown's feudal rights
such as purveyance and wardship, instead of coming from regular domestic taxation.29
25 See the emphasis on the importance of the 1736 recoinage to the economic development in Japan in
Shimbo Hiroshi and Sait6 Osamu, "Gaisetsu - 19 seiki e [An overview: toward the nineteenth century]," in
Shimbo Hiroshi and Sait6 Osamu, eds., Kindai seich5 no taidd [Gathering Momentum for Modem
Growth], volume 2 of Nihon keizaishi [An Economic History of Japan] (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1989), p.
27.
26 Mikami Rydz6, En no tanjyd [The Birth of the Yen], revised version (T6ky6: T6y6 Keizai Shinp6sha,
1989), pp. 59-63.
27 Shimbo Hiroshi and Sait6 Osamu, "Gaisetsu - 19 seiki e," in Shimbo Hiroshi and Sait6 Osamu, eds.,
Kindai seich5 no taidd [Gathering Momentum for Modem Growth], pp. 26-31.
28 For more details, see Gerald Harriss, "Political Society and the Growth of Government in Late Medieval
England," Past and Present, No. 138 (February 1993), p. 40; and W. M. Ormrod, "England in the Middle
Ages," in Richard Bonney ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, 1200-1815 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999), particularly pp. 27-33.
29 The customs had a ambivalent status as it belonged to the crown's ordinary revenue yet it was a kind of
regular tax. For the importance of domain revenue to the state in the early Tudor, see B. P. Wolffe, The
Crown Lands 1461 to 1536: An Aspect of Yorkist and Early Tudor Government (London: Allen and Unwin,
Only in emergencies such as invasions or foreign wars could the crown ask Parliament
for "extraordinary revenues," which were levied upon both property and income in the
country. As the historian Richard W. Hoyle has emphasized, these extraordinary supplies
were justified by the special obligation of subjects to aid the crown in emergencies and
they were not normal taxes collected annually.30 It is important to note that the crown's
ordinary revenue supported not only the royal household but also the royal government in
providing governance, domestic order, and justice in peaceful times. 3 1 That "the king
should live of his own" is thus a fiscal creed of the domain state in England.
The state in eighteenth-century Japan was an incomplete fiscal state. In sharp contrast to
the unitary system of currency that the shogunate established in Japan, it collected taxes
only in the territories under its direct governance, even though it had the authority and
power to order domain governments to share public expenditures in river works, famine
relief, and national defense. 32 The state in eighteenth-century China was a fiscal state
which received most of its tax revenue from land taxes and the salt tax. The fiscal system
in eighteenth-century China was politically highly centralized, with the Board of Revenue
in the central government supervising the accounts of annual collection and expenditures
1970), p. 25; idem, The Royal Demesne in English History (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971), chapter 1;
Penry Williams, The Tudor Regime (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), p. 58; G. R. Elton, England Under the
Tudors, Third Edition (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 47-57.
30 See the discussion of the fundamental difference between regular taxation and irregular extraordinary
supplies in Richard. W. Hoyle, "Crown, Parliament and Taxation in Sixteenth-Century England," English
Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 434 (November 1994), pp. 1192-6.
31 This lack of institutional distinction between the crown's personal expenses and the costs of civil
government remained unchanged in England until 1830, even after the crown's ordinary revenue was
replaced by the Civil List in 1697. See Basil Chubb, The Control ofPublic Expenditure: Financial
Committees of the House of Commons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), pp. 9-10.
32 Mark Ravina rightly pointed out the incompleteness in extracting tax revenue of the shogunate, but he
underestimates its political authority in ordering daimyos to share the expenditures of the central
government in providing for social policies such as infrastructure and famine relief. See Mark Ravina,
Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 24-28.
created by provincial governments. 33 Unlike the domain state in England, the finances of
the imperial household and of the state were institutionally separated in eighteenth-
century China. Despite different fiscal structures, the actual operation of the fiscal
system in all three cases was decentralized, as a large proportion of state revenue was
assigned for particular purposes without being transferred to the central government. 34
One important condition for the smooth operation of the early modem state with
decentralized fiscal systems is a common paternalistic justification of state power cast in
general moral terms of protecting the subjects' welfare. 35 This was embodied in various
"social policies" such as famine relief, improvement of transportation, maintenance of
water-conservancy, river management and so on. 36 These "social policies" are crucially
important if we are to understand the broader political significance of public finance.
They defined the moral obligation of the state in providing protection for society,
justified the state's revenue extraction, and implanted an element of "public-ness" in
3 For a description of the politically centralized fiscal system after the reforms of the 1720s, see Madeleine
Zelin, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reforms in Eighteenth-Century Ch'ing China (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992).
3 On decentralization in the fiscal operation in sixteenth-century England, see Patrick K. O'Brien and
Philip A. Hunt, "The Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 1485-1815," Historical Research, Vol. 66, No. 160
(June 1993), pp. 141-142. For eighteenth-century Japan, see Oguchi Ytijir6, "Bakufu no zaisei [The public
finance of the shogunate]," in Shimbo Hiroshi and Sait6 Osamu, eds., Kindai seichai no taid6 [Gathering
Momentum for Modern Growth], p. 132. For eighteenth-century China, see Wang Yeh-chien, Land
Taxation in Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 12-18.
3 See the emphasis on the autonomy of the state through legitimating the state power in Quentin Skinner,
"The state," in Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson, eds., Political Innovation and Conceptual
Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 117-118.
36 On the legitimation of state power through government spending to improve societal welfare in early
modern England, see Michael J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, chapter 3; Steve
Hindle, The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1640 (New York: Palgrave, 2000),
chapters 2 and 6. For the case of eighteenth-century Japan, see Oguchi Yijir6, "Bakufu no zaisei," pp.
153-7. For eighteenth-century China, Zelin emphasizes the role of government expenditures to promote
public welfare; see Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate's Tael, p. 304. For famine relief in eighteenth century
China, see Pierre-Etienne Will, Bureaucracy andFamine in Eighteenth-Century China, trans. Elebrg
Forster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990); and Pierre-Etienne Will and R. Bin Wong, Nourish the
People: The State Civilian Granary System in China, 1650-1850 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1991).
government finance. It was upon this moral basis that the central government could
require local governments to share costs, while local governments in turn could make
their case for demanding funds from the center. Nonetheless, this important role of early
modern states in providing public goods has often been neglected by scholars who
consider warfare the driving force behind state-building.37
The state in all three cases provided domestic stability and protected basic property
rights, which were indispensable to the development of a market economy. 38 The legal
protection of property rights does not distinguish the development of the market economy
in early modern England from that in early modern Japan and China. Recent scholarship
has forced us to re-evaluate the degree to which the concept of property rights was
recognized in East Asia and the actualities of economic and legal practice in England.39
The market economy in early modern England itself functioned largely through informal
social networks rather than being coordinated through the formal legal institutions of the
3 For the (over) emphasis on the role of warfare in state building, see Charles Tilly ed., The Formation of
National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); idem, Coercion, Capital,
and European States, 990-1992 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992); Brian Downing, The Military Revolution
and Political Change (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). For the discussion of the roles
that early modem states played in providing social welfare, see Michael J. Braddick, "The Early Modem
English State and the Question of Differentiation, from 1550 to 1770," Comparative Studies in Society and
History, Vol. 38, Issue 1 (January 1996): 92-111; Stephen R. Epstein, "The rise of the West," in John A.
Hall and Ralph Schroeder, eds., An Anatomy ofPower: The Social Theory ofMichael Mann (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 247.
38 Stephen R. Epstein emphasizes that public goods provided by the state such as protection of property
rights, law and order, and defense facilitated economic growth in the early modem period. Stephen R.
Epstein, Freedom and Growth: The Rise of States and Markets in Europe, 1300-1750 (London: Routledge,
2000), p. 9.
39 Neo-institutional economists often consider the role of formal legal institutions the distinctive feature of
the market economy in England. See Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New
York: Norton, 1981), pp. 154-157; idem., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 114-117. For the legal protection of property rights in
China during the Qing dynasty, see Kathryn Bernhardt and Philip C. C. Huang eds., Civil Law in Qing and
Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Philip C. C. Huang, Civil Justice in China:
Representation and Practice in the Qing (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); and Madeleine Zelin,
Jonathan K. Ocko, and Robert Gardella, eds., Contract and Property in Early Modern China (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2004).
state. In the eighteenth century, many English laws were not only imprecise but even
hostile towards common business activities.40 On a practical level, the protection of the
courts was simply beyond the reach of most tradesmen, manufacturers, and retailers. In
this situation, English businessmen "generally resorted to their own informal, cheaper
and more speedy systems of arbitration conducted by trade associations, guilds, chambers
of commerce and other peer groups who applied commercial rules to disputes." And
"English common law did not establish a national hegemony over economic matters until
rather late in the nineteenth century."41 The use of informal social networks to
coordinate economic transactions and settle business disputes on the basis of trust and
reputation is familiar to students of the economic history of early modem China and
Japan. It is thus a mistake to overemphasize the role of the state in creating a market
economy, which is often seen in the school of historical institutionalism. 42
The development of a market economy in England from the sixteenth century onward is
well-known. 4 3 Less recognized are similar developments in eighteenth-century Japan
and China. From a comparative perspective, features of economic societies in
eighteenth-century Japan and China exhibited many surprising similarities with those
40 See the literature review in David Sugarman and G. R. Rubin, "Introduction: Towards A New History of
Law and Material Society in England, 1750-1914," in G. R. Rubin and David Sugarman eds., Law,
Economy and Society, 1750-1914: Essays in the History of English Law (Abingdon, Oxon. : Professional
Books, 1984).
41 Patrick O'Brien, "Central government and the economy, 1688-1815," p. 217 and p. 230.
42 See such examples in Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of
Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 63-65 and 73-76; Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "The Myths of the
Market and the Common History of Late Developers," p. 250; Randall Collins, "Weber's Last Theory of
Capitalism: A Systematization," American Sociological Review 45 (December 1980): 925-942. Max
Weber is ambivalent on the role of state's formal laws in the development of capitalism. See the discussion
of this point in Roger Cotterrell, "The Development of Capitalism and the Formation of Contract Law," in
Bob Fryer, Alan Hunt, Doreen McBarnet and Bert Moorhouse, eds., Law, State and Society (London:
Croom Helm, 1981).
43 John Hicks, A Theory ofEconomic History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
seen in early eighteenth-century England. These included increasing commercialization
of agricultural production; proto-industrialization in the economic core areas (the Lower
Yangzi Delta in China and the Kinai region in Japan); the expansion of the urban
economy; the growth of inter-regional long-distance trading of staple goods such as
grain, cotton cloth, silk, and so on, which gave birth to a unified national market and
further stimulated regional division of labor; de facto labor mobility; and the rise of
businessmen and entrepreneurs whose money-making activities were seen as morally
legitimate.44 The consolidation of a market economy in the three societies prepared two
necessary conditions for the rise of a modem fiscal state. One is a sophisticated private
financial network connecting major cities and market towns which was able to transfer
money across time and space with speedy credit instruments such as bills of exchange. 45
This constituted an important domestic pool from which state actors could draw useful
ideas, financial techniques, and even advisors when they tried to mobilize more financial
44 For a discussion of the development of a market economy in China in the eighteenth century, see
Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), chapters 1 and 2; R. Bin Wong, China Transformed:
Historical Change and the Limits ofEuropean Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 13-
43; Wu Chengming, Zhongguo zibenzhuyi yu guonei shichang [Capitalism and the Domestic Market in
China] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1985), particularly pp. 217-46 and pp. 247-65; and Li
Bozhong, "Zhongguo quanguo shichang de xingcheng: 1500-1800 [Emergence of a national market in
China, 1500-1800]," Qinghua daxue xuebao, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1999): 48-54. For Japan, see Thomas C.
Smith, Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization, 1750-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1988); Edward E. Pratt, Japan's Protoindustrial Elite: The Economic Foundations of the Gono
(Cambridge: The Harvard University Asia Center, 1999); David L. Howell, Capitalism From Within:
Economy, Society and the State in a Japanese Fishery (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995);
Hayami Akira and Miyamoto Matao, eds., Keizai shakai no seiritsu: 17 1h_]'th seiki [The Formation of an
Economic Society: seventeenth and eighteenth centuries], volume 1 in Nihon keizaishi [An Economic
History of Japan] (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1988).
45 The financial networks in seventeenth-century England were mostly concentrated in London. In
eighteenth-century Japan, the dense financial networks centered on Osaka and extended mainly to Kyoto
and Edo. In China, the Shanxi bankers had established financial networks which connected 24 major cities
and market towns in China by the 1850s. See Eric Kerridge, Trade and Banking in Early Modern England
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988); Y. Shikano, "Edo-ki Osaka ni okeru ry6gaesh6 no kinyi
kind o megutte [On the financial functions of the moneychangers in Osaka in the Edo period]," Keizaigaku
ronso, Vol. 52, No. 2 (December 2000), pp. 237-41; Huang Jianhui, Shanxi piaohaoshi [A History of
Shanxi Bankers], revised version (Taiyuan: Shanxi jingji chupanshe, 2002), pp. 137-150.
resources using tax revenue. The other is a large commercialized sector in the economy
which constituted an important potential base for the state to tap indirect taxes on
domestic consumption. 46
The three cases also illustrate that the institutions of public finance do not necessarily
develop in tune with the market economy. In particular, the old state had little
institutional ability to deal with new problems that accompanied the development of a
market economy. For example, the price revolution in England between the 1450s and
1650s and in Japan between the 1820s and 1860s, and in China throughout the eighteenth
century severely eroded the fiscal bases of their respective governments. 47 The situation
in China was a bit special it encountered a prolonged deflation between the 1820s and
1850s when opium smuggling and reduction in China's exports to Europe greatly reduced
China's domestic silver stocks. The severe domestic deflation led to widespread tax
arrears and unemployment. 48
46 According to Saito Osamu's estimation, non-agricultural sectors (commerce, finance, service, and so on)
accounted for about 50 percent of the GDP of Japan in the 1860s. See Sait6 Osamu, "Bakumatsu-ishin no
seiji sanjutsu [Political arithmetic and Japan in late Tokugawa and early Meiji Restoration]," in the Society
of Modern Japan eds., Meii ishin no kakushin to renzoku [The Innovation and Continuity of the Meiji
Restoration], volume 14 of Nenpo kindai Nihon kenkyal (T6ky6: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 1992), p. 278. In
Wu Chengming's estimation, the total value of major commodities transacted in the national market in
China around 1840 amounted to 387million tael of silver. See Wu Chengming, Zhongguo zibenzhuyiyu
guonei shichang [Capitalism and the domestic market in China], p. 251.
47 For the price revolution in England between 1450 and 1649, see the overall review of the price revolution
in England in C. G. A. Clay, Economic Expansion and Social Change: England 1500-1700, volume I
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), chapter 2. For the upward trend in prices in Japan,
particularly after the 1820s, see Shimbo Hiroshi, Kinsei no bukka to keizai hatten: zenk5gyo shakai e no
sairy5teki no sekkin [Prices in the Early Modern Period and Economic Development: A Quantitative
Approach toward a Preindustrial Society] (T6ky6: Toy6 Keizai Shinp6sha, 1978). For the slow yet steady
price rise in eighteenth-century China, see Wang Yeh-chien, "Secular Trends of Rice Prices in the Yangzi
Delta, 1638-1935," in Thomas G. Rawski and Lillian M. Li, eds., Chinese History in Economic Perspective
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992): 35-68.
48 See a description of this deflation in Lin Man-houng, China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and
Ideologies, 1801-1856 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2006), chapter 3.
Insufficient government income seriously weakened the institutional basis of the
autonomy and capacity of the state in all the three countries. 49 The already difficult fiscal
conditions were greatly exacerbated by new challenges from abroad requiring increased
military expenditures. In this situation, seemingly minor occurrences may end up
producing huge political upheavals when the state lacks the necessary financial resources
to deal with emergent situations. It is thus not coincidental that big political events took
place as the states became financially exhausted: the outbreak of the English Civil Wars
in 1642, the collapse of the Tokugawa regime in the Meiji Restoration of 1868, and the
beginning of the Taiping Rebellion in China in 1850 (perhaps the largest civil war in
world history). This explains the choice of the starting year for each case. In this sense,
the emergence of (or failed emergence) of a modern fiscal state is not a process of
building a state from scratch, but rather a transformation in the institutions of public
finance in an already well-established state in such a way that a new institutional basis for
state the autonomy and capacity, and a new kind of state-economy relationship, emerges.
In each episode, state actors faced the same problems: how to increase revenue with low
administrative and political costs so as to contain challenges from within and without. As
they searched for new methods and institutions in public finance so as to rebuild the
state's autonomy and capacity, they conducted many similar experiments in public
finance. They tried to raise credit in the markets, to collect domestic consumption taxes,
to issue paper money, to seek collaboration from private financiers, etc. They also made
49 For the importance of institutions of public finance to the autonomy and capacity of the state, see Theda
Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Peter B. Evans,
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985); Michael Mann, The Sources ofSocial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986).
similar mistakes, which led to huge discounts of state credit instruments in the market. In
each process of institutional experimentation in public finance, we also observe intensive
interactions between the state actors and private financiers. State actors tried to use the
current tax revenue to mobilize more financial resources from the market, both domestic
and foreign. Moreover, the most powerful private financiers all had close connections
with government (or with certain factions in government). This phenomenon of
influential political merchants (zhengshang in Chinese and seisha in Japanese) in public
finance is universal, in spite of their distinctive political traditions and cultures.
The end results and sequences of institutional transformation in the three cases are
different, however. England first transformed from a domain state into a fiscal state in
the late 1640s and the fiscal state had been firmly established in the 1650s. 50 A
centralized bureaucracy to collect the customs and excises on liquor had been established
in 1672 and 1683 respectively. After the Glorious Revolution in 1688, England entered
into consecutive expensive wars with France in the so-called Second Hundred Years War
(1689-1815). In order to fund the growing military expenditures after 1689, the English
state mainly depended upon borrowing, though the option of issuing paper notes was
brought up in the early 1690s. After 1713, the English government began to convert its
remaining unfunded short-term debts into funded long-term debts and try to reduce the
interest rates of its funded long-term borrowing . The modern fiscal state emerged in the
50 For the emphasis on the importance of the Civil Wars to the rise of fiscal state in England, see Patrick K.
O'Brien, "Fiscal Exceptionalism: Great Britain and its European rivals from Civil War to triumph at
Tranfalgar and Waterloo," in Donald Winch and Patrick K. O'Brien eds., The Political Economy ofBritish
Historical Experience, 1688-1914 (Oxford: Published for The British Academy by Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 246; Michael J. Braddick, The Nerves of State: Taxation and the Financing of the English
State, 1558-1714 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 16.
1720s when the perpetual redeemable annuities came to dominate government
borrowing. The receipts from the customs and excises collected by the centralized
bureaucracy were used to make prompt and regular interest payments on these long-term
borrowings. By the 1750s, the new institutions of modern fiscal state had been
consolidated.
In contrast to England's dependence upon short-term financing prior to the establishment
of a modem fiscal state, the new Japanese government formed in 1868 depended heavily
on de facto inconvertible paper notes to meet government spending. From the late 1870s
onward, it began to turn to indirect taxes rather than the land tax to increase revenue.
Due to the unequal treaties imposed by Western powers, which set the level of customs
duties at 5 percent, the option to increase revenue through raising the customs duties was
not available. Given this restriction, the government tried hard to extract revenues from
taxes levied on major consumption goods such as sake, liquor, tobacco, soy sauce, etc.
The modem fiscal state emerged in Japan in the mid-i 880s when the new institutions of
public finance enabled the government to stabilize the value of paper money issued by
the Bank of Japan. The centrally collected tax revenue was vital to sustain the
creditworthiness of the Bank of Japan. The modern fiscal state was consolidated in Japan
by 1895.
In contrast, China shows why institutional experiments and developments in public
finance do not necessarily lead to transformation into a modern fiscal state. Although the
Chinese government issued paper notes between 1853 and 1863 to meet government
spending in repressing the Taiping Rebellion, this monetary experiment failed to have
much impact on institutional development. Nevertheless, there were significant changes
in the institutions of public finance in China after the 1860s. As in England and Japan,
the receipts from the customs and the domestic consumption tax (the lijin duty collected
from wholesalers) became the major pillar of government finance. Nevertheless, fiscal
operations remained decentralized, with a large number of specific sources of revenue
being assigned by the central government directly for particular purposes without being
transmitted to Beijing. Thus the central government never gained the institutional ability
to use its tax revenue in an aggregated way to mobilize financial resources. A discernible
trend toward a modern fiscal state did not appear until 1895. It was disrupted by the
Boxer Incident in 1899. The resulting indemnities financially broke the state, which
finally collapsed in 1911.
IV. The modern fiscal state in the mirrors of England, Japan, and China
Having outlined the case for the comparability of England, Japan, and China in economy
and state formation, I now attempt to demonstrate briefly how a comparative approach
allows us to isolate the crucial feature of the modern fiscal state. This is the institutional
linkage between the state's centrally collected revenue and its long-term involvement in
the financial markets. Its importance to state capacity and autonomy becomes apparent
when we compare China with England and Japan. Moreover, the three cases examined
here - two successes and one failure - also illustrate that there may be more than one
path toward the modern fiscal state.
Let us first turn to the case of England. The discovery by recent scholarship of a "strong
state" with an efficient tax bureaucracy overthrows the old view of the eighteenth-century
English state as an amateurish laissez-faire state which had an underdeveloped
bureaucracy and which depended upon decentralized local governance by the gentry.5
The well-known "financial revolution" in eighteenth-century England, which allowed the
government to take on huge sums of long-term debt for the prosecution of wars, was in
the past often attributed to its developed market economy.52 Thanks to the work of Peter
Mathias, Patrick O'Brien, John Brewer, and other historians, we now have a better
understanding of the part played by taxation in this financial revolution. The
creditworthiness of the English government was based upon a surprising ability to extract
tax revenue from the economy, which made eighteenth-century England one of the most
heavily taxed countries in the world. The contemporary fiscal system was highly
centralized as local taxes accounted for only 10 percent of the levies of central
government before the 1770s.f The composition of English tax revenue underwent
significant change over the course of the century as it came to rely more and more on
5 The image of eighteenth-century English administration as a decentralized gentry-administration which
did not have a large state apparatus can be found in Max Weber, Economy and Society, volume II
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 1061-1064. For more recent examples, see Gabriel
Ardent, "Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations," in Charles Tilly ed.,
The Formation ofNational States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 196;
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, p. 159; Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital:
Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,
1996), p. 22.
52 The level of debt of the English government rose from almost nothing in 1688 to E16.7 million by 1697,
£76 million by 1748, and E245 million by 1783. See John Brewer, The Sinews ofPower: War, Money and
the English State 1688-1783 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), p. 114.
5 Peter Mathias and PatricK. O'Brien, "Taxation in Britain and France, 1715-1810: A Comparison of the
Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the Central Governments," Journal ofEuropean
Economic History, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1976): 601-50; Patrick K. O'Brien, "The political economy of British
taxation, 1660-1815," Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1988): 1-32.
5 Peter Mathias, "Taxation and industrialization in Britain," in Peter Mathias, The Transformation of
England: Essays in the Economic and Social History of England in the Eighteenth Century (London:
Methuen, 1979), p. 117.
indirect taxes. The receipts from the customs and excises accounted for 70-80 percent of
the total government annual income for most of this time. In particular, the proportion of
revenues from excises in the total revenue rose from 26 percent in 1696-1700 to 36
percent in 1711-1715 and to 51 percent in 1751-5."
As Patrick K. O'Brien has pointed out, the vast expansion of receipts from indirect taxes
was not only a result of the expansion of the economy but also a consequence of an
administrative revolution in public finance.56 John Brewer further demonstrates that the
establishment of a highly centralized bureaucracy staffed by salaried officers gave the
English state an institutional ability to collect elastic and reliable revenues from the
indirect customs and excises. In particular, Brewer points out that the Excise
Department, the biggest department in government during this period, approximated the
Weberian ideal type of rational bureaucracy.5 7
The Excise Department played exactly the role that Max Weber expects a rational
administrative bureaucracy to play in the development of capitalism, i.e., reliability and
predictability in administration. In contrast to the bureaucracy in Prussia which
5 Cited from Table 2 in J. V. Beckett, "Land Tax or Excise: the levying of taxation in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century England," English Historical Review, Vol. 100, No. 395 (April 1985), p. 306.
56 For example, the excises and stamp duties increased from £0.4 million in 1685 to £2.8 million in 1720
while the estimated national income (at current prices) increased only from £41.76 million in 1680 to
£53.92 million in 1720. See Patrick K. O'Brien, "The political economy of British taxation, 1660-1815,"
Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1988), p. 3 and p. 9.
5 Relevant characteristics included: recruitment by examination, professional training, meticulous
bookkeeping, centralized supervision based upon standardized bureaucratic procedures for the assessment
and collection of excises, and promotion on the basis of seniority. Brewer, The Sinews ofPower, p. 68.
58 For Weber's discussion of the contribution of rational bureaucracy, see Max Weber, Economy and
Society, volume II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 974-975 and pp. 1393-1394. Had
Weber known more about the Excise Department in eighteenth-century England, he might have
incorporated it into his theory of capitalism. The Excise Department has also been neglected by Bernard S.
Silberman, who traces the beginning of a rationalized bureaucracy in England to around 1790. See Bernard
managed state enterprises for fiscal revenue, the centralized bureaucracy in eighteenth-
century England specialized in collecting indirect customs and excises. As Brewer has
emphasized, the receipts from the customs and excises, particularly from the highly
efficient Excise Department, enabled the English government to make regular interest
payments on the issued stocks of perpetual annuities. This was vital to the success of the
perpetual annuity which dominated the English government's borrowings after the 1740s.
In comparison, the collection of the land tax was firmly controlled by land owners
themselves. As a result, underestimation and evasion in the collection of the land tax
were widespread. Moreover, the local gentry who collected the land tax often retained
the money for one or two years before sending it to the central government.59
The success of the eighteenth-century English state in extracting the indirect customs and
excises and its remarkable abilities to mobilize financial resources provided a solid
institutional basis for state capacity and autonomy. In possession of a centralized
bureaucracy whose agents collected the vast majority of tax revenue, the government
enjoyed more autonomy than did those states which could only depend upon local powers
for revenue collection. With a relatively diversified tax base consisting of the direct land
tax and indirect customs and excises, the English state was more autonomous than those
states which relied upon a single source of taxation. Perhaps most importantly, by using
S. Silberman, Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and
Great Britain (Chicago: The University Press of Chicago, 1993), p. 7 and chapters 10-12.
59 For the underassessment and evasion of the land tax, see W. R. Ward, The English Land Tax in the
Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), particularly section II. For the local gentry's
use of the collected revenue from the land tax to set up country banks, invest in projects such as canals and
turnpike trusts, or simply earn interest, see L. S. Pressnell, "Public Monies and the Development of English
Banking," Economic History Review, Vol. 5, Issue 3 (1953), pp. 378-97. For the political considerations
behind the central government's tolerant attitude to mismanagement of the land tax, see Colin Brooks,
"Public finance and political stability: the administration of the land tax, 1688-1720," Historical Journal,
Vol. 17, No. 2 (1974): 281-300.
the tax revenues to secure the stocks of perpetual annuity which the state issued to the
investing public, the English state was autonomous vis-a-vis big financiers. This
autonomy was impressive; as the English government was able to reduce the interest
rates of its issued redeemable perpetual annuities from over 6 percent in 1717 to 3
percent by 1752. From the 1740s on, it mainly used the stocks of perpetual annuities to
raise long-term loans from the public, although the Bank of England was entrusted to
manage state annuities. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the centralized
customs and excise bureaucracy became civil service departments in government, which
reflected another aspect of the autonomy of the state.60
How shall we characterize the institutional development in public finance in eighteenth-
century England? The term "fiscal-military state" coined by Brewer nicely captures the
close interactions between the institutional development of public finance in the
eighteenth-century English state and the many expensive wars that it fought from 1689 to
1815. Nevertheless, this concept concentrates mainly on the use of the state's fiscal
resources and does not directly address the institutional feature of the state's public
finance. In regard to this, Brewer does point out the remarkably centralized fiscal system
which appeared in the late seventeenth century. According to Brewer, the Treasury
managed both receipts and disbursements of all government departments in this
centralized fiscal system, which distinguished the English state from other European
states by its institutional ability to "keep full accounts of total government revenue and
expenditure." 6'
60 3rewer, The Sinews ofPower, chapter 3.
61 Brewer, The Sinews ofPower, p. 129.
However, Brewer overestimates the degree of centralization in the management of
government spending in eighteenth-century England, which was much lower than in the
collection of the customs and excises. For example, the Treasury before the mid-
eighteenth century did not have access to itemized information on expenditures of the
army and navy, the two biggest spending departments, and could only approve the
estimates of the sum of expenditures required by them. 62 Fully centralization in the
Treasury's management of government expenditures was not realized until the second
half of the nineteenth century when government departments uniformly adopted double-
entry bookkeeping. 63 By contrast, collection of excises was extraordinarily centralized,
as the accounts and records of excise officers all over England had to be sent to London
for regular scrutiny.64 The centralized management of the Excise Department is thus the
exception rather than the rule in the English state in the eighteenth century.
Patrick K. O'Brien and Philip A. Hunt describe these changes after the 1640s as "the rise
of a fiscal state" and they highlight the growing importance of domestic tax revenue in
the English government's income since the mid-sixteenth century. 65 However, the term
of "fiscal state" by its definition can neither capture the special institutional developments
in public finance from the 171 Os onward nor distinguish it from fiscal states in other parts
of the world, such as in eighteenth-century China where the state rested upon tax
62 J. E. D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, 1774-92 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958), p. 140
and p. 151.
63 Henry Roseveare, The Treasury 1660-1870: The Foundations of Control (London: Allen & Unwin,
1973), pp. 71-4.
64 Brewer, The Sinews ofPower, pp. 102-111.
65 Patrick K. O'Brien and Philip A. Hunt, "England, 1485-1815," in Richard Bonney ed., The Rise of the
Fiscal State in Europe, 1200-1815 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
revenues. As O'Brien and Hunt have pointed out, the powerful English state from 1720s
onward greatly benefited from two interrelated fiscal developments, i.e., the highly
centralized bureaucracy to collect increasing indirect tax revenues from the customs and
excise, which service the regular interest payments of the market-based system of
permanent debt of the state.66 This characterization makes the fiscal state in eighteenth-
century England a modem one which distinguishes it from a traditional fiscal state
bearing no perpetual liabilities.
I argue that the concept of the modem fiscal state is more important for understanding the
general institutional features of the eighteenth-century English state than is the particular
use of state revenues for military purposes. This new kind of state emerged during the
1730s when the institutional linkage between the revenue collected by the centralized
bureaucracy and the interest payments on the English government long-term debt under
the management of financial institutions such as the Bank of England became firmly
established. The institutions of the modem fiscal state enabled the English government to
mobilize necessary financial resources to afford expensive wars, in spite of widespread
waste and corruption in government spending, especially in the army and navy.67 More
importantly, recognizing the central institutional feature of the modem fiscal state makes
it easier to put the eighteenth-century English state, which emerged in a very special
historical context characterized by successive conflicts and the enormous expansion of
66 Ibid., p. 65.
67 For details about the extensive venality and corruption in eighteenth-century British Navy, see Daniel A.
Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1965), particularly chapters 8 and 9. Systematic reforms to clear government corruption did not begin until
the nineteenth century. For these reforms, see Philip Harling and Peter Mandler, "From 'Fiscal-military'
State to Laissez-faire State, 1760-1850," Journal ofBritish Studies, 32 (January 1993): 44-70; Philip
Harling, The Waning of "Old Corruption": The Politics of Economic Reform in Britain, 1779-1846
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
the Atlantic trade, into a broader comparative perspective. For example, the Japanese
state in the mid-i 880s had developed into a modem fiscal state even though it had not
fought any large-scale international wars and was in a marginal position in the global
trade and capital markets of the time. In contrast to the long-term borrowing of the
eighteen-century English state, the Meiji government's permanent liabilities were
embodied in the convertible paper notes.
Political economists of late development have focused on the direct means that the
Japanese state used in this period to promote modem industrial development. Japan has
often been held up as the perfect example of state-led economic growth. 68 However,
mismanagement and inefficiency in the new government's direct investments in
industrial projects is now well-known. 69 It is now widely accepted that the establishment
of the Bank of Japan in 1882 and its importance in stabilizing the value of paper money
and curbing a severe inflation between 1878 and 1881 was more important to Japan's
economic modernization than the government's direct industrial investment. 70 The stable
68 See for example the description of the role of the state in Japan's industrial development in G. C. Allen,
A Short Economic History ofModern Japan (London: Macmillan, 1981).69 For an empirical study of the mismanagement of these state-owned enterprises, see Yamamura Kozo,
"Entrepreneurship, ownership, and management in Japan," in Peter Mathias and M. M. Postan eds., The
Cambridge Economic History of Europe, volume VII, The Industrial Economies Capital, Labour, and
Enterprise, Part 2, The United States, Japan, and Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),
pp. 226-230; Takamura Naosuke, Nihon bosekigydshijosetsu (j6) [Introduction to the History of the
Japanese Textile Industry - 1] (T6ky6: Hanawa Shob5, 1972); S. McCallion, "Trial and error: the model
filature at Tomioka," in W. Wray ed., Managing Industrial Enterprise, Casesfrom Japan 's Prewar
Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).
70 The period between 1885 and 1890 witnessed the first economic boom in Meiji Japan as both the number
of corporations and the paid-up capital doubled. See Nakamura Takafusa, "Makuro keizai to sengo keiei
[Macroeconomy and post-war management]," in Nishikawa Shunsaku and Yamamoto Ydzo, eds.,
Sangy5ka nojidai (ge) [The Age of Industrialization: Part 2], volume 5 in Nihon keizaishi [An Economic
History of Japan] (Toky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), p. 10. For the importance of the financial reforms in the
early 1880s, see Richard Sylla, "Financial Systems and Economic Modernization," Journal ofEconomic
History, Vol. 62, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 277-92; Henry Rosovsky, "Japan's Transition to Modem
Economic Growth, 1868-1885," in Henry Rosovsky ed., Industrialization in Two Systems: Essays in Honor
ofAlexander Gerschenkron (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).
macroeconomic environment that the Bank of Japan helped create in the second half of
the 1880s facilitated the transfer of idle money from non-agricultural sectors (commerce,
service, finance, etc.) into industrial development; it was these funds which were the
main source for industrial investment in Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.71
Centralized tax collection was crucial to sustain the Bank of Japan. While England in the
1750s consolidated the modem fiscal state by using tax revenues as security for long-
term loans, Japan established a modem fiscal state in the late 1880s by employing tax
revenues to safeguard the value of banknotes issued by the Bank of Japan, the legal
tender. The government channeled the centrally collected tax revenues into the reserves
of the Bank of Japan and granted it a monopoly in note-issuing, which was the most
important business of the Bank in its early stages. The fiscal system in Japan in the mid-
1880s was highly centralized, as all the collected revenue was at the disposal of the
central government. The transfer of collected tax revenue had previously been made
through bills of exchange. After 1882, the central government even required officials to
use telegraphs to send the bills of collected tax revenue to Tokyo. 72 Centralized fiscal
system helped the Bank of Japan gradually establish corresponding relationships with
other national or private commercial banks and thus fulfill the function of the central
bank in the Japanese economy in the late 1890s.
71 For the contribution of non-agricultural wealth to industrial investment in Meiji Japan, see Teranishi
J6r, "Kinyad no kindaika to sangy6ka [The modernization of finance and industrialization]," in Nishikawa
Shunsaku and Yamamoto Yuz6, eds., Sangyjka nojidai (ge) [The Age of Industrialization: Part 2], p. 63.
72 Muroyama Yoshimasa, Kindai Nihon no gunji to zaisei [The Military and Public Finance in Early
Modern Japan] (T6ky6: T6ky6 Daigaku Shuppankai, 1984), p. 68.
In terms of the composition of government tax revenue, the shift to increasing reliance
upon indirect consumption taxes, particularly the taxes levied upon sake and liquor, was
quite noticeable. The revenue from duties levied upon the production of sake and liquor
(shuzozei) rose from 12.3 percent of the annual total tax revenue in 1878 to 26.4 percent
in 1888. In 1899, this percentage reached 38.8 percent (49 million Yen), which for the
first time exceeded the land tax (35.6 percent, or 45 million Yen).73 This dramatic
increase within two decades resulted more from improved collection rather than the
expansion of domestic consumption. As with the excise collection in England, the duties
levied upon sake and liquor in Japan were collected by the bureaucrats of the Ministry of
Finance.74 From 1891 to 1895, debates in the newly established Japanese parliament, the
Diet, turned mainly on the purpose of the newly established institutions of the modern
fiscal state: were they to be used to collect funds for military expansion or to promote
domestic welfare and local infrastructure?75
The establishment of the modern fiscal state in Japan in the period between 1886 and
1895 was a great institutional achievement as it successfully attained the convertibility to
silver of the banknotes issued by the Bank of Japan and thus safeguarded their value as
the legal tender in the domestic economy. Moreover, it had a great impact on the
7 Cited from Fujiwara Takao, Kindai Nihon shuzogydshi [A History of Sake Brewing in Modem Japan]
(Kyoto: Mineruva Shob6, 1999), p. 2. For a discussion of the rising importance of indirect taxes in Japan
after 1868, see Hayashi Takehisa, Nihon ni okeru sozei kokka no seiritsu [The Formation of the Tax State
in Japan] (T6ky6: T6ky6 Daigaku Shuppankai, 1965).
14 Ibid., pp. 101-108.
75 The liberals in Japan advocated a "reduction of the tax burden on the people" (minryoku kyiyo) and
opposed the government's agenda of "rich state, strong army" (fukoku ky5hei). In particular, they
demanded the reduction of military expenditures and an increase in government spending on local
infrastructure. See Banno Junji, "Meiji kokka no seiritsu [The establishment of the Meiji state]," in
Umemura Mataji and Yamamoto Ynz6, eds., Kaik5 to ishin [The Opening of Japan and the Restoration],
volume 3 in Nihon keizaishi [An Economic History of Japan] (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1989), pp. 102-5.
government's ability to influence the economy and to achieve its goals. Although the
total government expenditures between 1888 and 1892 accounted for only 7.9 percent of
GNP, the Japanese government could play an indirect yet effective role to foster
industrial investment. 76 For example, even though the over-heated economy, particularly
the boom in the formation of join-stock companies in the late 1880s, led to a severe
financial panic in 1890, the Bank of Japan continued to discount bills issued by banks
which accepted the shares of major railway companies as security. This policy greatly
encouraged investment and capital formation in railway construction.77 Moreover, the
new institutions of a modem fiscal state improved the Japanese government's
creditworthiness. In addition to the state liability in the form of banknotes issued by the
Bank of Japan, the Japanese government in 1886 successfully issued a long-term Navy
Bond ofY17 million with an annual interest of 5 percent in the domestic market to
modernize the Japanese navy. 78
In a negative way, China shows the importance of building a modern fiscal state. China
had been ruled by traditional fiscal states which rested upon tax revenues rather than
royal estates since perhaps the tenth century. In the eighteenth century, the government
collected up to 80 percent of its tax revenue in silver. Yet the fiscal state remained
persistent in China. Despite its long experience with tax institutions, it did not transform
76 This was quite low as compared with 16.2 percent in France, 13.2 percent in Italy, and 12.5 percent in
Sweden in the same period. Cited from Yasukichi Yasuba, "Did Japan Ever Suffer from a Shortage of
Natural Resources Before World War II?" Journal ofEconomic History, Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 1996),
549.
Ishii Kanji, "Japan," in Rando Cameron and V. I. Bovykin, eds., International Banking: 1870-1914 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 226.
78 Muroyama Yoshimasa, Kindai Nihon no gunji to zaisei [Public Finance and the Military in Modem
Japan], pp. 133-134.
into a modem fiscal state. In order to have a better sense of this puzzle, let us review
some important fiscal developments in nineteenth-century China.
Although there was no alteration in the government ruling China between 1850 and 1911,
as occurred in England and Japan, significant changes happened in public finance. Many
of these paralleled the developments in England and Japan. First, the average annual tax
revenue of the Qing government more than doubled from some 40 million tael in the
1830s to about 90 million tael in the early 1890s as a result of expansion in both domestic
and international trade after the 1860s. Second, the composition of the state tax revenue
became more diversified. While the percentage of the receipts from land taxes in
government annual income dropped from more than 70 percent in the 1840s to some 40
percent in the 1880s and 1890s, the receipts from the indirect taxes such as customs, the
domestic consumption tax (lijin duties), and the salt tax grew to some 50 percent over the
same period. 9
As in both England and Japan, the method to transmit government tax revenue became
more reliant upon the use of bills of exchange, which were first introduced into state
fiscal operations in the 1860s. In the period between 1875 and 1893, about one-third of
the tax revenues which the central government ordered sent to Beijing were transmitted
by private bankers through bills of exchange. 8 The vast majority of tax revenues sent to
Beijing from the provinces of Sichuan, Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang, and from the
79 Zhou Yumin, Wan Qing caizheng yu shehui bianqian [Public Finance and Social Change in the Late
Qing](Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2000), p. 239, table 4-3.
80 Song Huizhong, "Piaoshang yu wanqing caizheng [Shanxi Bankers and Public Finance in Late Qing]," in
Caizhengyujindaishi lunwenji (shangce) [Collected Papers on Public Finance and the Early Modern
History: Part 1] (Taipei: Academic Sinica, 1999), p. 402.
customs offices in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangdong, were also transmitted by private
bankers through bills of exchange.81 The inter-provincial transfer of official funds under
the supervision of the central government also depended upon private bankers. In both
England and Japan, the use of speedy bills of exchange to transfer government tax
revenue was crucially important for the government to centralize the management of its
annual income. And centralization in tax collection was one key step toward the building
of the modern fiscal state.
Moreover, the customs and the liin duty were collected by salaried staffs. Under the
management of western officials employed by the Qing government, the Imperial
Maritime Customs became a highly centralized and efficient bureaucracy in collecting
the customs revenue.82 Meanwhile, most of the officials who collected the liin duty in
nineteenth-century China were expectant-officials (houbu guanyuan). The Board of
Revenue in Beijing required every provincial government to send the name list of
collecting officials in each collection station and report on their performance twice a year.
Official-candidates who collected liin duties were subject to the rules of formal officials.
For example, they were not allowed to serve in their birth-places, and good performance
in tax collection gave them priority for promotion in the bureaucratic system. 83 This was
similar to the basic principles in the management of the Excise Department in eighteenth-
century England.
81 Ibid., pp. 401-402.
82 It is important to note that the western officials in the Imperial Maritime Customs were only collecting
agents, who had no power or authority to decide the spending of the collected customs revenue. On this
point, I benefit from discussing with Ren Zhiyong at Beijing University.
83 For the importance of salaried officials in the collection of lijin, see Susan Mann, Local Merchants and
the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750-1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 104; Luo Yudong,
Zhongguo liinshi [A History of Lijin in China] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936), pp. 84-5. I will
talk about the management of lijin collection in detail in chapter 7.
Like in England, some 77 percent of the government's short-term foreign loans between
the 1860s and 1880s were used for military purposes, all secured by the tax revenue from
the customs and ijin duties.84 Estimated at 44 million tael of silver, this was a
substantial amount. The revenues collected from indirect liin duties and the customs,
along with these short-term loans, were vital to support the building of a western-style
navy and to fund the expensive expeditions to re-conquest Xinjiang in the period between
1873 and 1883 and the conflicts on both land and sea with France in the Sino-French War
in 1884-1885.
Looking back on these three cases, we can see that recognizing the institutional
characteristics of a modern fiscal state sheds new light on the study of state capacity.
Scholars who study this issue in the third world through the lens of state extraction of
revenues from the economy often focus on the land tax rather than looking at indirect
taxes such as consumption taxes. 85 Overemphasizing the land tax leads many scholars to
measure state capacity by its ability to penetrate into the village or sub-village level so as
to extract more revenues from the land tax or otherwise from the peasants.86 We need to
reconsider this approach, especially when we deal with an economy which has already
84 Zhou Yumin, Wan Qing caizheng yu shehui bianqian [Public Finance and Social Change in the Late
Qing], pp. 282-83.
85 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the
Third World (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), chapter 2.
86 This neglect of the commercial sectors as an important source for the state to tap revenues so as to
strengthen state capacity is particularly strong in the study of state transformation in China and Japan in the
late nineteenth century. For example, Thomas C. Smith attributed Japan's success to effective local
governance at the village level dating from in the Tokugawa period, particularly in the collection of land
taxes. See Thomas C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins ofModern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1959). For China, see the measurement of state power by its ability to penetrate into rural areas in
Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1988); Philip A. Kuhn, Origins of the Modern Chinese State (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2002), chapter 3.
developed large commercial sectors and financial networks such as Japan and China in
the nineteenth century.
In eighteenth-century England, and in Japan and China in the second half of the
nineteenth century, indirect consumption taxes proved more important than the land tax
for state actors to raise revenue. Accordingly, state power and capacity in these and
similar societies should be judged by the state's institutional ability to collect indirect
consumption taxes. Moreover, the receipts from consumption taxes also supported the
state's autonomy in the international arena as they came from domestic consumption.
This domestic source to increase tax revenue was particularly important to Japan and
China, two countries that had lost the sovereign power to raise government income
through raising customs rates. Furthermore, the use of tax revenue to mobilize financial
resources even just from the domestic market is far more effective in enhancing state
capacity than is direct extraction from peasants, as illustrated by the case of Japan.
Nevertheless, a puzzle arises when comparing the absence of the modern fiscal state in
China with its rise in England and Japan. In China, reliance upon indirect taxes for
raising revenues and the extensive employment of bills of exchange to transfer tax
revenue did not prompt centralization in collection. Instead, the fiscal operation
remained to a significant degree decentralized, as specific items of revenue collected in
various provinces were directly assigned by the central government for particular
purposes without being transferred to Beijing. In contrast to England and Japan, where
the state began to use its current revenue to raise long-term credits in the financial
markets, the Qing government prior to 1895 always paid back its short-term borrowing
when the emergency was over. Had the Qing government used its current tax revenue,
even just the elastic revenue from consumption taxes and the customs, to either raise
long-term loans or establish a central bank, modern China history might have been
different. Any explanation for the lack of the modern fiscal, state in China by 1911 must
address simultaneously two different yet closely related questions: the important
institutional changes that had already happened in public finance and the absence of the
institutional linkage between tax revenues and the state's long-term involvement in the
financial markets.
V. The issue: how to explain the rise of the modern fiscal state?
How shall we explain the rise of a modern fiscal state in England and Japan but not in
China? Some alternative explanations can be excluded at the very beginning. As the
modern fiscal state is characterized by the institutional linkage between a centralized tax
collection and the state's long-term liabilities secured by tax revenues, the relative size of
tax revenue and state liabilities does not matter. In other words, what matters is not the
absolute scale of the state's tax revenue but whether the state actors use its revenues,
particularly those extracted from the indirect consumption taxes and customs, to
institutionally secure the state's long-term liabilities in the financial markets.
This greatly simplifies a comparative study of three countries in quite different
circumstances. For example, the territorial size of China is not an insurmountable
obstacle to building a modern fiscal state because private financial networks had
connected all the major cities and market towns in China in the second half of the
nineteenth century. They transferred huge sums of money regularly, including a large
proportion of government tax revenues. Meanwhile, the ongoing debates about the "real"
scale of domestic consumption and trade in nineteenth-century China are not relevant,
because, as I will show later, China would have become a modem fiscal state had it
centralized its current rather than "potential" tax revenues to mobilize long-term financial
resources in the markets.
Different sequences are possible in building a modem fiscal state. Early development as
a traditional fiscal state seems to give no advantage in making the transition to a modem
fiscal state, as we can see by comparing China and England. Past history of political
centralization also appears to have no bearing on the establishment of a centralized fiscal
system; Japan attained this goal before 1880, while China did not. Whereas the English
state began with short-term debts and then made a transition to long-term borrowings, the
Japanese state started in 1868 with long-term liabilities in the form of government paper
notes. England had established a centralized bureaucracy in collecting the customs and
excises in the 1680s before it had accumulated huge debts between 1689 and 1713. In
contrast, the Japanese government had huge amounts of liabilities in the form of non-
convertible paper notes before centralized taxation was introduced in 1871. England had
an institution of political representation - Parliament - prior to the rise of the modem
fiscal state in England. However, a modem fiscal state emerged in Japan before the
opening of the Japanese Diet in 1891, which suggests that an institution of political
representation may not be a necessary condition for building a modem fiscal state.
Neither are international wars necessary for the creation of a modern fiscal state. Japan
did not fight any large-scale international wars in the period between 1868 and 1895.
Moreover, financial difficulties forced its government to try hard to avoid military
confrontation with China and Russia both in the 1870s and 1880s. In contrast, the
Chinese government launched expensive military campaigns in the northwest and
Xinjiang between 1866 and 1883 and fought the Sino-French War in 1885. Yet a modern
fiscal state emerged in Japan but not in China. It is true that a "rich state, strong army"
(fukoku kydhei) was one of the most important goals of the Meiji government. 87 Yet very
few Japanese officials between 1868 and 1882 considered the government's extreme
reliance upon inconvertible paper notes the means to achieve that goal. In fact, the
financial crisis associated with the excessive issue of paper notes between 1868 and 1890
remained the major factor to contain several schemes for overseas adventures. Instead of
war prompting institutional development in public finance, it was the establishment of the
institutions of the modern fiscal state that gave the Meiji government the confidence to
challenge China over the issue of Korea in 1894-5.
The lack of an industrial economy in China in the late nineteenth-century is does not
explain China's failed transformation into a modern fiscal state. The modern fiscal state
emerged in England in the 1730s, before the first industrial revolution (often dated to the
1750s). Likewise, when the Japanese government built a modern fiscal state in the late
1880s, the Japanese economy at the time was far from an industrial one. A modern fiscal
87 Richard J. Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army ": National Security and the Technological
Transformation ofJapan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), chapter 2.
state is apparently not a product of an industrial economy. Therefore, theories that try to
explain the lack of large-scale industrialization in China in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries are not directly related to our understanding the absence of the
modem fiscal state in China by 1911.88
A comparative lens and attention to historical process help us notice some shortcomings
in the existing explanations of particular cases. In regard to the success of market-based
long-term borrowing in eighteenth-century England, for example, neo-institutionalists
often attribute the rapid growth of the English government's tax revenue to the institution
of Parliament. In Margaret Levi's view, for instance, Parliament as an institution
represented the interest of powerful constituents in the management of public finance. It
therefore ensured a quasi-voluntary compliance from tax payers, reduced transaction
costs in collecting taxes, and thus contributed to the rise of tax revenue.89 Closer
examination of the workings of public finance casts doubt on this view. The English
Parliament at the time was dominated by land owners, yet the increased tax revenue
mainly came from the customs and excises, which fell upon ordinary consumers. It is
hard to argue that Members of Parliament represented the interest of ordinary consumers.
As excises were regressive and were widely detested by the English people in the
88 This literature has paid scant attention to the role of the institutions of public finance in economic
development in general and industrial development in particular. For the representative works, see Mark
Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1973); Philip C. C. Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Li Bozhong, Jiangnan de zaoqi gongyehua, 1550-1850 [The
Early Industrialization in the Lower Yangzi Delta, 1550-1850] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxiang cubanshe,
2000).
89 Margaret Levi, OfRule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 97 and p. 118.
eighteenth century, "quasi-voluntary compliance" does not well describe payment of
excises by ordinary English people. 90
The theory of the collective action problem provides a better explanation for the rise of
excise revenue. The number of ordinary consumers of goods subject to excises such as
beer and ale was quite large. The cost of monitoring participation in the anti-excise
campaign was thus formidably high. Yet the benefit of falling retail prices is an inclusive
"public good," which anyone could enjoy regardless of whether he participated in the
anti-excise movements. This made it difficult to organize consumers politically to
oppose the government's efforts to raise excise rates, a typical collective action
problem.91
Because the royal government depended upon its own bureaucracy to collect the customs
and excises, local elites was unlikely to control the royal government through taxation. 92
Big producers and wholesalers of major consumption goods had no way easily hide their
immobile assets from government officials so as to increase their bargaining power with
the government in issues of taxation.93 However, as along as they could transfer the
90 Until 1736, according to Stephen B. Baxter, "the excise officers were required to carry arms to defend
themselves." Stephen B. Baxter, The Development of the Treasury, 1660-1702 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1957), p. 101. For examples of popular resentment of excises, see Peter Mathias, The
Brewing Industry in England: 1700-1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), p. 345; Edward
Hughes, Studies in Administration and Finance 1558-1825 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1934), pp. 327-8 and pp. 332-3.
91 See the classic discussion in Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Actions (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1965).
92 For example, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal argues that the political power of the English elites over the crown
came from their control over fiscal sources. See Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, "The Political Economy of
Absolutism Reconsidered," in Robert H. Bates, et al., Analytic Narratives (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton
University Press, 1998).
93 Robert Bates and Da-Hsiang Lien argues that in an affluent economy, property owners who have more
mobile assets are able to increase the transaction costs of government in collecting taxes by hiding their
burden of increasing taxes to ordinary consumers, they lacked the motivation to oppose
the government over heavy consumption taxes. The theory of collective action problem
also explains why revenue from indirect taxes upon domestic consumption quickly
became the major pillar of public finance in Japan and China in the late nineteenth
century, neither of which had an institution of political representation.
In a pioneering study of how institutions affect economic performance, North and
Weingast used the Parliament after the Glorious Revolution in 1688 to explain the
success of the English government's long-term borrowing in the eighteenth century.
There are two different kinds of explanation in this classic paper. One relies upon the
role that the post-1688 Parliament played in ensuring the government's credible
commitment to protect the property rights of creditors of the English government. But it
can hardly explain the dominance of short-term unfunded borrowing in the Nine Years
War (1689-1697), which accounted for more than 70 percent of the total government
debt.94 Even the new institution of the Bank of England, which was funded in 1694 to
make loans to the government, was by no means a permanent institution at the time. As
J. Lawrence Broz and Richard S. Grossman have pointed out, Parliament could legally
withdraw the charter of the Bank of England by returning the principal of its loans to the
government. 95 In this light, Parliament as an institution itself does not have a necessary
wealth. Bates and Lien then argue that property owners thus have greater bargaining power to force the
government to make political concessions. See their formal argument in Robert Bates and Da-Hsiang
Donald Lien, "A note on taxation, development, and representative government," Politics and Society, Vol.
14, No. 1 (1985): 53-70.
94 Calculated from B. R. Mitchell, Abstract ofBritish Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1962), p. 4 0 1 .
95 J. Lawrence Broz and Richard S. Grossman, "Paying for privilege: the political economy of Bank of
England charters, 1694-1844," Explorations in Economic History, 41 (2004): 48-72.
temporal dimension to explain the gradually rising importance of long-term borrowing in
the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) and thereafter. 96
Nonetheless, North and Weingast also provide a second, dynamic explanation which has
been largely neglected. In their view, as the society became more familiar with the
"predictability and commitment" of the new political institution in safeguarding property
rights, the perceived risk of lending to the English government was reduced. As a result,
state long-term borrowing continued to grow.97 This explanation implies a self-
reinforcing process between the government's punctual interest payments and the
increasing confidence of creditors. But when did this self-reinforcing mechanism start?
Certainly not from 1693, as North and Weingast suggest. As Brewer has noted, even in
1697 England's success at building a market-based system of long-term borrowing was
by no means self-evident, let alone an inevitable outcome of her entry into European
power struggles in 1688.98 It is well-known that creditors' confidence in the English
government's creditworthiness vis-i-vis long-term borrowing was not securely
established until the 1720s, when the government demonstrated its ability to service
interest payments by reliable collection of revenues from the customs and excises.
The problem of timing is more obvious when we consider that the centralized
bureaucracy to collect the customs was formed in 1672 and the Excise Department in
96 David Stasavage also notes that post-1688 Parliament as an institution is less able to explain why the
system of long-term borrowing at low interest appeared thirty years. David Stasavage, Public Debt and the
Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688-1789 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), p. 5.
97 Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeen-Century England," Journal ofEconomic History, Vol.
49, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 823-4.
98 Brewer, The Sinews ofPower, p. 138.
1683, both prior to the Glorious Revolution. Nor can the post-1688 Parliament explain
these two institutional innovations. 99 Edgar Kiser and Joshua Kane have tried to address
this development mainly by looking for factors such as "the development of efficient
communication, transportation, and record-keeping" that could increase the monitoring
capacity of the central government so as to overcome the principal-agent problem in
collecting indirect taxes. However, there were in fact no technological breakthroughs in
transportation or communication which greatly enhanced the royal government's ability
to supervise its agents in the period between 1660 and 1683.100
To account for the rise of bureaucracy in managing public finance in Europe, Thomas
Ertman highlights the importance of timing of participation in the European geographical
struggles. In his view, the necessary condition for the rise of bureaucratic management of
public finance is that previous development in education and finance had prepared a pool
of competent and well-educated financial officials from which the state could recruit
officials. Therefore, countries that entered the geographic struggles prior to the
availability of such a pool (e.g., before 1450) had to rely on patrimonial practices such as
"proprietary officeholders, tax-farmers, and officeholder-financiers" to meet state fiscal
needs.101 Yet the causal effects of this timing are not salient in the case of England. As
99 Edgar Kiser also notes that the timing of the establishment of bureaucracies in collecting the customs
duties and excises in Restoration England poses a puzzle which cannot be explained by the Glorious
Revolution in 1688. See Edgar Kiser, "Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modem Tax Systems: A
Principal-Agent Analysis," Politics and Society, Vol. 22, No. 3 (September 1994), p. 299.
100 Edgar Kiser and Joshua Kane, "Revolution and State Structure: The Bureaucratization of Tax
Administration in Early Modem England and France," American Journal ofSociology, Vol. 107, No. 1
(July 2001), p. 187, and p. 195. They are wrong to use the managerial and organizational methods that the
centralized Excise Department used to monitor its agents in the 1680s as the causes which led to its
establishment, which is a fallacy of functionalism.
101 Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 28.
Ertman acknowledges, England got involved in European geographical struggles from
the 11 00s to the 1480s. In the end, he mainly appeals to enhanced parliamentary
supervision in conjunction with two wars with the Dutch (1665-6 and 1672-4) to explain
the emergence of centralized bureaucracies in the collection of the customs and
excises.io2 However, in the Restoration period, the customs and excises belonged to the
crown's ordinary revenue, in which Parliament had neither authority nor power to
intervene. 0 3
Turning to the case of Japan, we find scholars appealing to the concept of "corporate
coherence" among Meiji leaders to explain the creation of a powerful central
government.104 However, this "corporate coherence" simply does not exist when we
examine the power struggles among different political factions which had conflicting
institutional schemes. 105 Moreover, we shall not interpret the institutional development
after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 as a unilinear road toward centralization. First,
foreign threats did not necessarily lead to centralization; fiscal decentralization was
compatible with national defense. Second, in 1870 even the advocates of political and
military centralization had to admit that centralized governance was not practical as the
new government did not have the financial resources to extend its governance over the
whole territory of Japan. As the Japanese historian Haraguchi Kiyoshi has pointed out,
centralization between 1868 and 1870 simply referred to an administrative conformity
102 Ibid., pp. 171-8 and pp. 187-207.
103 Henry Roseveare, The Treasury 1660-1870: The Foundations of Control (London: Allen & Unwin,
1973), pp. 52-54.
104 See Ellen K. Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan,
Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Books, 1978).
105 For the detail of the fierce factional struggles within the early Meiji government, see Michio Umegaki,
After the Restoration: The Beginning ofJapan's Modern State (New York: New York University Press,
1988).
between domain governments and the Meiji government, which itself governed only the
lands of the former shogunate.106 Thus the political centralization that occurred after
abolition of the domain system in 1871 was far from a well-planned strategy (I will
discuss it in more detail in the chapter of Japan). For example, the Meiji government in
1872 adopted the highly decentralized national banking system of America and rejected
the centralized British model. 107
In regard to public finance, the initial policy orientation in institution building after the
Meiji Restoration was not even toward a fiscal state. Instead, the early Meiji government
adopted the fiscal policy of a domain state, i.e., to raise government income by directly
owning and managing enterprises in mining and railway building and by granting
monopolies to privileged merchants in organizing the export of Japanese goods.' 08 The
failure of these policies left the government confronting a huge deficit, and forced the
sale of unprofitable state-owned enterprises; profitable ones in gold-mining were
retained. 109 Even after the officials of the Finance Ministry in 1878-80 turned to indirect
taxes levied upon consumer goods such as sake, liquor, tobacco, etc. to raise government
106 Haraguchi Kiyoshi, "Haihan chiken seiji katei no hitotsu k6satsu [An investigation of the political
process of abolishing the domain system]," Meijo shogaku, No. 29, special issue (January 1980): 47-94.107 Nakamura Naoyoshi, Okuma zaisei no kenkyai [A Study of the Policies of Public Finance of Okuma]
(T6ky6: Azekura Shob6, 1968), p. 38.
108 For an important discussion of the fiscal purpose of the industrial policies in early Meiji and their
connection to the concept of a domain state (kasan kokka), see Yamamoto Hirofumi, "Shoki shokusan
seisaku to sono shiisei [The early industry-promotion policy and its revision]," in And6 Yoshio, ed., Nihon
keizai seisaku shiron (ge) [The History of Economic Policy in Japan (I)] (T6ky6: T6ky6 Daigaku
Shuppankai, 1973); Nagai Hideo, "Shokusan kogy6 seisaku no kich6: kanei jigy6 o chtishin to site" [The
basic tunes in the industry-promotion policies], originally published in Hokkaido daigaku bungakubu kiyo,
No. 10, November 1969, reprinted Nagai Hideo, Meiji kokka keiseiki no gaisei to naisei [Foreign Relations
and Domestic Governance in the Formation Period of the Meiji State] (Sapporo: Hokkaid6 Daigaku Tosho
Kaikokai, 1990).
109 Thomas C. Smith pointed out that Meiji government sold the state-owned enterprises after 1881 simply
to get rid of the burden on public finance. Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development
in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), chapter 8.
income, the economic policy implemented by the new Finance Minister Matsukata
Masayoshi in 1882 caused a severe domestic deflation, which was disastrous to the
collection of consumption taxes.110 How could a government implement policies which
were disastrous to its major source of revenue?
The above difficulties in explaining the eventual rise of the institutions of the modem
fiscal state appear more perplexing when we consider the functions and distributional
effects of these institutions. In a study of the relationship between political institutions
and economic growth, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson raise a very important
question: why are political powerful groups or state actors not in favor of economic
growth as it "would provide more resources for these groups to take over or tax,
increasing their economic returns"? 11 Their answer to this question is based upon the
concern of elites about the distributional effects of economic growth. In their view,
politically powerful groups oppose economic growth only when they know that economic
changes will weaken their established power base by enriching potential political rivals.
Likewise, the success of the financial revolution in eighteenth-century England has been
attributed to the political dominance of the Whig party between 1714 and 1746. As it
was closely associated with the monied class and represented the interest of creditors to
10 The revenues collected from domestic consumption dropped from 17 million Yen in 1882 to 2.9 million
Yen in 1885. Cited from Table 18 in Hayashi Takehisa, Nihon ni okeru sozei kokka no seiritsu [The
Formation of the Tax State in Japan], p. 64.
"1 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," American
Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 1 (February 2006), p. 115.
the English state in both Parliament and the executive branch, the Whig regime, it has
been argued, greatly reduced the risk of default on state debt. 12
Such a political explanation is not convincing, however. Why would a Tory government
default on long-term borrowings which bore low interest rates and greatly enhanced the
state's spending capacity? As the increasing scale of long-term borrowing was serviced
by revenues collected from the indirect customs and excises, landed political elites did
not shoulder the ever-rising burden of taxation. The collective action problem prevented
ordinary consumers from organizing effective opposition movements against the rising
indirect taxes. While state actors benefited from much enhanced spending capacity, the
subscribers to the state's perpetual annuities, including members of the landed class,
benefited from punctual interest payments on annuities. In this light, political elites in
England should have had every reason to embrace the institutions of the modern fiscal
state. We must ask why did these institutions not appear earlier in England? Moreover,
state actors in a commercialized economy should have every reason to welcome the
institutions of the modern fiscal state. But if so, why did the modern fiscal state not
emerge in China, and why did it not appear earlier in England and Japan? These
questions remind us that it is highly problematic to assume that politically powerful
groups possess perfect information about the distributional impact of institutional or
economic changes, an assumption which Acemoglu and Robinson implicitly take in their
model of political institutions and economic growth.
m For two prominent examples of political explanation of the English financial revolution, see Carruthers,
City of Capital, chapter 6; David Stasavage, Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and
Great Britain, 1688-1789 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chapter 5.
As Mark Blyth has emphasized, we must take into account the uncertainty in actors'
recognition of the distributional effects of institutional change. 1 3 In explaining the
phenomenon of the modem fiscal state, the uncertainty is to a large degree caused by the
interactive nature of institutional change and the politics involved in the process of
institution building. On the one hand, the modem fiscal state is not an automatic result or
a spontaneous development of a market economy. Private economic actors, no matter
how creative, simply cannot invent by themselves the financial institutions and
techniques which involve the use of the state's tax revenue. On the other hand, state
actors, no matter how capable, cannot create the institutions of the modem fiscal state in
isolation from the economy and society. They were in general unfamiliar with the arcane
techniques already developed in the private financial markets of the early modem period.
Nor could state actors simply use coercion to force economic actors to accept the credit
instruments issued by the state. In this case, it was beneficial for state actors to seek
cooperation from private financiers who had already developed financial networks to
transmit money across time and space.
At the same time, state actors involved in building the modem fiscal state had to
overcome the information asymmetry problem between the central government as the
principal and officials who collected taxes as "agents" for the state. Moreover, in
appreciating the difficulties of this process, we must bear in mind how things appeared to
people at the time. As noted earlier for England, if the state could not demonstrate its
113 Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 30-4.
institutional ability to use tax revenue to sustain the creditworthiness of its long-term
liabilities, economic actors would be unwilling to supply long-term credit. To
contemporary state actors, such resistance to long-term liabilities was more likely to
make state actors doubt the feasibility of the state's long-term credit instruments, rather
than urging them to reform the tax institutions. Finally, both taxation and the state's use
of long-term credits are highly political issues as they significantly affect the interest
distribution in society. Even the effort of state actors to gather information about revenue
potential would encounter strong societal resistance.
In this light, the success of England and Japan and the failure of China in building a
modem fiscal state are far from inevitable at the beginning of each episode. In order to
overcome the problem of indeterminacy in early stages of institutional change and avoid
a deterministic explanation of the rise of the modem fiscal state in England and Japan but
not in China, I conduct a "deep" comparative historical analysis of the three cases in this
dissertation. By a "deep" historical analysis, I mean two things. First, I historically
reconstruct the specific multiple possible outcomes at different stages of this interactive
process. In light of these possible alternatives, the eventual observed institutional
outcome ceases to appear as an inevitable result. The purpose of this historical
examination is to avoid the "within-case" selection bias that is often seen in small-N
case-studies.1 1 4 This bias is mainly caused by implicitly taking the observed
phenomenon as the only end-result while neglecting other possible outcomes. Adding
more causally homogenous cases to the analysis does not necessarily remove the within-
114 For a discussion of this kind of selection bias in the use of history in the social sciences, see Ian S.
Lustick, "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of
Selection Bias," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 3 (September 1996): 605-618.
case selection bias.115 Second, I focus on the concrete rather than assumed goals and
constraints that historical actors actually took into account in their specific contexts of
time and place; I attempt to understand what kind of uncertainty they faced in their
decision-making.116 As much as possible, I try not to put information or knowledge that
was not available ex ante to historical actors into the making of their "rational"
considerations.
As Pierson and Skocpol have pointed out, the emergence and consolidation of institutions
is often a process that takes place "over a substantial stretch of years, maybe even
decades or centuries." 1 7 The mechanism to explain the rise of the modem fiscal state
thus should have a significant temporal dimension. That is to say, the explanatory factors
must have happened earlier than the outcome to be explained, and there must have been a
mechanism to carry the causal effects throughout the time interval between the causal
factors and the eventual outcome.118 A temporally-based explanation raises two basic
questions. First, how far back shall we go in our search for causes without running into
115 For emphasis on the different nature of "within-case" selection bias and "across-case" selection bias, see
David Collier and James Mahoney, "Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research," World
Politics, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1996): 56-91. See the difference between causally homogenous and
heterogeneous cases in comparative studies in Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond
Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), chapter 2.
116 Game theorists who deal with games with a multiplicity of equilibria are paying increasing attention to
the specific contexts so as to decide which equilibrium would have a "deep stability" and thus is more
likely to appear in the real world. See Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy,
chapter 11; Robert H. Bates, et al., Analytic Narratives (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1998),
.13-14.
Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, "Historical Institutionalism," p. 698.
For the discussion of historical causation in social science, see John C. Harsanyi, "Explanation and
Comparative Dynamics in Social Science," Behavioral Science 5 (April 1960), p. 137 and Jon Elster, Nuts
and Boltsfor the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 3. For the discussion
of the importance of periodization to comparative historical analysis, see Evan S. Lieberman, "Causal
Inference in Historical Institutional Analysis: A Specification of Periodization Strategies," Comparative
Political Studies, Vol. 34, No. 9 (November 2001), pp. 1017-23.
the problem of infinite regress in historical causation?' 19 Second, how shall we escape
the fallacy of spurious causality in historical causation? The longer the time interval
between the explanatory factors and the eventual institutional outcome, the bigger the
danger of spurious causality. In other words, something which happened during this
interval may better explain the outcome than the originally designated explanatory
factors. 2 0 Shortening the time interval between explanatory factors and outcome helps
avoid this trap. However, it may omit some causally relevant factors prior to the
temporal span that we set for our causal exploration.121 For example, if we try to find the
causes of the rise of the modem fiscal state in post-1720 England or post-1880 Japan, we
miss crucially important institutional developments, such as the centralization of tax
collection (established in England in the 1680s and in Japan in the late 1870s).
In the study of the rise (or not) of the modem fiscal state in England, Japan, and China,
how shall we determine the periodization for each case so as to avoid the pitfall of
infinite regress? How shall we identify the temporal causal mechanism which would
carry its causal effects throughout the temporal processes of building and consolidating
119 In the trap of infinite regress, there are always some prior causal factors, backward perpetually into the
past. On this problem in historical causation, see James Fearon, "Causes and Counterfactuals in Social
Science: Exploring an Analogy between Cellular Automata and Historical Processes," in Philip E. Tetlock
and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological,
and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 39-67. Regarding
infinite regress in the construction of causal chains in general, see Gary King, Robert 0. Keohane, and
Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 86.
120 For a general discussion of spurious causality in comparative historical analysis, see Edgar Kiser and
Michael Hechter, "The Role of General Theory in Comparative-historical Sociology," American Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 97, No. 1 (July 1991), p. 7. William Sewell pointed out that Skocpol made this mistake in
her explanation of the revival of the Chinese Communist Revolution. See William H. Sewell, Jr., "Three
Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology," in Terrence J. McDonald, eds., The Historic Turn in the
Human Sciences (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 256-7.
121 See Paul Pierson, Politics in Time, chapter 3; Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, "Historical
Institutionalism," pp. 703-4.
the institutions of the modem fiscal state? How could such a temporal causal mechanism
reconcile the indeterminacy caused by the multiplicity of possible outcomes in the initial
stages of the highly interactive process of institutional change with the emergence of the
eventual institutional outcome? I turn to the next chapter to discuss these questions.
Chapter 2 A Model of Institutional Learning: A Path-dependent Account of the Rise
of the Modern Fiscal State
. Introduction
In the study of institutional change, scholars such as Avner Greif, David Laitin and
Kathleen Thelen have stressed that a good theory of institutional change should be able to
account for the stability of the same institutions, and vice versa. 122 This insight is
particularly important to the study of how existing institutions change in response to
variations in social, political, and economic environments. This kind of institutional
change can be incremental and continuous, or it can lead to opposing end results, such as
survival or demise of these institutions. 123 However, I argue it is difficult to apply the
analytic tools which have been developed to understand the stability and change of
existing institutions to the study of fundamental institutional change characterized by
emergence and consolidation of new institutions, particularly when various institutional
elements have not yet formed a mutually reinforcing system to yield new beliefs and
regularities of behaviors among actors.
122 Avner Greif and David D. Laitin, "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change," American Political
Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 4 (November 2004), p. 636; Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in
Comparative Politics," Annual Review ofPolitical Science, 2 (1999), p. 369.
123 The endogenous model of institutional change proposed by Avner Greif and David D. Latin is mainly
about the survival or demise of existing institutions such as political regimes or cleavages when there are
changes in socio-economic environments. See Avner Greif and David D. Laitin, "A Theory of Endogenous
Institutional Change," American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 4 (November 2004): 633-52. For
the study continuous institutional changes such as institutional layering and conversion, see Kathleen
Thelen, "How Institutions Evolve," in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative
Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 225-230;
idem., How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States,
and Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, eds.,
Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
The rise of the modem fiscal state is characterized by two closely connected institutional
innovations in public finance: a centralized tax institution and a financial institution
which uses the amalgamated tax revenue to mobilize long-term financial resources in the
form of either state bonds or paper notes. Therefore, it is a fundamental institutional
change, even though some old institutions may be incorporated into or endowed with new
functions in this new kind of state. As this institutional transformation not only
centralizes the operation of state public finance but also significantly affects the
distribution of interest in society, the rise of the modem fiscal state is a highly political
process in which actors have different ideas, political agendas, and institutional
preferences. At the same time, socio-economic conditions, such as the scale of the
commercial sector and the development of inter-regional trade, affect the viability of the
institutional elements with which actors experiment. The process which gives rise to the
modem fiscal state is thus rife with intensive interactions among actors, institutional
arrangements, and socio-economic conditions. How shall we identify a causal
mechanism which has a temporal dimension and can handle the multiplicity of possible
outcomes and the uncertainty which are endogenously generated by these interactions?
This is the central question for analyses of fundamental institutional change.
In conceiving a temporal causal mechanism to explain the observed institutional
outcomes, i.e., the rise of a modem fiscal state in England and Japan and its absence in
China, the first thing is to determine the beginning point of such a mechanism so as to
avoid the problem of infinite regress in historical causation. In this dissertation, I choose
to start from a critical event in each case which initiates the causal journey for subsequent
institutional change in public finance, i.e., the outbreak of the English Civil Wars in
1642, the Meiji Restoration in 1868, and the beginning of the Taiping Rebellion in 1850
in China. The selection of these critical events is not arbitrary, nor simply for the sake of
convenience. Instead, they represent a special moment common to the three cases to be
studied, i.e., the inability of the old institutions of public finance to sustain the autonomy
and capacity of the state under new socio-economic circumstances. As a result, the state
that did not possess the necessary tax and financial institutions found itself unable to
handle disruptions in the market economy, the resulting social dislocations, and threats
from abroad. Meanwhile, these critical events mark the beginning of a search for
alternative institutions. The three cases thus have one common generic sequence in the
process of institutional change: 1), the stickiness of existing institutions which are
unsuitable to new socio-economic circumstances; 2), the critical event that provides a
"window opportunity" for seeking alternative institutions; 3), experimentation with
various institutional arrangements.
But why did state actors prior to these critical events not implement fundamental changes
in institutions of public finance to enhance the capacity of the state? What prevented
them from developing centralized institutions to extract revenues from commercial
sources? To answer these questions, I argue it is important to put the fiscal difficulties of
the state before the critical events in an institutional perspective. Problems in meeting
government spending did not necessarily lead to efforts to centralize institutions in public
finance, although centralization could bring increased flows of revenue. Instead, the
initial responses of state actors were to adjust, rather than jettison, the existing
institutions. Meanwhile, states that started with decentralized fiscal operations could rely
upon their established political authority and transfer to local governments or even local
communities the spending burden of state affairs such as provision of social welfare,
infrastructure maintenance, and even national defense. The concern shared by the center
and local governments to maintain social and political order in these three early modem
states thus helped sustain old institutions even as they became unsuited to the socio-
economic environment. The reliance upon fiscal decentralization in this situation is self-
reinforcing, i.e., the more the center transferred the burden of spending to local
governments, the more difficult for it to centralize its fiscal operation. We therefore do
not observe state actors actively seeking alternative institutions in public finance. The
exhaustion of existing institutions in dealing with new challenges was by no means self-
evident to actors at the time.
Even when state actors were forced to search for new institutions, they had little help
from existing institutions. Institutionalists have emphasized that institutions, both formal
and informal, are important for actors in a world of incomplete information to decipher
the socio-economic environment in policy-making.124 However, when the existing
institutions in public finance failed to support the capacity and autonomy of the state in
new circumstances, they also burdened state actors with a huge information problem.
The ability of state actors to conceive or design alternatives was severely constrained by
124 For a discussion of the cognitive function played by both formal and informal institutions, see Douglass
C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), p. 96; Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Paul J. DiMaggio and
Walter W. Powell, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1991): 1-40; Peter A. Hall, "Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state," Comparative
Politics, Vol. 23 (1993): 275-96.
existing institutions which could not provide the information necessary to creating new
institutions of the modem fiscal state. For example, actors had no means yet to obtain
reasonably accurate estimates of the size of domestic consumption and its potential for
taxation, an assessment of the distribution of wealth in society, an estimate of the
potential of direct taxation such as the land tax and property tax, the scale of lending in
the economy upon which the state could rely, and so on. Actors thus had to grapple with
a great deal of uncertainty in their search for alternative institutions.
An institutional examination of the fiscal difficulties that the state experienced in each
case prior to these critical events thus has two important implications. First, causes of the
rise of the modem fiscal state are unlikely to occur prior to the critical events. Second,
even though these critical events mark the end of the viability of existing institutions in
public finance, a huge degree of uncertainty about what alternatives may come next
remains. In this light, the rise of the modern fiscal state is distinct from the kind of
institutional development described for critical junctures. In this literature, the
mechanism of reproduction is mainly based upon the use of political power helps sustain
the institutional outcome formed at the critical juncture, such as a regime type, a pattern
in the union-state relationship, a coalition of social classes, etc.125 In contrast, actors at
125 Political power is the crucial element in the mechanism of reproduction in this literature. For
representative examples of (positive) critical junctures, see Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping
the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Gregory M. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social
Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991); Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State:
Parties and Policies in Global Markets (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001). In the
formation of the petro-state, oil revenue also constitutes the key material basis for the use of state power;
see Terry L. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1997), particularly chapters 4 and 5. For an emphasis on the importance of social and economic
resources in sustaining such a mechanism of reproduction in the literature of (positive) critical juncture, see
the critical events in England in 1642, Japan in 1868, and China in 1850 had no effective
institutions to maintain but rather had to grope in opacity for new institutional
arrangements. This uncertainty and opacity did not change even where new political
actors came to seize state power. After all, the failure of the old institutions to generate
necessary information for conceiving or designing new institutions was a constraint on
both the state and on societal actors. Therefore, the emergence of new political actors
(e.g., a rising merchant class) itself does not suffice to dispel uncertainty in explaining the
outcome of subsequent institutional change. 126
There is a noticeable time interval between the critical events at which actors began to
search for new financial institutions and the eventual outcome of the rise (or not) of the
modem fiscal state: from 1642 to 1752 in England, from 1868 to 1895 in Japan, and from
1850 to 1911 in China. The uncertainties of the environment in which actors, socio-
economic circumstances, and institutional elements interact intensively engender a
multiplicity of possible outcomes during this time interval. In this light, the modem
fiscal state is far from the only possible outcome. The rise of the modem fiscal state also
differs from those institutional changes where there is only one outcome after reaching
the critical moment of change, such as in the tipping-point model.127 What kind of causal
Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," Annual Review ofPolitical Science,
2 (1999), pp. 391-2.
126 For an example of the use of new political actors to explain institution change, see Daron Acemoglu,
Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, "The rise of Europe: Atlantic trade, institutional change and
economic growth," American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 3 (June 2005), pp. 563-5.
127 For applications of the tipping-point model, see Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1978); David D. Laitin, "National revivals and violence," in John R. Bowen
and Roger Petersen, eds., Critical Comparisons in Politics and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999): 21-60.
mechanism can explain the observed outcomes from the interactive process of
institutional changes?
In section II of this chapter, I briefly survey the institutional background of state financial
difficulties in England between the 1600s and 1630s, in Japan between the 1820s and
1860s, and in China between the 1820s and 1840s. In section III, I examine the
implications of the dysfunction of existing institutions for the rise of alternative
institutions. In particular, I argue that the exhaustion of the old institutions in dealing
with new challenges from within and without represents an appropriate starting point for
understanding the rise of the modem fiscal state. In section IV, I discuss how
uncertainties that the old institutions generated for subsequent institutional changes made
the eventual outcome of the modem fiscal state far from inevitable. I then analyze why
we need a causal mechanism which has a temporal dimension to handle this problem of
indeterminacy caused by a multiplicity of possible outcomes. In particular, I focus on
evolutionary and path-dependent approaches, which try to explain the observed outcome
while taking into account uncertainty, contingency, and multiple possible outcomes in the
process of change. I examine their merits and shortcoming in explaining the specific
empirical case of the rise of the modem fiscal state.
In section V, I outline a model of institutional learning which can reconcile the
multiplicity of possible outcomes in the initial stages of institutional development with
the final observed outcome. Its major feature is the conjunction of a severe credit crisis
and appropriate socio-economic conditions. The origin of the severe credit crisis is
exogenous to subsequent institutional development, yet it constitutes a pressing problem
which forces actors to try various institutional arrangements, regardless of their
individual political ideas, interests, and agendas. The socio-economic circumstances are
necessary conditions which allow actors to realize the mutually-reinforcing effects
between fiscal centralization and the state's long-term liabilities in the financial markets.
These in turn lead to the emergence and consolidation of one particular institutional
outcome. The model of institutional learning thus is endogenous to the process of
institutional change and has a strong path-dependent feature.
II. Exhaustion of old institutions under new socio-economic circumstances: England
(1600s-1630s), Japan (1820s-1860s), and China (1820s-1840s)
As mentioned in the introduction, the financial basis on which the early modern state
rested varied across the three cases in this study: the domain state in England, the
incomplete fiscal state in Japan, and the (traditional) fiscal state in China. Nonetheless,
they all experienced a period of fiscal difficulties when the state's income was inadequate
to meet its spending. The root cause of the tremendous fiscal problems was the fact that
the existing institutions of public finance had come to lag terribly behind the greatly
changed socio-economic environment. Relevant factors included the increasing presence
of state power in society, population growth, increasing population mobility, the
deepening monetarization of economic life, the development of inter-regional trade and
financial networks, the expansion of the urban economy, and so on. In consequence,
price fluctuations - either inflation or deflation - not only had widespread impact on
society but also directly affected the income and expenditures of the state.
In contrast, traditional pillars of the state finance, such as the domain revenues in early
Stuart England and the land taxes in Japan and China before the early nineteenth century,
had become either depleted or inelastic. None of these states had yet developed the
institutional ability to tap new tax bases in the economy, particularly the commercial
sectors. As it was impossible for a well-established early modem state to massively
reduce its expenditures for national defense, maintenance of political and legal order, and
the provision of social welfare such as calamity relief, all three states experienced great
trouble in meeting spending with current income. In England this occurred between the
1600s and 1630s, in Japan between the 1820s and 1860s, and in China between the 1820s
and 1840s. Let us examine the institutional background and socio-economic
circumstances for each case.
The domain state formed in England by the mid-sixteenth century did not rely upon
regular domestic taxation but derived its ordinary revenues from royal estates, the
customs, and the crown's feudal rights such as wardship and purveyance. Domestic
taxation appeared less urgent when the Tudor monarchs in the late 1530s began to
plunder the vast wealth of the Church, which owned about 20-25 percent of the land in
England in the 1530s.128 Among the total income of the royal government between 1534
and 1547, the revenue from traditional sources and newly plundered ex-monastic land
amounted to about 60 percent while the revenues derived lay taxation and ecclesiastic
128 In 1535, the revenues of the Church amounted approximately to E400,000 while the revenues from the
king's lands were only £40,000. See W. G. Hoskins, The Age ofPlunder: King Henry's England 1500-
1547 (London: Longman, 1976), p. 121.
taxes contributed only 30 percent. 129 Nonetheless, the expensive wars with France forced
the royal government to sell ex-monastic and chantry lands in the period between 1540
and 1552, which provided up to 32 percent of the total war expenditures of some E3.5
million.130 Of course, this was not sustainable in long run. From 1588 to 1603, sales of
royal lands could only cover 13 percent of some E4,978,054 of military spending in the
Anglo-Spanish war and the colonial wars in Ireland, while 71 percent were funded by lay
and clerical subsidies.131
The early Stuart regime in 1603 thus inherited much depleted reserves of domain
revenue, yet it had to face the pressure of rising expenditures. The "military revolution"
in Western Europe after the mid-sixteenth century greatly increased the scale and
duration - and thus the cost - of warfare on both land and sea by intensive use of
gunpowder, heavy arms, new warships, and siege tactics.132 Meanwhile, the period from
1450 to 1649 witnessed a "price revolution" in England, as well as in other countries in
Western Europe. Over this period, the average grain price in England increased 700
percent, that of industrial products 210 percent, and the real wages of agricultural
laborers 200 percent. Prices did not become stable until the 1650s.13 3 [Figure 2.1] This
129 Calculated from Table 5.1 in Peter Cunich, "Revolution and Crisis in English State Finance, 1534-47,"
in W. M. Ormrod, Margaret Bonney, and Richard Bonney, eds., Crises, Revolutions, and Self-sustained
Growth: Essays in European Fiscal History, 1130-1830 (Stamford: Shaun Tyas, 1999), p. 123.13 0 Penry Williams, The Tudor Regime (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 69.
131 Calculated from the figures in R. W. Hoyle, "Crown, Parliament and Taxation in Sixteenth-Century
England," English Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 434 (November 1994), p. 1193.
132 The spiraling cost of fighting wars is been well-accepted, even though scholars hold divergent views on
the continuity, chronology, and the causes of the military revolution in early modem Europe. See Clifford
J. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern
Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). For the impact of the military revolution on England in the early
seventeenth century, see Conrad Russell, Unrevolutionary England, 1603-1642 (London: Hambledon,
1990), p. 126.
133 For an overall review of the price revolution in England in C. G. A. Clay, Economic Expansion and
Social Change: England 1500-1700, volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), chapter 2.
price revolution resulted from the interplay of several slow socio-economic trends, such
as population growth, the expansion of the urban economy and non-agricultural sectors,
and the increasing monetarization of the English economy.134
Figure 2.1 Index of price of foodstuffs in England: 1451-1700
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Source: R. B. Outhwaite, Inflation in Tudor and Early Stuart England, second edition (London: The
Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 12.
In contrast, the nominal value of the crown's total ordinary revenue rose only from
E170,000 in 1547 to E300,000 by 1603, which represented a 40 percent fall in real
134 For a general review of the price revolution in Europe between the mid-fifteenth and mid-seventeenth
centuries, see R. B. Outhwaite, Inflation in Tudor and Early Stuart England, second edition (London: The
MacMillan Press, 1982). For an emphasis on the contribution of urbanization, see Jack A. Goldstone,
"Urbanization and Inflation: Lessons from the English Price Revolution of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 89, No. 5 (1984): 1122-60. For a discussion of the
increasing monetary input as a cause of the price revolution, see Douglas Fisher, "The Price Revolution: A
Monetary Interpretation," Journal ofEconomic History, Vol. XLIX, No. 4 (December 1989): 883-902.
terms.135 As a result, the early Stuart government started with constant deficits in
ordinary accounts even in the years of peace and good harvests between 1603 and
1618.136 Two-thirds of the deficit was caused by subsidies to the colonial government in
the newly conquered Ireland.'3 7 Studies of early Stuart history have convincingly
demonstrated that the increasing discrepancy between expenses to maintain the state and
the shrinking ordinary revenue was the primary cause for the "functional breakdown" of
the government in the 1610s and 1620s.138
At this moment, contemporary political actors concerned about the urgency of fiscal
reform were aware of two options. One was to rescue the traditional domain state by
cutting government expenditures while increasing yields from sources of the ordinary
revenue. The other was to transform into a fiscal state by turning the parliamentary
supplies from irregular extraordinary revenues granted only in emergencies into regular
taxation to fund the government in both peace and war. The latter seemed more practical
as royal estates had been shrinking and feudal revenues such as purveyance became
obsolete in the changed economic circumstances.139 As early as 1593, there had been a
3 5 Penry Williams, The Later Tudors: England 1547-1603 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), p. 147; Conrad
Russell, The Addled Parliament of 1614: The Limits ofRevision, The Stenton Lecture 1991 (Reading:
University of Reading, 1992), p. 10.
136 Alan G. R. Smith, The Emergence of a Nation State: The Commonwealth of England 1529-1660, second
edition (London: Longman, 1997), p. 254. By 1610, the royal government was facing a debt of E400,000
and an annual deficit of E140,000 in the ordinary account. John Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance
Under James VI andI (London: Royal Historical Society, 2002), p. 118.
137 Ronald Hutton, Debates in Stuart History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 60-1.
138 See a succinct review of this literature in Thomas Cogswell, Richard Cust and Peter Lake, "Revisionism
and its legacies: the work of Conrad Russell," in Thomas Cogswell, Richard Cust and Peter Lake eds.,
Politics, Religion and Popularity in Early Stuart Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
139 For example, after decades of inflation, purveyance - the crown's prerogative rights to have the royal
household supplied at prices far below the current market prices - stirred waves of grievances, particularly
from regions that provided these goods, such as Kent and Essex. Cited in Eric N. Lindquist, "The King, the
people and the House of Commons: The problem of early Jacobean Purveyance," Historical Journal, Vol.
31, No. 3 (1988), pp. 550-556.
proposal to create an annual land tax of E100,000 to fund wars.140 However, in the
negotiations of the Great Contract in the 1610s, the royal government failed to reach an
agreement with Parliament as to how to use a national land tax to replace the crown's two
major feudal revenues, namely, wardship and purveyance.141 In addition to the
disagreement over the appropriate level of annual taxation, many Members of Parliament
considered the levy of a national land tax by the central government unacceptable. Some
argued that even Parliament had no authority to impose it. The landed class was
particularly hostile to the national survey that the levy of land taxes would require.142
At the same time, the fiscal principle of a domain state which formally separated the
crown's ordinary revenue from the extraordinary revenue granted by Parliament in
emergency remained influential among political actors.143 Moreover, parliamentary
supplies became less attractive to the royal government as their assessment and collection
were controlled by local gentry, which led to severe under-assessment and even
widespread evasion. 144 For instance, the yield of a granted subsidy fell from £137,000 in
1559 to £55,000 in 1628, only one-fifth of the 1559 level in real terms.145 The situation
remained the same even in the religious wars with France and Spain between 1625 and
140 John Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance Under James VI and I, p. 68.
141 Conrad Russell, The Addled Parliament of 1614: The Limits ofRevision; Eric N. Lindquist, "The Failure
of the Great Contract," Journal ofModern History, Vol. 57, No. 4 (December 1985): 617-51.
142 Eric N. Lindquist, "The King, the people and the House of Commons: The problem of early Jacobean
Purveyance," p. 561 and p. 565; idem, "The Failure of the Great Contract," p. 645, particularly footnote
108, and p. 648.
14' R. W. Hoyle, "Crown, Parliament and Taxation in Sixteenth-Century England," English Historical
Review, Vol. 109, No. 434 (November 1994): 1174-96.
144 Roger Schofield, "Taxation and the political limits of the Tudor state," in Claire Cross, David Loades,
and J. J. Scarisbrick eds., Law and Government under the Tudors: Essays Presented to Sir Geoffrey Elton
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Conrad Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 169-70; idem, Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-1629 (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1979), pp. 49-5 1.
145 Derek Hirst, England in Conflict, 1603-1660: Kingdom, Community, Commonwealth (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 26.
1628. Parliament supported the war by voting extraordinary supplies, yet the actual
yields were disappointing. 146 The royal government lacked the necessary institutions to
improve the collection of granted parliamentary supplies.
In the 1610s, both Parliament and the royal government looked back at the consolidation
of the domain state in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries in their search for
remedies for the current fiscal crisis. 14 7 Financial officials of the royal government still
believed that it was possible to increase the yields from the ordinary revenue through
better management. To this end, they attempted to uncover the "concealed" rents and
lands that belonged to the crown, to disforest and sell timber, to drain the fens, to
encroach on commons, etc. 148 They even sought to increase ordinary revenues by
reviving some medieval feudal rights, such as knighthood and forest fines, and by selling
general pardons, titles of baron and peer, and even offices. 149 They also implemented
"mercantilist policies," such as granting monopolies to commercial projects, and hoped to
share the expected business profit. 150 These measures to save the obsolete domain state,
however, were fiscally unproductive and politically unpopular.
146 Parliament did not intend to use "fiscal means" to block the king's war efforts. For Parliament's support
of the war of 1625-8, see Thomas Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution: English Politics and the Coming of
War, 1621-1624 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
147 G. L. Harriss, "Medieval Doctrines in the Debates of Supply, 1610-1629," in Kevin Sharpe ed., Faction
and Parliament: Essays on Early Stuart History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); John Cramsie, Kingship
and Crown Finance Under James VI and 1, p. 190.
148 On these entrepreneurial projects, see Joan Thirsk, "The Crown as projector on its own estates, from
Elizabeth I to Charles I," and Richard Hoyle, "Disafforestation and drainage: the Crown as entrepreneur?"
Both in R. W. Hoyle ed., The Estates ofthe English Crown, 1558-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
149 John Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance Under James VI and I, p. 141 and p. 147.
150 John Cramsie, "Commercial Projects and the Fiscal Policy of James VI and I," Historical Journal, Vol.
43, No. 2 (2000): 345-364; Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1992), p. 122.
As the English historian Conrad Russell has reminded us, we need to view the conflicts
between the royal government and Parliament in this period as taking place within an
institutional framework accepted by both sides. 5 1 For example, the granting of
monopoly was not itself controversial. Rather, it was the private enforcement of
government regulation by monopolists that stirred up strong protests.'s2 Opponents were
concerned about the ill influence that the abuse of monopolies had on the health of the
body politic, which the monarch and his councilors had a duty to preserve.15 3 And the
royal government was prepared to repeal many unprofitable measures such as patents of
inns, alehouses, and gold and silver thread while preserving a few fiscally productive
ones such as the monopoly of tobacco.15 4 Likewise, the disputes between crown and
Parliament over the customs duties in the 1620s occurred in the shared recognition of the
king's prerogative to raise the obsolete rates of customs duties. 5 5
One major constitutional debate between Parliament and the royal government were over
the annual collection of ship money, a non-parliamentary levy whose annual collection
was extended to the whole country in 1635. As its annual collection was based upon the
directly assessed individual wealth in each county and major town, ship money became a
defacto nation-wide direct tax. The collected ship money was used for the newly
established professional royal navy rather than being diverted for other purposes, such as
151 Conrad Russell, The Addled Parliament of 1614: The Limits of Revision, p. 18.
152 Linda Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England, p. 138; Conrad Russell,
Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-1629, p. 100.
153 David Harris Sacks, "The countervailing of benefits: monopoly, liberty, and benevolence in Elizabethan
England," in Dale Hoak, ed., Tudor Political Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
particularly pp. 280-281.
154 John Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance Under James VI and I, p. 177;
155 Michael J. Braddick, The Nerves of State: Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558-1714
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 53-54.
to raise a standing army or for the crown's personal expenses.156 However, according to
the fiscal constitution of the domain state, ship money did not belong to the crown's
"ordinary revenue," and therefore its levy could only be justified by emergencies and
voted only by Parliament. In the peaceful years of 1634-35 there was no imminent
danger to England. In making its case, the royal government appealed to the crown's
duty to protect the realm under the new circumstances of naval warfare, which made it
urgent for England to replace the conscription of merchant ships by a professional
navy.157 The continued collection of ship money, in spite of its unsettled legal status,
best illustrates the tension between the obsolete institutions of domain state and the new
reality.
Several factors contributed to the stickiness of the institutions of the domain state in early
Stuart England. The severe fiscal crisis in the 1610s forced the royal government to
implement retrenchment which saved some £63,000 in the period between 1617 and 1620
by reducing the expenditures of the royal household, wardrobe, pensions, navy, ordnance,
and garrison. These continued into the reign of Charles I (1625-1642).158 The English
government could not afford costly offensive strategies, as illustrated in the debacle of
the expeditions of Cadiz and the Isle of Rh6 in the wars in 1625-28. Because of the
156 Andrew Thrush, "Naval finance and the origins and development of ship money," in Mark Charles
Fissel, ed., War and Government in Britain, 1598-1650 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991);
Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I, pp. 594-5.
157 For details of these debates, see Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I, pp. 717-729; Glenn
Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642
(London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 202-11.
158 John Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance Under James VI and I, pp. 160-162; idem, "Crown Finance
and Reform: The Legacy of the 'Addled Parliament'," in Stephen Clucas and Rosalind Davies eds., The
Crisis of 1614 and the Addled Parliament (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), p. 39; Kevin Sharpe, "The Personal
Rule of Charles I," in Howard Tomlinson ed., Before the English Civil War: Essays on Early Stuart
Politics and Government (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), p. 60.
English Channel, it could retreat from the power struggles going on in Continental
Europe.159 This defensive strategy made it possible for the royal government to stop
various non-parliamentary means undertaken to raise revenues to meet military
expenditures, such as the benevolence and the forced loans in 1626-28.
More importantly, the royal government shifted its fiscal burden to localities. Fiscal
decentralization intensified as the royal government transferred much of the financial
costs of national defense, the implementation of the poor law, famine relief, maintenance
of order and infrastructure, and so on to localities. Local gentry collected various local
"rates" to disburse these state affairs on the local level. 160 The major role for the central
government was to provide coordination and guidance.161 Only when local governments
were reluctant to strictly implement measures to prevent the spread of plagues, such as
isolation and confinement, did the central government take more initiative.162 The shared
agenda of center and local elites to legitimate the state power thus complemented the
entrenched fiscal decentralization.163
15' For the emphasis on the role the Channel played in preventing the escalation of England's military
spending in the 1630s, see Conrad Russell, Unrevolutionary England, p. 135.16( John Guy, Tudor England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 385; Conrad Russell, The Causes
of the English Civil War, p. 175
161 For assessments of the active role of the center in guiding local governance in early Stuart England, see
Michael J. Braddick, "State Formation and Social Change in Early Modern England." Social History, Vol.
16, No. (1991): 1-17; Paul Slack, From Reformation to Improvement: Public Welfare in Early Modern
England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Michael J. Braddick and John Walter, eds., Negotiating
Power in Early Modern English Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
162 Michael J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, pp. 124-8.
163 For emphasis on the interdependence of the center and local governments in early Stuart England, see
Steve Hindle, The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, chapter 1.
Ship money and the customs were the two principal pillars of the royal government
which helped prevent its insolvency in the late 163Os.164 Nonetheless, the fiscal stability
in the 1630s was precarious as the central government did not have the ability to mobilize
financial resources by means of its revenues. Ship money was consumed by the royal
navy. The customs revenues were controlled by the syndicate of customs farmers. In
1628, the City of London refused to provide fresh credit to the royal government unless
its previous debts had been satisfactorily cleared.165 Meanwhile, fiscal decentralization
and local gentry control over the assessment and collection of both parliamentary
supplies and non-parliamentary levies such as ship money to a large extent contained the
tension between the center and localities. The royal government's intention to
excessively extract revenues from society could be effectively blocked by the non-
cooperation of local elites.166
In contrast to the domain state in England in the 1600s, the Japanese state in the early
nineteenth century rested upon tax revenues. Yet it was an incomplete fiscal state
because the shogunate (the Bakufu), acting as the central government, did not collect
taxes in the whole territory of Japan but only from the territories under its governance.
This resulted from the previous history of state formation in Tokugawa Japan (1603-
1868). The fiscal institutions of the Bakufu, which unified Japan in 1603, were not fully
consolidated until the 1730s. In the early seventeenth century, Japan was one of the
164 Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I, p. 129 and p. 593.
165 Robert Ashton, "Revenue Farming under the Early Stuarts," Economic History Review, new series, Vol.
8, Issue 3 (1956), p. 317.
166 See the emphasis on this point in Richard Cust, The Forced Loan and English Politics, 1626-1628
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 142-3; Conrad Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-1629,
pp. 64-5.
major gold and silver producing countries in the world. The Bakufu derived its income
mainly from three sources: the land tax (nengu), which was paid in rice for paddy fields
or in cash for dry lands; the profit from the gold and silver mines which it monopolized;
and government-regulated foreign trade through Nagasaki.167 However, the output of
gold and silver sharply declined after the mid-seventeenth century. Meanwhile, foreign
trade led to huge outflows of silver to China in return for imports such as raw silk. In
order to prevent silver drainage, the Bakufu in the 1630s began to tightly control foreign
trade and encouraged domestic production of raw silk as "import-substitution." In 1668,
it prohibited the export of silver.' 68
As the land tax became the principal source of government income, the Bakufu in the
famous Ky6h6 Reform (1716-1736) tried to improve its yields. It encouraged
reclamation of new lands, endeavored to update the assessment of agricultural output, and
began to collect the land tax according to a fixed rate.169 Over the course of the
eighteenth century, the income of the Bakufu became inadequate to sustain its ever-
expanding role in governing Japan. In response, it transferred the burden of increasing
public expenditures in river management, calamity relief, and infrastructure maintenance
to domain governments (han) that acted as local governments. These measures included
the imposition of levies such as construction services (kuniyaku bushin), the handover
167 According to Ono Mizuo, the profit from mines of gold and silver was almost equivalent to the revenue
collected from the land tax in this period. See Ono Mizuo, Edo bakufu zaisei shiron [A Study of the Fiscal
History of the Bakufu] (T6ky6: Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 1996), pp. 32-1.
168 For an important discussion of these economic considerations in the Bakufu's "closure policy" (sakoku)
between 1630s and 1660s, see Tashiro Kazui, "Tokugawa jidai no b6eki [Foreign trade in the Tokugawa
period]," in Hayami Akira and Miyamoto Matao, eds., Keizai shakai no seiritsu: 1 7' hh seiki [The
Formation of an Economic Society: Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries], pp. 130-64.
169 Furushima Toshio, "The village and agriculture during the Edo period," in John W. Hall ed., The
Cambridge History ofJapan, volume 4, Early Modern Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), pp. 495-8.
river management and flood control projects (otetsu bushin), etc.170 Transfer of the costs
of state affairs to domain governments stabilized the incomplete fiscal state in practice.
In the period between 1760 and 1786, the Bakufu implemented active mercantilist
policies (the Tanuma Reform) to both expand its tax base and tap revenues from the non-
agricultural sectors, including foreign trade. It imposed new taxes upon sake, soy sauce,
water wheels, and so on, which were collected through the intermediaries of villages,
business guilds (nakama), wholesale agencies (tonya), and government-granted
monopolies (kabunakama). To ease the economic distress of daimyos and earn profit, the
Bakufu forced important merchants in Osaka to provide it with low-interest loans
(goyakin) and then re-lent these monies to daimyos. The Bakufu also sought to raise
revenues from the commercial development of the colony of Ezo (today's Hokkaido) and
from the export of Japanese goods such as copper and dried sea products to Chinese and
Dutch merchants through Nagasaki. Fiscal productiveness to a large extent determined
the fate of these policies. The Bakufu was forced to repeal some new levies upon silk
thread, lamp oil, and cloth when collection by monopoly-holding urban merchants led to
large-scale riots by small producers. The loans to daimyos and the commercial
development of Ezo became fiscal drains and had to be curtailed. 171 In 1787, the Bakufu
re-exerted tight control over foreign trade so as to limit the outflow of copper when it
began minting increasing amounts of copper cash for the domestic economy.
170 Oguchi Yiijir6, "Bakufu no zaisei," in Shimbo Hiroshi and Sait6 Osamu, eds., Kindai seich5 no taid6
[Gathering Momentum for Modem Growth], pp. 152-5.
17' Oguchi Yqjir6, "Bakufu no zaisei," pp. 141-4; John Whitney Hall, Tanuma Okitsugu, 1719-1788:
Forerunner ofModern Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), chapter IV.
Nonetheless, Bakufu financial officials well understood the fiscal importance of
encouraging exports of Japanese goods, if not of precious metals.17 2
However, efforts to diversify the tax base in the second half of the eighteenth century
coincided with a highly hostile environment. Severe natural calamities such as unusually
cold weather, droughts and volcanic eruptions frequently occurred, causing widespread
crop failure and serious famine. 173 At a time when revenues were falling sharply,
particularly due to reliance on the land tax, the Bakufu as the central government was
obliged to provide famine relief and funds for the recovery of agricultural production; to
prepare reserves of grain and funds against future incidences of famine; and to prevent
the fall of rice prices through government procurement, etc. 174 In the period between
1786 and 1817, the Bakufu depended mainly upon the reduction of administrative and
shogunal household expenditures, the dispensing of its cash reserves, and the transfer of
larger shares of outlays for river management and other construction projects to domain
governments in order to keep expenses with the limits of income.1 75
In addition to natural disasters, it was also a time of rising international tension. Disputes
with the Russians over the northern frontiers and the appearance of British warships in
Japanese waters between 1808 and 1818 made increased defense spending in Ezo and the
17 Nakai Nobuhiko, Tenkanki bakuhansei no kenkyi [A Study of the Bakufu-han System in the Transition
Periods of H6reki and Tenmei (1751-1788)] (T6ky6: Hanawa Shob6, 1971), pp. 1534. The new restriction
on foreign trade in 1787 mainly aimed to stop outflows of copper from Japan.
173 See Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 238-40.
174 Fujida Satoru, "19 seiki maehan no Nihon," in Iwanami koza Nihon tsishi, Vol. 15 Kinsei 5 (T6ky6:
Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 8-12.
m For the detailed discussion of the limit of fiscal retrenchment in the period between 1789 and 1817, see
Oguchi Yiijir6, "Kansei-Bunkaki no Bakufu zaisei [The public finance of the Bakufu between 1789 and
1817]," in Bit6 Masahide Sensei Kanreki-kinenkai ed., Nihon kinseishi ronso (ge) (T6ky6: Yoshikawa
K6bunkan, 1984), pp. 209-52.
T6ky6 Bay area urgent.176 By 1818, the Bakufu could no longer continue the policy of
parsimony in public expenditures and began to use currency debasement to raise
revenues, even though this had previously been viewed as a bad policy. Officials
responsible for financial affairs seemed to hope that the increased monetary input could
reverse the decline of rice prices ongoing since 1810 and stimulate economic
transactions, thus avoiding inflation. In order for the economy to absorb the increasing
amount of minted coins, they deliberately debased the currency with smaller
denominations and increased the amount of the minted copper cash.177 By 1832, the total
profit that the Bakufu had gained from recoinage was as high as 5.5 million ry5, an
enormous sum given that its annual income was less than 1 million ryd at the time. 78 In
response to a 75 percent rise in prices from 1818 to 1838, financial officials in 1841
attempted to use more market competition to drive down prices by ordering the
dissolution of business guilds and monopolies.179 The failure of this policy finally forced
the Bakufu to stop raising fiscal revenues by recoinage in 1844.
Enormous pressure to increase defense spending continued through the 1840s as Japan
observed the military superiority of the British in the Opium War (1840-42).
Retrenchment was implemented again to reduce the expenditures of the shogun's
household and administration, yet there was little room left for parsimony. In 1843, the
176 The British warship Phaeton entered Nagasaki harbor in 1808, and British ships appeared in Uraga in
1816, 1817, and 1818. For the increasing awareness of foreign threats in Japan between 1792 and 1818, see
Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan, pp. 482-502.
177 For these economic considerations, see Shimbo Hiroshi and Sait6 Osamu, "Gaisetsu - 19 seiki e," pp.
30-1.
178 Ibid., p. 31. The estimate of the Bakufu's annual income in the 1830s is cited from Oyama Shikitar6,
Bakufumatsu zaiseishi kenky! [A Study of the Fiscal History of the Late Bakufu] (Kyoto: Shibunkaku
Shuppan, 1974), p. 46.179 Fujita Satoru, Tenp5 no kaikaku [The Tenp6 Reform] (T6ky6: Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 1989), pp. 145-8.
Bakufu carried out serious reforms which aimed to extract more revenue from the land
tax by uncovering reclaimed land that had remained untaxed, and by more accurate
assessments of agricultural output, particularly the value of lands used for cultivating
cash crops. However, the Bakufu did not possess the necessary administrative ability for
such a formidable task.180 Moreover, commercialization in the rural areas had produced
significant social differentiation within villages. The Bakufu could not extract more tax
revenues directly from the landlords or rich farmers upon whom it had to depend to
maintain order and administration on the village level.18' Many local magistrates who
bore the brunt of peasant anti-tax riots strongly opposed harsh measures to extract land
taxes from peasants and called for "benevolent governance (jinsei)."182 In the absence of
reliable and elastic tax revenues, the Bakufu's creditworthiness in the financial markets
remained low. The "forced loans" (goydkin) that the Bakufu imposed upon urban
merchants did not satisfy its increasing fiscal needs.
Nonetheless, the stringent fiscal situation of the Bakufu did not lead to its immediate
collapse. Instead, as the central government, it could mobilize domain governments to
strengthen the defense of Japan and urge them to adopt Western-style cannons. The
pressure of increasing defense expenditures was thus transferred to domain governments
as the security of Japan was considered the "public" interest of Japan rather than the
180 Thomas C. Smith, "The Land Tax in the Tokugawa Period," reprinted in Thomas C. Smith, Native
Sources ofJapanese Industrialization, 1750-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 50-
70.
181 Oguchi Yiijir6, "Bakufu no zaisei," in Shimbo Hiroshi and Saito Osamu, eds., Kindai seicho no taidd
[Gathering Momentum for Modem Growth], pp. 138-140 and pp. 150-15 1.
182 Fujita Satoru, Tenpo no kaikaku [The Tenp6 Reform], pp. 138-144.
Bakufu's "private" interest. 8 3 Much as in early Stuart England, fiscal decentralization
was complemented by a widely shared goal to legitimate the state power in both domestic
and foreign affairs.
Unlike the domain state in early Stuart England, the state in eighteenth-century China
was a fiscal state which derived the vast majority of its income from the land and salt
taxes.184 In contrast to the incomplete fiscal state in Tokugawa Japan, the central
government in China taxed the whole territory governed directly by its administrative
institutions (China proper). After the fiscal reforms in the reign of the Yongzheng
emperor (1723-1735), the management, if not the actual operation, of the fiscal system of
Qing China became more centralized as the Ministry of Revenue supervised and audited
the annual accounts of both the collections and expenditures of provincial
governments. 18 By 1750, the assessment and collection of land taxes was much
simplified when the government converted the value of the head tax and miscellaneous
labor services into standard land taxes collected by fixed quotas.
After the resumption of foreign trade in China in 1685, huge amounts of silver flowed
from overseas into the country in return for raw silk, tea and porcelain. According to the
83 On the role of the Bakufu as the central government in organizing national defense, see Fujita Satoru,
Bakuhansei kokka no seijishi teki kenkya [A Study of the Political History of the Bakuhan System] (T6ky6:
Azekura Shob6, 1987), pp. 213-4. For a discussion of the transfer of defense expenditures to domain
governments, see Oguchi Yijir6, "Bakufu no zaisei," p. 166; Fujita Satoru, "Tenp6 kaikakuki no kaib6
seisaku ni tuite [A study of the policies of seaborne defense in the Tenp6 period]," Rekishigaku kenkya, No.
469 (1979), especially pp. 20-24
184 In 1753, the revenues from the land tax accounted respectively for about 73 percent and the salt tax
about 12 percent of the annual government income. Calculated from Table4.2 in Wang Yeh-chien, Land
Taxation in Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 72.
185 Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reforms in Eighteenth-Century Ch'ing
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
historian Wang Yeh-chien's estimates, silver inflows caused a 280 percent increase in the
silver stock in China between 1680 and 1830. 186 As a suitable medium for inter-regional
trade, silver greatly stimulated the monetization of the Chinese economy and the
development of a national market. Meanwhile, the development of a market economy in
eighteenth-century China further benefited from many liberal economic policies
implemented during the reign of the Qianlong emperor (1736-1796). The government
permitted Chinese merchants to engage in foreign trade, encouraged private investments
in mining, repealed transit duties on the grain trade in times of peace, and reduced taxes
levied on commercial transactions and the surcharges on salt.1 87 These new economic
policies to a large extent represented a changing attitude on the part of government
officials toward the new reality of a market economy. The greatly expanded domestic
economy and the development of long-distance trade provided the state with a growing
tax base. Although the government fixed the rates in the collection of the land tax, lightly
taxed the commercial sectors, and often granted tax remission to regions struck by natural
calamities (even nation-wide exemption from land taxes), it could still afford to govern a
186 Calculated from Table 1.2 in Wang Yeh-chien, "Secular Trends of Rice Prices in the Yangzi Delta,
1638-1935," in Thomas G. Rawski and Lillian M. Li, eds., Chinese History in Economic Perspective
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 61. For the silver inflows into China in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, see Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1998), pp. 143-9.
187 For government encouragement of commercial development, see Gao Wangling, Shiba shiji Zhongguo
dejingjifazhan he zhengfu zhengce [The Economic Development in Eighteenth-century China and
Government Policy] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1995); Zhang Xiaotang, "Qianlong
nianjian Qingzhengfu pingheng caizheng zhi yanjiu [Fiscal adjustments during the reign of Qianlong],"
Qingshiyanjiuji, Issue 7 (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1990), pp. 47-59; Xu Tan and Jing Junjian,
"Qingdai qianqi shangshui wenti xintan [A new study of commercial taxes during the Qing dynasty],"
Zhongguojingiishiyanjiu, No. 2, (1990): 87-100. On state support for private investment in the mining of
copper, see Chiu Peng-sheng, "Shiba shiji diantong shichang zhong de guanshang guanxi yu liyi guannian,"
Zhongyangyanjiuyuan lishiyuyan yanjiusuojikan, Vol. 72, Part 1 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2001): 49-
119.
large territory and to pay for expensive military campaigns in Central Asia, Tibet, and
Burma.'
As in the well-established early modem states of early Stuart England and Tokugawa
Japan, legitimation of state power in eighteenth-century China required government
expenditures toward maintaining social order and providing for the public welfare
throughout measures such as famine relief, maintenance of water conservancy, and so on.
Nevertheless, with the development of a market economy, China also experienced a slow
yet steady inflation as the level of prices rose some 300 percent over the eighteenth
century. As tax rates and quotas of the budgets for provincial governments remained
fixed, there was an increasing discrepancy between government income and spending. In
response, the central government appealed to extraordinary revenues through the sales of
nominal titles (juanna) and levies of "contributions" (baoxiao) upon the privileged big
merchants who were granted monopolies in selling salt and in doing business with
Westerners. Local governments, at both the provincial and prefectural levels often
collected surcharges besides the official state taxes to cover their inadequate funds.
Although to some extent this bred corruption, such surcharges were primarily a necessary
means to sustain the operation of the state given the fixed quotas in tax collection. 189
188 Despite these expenses, the amount of silver deposited in the Ministry of Revenue was as high as 80
million tael silver by 1795. See Zhang Xiaotang, "Qianlong nianjian Qingzhengfu pingheng caizheng zhi
yanjiu," p. 27. For the contribution of commercial resources the imperial wars and expansion in the
eighteenth century, see Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia
(Cambridge, MA.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005) and Dai Yingcong, "The Qing
State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force in the Jinchuan Campaigns," Late Imperial China, Vol. 22,
No. 2 (December 2001): 35-90.
189 On the supplementary roles of these local surcharges to the maintenance of the state, see Wang Yeh-
chien, Land Taxation in Imperial China, p. 19; Iwai Shigeki, Chagoku kinsei zaiseishi no kenkyfi [A Study
of the Fiscal History of Early Modem China] (Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004), pp. 43-62.
As it entered the nineteenth century, the Qing government encountered a severe deflation
which it had no institutional ability to overcome. This deflation was mainly caused by
outflows of silver due to the opium trade in the period between the 1800s and 1850s.
China's reduced exports between the 1810s and 1850s, which resulted from an economic
depression in Europe and America, further reduced the inflow of silver into China.190 As
a result, China's domestic silver stocks are estimated to have fallen some 40 percent
between 1820 and the 1850.191 From 1820 onward, the consequences of the intensified
silver drainage were no longer confined to the coastal areas but spread to the whole
economy. 192 This caused a severe deflation and widespread unemployment throughout
the country. Moreover, the scarcity of silver raised the exchange rate between silver
(kuping tael) and copper cash (wen) far above the official rate of 1:1000; this reached
1200-1500 in the 1830s and even went above 2000 in the 1840s (yingui qianjian). As
taxation was paid in silver, the rising value of silver vis-a-vis copper cash greatly
increased the tax burden on peasants and salt merchants even though official tax rates
remained unchanged. In consequence, chronic and nation-wide arrears in land and salt
taxes appeared.193
190 Lin Man-houng, "Zhongguo de baiyin wailiu yu shijie jinyin jianchan," Zhongguo haiyangfazhanshi
lunwenji, No. 4 (1991).
191 Wang Yeh-chien, Zhongguojindai huobi yu yinhang de yanjin: 1644-1937 [The Evolution of Currency
and Banking in Early Modem China: 1644-1937] (Taipei: Institute of Economic Research, Academia
Sinica, 1981), p. 27.
192 For the process of how silver outflows began to affect the national economy from the 1820s on, see Lin
Man-houng, "Yin yu yapian de liutong ji yinguiqianjian xianxiang de quyu fenbu: 1808-1854," Zhongyang
yanjiuyuanjindaishisuojikan, Vol. 22, Part 1 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1993): 91-135.
193 For a detailed discussion of unemployment and shortage in government tax revenue between the 1820s
and 1850s, see Lin Man-houng, China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1801-1856,
chapter 3.
The Qing government between the 181 Os and 1840s was forced to make several
adjustments. The central government reduced administrative expenditures, dispensed the
reserved silver in the Ministry of Revenue, introduced more competition into the sales of
salt, and frequently appealed to the sale of nominal official ranks to raise revenues.' 94
Facing inadequate funds assigned from the center, provincial governments became more
dependent upon the collection of surcharges from both agrarian and commercial sources,
which were permitted yet not supervised by the Ministry of Revenue.195 Moreover, in
order to ease its burden in providing social welfare, the government encouraged local
gentry in both urban and rural areas to take responsibility through such measures as local
granaries, prevention of plagues, maintenance of infrastructure, and so on.196 However,
the effectiveness of these fiscal reforms within the boundaries of existing institutions was
limited as they did not remove the root cause of the crisis, i.e., the severe deflation caused
by silver drainage.
The fiscal difficulties between the 1820s and 1850s exposed a fundamental deficiency in
the institutions of public finance, in spite of the development of a market economy during
the eighteenth century. The Qing government only minted denominated copper cash with
the smallest unit in market exchanges (1 wen) (like one cent in the American economy).
194 Zhou Yumin, Wan Qing caizhengyu shehui bianqian [Public Finance and Social Changes in Late Qing],
pp. 71-4 and pp. 96-102. On the legalization of "private sales" of salt as a means to raise revenue from the
salt tax in the reforms in the 1830s, see Okamoto Takashi, "Shinmatsu hy6h6 no seiritsu [The
establishment of salt-license in the late Qing]," Shigaku zasshi, Vol. 110, No. 12 (December 2001): 36-60.
195 Yamamoto Susumu, Shindai zaiseishi kenkyia [A Study of the Fiscal History of the Qing Dynasty]
(T6ky6: Kyiikoshoin, 2002), particularly chapters 2-6; idem., "Shindai k6ki Shizen ni okeru chih6 zaisei no
keisei [The formation of the provincial fiscal system in Sichuan province in late Qing]," Shirin, Vol. 75,
No. 6 (November 1992): 33-62.
196 Yamoto Susumu, "Shindai k6ki Kose no zaisei kaikaku to zend6 [Fiscal reforms and charity in
Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces in late Qing]," Shigaku zasshi, Vol. CIV, No. 12 (December 1995): 38-60;
idem., "Shindai k6ki Shizen ni okeru chih6 zaisei no keisei [The formation of the provincial fiscal system
in Sichuan province in late Qing]," particularly 33-48.
It did not mint denominated silver currency. Nonetheless, this bimetallic monetary
system is not a parallel standard system of silver and copper (yinqianfubenwei), for silver
was the de facto standard currency which was used in wholesale and inter-regional trade.
Therefore, silver was the unit used to measure value and cost in economic transactions;
and copper cash was only the subsidiary currency (or currency of small denomination)
for daily transactions.' 97 The low-valued and bulky copper cash could not replace silver
in interregional trade, while silver as a currency by weight was too inconvenient for daily
transactions and retail. The high transaction costs caused by the lack of a standardized
token silver currency and the intermediary units between 1 wen copper cash and 1 tael
silver (equals 1000 wen) were to a large extent alleviated by the widespread use of
promissory notes denominated in copper cash and issued by money-exchangers, pawn-
houses, and even shopkeepers, and also by bills of exchange or banknotes issued by big
merchants and bankers. The Mexican silver dollar had become the de facto currency in
economic life in the coastal areas by the early nineteenth century.198 This background
accounts for why many influential statecraft officials and scholars advocated non-
intervention by the state in monetary issues during the great debates over the scarcity of
silver and unbalanced exchange rates between silver and copper cash between 1820s and
197 The monetary historian Ye Shichang has pointed out that silver was the de facto standard currency in
eighteenth-century China, yet he does not consider copper cash as a subsidiary currency. In fact, even in
the gold-standard economy in late eighteenth-century England, copper coins were important to retail sales
because they were the currency of small denominations. See Ye Shichang, Yapian zhanzheng qianhou
woguo de huobi xueshuo [The Monetary Theories in China in the Years Before and After the Opium War]
(Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1963), p. 6. For the importance of copper cash in the English
economy in the eighteenth century, see Peter Mathias, The Transformation ofEngland: Essays in the
Economic and Social History of England in the Eighteenth Century (London: Methuen, 1979), chapter 10.
198 Just imagine the American economy with only two units of currency: pennies and ten dollar bills! For
the complementary roles of privately-issued notes denominated either in silver or copper cash to the
deficiencies in the state's monetary system, see Wang Yeh-chien, Zhongguojindai huobiyu yinhang de
yanjin: 1644-1937 [The Evolution of Currency and Banking in Early Modem China: 1644-1937], pp. 12-
26.
1850s.199 However, the lack of effective intervention by the state in a period of deflation
can be disastrous to the economy.
In an economy where the state mints a denominated standard currency, the state can use
currency debasement, i.e., the reduction of the content or fineness of precious metals such
as gold or silver used in mintage, to maintain the level of the domestic monetary supply
and thus avoid deflation caused by deficits in foreign trade. This is equivalent to a policy
of currency devaluation as a response the chronic deficits in foreign trade. However, as
discussed above, the Qing government used silver by weight as the standard currency. It
could not therefore use the debasement of silver currency as a devaluation policy to
overcome the severe deflation caused by silver drainage through foreign trade.20
Lacking the necessary monetary institutions, the Qing government could do little to
overcome domestic deflation and the ensuing fiscal crisis. In this light, we shall not
assume that the development of a market economy in eighteenth-century China would
automatically continue into the nineteenth century. 20 1 Nor can we attribute the fiscal
difficulties and weakened state capacity in the first half of the nineteenth century solely to
factors such as population growth, extension of territories, and corruption.202
199 For the details of these debates, see Lin Man-houng, "Two Social Theories Revealed: Statecraft
Controversies over China's Monetary Crisis, 1808-1854," Late Imperial China, Vol. 12, No. 2 (December
1991): 1-35. In this otherwise excellent empirical study, Lin fails to realize the role of state's monetary
policy in overcoming deflation and thus over-evaluates the proposals of non-interference in her comments
on the debates.
200 This is similar to the case of deflation in a country which sticks to the gold standard or pegs its currency
to a strong currency even when it suffers from deficits in foreign trade.
201 The leading scholars who have emphasized economic development in eighteenth-century China, such as
Li Bozhong, R. Bin Wong, and Kenneth Pomerantz, often ignore the economic deflation between the 1820s
and 1850s and its implications for the sustained development of the Chinese economy.
202 The widespread unemployment caused by deflation often leaves an impression of "overpopulation"
among researchers. See the criticism of creed of overpopulation in Qing China in James Lee and Wang
Feng, One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard
University Press, 1999). For the association between extension of territory and a weakened state in Qing
III. Implications of the exhaustion of old institutions to the search for alternative
institutions
Against the background described above, we shall not attribute the causes of the fiscal
difficulties of an already institutionalized early modem state to the ruler only. Issues of
public finance in all the three cases had clearly become sufficiently complicated that the
ruler could not handle them personally. Important policies in public finance were always
deliberated among ministers and financial officials before a final decision was reached.
Moreover, the collection of revenues and the expenses related to state affairs involved
thousands of officials (either salaried or non-salaried) all over the country. Finally, the
fiscal condition of the state was already heavily influenced by the market economy,
particularly the ups and downs in prices, which was out of the control of the ruler.
The institutions of public finance in the three cases share one common feature: the state
did not possess the ability to collect indirect taxes from domestic consumption, which
remained lightly taxed. Without the institutions to both raise reliable revenues and
manage available revenues efficiently, none of these states could effectively mobilize
financial resources in the markets. However, these deficiencies in public finance did not
imply an immediate bankruptcy or collapse of the state. Instead, the old institutions
proved sticky as each state made adjustments to alleviate the pain of fiscal crisis,
China, see G. William Skinner, "Introduction," in G. William Skinner ed., The City in Late Imperial China
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), p. 20. This thesis, which underestimates the potential of the
expanded economy in China proper to sustain the state's territory expansion in the eighteenth century,
cannot explain the chronic tax arrears between the 1820s and 1850s. If such chronic and nation-wide tax
arrears were produced by corruption of officials, then one can hardly imagine how such an incompetent
regime could manage to survive till 1911.
particularly through mobilizing local governments and even local communities to share
the increasing cost of managing state affairs.
When it comes to this issue, neo-institutionalists often hold a surprisingly non-
institutional approach as they attribute these problems to the rulers' arbitrary violation of
property rights through predatory taxation.2 0 3 In the three cases examined here, the state
simply did not have the necessary institutions to tap revenues from the commercialized
sectors in the economy. Therefore, the ruler's personal will did not necessarily imply any
actual influence on the economy. Take early Stuart England as an example. Even if
James I or Charles II desired to extract predatory taxes, he still lacked the necessary
institutions to do it. If the wealth of the property-owning class was outside the reach of
the government's "grabbing hand", why should merchants bother to use force to
overthrow the government? In light of the institutional ability of the state to collect
revenues from commercial sectors, we shall not take for granted that there is a direct
conflict of interest between the rising merchant class and the old state.
Meanwhile, maintenance of state power does not imply that the state has to aggregate to
the center as much revenue as possible. Instead, in these three well-established early
modern states, we see a common complementary effect between fiscal decentralization
and local participation in the maintenance of political order and provision of social
welfare. The shared concern to maintain the social and political order thus tied the center
203 Taxation is often characterized as the direct conflict between the monarch and society, or the game
between the monarch and the subjects. See examples in Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James
Robinson, "Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth," NBRE Working Paper, Series
10481, 2004, p. 9; Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, "The Role of General Theory in Comparative-
Historical Sociology," American Journal ofSociology, Vol. 97, No. 1 (July 1991), pp. 19-20.
and localities together. This political condition was indispensable for the transference of
the financial burden from center to localities, which helped mitigate the spending
pressure on the center and prevented an immediate collapse of the state. Intensified fiscal
decentralization further decreased the urgency to search for new tax schemes and
alternative institutions.
In England, for example, the Privy Council in 1627 proposed a nation-wide excise upon
beer, ale and cider as a non-parliamentary levy justified by the demands of war. Because
hostilities with France and Spain ended in 1628, this remained on paper through the
1 630s.2 In Japan, the Bakufu between 1844 and 1853 did not experiment with new
taxation but relied mainly upon the land tax and "forced loans" from urban merchants;
the latter became a kind of long-term (return in twenty years) form of borrowing with an
annual interest rate of 12.5 percent. In China, the Shengjing General Xi En in 1843
proposed that the government levy a tax of 10 percent upon the net profit of a wide-range
of business establishments such as banks, pawns, shops, and warehouses. In addition to
an estimated annual yield of several million tael, he also pointed out that such a levy was
equitable as the heavy tax burden on peasants and light tax on businessmen violated the
principle of impartiality in state affairs. After deliberating this proposal collectively, the
Grand Council and the Board of Revenue turned it down on the grounds that such a
204 Paul Christianson, "Two Proposals for Raising Money by Extraordinary Means, c. 1627," English
Historical Review, Vol. CXVII, No. 471 (April 2002):355-73.
collection would disrupt market transactions and it was administratively too difficult to
check the accounts of each shop.20 s
In this light, the social, economic, and political factors that gave rise to the financial
difficulties of the early modem state in England, Japan, and China did not indicate any
specific direction for subsequent institutional changes. The causes of the rise of the
modem fiscal state are unlikely to appear earlier than 1642 for England, 1868 for Japan,
and 1850 for China. Nonetheless, the readjustment in the old institutions of public
finance turned out to have its own limit and the political stability achieved in this way
was highly precarious. As intensified fiscal decentralization weakened the capacities of
the central government, it was unable to contain unexpected domestic disruptions or
shocks coming from abroad.206
In England in the 1630s, religious tensions in English society began to escalate when
Charles I tried to use coercive means to impose religious conformity upon the three
separate kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland. Yet he did not have the fiscal and
military capacity to attain his goals. Charles I's religious wars with Scotland in 1637-40
provided an opportunity for the Irish to rebel in 1640. The war on two fronts thus
seriously weakened the crown's ability to deal with his political opponents within
England. The escalating mutual mistrust between Charles I and the Long Parliament
205 Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan ed., Jiaqing Daoguang liangchao shangyu dang EfAZXM9i*.%
[Edicts during the Reigns of Jiaqing and Daoguang] (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2000),
Volume 48, pp. 331-4.
206 This is similar to Theda Skocpol's argument that a financially bankrupt state is the necessary condition
for the outbreak of large-scale revolution, even though her structural prescription of the bankruptcy of the
state is over-simplistic. See Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of
France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
ultimately led to their armed conflict in 1642. The huge crack within the ruling class was
seized upon by radicals who advocated parliamentary, and later popular, sovereignty; this
turned a traditional rebellion into a great republican revolution. 207
In Japan, the precarious stability began to shatter after the arrival of Perry's fleets in
1853. This first intensified fiscal decentralization as the Bakufu permitted domain
governments to retain funds which should have been handed over to the center
(agenakin) for strengthening local defenses.208 From 1854, the Bakufu had to turn to
mintage for fiscal purposes. When Japan was forced to open its ports to foreign trade in
1858, the gold standard established since 1772 collapsed quickly as gold currencies flew
to the West. 209 In order to avoid the resulting domestic deflation, the Bakufu in 1860 was
forced to switch to a de facto silver standard. 2 10 Between 1860 and 1867, it relied too
much upon the mintage of silver and copper currencies to raise revenues, particularly by
using the Mexican silver dollar acquired through foreign trade as minting materials. 2 11 In
207 The religious policy of Charles I and the British perspective of "three kingdoms" provide the most
compelling account for the outbreak of the English Civil War in 1641. The studies of religious and
economic conflict in the English society then complement the story by accounting for the escalation and
prolonging of the Civil War. For the former school, see Conrad Russell, The Cause of the English Civil
War, chapter 5; idem., The Fall of the British Monarchies, 163 7-1642 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991). For the
latter school, see Ann Hughes, The Causes of the English Civil War, second edition (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1991); David Wootton, "From Rebellion to Revolution: The Crisis of the Winter of 1642-3 and
the Origins of Civil War Radicalism," English Historical Review, Vol. 105, No. 416 (July 1990): 654-69.
208 Oguchi Yfjir6, "Bunkyiki no Bakufu zaisei [Shogunal finance in the period of 1861-64]," in Kindai
Nihon Kenkyfikai, ed., Bakumatsu ishin no Nihon, volume 3, Nenpo kindai Nihon kenkyfa (T6ky6:
Yamagawa Shuppansha, 1981), pp. 54-5.
209 The exchange rate between gold and silver was 1:5 in Japan as compared to 1:15 abroad. See the
discussion of this phenomenon in Ohkura Takehiko and Shimbo Hiroshi, "The Tokugawa Monetary Policy
in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," Explorations in Economic History, 15 (1978), pp. 112-115.
2 Between 1861 and 1868, the Bakufu only minted 667,000 ry5 of its nominal standard gold currency
(Man'en koban and ichibukin), yet minted 47 million ry5 (Man'en nishu-gin), which made it the standard
silver currency in the economy. See Miyamoto Matao, "Bukka to makuro keizei no henka [Changes in
prices and macroeconomy]," in Shimbo Hiroshi and Sait6 Osamu, eds., Kindai seicho no taid5 [Gathering
Momentum for Modem Growth], p. 88.
211 The total amount of silver currency minted between 1860 and 1867 is estimated to be 81.68 million ryo.
Okura Takehiko, "Y6gin ryfinya to bakufu zaisei [The inflow of the Mexican silver currency and the
1863, the profit from mintage accounted for 52.6 percent of the Bakufu's total annual
income. 212
As it transferred escalating defense expenditures to domain governments, the Bakufu lost
control over their financial matters. Nonetheless, most domain governments did not have
effective fiscal policies but simply appealed to the issue of paper notes to meet spending.
A few domains, particularly Satsuma (one of the leading domains in the Meiji
Restoration in 1868), raised income mainly by counterfeiting the Bakufu's currency.m
In consequence, the amount of currency in Japan is estimated to have increased from 53
million ry6 to 130 million ryd between 1860 and 1867. As a result, the price level rose
more than 200 percent in the same period. Hyperinflation not only weakened the
Bakufu's fiscal capacity but also damaged its legitimacy.
Bakufu's fiscal system]," in Kamiki Tetsuo and Matsuura Akira, eds., Kindai ikki ni okeru keizai hatten
[Economic Development in the Transitional Years to the Modem Period] (T6ky6: D6bunkan, 1987), p.2 5 5 .
212 Ibid., Table 7-3, p. 250.
213 The net profit that Satsuma gained from counterfeiting Bakufu's currency was as high was 2 million ryd
between 1862 and 1865. See Ishii Kanji, Hara Akira, and Takeda Haruhito, eds., Nihon keizaishi I:
Bakumatsuishinki [An Economic History of Japan (I): The Late Tokugawa and Early Meiji Period] (T6ky6:
T6ky6 Daigaku Shuppankai, 2000), p. 16. The scale of counterfeiting in Satsuma was big as about 4,000
laborers worked in the counterfeiting workshops. See M6ri Toshihiko, Meiji ishin no saihakken [A Re-
discovery of the Meiji Restoration] (T6ky6: Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 1993), p. 70.
214 Of the total amount of currency in 1867, about 15 to 21 percent was the paper notes issued by domain
governments. See Miyamoto Matao, "Bukka to makuro keizei no henka," in Shimbo Hiroshi and Sait6
Osamu, eds., Kindai seichd no taidd [Gathering Momentum for Modem Growth], p. 33 and p. 89.
Figure 2.2 The trend of prices in Japan, 1800-1867
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Source: Okura Takehiko and Shimbo Hiroshi, "The Tokugawa Monetary Policy in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries," Explorations in Economic History, 15 (1978), pp. 119-120.
The political situation in the 1860s was highly unstable as there had been deep division
over the issue of opening to the West among the Court, major domains, and the Bakufu.
This eroded the consensus upon which the maintenance of the cooperation between the
center and local governments rested. The Bakufu did not have the capacity to either
contain domestic political opponents or to reject the unequal treaties imposed by western
powers. This was the crucial background behind the regime change known as the Meiji
Restoration of 1868.
In sharp contrast to the Bakufu's use of recoinage to mitigate the deflationary pressure
caused by the outflow of Japanese gold, the Qing government in China could do little to
overcome the deflation caused by silver drainage. Its past experience in monetary policy
primarily concentrated on how to alleviate the scarcity of copper cash (the currency of
small denomination) which raised the exchange rates between copper cash and silver and
therefore caused trouble to both public finance and daily economic transactions in the
eighteenth century. 2 15 By increasing the output of minted copper cash in both the
provinces and the capital, the Qing government in the late eighteenth century managed to
stabilize the market exchange rate between silver tael and copper cash around the official
rate of 1: 1000.216 Based upon these precedents, the Qing government's initial response
to the rising value of silver vis-i-vis copper cash in the early nineteenth century was to
reduce and even stop the mintage of copper cash. The rationale was that the reduction of
minted copper cash would drive up its value and thus the official exchange rate with
silver would be resumed.m
The failure of this method prompted heated debates over monetary policy among scholars
and officials from 1820 onward. Prior to the 1840s, these centered on three approaches.
215 In the first half of the eighteenth century, the market exchange rate between silver (tael) and copper cash
was 1: 700-800 as compared with the official exchange rate of 1:1000. The main cause was a great
reduction of imported Japanese copper after 1715. Copper from Japan had been the main raw material for
the mintage of copper cash in China since 1683. See Chen Chau-nan, Yongzheng Qianlong nianjian de
yinqian biia biandong [A Study of the Fluctuations of the Exchange Rates between Silver and Copper
Cash during the Reigns of Yongzheng and Qianlong] (Taipei: Zhongguo xueshu zhuzuo jianzhu
weiyuanhui, 1966), p. 42. For the emphasis on the importance of minted copper cash to small economic
transactions in the Chinese economy, see Adachi Keiji, "Shindai zenki ni okeru kokka to zeni [The State
and Copper Cash in Early Qing]," Thy6shi kenkyi, Vol. XLIX, No. 4 (March 1991): 47-73. On the
measures to mitigate the scarcity of copper cash in the reign of Qianlong (1736-1795), see Kuroda
Akinobu, "Kenryi no sentaka [The High Value of Copper Cash in the Reign of Qianlong]," Toyoshi
kenkyi, Vol. XLV, No. 4 (March 1987): 692-723.
216 Hans Ulrich Vogel, "Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800," Late Imperial China, Vol. 8, No. 2
(December 1987): 1-51.
17 See the details in Lin Man-houng, "Jiadao qianjian xianxiang chansheng yuanyin 'qianduo qianlie lun'
zhi shangque [A study of the falling value of copper cash vis-A-vis silver in the period between 1808 and
1850]," in Zhang Bingcun and Liu Shiji eds., Zhongguo haiyangfazhanshi lunwenji, volume 5 (Taipei:
Academia Sinica, 1993): 357-426.
Many suggested abandoning the use of silver in public finance, which was equivalent to
replacing the silver standard with a copper one. However, recognizing that the low-
valued and bulky copper cash was not suitable for interregional trade and wholesaling,
especially in a large country like China, they proposed two supplementary measures.
One was to mint copper cash with bigger nominal values (zhudaqian), such as 5 wen
(dangwu), 10 wen (dangshi), and even 1000 wen (dangqian). The other was to issue
paper notes denominated in copper cash (xingchao) for both public finance and
interregional trade. 2 18 Yet both measures were so controversial that the government was
reluctant to implement them. A few officials advocated the minting of a denominated
silver currency. Provincial governments in Jiangsu, Fujian, and Zhejiang in the 1830s
also experimented with the minting of token silver currency, but it could not compete
with the high-quality and well-established Mexican silver dollar which was already
widely used in coastal areas in China, and thus it could not circulate in the markets.219
The third proposal was to seek out new silver mines and to curb silver drainage by
prohibiting the opium trade.
Whereas both conversion to a copper standard and the mintage of silver currency
represented fundamental changes in the monetary regime, this last approach could be
adopted within the existing institutional framework. It is thus not surprising that the Qing
government ultimately chose this option. However, the prohibition of the opium trade in
the late 1830s triggered the Opium War (1840-42). After China's defeat, the opium trade
218 Ye Shichang explicitly points out that in all proposals for issuing paper notes, paper notes were
denominated in copper cash rather than in silver. See Ye Shichang, Yapian zhanzheng qianhou woguo de
huobi xueshuo [The Monetary Theories in China in the Years Before and After the Opium War], p. 39.
219 Wei Jianyou, Zhongguojindai huobishi [A History of Currency in Early Modem China] (Hefei:
Huangshang shushe, 1984), pp. 116-8.
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continued and thus both domestic deflation and fiscal crisis persisted throughout the
decade. Meanwhile, the search for silver mines was unsuccessful as China is poorly
endowed with silver deposits. Inevitably, the attention of government officials and
scholars turned again to the question of how to convert to a copper standard, yet no
consensus emerged from their debates. 220 The financially exhausted government became
increasingly unable to mitigate the rising unemployment, or to provide relief to regions
struck by natural disaster. As a result, in 1850 the Taiping Rebellion originated in
Guangxi province, where there had been devastating unemployment, and soon escalated
into a prolonged civil war.22
The onset of three critical events - the Civil War in England in 1642, the Meiji
Restoration in 1868, and the Taiping Rebellion in China in 1850 - were turning points for
subsequent institutional development in public finance. The ensuing wars provided a
window of opportunity for actors in all three cases to put into practice many financial and
fiscal measures that had hitherto been merely questions for debate or had existed on the
books only. These included the levy of taxes on domestic consumption and the massive
issuing of state fiduciary instruments of credit such as bills of short-term borrowing and
paper notes. In this sense, these big events initiated the search for new fiscal and
financial institutions. How did this search end up with the particular institutions of the
modern fiscal state?
IV. Temporal causal mechanisms and the multiplicity of outcomes
220 Eguchi Hisao, "Ahen sens6go ni okeru ginka taisaku to sono zasetsu [The Frustration of the proposals in
regard to the price of silver after the Opium War]," Shakai keizai shigaku, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1976):22-40.
221 A reference of unemployment and the outbreak of Taiping Rebellion?
101
From a functional perspective, state actors should embrace the institutions of the modem
fiscal state for their potential to extract revenues from millions of ordinary consumers and
to achieve economies of scale in using tax revenue to mobilize long-term financial
resources. This is, however, a perspective from hindsight. Given the uncertainty
involved, contemporary actors did not know what specific institutional arrangements
would provide a solid fiscal and financial foundation. They could not even know the
distributional effects of new institutional proposals or arrangements. They thus could
hardly reach consensus on the specifics of the new institutions in their strategic
bargaining.2 2 2 The use of political power per se is not sufficient to dispel such
uncertainty. They may mistakenly reject those institutional arrangements that would be
ultimately beneficial to their interests in the long run.223 In this situation, we cannot
explain the modem fiscal state as a result of actors' intentional design or strategic
bargaining. Nor can we expect a "corporate coherence" to emerge among state actors
over the issues of institutional building in public finance when there were quite divergent
policy options.224
Although the search for new institutions is many ways alike a trial-and-error process, the
political actors involved have conflicting ideas, interests, and institutional solutions.
Experiments with new institutional arrangements are always complicated by power
222 See the discussion of the limits of rational design in the study of institutional dynamics in Paul Pierson,
"The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change," Governance, Vol. 13, No. 4 (October
2000), particularly pp. 477-86.
223 On how politically powerful actors select and strengthen the specific institutional arrangements which
are beneficial to their interests, see Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992).
224 For examples using "corporate coherence" among state actors to explain the emerge of strong states, see
Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton
University Press, 1978) and Ellen K. Trimberger, Revolutionfrom Above: Military Bureaucrats and
Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Books, 1978).
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struggles among actors who hold divergent views not only on the specifics of institutions
but also on politics. Obviously, political circumstances do not allow actors to try out and
objectively evaluate various institutional arrangements one by one until they find the
right solution. There is always a political cost to pay if an experiment in public finance
fails, as rivals are waiting for the opportunity to come to power and try their own favored
institutional designs. The first movers into institutional experimentation are therefore
more likely to fail, thence to be replaced by their rivals.
Beyond the level of individual actors, these institutional experiments were influenced by
structural factors in the socio-economic environment - both domestic and international.
These included the overall scale of domestic consumption, the composition of various
sectors of the domestic economy, and the status of a country in the global economy.
They could not be changed or manipulated by actors in the short run, yet they
significantly determined the effectiveness of fiscal and financial policies. For example,
the degree of concentration in the production and sale of major consumer goods directly
affected the administrative costs of collecting taxes on domestic consumption. The more
concentrated, the easier to collect. At the same time, the domestic economy also
interacted with the international economy. The failure of the English government's
recoinage policy in 1697 was due to the higher value of silver overseas, particularly in
East Asia. As a result, it was profitable to export the newly minted coins, and silver coins
soon disappeared in England, leading to a severe domestic deflation. 25 Likewise, the
conversion to the gold standard among major economic powers in the 1870s made silver
225 J. Keith Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments: 1650-1710 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1960), pp. 23-61.
103
flow back to East Asia. The deficiencies of silver by weight as a currency became less
apparent in China while making it enormously difficult for the Meiji government to
maintain the gold standard adopted in Japan in 1869.
Considering these complex interactions among various factors, we cannot assume that
there would be a cumulative learning among the political actors involved in these
experiments. For one thing, the political powerful are not necessarily those with better
learning capacities. Moreover, it is difficult for actors under conditions of uncertainty to
diagnose the real causes of institutional failure. Was failure the outcome of inherent
inadequacies in the institutional arrangements? Or was it due to a lack of competent
officials to run theoretically sound institutions? Or was it simply a temporary result from
the general recession in the economy? When learning is further complicated by power
struggles and conflicts of interest among politicians, it is more unlikely for them to reach
consensus on what lessons should be learned from previous experiences. In this light,
cognitive factors such as ideas among actors are not sufficient to reduce uncertainties in
the process of institutional change.
The inadequacies of learning in explaining the direction for subsequent institutional
development can be illustrated by the case of Meiji Japan, a paramount example of a
"learned modernization." The willingness to learn from the West does not suffice to
create a consensus among politicians on what and how to study. This is particularly the
case in public finance. From 1868 on, deep disagreements existed among major factions
in the Meiji government over the issue of inconvertible paper notes. Various options to
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solve this problem - each of which implied quite different directions of institutional
development - were closely tied to fierce power struggles among these factions. If
nothing else, there were quite different banking systems available for study: the
decentralized national-banking system in America, the centralized system of note-issuing
in England, and the system of universal-banking in Germany and Belgium. This situation
was further complicated by power struggles within the government and conflicts between
the newly established Meiji regime and society.226 Learning in the political world is by
no means a cumulative and naturalistic process.
In the collection of the indirect taxes upon domestic consumption, as Edgar Kiser has
pointed out, there is a severe information-asymmetry problem between the central
government as the principal and the officials who work as "agents" for the state in
227collecting indirect taxes. How could the central government monitor tax collection
efficiently so as to ensure that the collected revenues flowed to the center? As the center
did not have the institutions to estimate accurately the scale of domestic consumption, it
is difficult for them to evaluate the performance of collecting officials. If the central
government cannot determine the potential yield of domestic consumption, it can hardly
press its collecting officials for more revenue. At the same time, the agents (either
officials or tax farmers) who collect the indirect taxes on consumption would not reveal
226 Even D. Eleanor Westney, who has emphasized the interaction between the imported Western
organizations and the Japanese environment, pays inadequate attention to the politics involved in this
process. See D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational
Patterns to Meiji Japan (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
227 Edgar Kiser, "Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modern Tax Systems: A Principal-Agent Analysis,"
Politics and Society, Vol. 22, No. 3 (September 1994): 284-315.
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their "private information" about the potential yield to the central government as they
could make profits by taking advantage of this information asymmetry.
Thus, neither the actor-centered mechanism nor the learning effect is adequate to explain
the rise of the modern fiscal state. Indeed, we must recognize that the interactions among
actors, institutional arrangements, and the socio-economic structure generate
endogenously a multiplicity of possible outcomes in the process of searching for new
institutions in public finance. In this light, the rise of the modern fiscal state is simply
one possible outcome rather than the inevitable one. Any causal mechanism to explain
the rise of the modern fiscal state as the eventual outcome thus has to avoid both
determinism and indeterminacy. If we take the observed eventual outcome - either the
rise of the modern fiscal state or not - as given, and neglect other possible outcomes, our
efforts to identify a causal mechanism may suffer from a selection bias. Nonetheless, if
all the possible outcomes have the same probability to occur, then we will have no causal
account but merely a throw of the dice. What is at issue is whether we can uncover a
causal mechanism which can reduce the degree of uncertainty over time and thus increase
the likelihood of the emergence of the modern fiscal state.
Causal mechanisms based on sequences and timing are inadequate to explain the specific
outcome of the modern fiscal state through highly interactive processes. Given the
multiplicity of possible outcomes, sequence-based temporal mechanisms beg the question
of why one particular sequence is causally more important than other possible sequences
which yield other outcomes. In the studies of the "inherent sequentiality" of a tightly
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linked sequence of events, the observed sequence turns out to be caused by the
mechanism of reproduction based upon the use of political power.228 Meanwhile, a
particular reactive sequence of events can hardly maintain itself over a long duration. For
example, an attack by one country would definitely trigger a reactive event from the
country being attacked. Yet as the war goes on, there will be a range of strategic
considerations and policy options and thus multiple possible event-sequences. In this
sense, neither the use of political power nor wars are sufficient conditions for the creation
of effective institutions of public finance. Wars may exert pressure on state actors to
increase tax revenue, yet they could also destroy the domestic economy and disrupt
foreign trade, making it more difficult to extract revenues and raise credit. A politically
and militarily powerful government may quickly collapse if it lacks the fiscal revenues to
support its seemingly mighty military machine.
In regard to timing in institutional change and development, it is important to distinguish
two kinds. If actors intentionally choose the moment of action, then timing is simply a
derivative of actors' strategic calculations, i.e., to seize the opportunity. As I have
pointed out, strategic calculation is not helpful under conditions of huge uncertainty. The
other kind of timing is essentially a structural constraint upon actors, but it does not
dictate how actors respond. The timing in Gerschenkron's theory of late industrialization
is such an example. Well-established steam-powered big industry in the nineteenth
century did not preclude the viability of alternative ways of industrial development for
228 See the discussion of the sequence of causally linked events in James Mahoney, "Path dependence in
historical sociology," pp. 526-32 and Paul Pierson, "Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in
Political Process," Studies in American Political Development, Vol. 14 No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 84-89;
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various late-industrializing countries or regions.m Likewise, the timing of participation
in the European geographical struggles that Thomas Ertman uses to explain the
development of bureaucracy in public finance is similar to a structural constraint. What
is at issue for Ertman is not timing per se but whether previous development in education
and finance had prepared a pool of competent and well-educated financial officials from
which the state could draw. Countries that became involved in the geographic struggles
before the availability of such a pool (e.g., before 1450) had to rely on patrimonial
practices such as "proprietary officeholders, tax-farmers, and officeholder-financiers" to
meet the state's fiscal needs.23 0 Yet the causal effects of timing in Ertman's theory are
not salient to the rise of the modem fiscal state. England's early entry into geographical
struggles (from the 11 00s to 1480s) did not prevent the emergence of bureaucracy in
public finance after 1683. In both late Qing China and late Tokugawa Japan, the
development of education and of a market economy also supplied the state with officials
who were competent in administrative and financial affairs.
The common feature of the evolutionary and the path-dependent approaches in studying
socio-economic change is that they take into account uncertainty and contingency. Both
try to explain how a specific outcome unpredictable by rational actors ex ante would
229 Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective," in Alexander
Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1962). For various alternative ways of industrial development other than that of relying upon steam-
powered big industry in nineteenth-century Europe, see Rondo Cameron, "A New View of European
Industrialization," Economic History Review, Vol. 38, Issue 1 (February 1985): 1-23; Patrick. K. O'Brien,
"Do We Have a Typology for the Study of European Industrialization in the XIXth Century?" Journal of
European Economic History, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1986): especially pp. 304-23; Charles Sabel and Jonathan
Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives To Mass Production: Politics, Markets and Technology in Nineteenth
Century Industrialization," Past and Present, 108 (1985): 134-76.
230 Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan, p. 28.
231 In both Japan and China, the statecraft scholarship school (jingshi in Chinese and keisei in Japanese),
which studied various practical issues relevant to governance, administration, and public finance, had been
highly influential since the eighteenth century.
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emerge eventually through a process characterized by a multiplicity of possible outcomes
in the initial stages. Nevertheless, the evolutionary theory is not appropriate to the study
of the rise of the modem fiscal state. The world of politics does not have a competition
mechanism as strong as that found in a free market economy to select the "efficient" or
"optimal" institutional arrangement. 2  Moreover, the evolutionary approach rests upon
one important pre-condition, i.e., the existence of a big pool of trials so that a large
number of "variations" is available simultaneously for the "selection mechanism" to
choose ex post facto the potentially optimal variant (e.g., a product, a technology, an
organizational form, etc.).23 3 However, within one country, it is impossible to have
different groups of actors experimenting with a large number of institutional
arrangements in public finance at the same time.
The theory of path dependence aims to integrate into one unified explanation both
contingency and multiple possible outcomes at the initial stage and irreversibility at the
later stage toward an eventual outcome which is unpredictable ex ante.234 The
mechanisms in the path-dependent process include increasing returns, externalities
(positive or negative), complementary effects (or self-reinforcement), and lock-in.235
232 Paul Pierson, "The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change," pp. 486-8.
233 For a review of the evolutionary theory of economic and technological changes, see Richard R. Nelson,
"Recent Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 33, No.
1 (March 1995): 48-90.
234 See the emphasis on the importance of the theory of path-dependence to the study of social and political
change in Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American
Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2 (June 2000): 251-67; James Mahoney, "Path dependence in
historical sociology," Theory and Society, Vol. 29 (2000): 507-48 and Jack A. Goldstone, "Initial
Conditions, General Laws, Path Dependence, and Explanation in Historical Sociology," American Journal
ofSociology, Vol. 104, No. 3 (November 1998): 829-45.
235 Regarding the generic features of path-dependent processes, see W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns
and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994) and Paul A.
David, "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (May 1985):
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Note that a path-dependent process is a "branching process" which has a multiplicity of
equilibria. In the initial stages, one cannot know which equilibrium is to be dominant in
future. In this sense, the path-dependent explanation is tightly coupled with a
counterfactual argument of "what might have happened" in the event of other possible
outcomes, i.e., alternative paths that the process might have taken.236
Yet the theory of path dependence does not tell us how to get from the initial multiplicity
and uncertainty to that "damned point," after which the path moves irreversibly toward a
specific outcome. Although the effects of small accidents or disturbances in the earlier
stage may be amplified by a path-dependent mechanism, we cannot tell ex ante which
small event will trigger a particular path as the path-dependent process is a non-
deterministic dynamic process.237 In this sense, the path-dependent mechanisms are only
necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the eventual observed outcome. Its
explanatory power is not retrospective to the early stage of socio-economic change when
it is still open to various possible outcomes. As actors cannot foresee the subsequent
effects of path-dependent mechanisms, they cannot realize ahead of time the
"criticalness" of the moment when a path begins toward move toward one possible
outcome. For example, few competitors would have realized that the introduction of the
332-7. The four causes of path dependence are cited from Scott Page, "Path Dependence," Quarterly
Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2006), p. 88.
236 For discussion of the counterfactual nature of a path-dependent explanation, see R. Cowan and P.
Gunby, "Sprayed to death: path dependence, lock-in, and pest control strategies," p. 521. The
counterfactual argument in path dependence is similar to what the historian John L. Gaddis calls the
"plausible counterfactual arguments" which "would have seemed feasible to decision-makers at the time."
On the use of counterfactual argument in historical study, see John L. Gaddis, The Landscape ofHistory:
How Historians Map the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 102.
237 On the non-deterministic nature of path-dependent process and its implications to policy-making, see
Paul A. David, "Path dependence, its critics and the quest for 'historical economics'," in P. Garrouste and
S. loannides, eds., Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas: Past and Present (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001), pp. 20-21 and p. 31; Scott Page, "Path Dependence," p. 91 and p. 102.
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DOS system or the QWERTY keyboard to the market was a momentous event. And
when they did realize, it was often too late to reverse the effect of externalities which had
helped establish the dominance of the two technologies. It is thus an error to conflate the
theory of critical junctures with path dependence. 238
Meanwhile, claims that a path-dependent process is approaching irreversibly toward or is
"locked" in one particular equilibrium can be falsified if the process is swamped or
disrupted by external shocks (e.g. new innovation or foreign invasion). Paul David thus
points out that one important precondition in the study of a path-dependent process is that
it should remain "structurally unperturbed." 239 For example, a state of "lock-in" in
technology such as the keyboard layout or the use of chemical pesticides may be mainly
due to the absence of superior alternatives, and not to the fact that the path-dependent
mechanism prevents a switch to an already proved better alternative. 240 The precondition
is implicitly assumed in the theoretical discussion of path dependence. However, it is
often violated when we apply the theory of path dependence to specific contexts of
institutional change in the real world.2
238 See such examples of conflation in James Mahoney, The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and
Political Regimes in Central America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 6-7; Juliet
Johnson, "'Past' Dependence or Path Contingency? Institutional Design in Postcommunist Financial
Systems," in Grzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E. Hanson, eds., Capitalism and Democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 291; and Terry L. Karl, The Paradox
of Plenty, p. 197.
239 Paul A. David, "Why are institutions the 'carriers of history'?: path dependence and the evolution of
conventions, organizations and institutions," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Vol. 5, No. 2
(1994), p. 208.
240 For the story of keyboard layout, see S. J. Liebowitz and S. E. Margolis, "The Fable of the Keys,"
Journal ofLaw and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1 (April 1990): 1-26. See the case of chemical pesticides in R.
Cowan and P. Gunby, "Sprayed to death: path dependence, lock-in, and pest control strategies," Economic
Journal, Vol. 106, No. 436 (May 1996): 521-42.
241 Paul Pierson has already noted this in his discussion of the relative status of "lock-in." Yet he fails to
realize that the same point also applies to the early stage of the path-dependent process, which makes the
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Applying the notion of path dependence to socio-economic change in general and
institutional development in particular involves dealing with the initial indeterminacy
among multiple possible outcomes. In the study of socio-political change, Paul Pierson
has identified four sources of increasing returns or positive feedbacks, i.e., the large start-
up costs in collective action; actors' investment in acquiring specific skills encouraged by
tightly complementary institutions; the use of political power which strengthens a
specific pattern of power-distribution in society; and the resilience of existing
institutions. 242 In his view, a path-dependent explanation still helps us understand ex
post, if not predict ex ante, the specific outcome, even though it only provides us a
necessary rather than sufficient causal account.243 Gerard Alexander also observes the
indeterminacy in path-dependent explanations. He comments that the possible sources of
path dependence such as institutional density, large set-up costs, coordination effects, and
adaptive expectations, do not suffice to cause an irreversible path toward the
consolidation of certain institutions in the early stage of democratic consolidation. At
that point, it is still possible for political actors to actively compete to modify the
institutional arrangements to advance their respective interests.244
"irreversibility" of a path problematic in empirical studies. See Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path
Dependence, and the Study of Politics," p. 265.
242 Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," pp. 257-63. For further
discussion of "asset specificity" as a source of path-dependence where existing institutions shape the
evaluation of other institutional alternatives among political actors, see Paul Pierson, Politics in Time, p.
148.
243 Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," p. 256.
244 See Gerard Alexander, "Institutions, Path-dependence, and Democratic Consolidation," Journal of
Theoretical Politics, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2001), pp. 257-60.
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In response to the problem of indeterminacy in the initial stages of socio-economic
change, Jeffrey Haydu argues that reiterated problem solving may provide the needed
causal linkage between events in different time periods when a common problem forces
different, and even rival, actors to come up with solutions to the problem. 245
Nonetheless, Haydu does not lay out why and how a problem becomes a common one for
actors with quite different interests, ideas, and political agendas. Moreover, his examples
include some very general social issues such as the conflict between the employer and
union, labor mobility, poverty, and so on. We cannot expect solutions to these general
problems to necessarily converge upon one particular direction of institutional
development. Instead, any solution may simply generate divergent directions of future
problems, which implies a multiplicity of institutional outcomes.
V. A model of institutional learning as the temporal causal mechanism to explain the
rise of the modern fiscal state
In order to identify a temporal causal mechanism to account for the emergence of the
modern fiscal state, I go back to the generic character of the path-dependent process, i.e.,
the probability distribution of the eventual outcome is dependent upon previous events
through time. Douglass North has argued that in an historical process which has many
choices at every step and in which each choice represents a real alternative, path
dependence "is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision making
through time."246 In such a path-dependent process of institutional change, we should
245 Jeffrey Haydu, "Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of
Problem Solving," American Journal ofSociology, Vol. 104, Issue 2 (September 1998), particularly pp.
353-9.
246 Cited from Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, p. 98.
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observe increasing interconnections between formal institutions and actors' behavioral
patterns and cognitive frameworks through time.247
In order to apply path dependence to the study of institutional change, we need to figure
out the complete set of choices that are available to the actors in their original contexts:
not only those that they choose but also those over which they have deliberated carefully
and which thus represented real policy options. As I have argued in section III, the
temporal causal mechanism for the rise of the modem fiscal state is unlikely to originate
prior to the critical events, i.e., 1642 for England, 1868 for Japan, and 1850 for China.
Meanwhile, in the initial stages of the critical events, we can expect to see one common
development in public finance across all three cases. This is the rising importance of
revenues from previously under-taxed sources, especially taxes on domestic
consumption. In contrast, the revenues from the taxes which had proved administratively
or politically difficult to collect in the past, such as the land tax or the tax upon property
and income, would remain inelastic. State actors desperate for revenue should quickly
find new elastic items to tax.
It is more difficult, however, to explain the emergence of centralized institutions in
collecting the indirect taxes on domestic consumption and the customs duties. As
discussed above, the effectiveness of new fiscal or financial institutions depends
significantly upon socio-economic structures largely beyond actors' control. For
example, the ability of the state to centralize the collection of indirect taxes upon
247 See the emphasis on this point in Scott Page, "Path Dependence," p. 89 and Douglass C. North, "Five
Propositions about Institutional Change," in Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., Explaining Social Institutions
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 25.
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domestic consumption is closely connected with the scale and the degree of concentration
of the consumption sectors in the economy. The more concentrated the production and
sale of major consumer goods, the less costly for the state to centrally collect as it only
needs to supervise a limited number of big producers and wholesalers, usually in urban
areas. The state may deliberately encourage the formation of monopolistic wholesalers
or producers with an eye to reducing the cost of tax collection. In so doing, the state
basically divides the monopolistic profit with these large-scale producers or wholesalers.
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of such a policy depends significantly upon the nature of
the production and sale of the consumer goods. The easier it is for small producers or
retailers to evade the barrier of entry, the more difficult it is for the state to promote
monopolies to facilitate tax collection.
In this light, factors such as the use of political power, the start-up costs in setting up
certain new institutional arrangements, and the actors' investment in acquiring skills
specific to new institutional arrangements are not sufficient to push institutional
development toward centralization. Instead, the first or earlier movers in the process of
institutional experimentation may encounter a high probability of failure, rather than the
"advantage of first mover," and thus have to leave the political stage or lose power. Not
surprisingly, there should be a strong risk-averse disposition among state actors; they are
unlikely to implement new institutions in public finance unless they have no other option.
Therefore, we shall not assume that actors are always motivated to keep searching for and
experimenting with new institutional arrangements until they establish the institutions of
the modem fiscal state.
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Moreover, we shall not take for granted that the complementary effects in various
institutional arrangements in public finance would necessarily generate a self-reinforcing
mechanism toward the modem fiscal state. In the initial stages, actors are unlikely to
simultaneously implement institutional arrangements that would immediately reinforce
each other. As a result, an important institutional innovation may seem ineffective due to
the absence of complementary institutional elements. For example, there can be a
mutually reinforcing relationship between the state's long-term borrowing and its tax
institutions. In order to safeguard the state's creditworthiness, state actors may try hard
to ensure reliability in the collection of tax revenues. Reliable tax revenues in turn boost
creditors' confidence in the state's long-term borrowing, which attracts more subscribers
for the state-issued bonds. Nevertheless, the process can easily go in the opposite
direction. The lack of reliable tax revenue may undermine creditors' confidence in newly
introduced credit instruments of long-term borrowing; the ensuing poor performance may
make state actors doubt the feasibility of long-term borrowing. Such a failed experiment
could then remove the motivation to make the collection of tax revenue more reliable. A
vicious cycle thus replaces a potentially virtuous cycle.
In this dissertation, I examine what factors after these critical events could have long-
lasting effects on subsequent institutional development and make actors keep searching
for centralizing institutions in public finance, in spite of divergent political agendas and
power struggles. In particular, my strategy is to explore events which are exogenous to
subsequent institutional development in public finance yet which may force the actors'
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efforts towards a certain specific direction. In this sense, these events do not result from
actors' intentions to build their preferred institutional arrangements. These events can be
small or big, domestic or international, one single event or a chain of tightly connected
events. Yet they share one common feature, i.e., they produce a huge credit crisis for the
state that is caused by an enormous issue of state fiduciary credit instruments - bills of
short-term borrowing or paper notes - to meet urgent spending.
The credit crisis, whose origin is exogenous to subsequent institution development,
brings the central government to the brink of bankruptcy. It thus constitutes a pressing
problem which must be solved, regardless of which political actors come to power. It
imposes a relatively "hard criterion" upon institutional experiments. As overcoming the
credit crisis becomes a common agenda for state actors across political camps, it acts as a
defacto selection mechanism which is not frequently observed in the complex and
opaque political world. In its absence, political actors would have more chance to
manipulate solutions to suit ideological agendas.2 4 8 Given this shared problem, different
groups of state actors would have strong incentives to preserve any effective institutional
arrangements left by their predecessors, along with key personnel who have demonstrated
their expertise in running these new institutional arrangements. The credit crisis thus
exerts long-lasting effects on subsequent institutional development.
Meanwhile, the central government which issued the credit instruments now bears all the
financial risk of redeeming them. It cannot simply pass the responsibility to local
248 See the discussion of the lack of a selection mechanism that is based upon competition or efficiency-
enhancement in Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," p.261.
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governments. This situation thus changes the risk distribution between the center as the
principal and local governments and the collectors of tax revenues (either tax farmers or
officials) as its "agents." This forces the center to centralize tax collection so as to
minimize its own risk. In this light, the credit crisis provides one means to break the
"lock-in" of fiscal decentralization and overcome the uncertainty and indeterminacy of
the early stage of institutional change.
The institutional development induced by the credit crisis resembles a "learning process
without an agent." Effective institutional arrangements are preserved and accumulate
over time. Competent officials in public finance are separated out from those who know
little about financial issues. As state actors, regardless of their individual political
standpoints, grappled with the same credit crisis, officials in public finance can learn
lessons from both their own experiences and from the policy mistakes of their political
rivals. This process is also institutional as a new framework comes into being when
accumulated elements begin to reinforce each other. This process of institutional
learning leads to the emergence of a modern fiscal state, an outcome not anticipated by
any political actors prior to the credit crisis. Socio-economic circumstances in turn are
necessary conditions to sustain this process by which actors under the pressure of the
credit crisis experiment with various institutional arrangements until effective ones
accumulate into a mutually reinforcing system. Instead of appealing to any single factor
such as ideas, or interest calculations, the model of institutional learning relies upon the
accumulation of effective institutional arrangements and competent officials in public
finance over time that gradually reduces the uncertainty in the process.
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When it becomes apparent that the accumulated institutional arrangements can overcome
the credit crisis, state actors turn their efforts to consolidating the emerging institutions.
In this case, reliable tax revenues sustain the creditworthiness of the state's long-term
borrowing or paper notes, and state actors in turn strengthen the management of
centralized tax institutions. In the process of consolidation, state actors become more
confident in the newly established institutions of the modem fiscal state. The
consolidation of the modem fiscal state is by no means followed by a long period of
institutional stasis as suggested in the "punctuated equilibrium" model of institutional
change. 249 As new social and political environments alter existing political coalitions and
power distributions, political actors actively contest both the normative implications and
250functional forms of these institutions. In the case of public finance, political actors
constantly struggle over the fairness of the tax burden and the purpose of government
spending, over the form of specific institutional components and the substance of
policies. However, these continuous and incremental changes do not compromise the
core feature of the modern fiscal state: the institutional linkage between tax revenues and
the state's long-term involvement in the financial markets.
In the following chapters, I explore through empirical studies how the conjunction of a
severe credit crisis with an appropriate set of socio-economic circumstances work
together to allow the unfolding of an institutional learning process over time. In the three
249 Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,"
Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2 (January 1984), pp. 242-3.
250 See the discussion of the political nature of institutional change in Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions
Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 31-33.
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instances, decentralization and centralization are two major possible institutional
outcomes. Nonetheless, in the case of England (1642-1757), two credit crises caused by
excessive issuing of short-term credit instruments in 1665-1672 and 1689-1713 forced
state actors to search for alternative centralized institutions. Both credit crises were
unintended consequences of war. In the former case, England fought against Holland
even though the fiscally unprepared English government did not intend to fight. In the
latter case, the two almost consecutive wars with France turned out unexpectedly
expensive and prolonged. Yet the redemption of the credit instruments constituted a
common problem for state actors. Socio-economic circumstances, particularly the central
position of London in the English economy and the under-development of domestic
financial networks in this period, significantly affected state actors' efforts to convert
short-term credits into long-term liabilities. Instead of turning them into banknotes
floating in the whole economy, an option that actors explicitly considered in the late
171 Os, the English government converted them into low-interest stocks of perpetual
annuities.
In the case of Japan (1868-1895), the credit crisis originated from the issue of non-
convertible paper notes to fund the military campaigns of the Meiji Restoration in 1868.
As the new Meiji government had to meet huge spending needs before it established
institutions to collect taxes, it had no option but to continue its reliance upon the de facto
non-convertible paper notes. The Japanese government's decision to adopt the gold
standard in 1871 ended up exacerbating the credit crisis due to the rise of the value of
gold in international markets after the mid- 1 870s. The convertibility of paper notes thus
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constituted a pressing problem for state actors to solve. The vibrant economy and the
development of domestic financial networks in Japan turned the direction of institutional
development toward how to safeguard the value of the paper notes already floating in the
economy.
The case of China (1850-1911) illustrates the consequence of the lack of an institutional
learning process. When the Qing government issued paper notes in 1853 to cover its
huge fiscal deficit, the Chinese economy was suffering from a highly destructive civil
war. The disrupted domestic economy and inter-regional financial networks could not
support institution building which aimed to promote the circulation of paper notes in the
economy. The failure of the experiment of paper notes in the 1850s made state actors
reluctant to try to introduce the use of credit instruments in public finance even when the
domestic economy and inter-regional financial networks not only recovered but also
expanded in the 1870s and 1880s. The absence of a credit crisis in this period
contributed significantly to the persistence of the traditional fiscal state and its
decentralized institutions. Using the indemnity to Japan in 1895 as a proxy for a credit
crisis on the center, I examine institutional developments after 1895 and discuss why the
modern fiscal state is a possible institutional outcome.
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Chapter 3 Events, Socio-economic conditions, and Institutional learning in
England's Path toward a Modern Fiscal State: 1642-1752
I. Introduction
In England's transformation into a modem fiscal state between 1642 and 1752, we can
discern a clear sequence in which previous institutional achievements provided a basis for
subsequent institutional development. A fiscal state that rested upon the customs, the
monthly assessment (the predecessor of the land tax in 1692), and excises became firmly
established after the English Civil Wars (1642-1652). In the Restoration period (1660-
1688), the management of the income and spending of the royal government became
more centralized, and the royal government established centralized institutions to collect
the customs in 1672 and excises on liquors in 1683. In fighting the Nine Years War
(1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713), the English
government came to increasingly depend upon long-term borrowing funded by tax
revenue, particularly those collected from the indirect excises and customs. As the
economic historian Larry Neal has pointed out, after the English government in the 1720s
established the creditworthiness of its perpetual annuities in the markets, it began to
experience the "joys of debt financing"; the pressure to serve the ever-increasing debt by
punctual semi-annual interest payments forced it to ensure efficient revenue collection
from indirect taxes. From then on, in Neal's view, the path toward the dominance of
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stocks of perpetual annuities at 3 percent, the famous system of "3 percent Consol,"
became ineluctable.2 s1
By the 1750s, the institutions of the modem fiscal state had consolidated. They were
characterized by the state's institutional ability to extract elastic and reliable revenues
from the indirect customs and excises to service regular interest payments of low-interest
perpetual annuities. The stocks of perpetual annuities were also highly liquid assets
which could be freely transferred in the securities markets. Liquidity and punctual
interest payments made them an ideal investment for ordinary investors in both England
and abroad, including professionals, middle-class women, and landed gentry.m The
Bank of England efficiently managed the transfer of and interest payments on the issued
stocks of perpetual annuities. These institutions significantly mitigated conflicts of
interest between land owners and the government and between land owners and the
monied class as the landed wealth did not bear the increasing burden of taxation. The
collective action problem undermined the resistance of ordinary consumers to the rising
excise rates on major consumer goods such as beer, ale, candle, soap, and so on.
Internationally, the enhanced financial capacities of the English state contributed to its
rise as the great power in the early nineteenth century. Domestically, they allowed the
executive branch to build up widespread networks of political patronage and use lucrative
sinecures and pensions to manipulate Members of Parliament. These factors led to a
251 Larry Neal, "The monetary, financial, and political architecture of Europe, 1648-1815," in Leandro
Prados de la Escosura, ed., Exceptionalism and Industrialization: Britain and Its European Rivals, 1688-
1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 180-1.
252 For the emphasis on these two features of the English government's redeemable annuities, see Larry
Neal, "The finance of business during the industrial revolution," in Roderick Floud and D. N. McCloskey,
eds., The Economic History ofBritain Since 1700, volume I, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), p. 165 and pp. 172-3.
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stable oligarchic regime rife with corruption in the second half of the eighteenth
century. 25 3
But how did institutional development in public finance reach that "damned point" of the
1720s, after which the path toward the modem fiscal state became ineluctable? Why did
the self-reinforcing process between reliable and elastic receipts from indirect taxes and
punctual interest payments on the government's market-based system of long-term
borrowing not appear earlier? For example, why did not it emerge during the
Interregnum (1649-1660) when the English government extracted domestic taxes,
borrowed short-term loans and fought not only colonial wars in Scotland and Ireland but
also international wars with Holland and Spain? Given that the collection of the customs
and excises had become efficient and centrally managed before 1688, why was the
system of long-term borrowing not established before the 1720s? When we consider the
contribution of the institutions of the modern fiscal state to the spending capacity of the
state and their distributional effects, resistance by political powerful land owners will not
explain the "delay" in the establishment of the modem fiscal state in England. Why,
then, did political elites in England not establish these institutions earlier?
These questions remind us that we must not take for granted a sequence that becomes
apparent only in hindsight. It is far from self-evident to actors in the process of
253 For the discussion of the relationship between the state's financial capacities and the stable oligarchy in
England after the 1730s, see J. H. Plumb, The Growth ofPolitical Stability in England, 1675-1725
(London: Macmillan, 1967); Geoffrey Holmes and Daniel Szechi, The Age of Oligarchy: Pre-industrial
Britain 1722-1783 (London: Longman, 1993). The severity of "Old Corruption" over the course of the
eighteenth century is illustrated by the large proportion of professionals and bureaucrats among the rich in
Britain in the early nineteenth century. See W. D. Rubinstein, "The End of 'Old Corruption' in Britain
1780-1860," Past and Present, No. 101 (November 1983), pp. 55-6.
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institutional development, who cannot know ex ante the functions and distributional
effects of institutions yet to be created. When we move with historical actors through this
process, the eventual outcome of a modem fiscal state ceases to be inevitable and several
other possible outcomes emerge. Take fiscal centralization as an example.
Centralization in public finance appeared in the early 1650s, but it did not continue to
develop. Instead, in the early years of the Restoration period, the degree of fiscal
decentralization resembled that of the early Stuart period (1603-1642) and the
government relied upon tax farmers for both the collection of its ordinary revenues and
for short-term credit. This situation could have been a "lock-in" equilibrium. Inability to
directly collect revenues made it difficult for the royal government to establish its
credibility in the financial markets, which forced it to rely upon tax farmers for credit.
Meanwhile, in a country which had not established institutions of long-term borrowing
and where the idea of a debt-free state remained deep-rooted, the prospect of a state with
massive perpetual debt seemed quite remote to most political actors. As a result, instead
becoming dominant during the Nine Years War or even earlier, long-term borrowing
began to grow only in the War of the Spanish Succession. Meanwhile, the perpetual
annuities which came to dominate the English government's long-term borrowing did not
fully secure the confidence of creditors until the 1720s.
Given the stickiness of existing institutions and their impact on actors' belief, behavior,
and cognitive capacity, actors do not easily jettison them for some unknown alternative
institutions. In this situation, exogenous shocks are necessary to break "lock-in"
situations such as fiscal decentralization and dependence upon tax farming. Nonetheless,
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the collapse of existing institutions does not automatically indicate a definite direction of
future institutional development for actors. In a process of institutional development
which has multiple possible outcomes, exogenous shocks that upset the previous "lock-
in" equilibrium will not necessarily exert long-lasting effects which force actors to search
for alternative institutions in a specific direction. For example, international wars may
compel state actors to search for institutions that can extract more revenue and borrow
more money. Nonetheless, the protection of the English Channel made it possible for
England to withdraw from expensive power struggles in Continental Europe. Instead of
rising military spending necessarily pushing actors to search for new institutions, fiscal
decentralization or inadequate financial ability could simply have led political actors in
England to avoid expensive international wars. In regard to the self-reinforcing process
between centrally collected revenue and the increasing amount of long-term borrowing, it
is equally possible at the initial stages for unreliable or insufficient tax revenues to reduce
the confidence of creditors in the government's long-term borrowing. The ensuing
difficulty in raising long-term credits would reduce the pressure on government to reform
its institutions of tax collection. A self-reinforcing process can turn out to be either a
virtuous or a vicious cycle.
How shall we explain the eventual outcome of the modern fiscal state in England in the
1750s out of a historical process which was rife with multiple possibilities, contingencies,
and uncertainties? In this chapter, I explore how two credit crises triggered a process of
institutional learning which led to fiscal centralization and ultimately to the outcome of a
modern fiscal state. The two credit crises were associated with international wars but the
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nature of the crisis was not determined by war per se. The common feature that defines
the two credit crises is the state's dependence upon credit instruments that it created to
meet its spending needs. Such a credit crisis is thus different from an economic crisis or
a general fiscal crisis characterized by huge deficits. One credit crisis happened between
1666 and 1672 when the government depended heavily upon the fictitious Treasury
Orders, a credit instrument of short-term borrowing when the government did not
received any actual lending. The other resulted from the accumulation of massive debts
during the two consecutive expensive wars, the Nine Years War (1689-1697) and the
War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713). They included both unfunded debts in the
form of tallies, exchequer bills, and bills issued by the army and navy to cover their
deficits, and funded loans bearing high interest rates.
Both crises were exogenous to subsequent institutional development as they were
unintended consequences of events which were out of the control of actors. However, the
redemption of the issued credit instruments constituted a pressing problem that had to be
solved, no matter which political factions came to power. They thus initiated a process of
institutional learning in which actors experimented with various institutional elements to
solve the problem; hence, effective institutional blocks, useful experiences in managing
public finance, and competent officials were preserved. The end result was a new set of
institutions: the centralized management in the collection and spending of the crown's
ordinary revenue, the establishment of centralized bureaucracies in collecting the customs
(1672) and excises (1683), and the forging of an institutional linkage between indirect
taxes and punctual interest payments on the state's perpetual debts in the 1720s. The
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model of institutional learning triggered by exogenous factors thus contains endogenous
factors which can explain the timing of the emergence of new institutions.
Socio-economic conditions between the 1640s and 1750s significantly shaped the process
of institutional development in public finance. These conditions included the dominance
of London in the English economy and the financial markets, the concentration of wealth
in London and its surrounding regions, and the increasing scale of production of major
consumer goods such as beer. Actors involved in institutional development could not
"manipulate" these conditions according to their institutional preferences or blueprints.
Yet these socio-economic conditions affected the feasibility of the English government's
floating of credit instruments such as tallies and exchequer bills and influenced the
institutional development of centralization in fiscal operation. In particular, the
geographic distribution of England's financial networks, which were overwhelmingly
concentrated in London and its environs in this period, determined the specific outcome
of institutional development in the direction of perpetual borrowing instead of the issuing
of paper notes for the domestic economy.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section II, I examine the fluid process of
institutional development in public finance between 1642 and 1688, which was
characterized by fluctuations between centralized direct tax collection and tax farming.
Distributional politics significantly affected the stability of various institutions with
which the government experimented from 1642 to 1660, when fiscal decentralization
came to replace the centralized institutions which had emerged in the early 1650s. I then
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explore the institutional learning process triggered by the massive issue of fictitious
Treasury Orders and analyze its contribution to the centralized management of the royal
government's ordinary revenue and the establishment of the central collection of the
customs and excises. In particular, I analyze the development of central collection of
excises and how the Excise Department overcame the information asymmetry problem in
monitoring collection in the 1680s.
In section III, I examine the institutional learning process triggered by the credit crisis
which arose from debts accumulated between 1689 and 1713. I argue that the political
conflicts between the Whigs and Tories did not affect the continuous accumulation of
effective institutional elements, experience, and competent officials in the government.
In particular, I argue that there were two different directions of institutional development
available after 1713 by which the state could have sought to overcome the crisis. One
was to turn unfunded short-term debt into long-term liabilities; the other was the issuing
of paper notes, as embodied in the banknotes issued by the Bank of England. Between
1713 and 1720, the combined effects of the government's dependence upon private
corporations to solve its debt problem and the political and financial difficulties involved
in circulating the banknotes throughout England rather than only in London significantly
affected subsequent institutional development. As a result, the path of building
institutional linkages between the state's tax revenue and its perpetual redeemable
annuities became dominant; the path represented by paper notes was abandoned. Section
IV concludes.
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II. Credit crisis and the path toward fiscal centralization: 1642-1688
The decade of the English Civil Wars (1642-1652) was a period of great fiscal
experimentation. After the outbreak of hostilities, both the king and the Long Parliament
felt the same pressure to raise money to fight. Despite their political differences, both
sides adopted similar fiscal expedients such as the sequestration of enemies' property,
borrowing, and the levy of excises. Military urgencies forced the Long Parliament to
impose two new taxes in 1643, the excise and the weekly assessment. The weekly
assessment was a direct tax which was imposed upon the property and income of each
county and town with fixed quotas. In 1646, it became the monthly assessment. In the
period between 1646 and 1654, the Parliamentary government sold the land confiscated
from the crown, the Royalists, the bishops, the deans, and the chapters to clear its debts to
creditors and the arrears of payment to soldiers and officers.2 5 5 In consequence, a fiscal
state emerged in England in the 1650s which derived its income from revenues collected
from the customs, excises, and the monthly assessment. 256
Important changes occurred in fiscal management as the Parliamentary government
centralized the management of its income and expenditures. The Parliamentary
government directly collected the customs. For the monthly assessment, Parliament in
254 Excises first fell on "tobacco, wine, cider, beer, groceries, silks, hats, lace, linen, and furs" and were
expanded to "meat and salt, alums, coppers, hops, starch, etc" in 1654. M. P. Ashley, Financial and
Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 66.
255 See the details of these sales in H. J. Habakkuk, "Public Finance and the Sale of Confiscated Property
during the Interregnum," Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1962): 70-88; Ian Gentles,
"The Sales of Crown Lands during the English Revolution," Economic History Review, New Series, Vol.
26, No. 4 (1973): 614-35; idem., "The Sales of Bishops' Lands in the English Revolution, 1646-1660,"
English Historical Review, Vol. 95, No. 376 (July 1980): 573-96.
256 On the importance of tax revenue to the Parliamentary government, see James S. Wheeler, The Making
of a World Power: War and the Military Revolution in Seventeenth-Century England (Stroud: Sutton,
1999), pp. 118-9.
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1645 ordered that the collected monies were not to be consumed by local forces but be
sent monthly to the Treasurers at War in London's Guildhall.2 s7 In 1654, the Council of
State in the Protectorate regime revived the Exchequer as a means to strengthen the
central management of public finance and ordered the customs, excises, and other sources
of revenue to be paid directly to the Exchequer.. In the historian James Wheeler's
view, this trend toward fiscal centralization represented "a step toward a truly modem
concept of state finance in which revenues would be consolidated and expenditures paid
out of the general revenue fund, rather than out of designated revenues." 259
Meanwhile, the Commonwealth regime in the 1650s adopted a system of deficit
financing in anticipation of its future tax revenue to support its navy and army. For
example, the Navy treasurers issued bills of imprest and warrants to the contractors who
provided the navy with goods and services. These short-term credit instruments, which
could be assigned or sold in the markets, filled the interval between the expenditures and
the arrival of tax revenue, and they were cleared when the government received its
collected tax revenues.260 Wheeler sees the deficit-financing system and the centralized
fiscal system in the 1650s as the origin of the financial revolution in eighteenth-century
England. 26 1 But did these institutions have a self-reinforcing mechanism which could
lead to a path toward long-term borrowing? To answer this question, it is important to
257 Wheeler, The Making ofa World Power, p. 109.
258 Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, pp. 40-41.
259 Wheeler, The Making ofa World Power, p. 141.
260 James S. Wheeler, "Navy Finance, 1649-1660," Historical Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 459-
60.
261 Ibid., p. 458.
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examine contemporary socio-economic conditions and their impact on institutional
development in public finance.
The unique position of London in the English economy facilitated government attempts
to centralize the collection of taxes. In the collection of the customs, some 70-80 percent
of the revenue was collected in London. Moreover, London and its surrounding areas
were the richest regions in England. Of the £53,436 monthly assessment that Parliament
levied on the area under its control in 1645, over two-thirds came from the eastern and
262home counties. In regard to the excise revenue collected from 30 September 1647 to
29 September 1650, London contributed 56.7 percent.263 Centralized tax collection was
thus easier to attain when more than half of government income was collected in London
and its environs.
Nonetheless, there were still no nation-wide financial networks to transmit money in
England in the 1650s. As result, between 1654 and 1659, the vast majority of tax
revenues into and government expenditures out of London were still transported in specie
rather than via more speedy credit instruments such as bills of exchange. 264 Payments to
the New Model Army were also made in coins, which were sent out from London once a
262 The specific amounts were: London and Middlesex (E8060), Norfolk (f7436), Suffolk (f7070), Kent
(f7070), and Essex (f6750). Cited from Ian Gentles, The New Model Army in England, Ireland, and
Scotland, 1645-1653 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 28.
263 Wheeler, The Making ofa World Power, p. 157. This percentage was even as high as 60.2 percent in the
period from March 1658 to August 1660. Ibid., p. 166.
264 In this period, even taxation in kind was not infrequent as shown in "an ordinance of the interregnum
[which] expressed willingness to accept payments in kind" and the fact that only half of taxes were required
to be paid in cash. See Michael J. Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth-Century England:
Local Administration and Response (London: The Royal Historical Society, 1994), p. 153, particularly
footnote 155.
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month to regiments scattered in various locations. 265 Transport of a large quantity of
specie was time-consuming. It was therefore more convenient to assign the revenues
from places of collection directly to destinations of spending. For example, parts of the
excise were collected and disbursed locally rather than being sent to London.266 In the
1650s, centralization of the monthly assessment began to decline as Cromwell permitted
the receivers-general to make payment directly to garrisons or regiments instead of
transmitting all the receipts to London.267 In this light, more centralized management and
supervision of government accounts in this period did not imply that the central
government could aggregate its income to allocate expenditures or to raise credits from
the financial markets in London. 268
Meanwhile, the central government in the 1650s did not possess the institutional ability to
extract elastic revenues. Although the Commonwealth and Protectorate governments
directly collected the customs, the customs amounted to only 20 percent of the
government's total income between 1650 and 1659.269 The boom in England's foreign
trade did not come until the second half of the seventeenth century. In the collection of
excises, the parliamentary government originally tried to depend upon its own salaried
officers to both assess and collect excises. However, direct collection aroused many anti-
excise riots between 1644 and 1649, which forced the Parliamentary government to
265 Gentles, The New Model Army in England, Ireland, and Scotland, p. 48.
266 Wheeler, The Making of a World Power, p. 158. Yet the exact percentage of the excise being spent
locally remains unknown.
267 Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, p. 82. For the details of
the decentralized system of assignments in tax revenue in Hampshire, see Andrew M. Coleby, Central
Government and the Localities: Hampshire 1649-1689 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987),
pp. 47-8.
268 1 am grateful to Patrick K. O'Brien for reminding me this point.
269 Calculated from Wheeler, The Making of a World Power, p. 213.
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repeal the excises levied upon meat and home-brewed beer. 270 Due to the small scale and
dispersed distribution in the production of excisable goods in this period, the
administrative cost of direct collection of excises under different local circumstances was
quite high. In response, the Protectorate government after 1650 had to gradually farm out
the collection of excises to local elites who were much better informed about local
circumstances. Local gentry also firmly controlled both the assessment and collection
of the monthly assessment. In the 1650s, the Protectorate government was unable to
establish its own bureaucracy to replace local elites in the collection of the monthly
assessment and excises. 2 72
Dependence upon local elites reduced the administrative cost in tax collection; yet these
elites were unlikely to sacrifice local interests for the benefit of the center.273 The central
government thus was unable to press for more excise revenues. Meanwhile, that fact that
the Major-Generals in the Protectorate regime made the suppression of ale-houses a high
priority between 1655 and 1657 may have further reduced the receipt of excises.27 4 As a
result, the monthly assessment remained the principal source of the Protectorate
government's income, amounting to almost half of the government's total revenue in
270 On the attempt to centralize the collection of excises and the anti-excise riots in the 1640s, Patrick K.
O'Brien and Philip A. Hunt, "Excises and the Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 1586-1688," in ," in W. M.
Ormrod, Margaret Bonney, and Richard Bonney, eds., Crises, Revolutions, and Self-sustained Growth:
Essays in European Fiscal History, 1130-1830 (Stamford: Shaun Tyas, 1999), pp. 209-14; Braddick,
Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth-Century England, pp. 179-190; idem., "Popular Politics and Public
Policy: The Excise Riots at Smithfield in February 1647 and Its Aftermath," Historical Journal, Vol. 34,
No. 3 (September 1991): 597-626.
271 Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth-Century England, pp. 191-193
272 See the succinct discussion of Cromwell's abortive efforts to build centralized governance in David
Underdown, "Settlement in the Counties, 1653-1658," in G. E. Aylmer ed., The Interregnum: The Quest
for Settlement, 1646-1660 (London: Macmillan, 1972).
273 Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth-Century England, pp. 135-136.
274 Peter Clark, The English Alehouse: A Social History, 1200-1830 (London: Longman, 1983), p. 177 and
Peter Haydon, The English Pub: A History (London: Robert Hale, 1994), p. 71.
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1654.m This led to severe conflicts of interest between the government and land
owners. In June 1657, mounting opposition to the heavy burden of the monthly
assessment forced the Protectorate government to reduce the monthly rate from E120,000
to E35,000.276 This caused an annual loss of more than E million which the government
was unable to cover from other sources.
Inadequate taxing ability reduced the credibility of the Protectorate government in the
financial markets. After 1652, the City of London refused to make loans to the
government as their past debts had not been cleared yet.277 In 1658, it did not even
accept the government's anticipated income as security for lending. 278 In the 1650s,
contractors to the army and navy played a dominant role in the government's deficit
financing. The vast majority of the total new debt incurred by the navy between 1651
and 1660 was owed to the victuallers of the navy.2 79 However, these contractors lacked
the resources to hold government debts longer in hopes of higher future returns. Instead,
they needed money back on time as they had to use cash to procure goods from their
suppliers. When the Protectorate government was unable to clear its previous short-term
debts within one or two years, the contractors had to demand cash payments for their
services.280
275 Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, p. 96.
276 Wheeler, The Making ofa World Power, p. 193.
277 Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, pp. 98-99.
278 Ibid., p. 107.
279 The percentage varied between 60.5 percent and 82.2 percent in the period between 1651 and 1660.
Cited from Wheeler, "Navy Finance, 1649-1660," p. 463.
280 For example, the contractor William Burton, who was a committed radical refused to supply any more
goods on credit in 1660. Cited from Bernard Capp, Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution
1648-1660 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), p. 364. See the state's lack of credit among contractors in Wheeler,
"Navy Finance, 1649-1660," p. 465.
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When the Protectorate government failed to make sufficient profit from the war with
Spain in 1656 to overcome its fiscal problems, its financial bankruptcy significantly
contributed to its collapse and the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660. As
Wheeler notes, the total debt of about £2.2 million of the Protectorate government in
1659 "was equivalent to only one year's average revenue, a level of short-term debt
comparable to the average debt of the period 1660-90, and considerably less than that
after 1700 (italics added)." 28' The underdevelopment of financial networks and small
scale of production in England in the 1650s severely constrained institutional
development toward long-term borrowing.
The newly emerged fiscal centralization of the early 1650s was thus short-lived. In the
early years of the Restoration, government fiscal operations became highly decentralized.
In 1660-2, the Cavalier Parliament reasserted the traditional separation between the
crown's ordinary revenue and the extraordinary revenue granted by Parliament. It settled
with the royal government the level of £l.2 million as the crown's annual ordinary
revenue, which came from the customs (£400,000), excises on liquors (£300,000), and
the hearth tax (£300,000, added in 1662).282 Nonetheless, the newly settled ordinary
revenue was in arrears as it took time for both the government administration and the
economy to recover from the political upheavals and severe depression of 1659-1660.283
The restored royal government suffered from tremendous financial difficulties from the
281 Wheeler, "Navy Finance, 1649-1660," p. 460.
282 The excise on domestically produced beer, ale, and cider accounted for up to 90 percent of the total
excise revenue in the Restoration. Cited from C. D. Chandaman, The English Public Revenue, 1660-1688
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), p. 41.
283 Chandaman, The English Public Revenue, p. 206; Paul Seaward, The Cavalier Parliament and the
Reconstruction of the Old Regime, 1660-1667 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 104.
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very beginning.284 Desperate need for regular income forced the government to rely on
tax farming, especially when the performance of direct collection of the customs and
excises was disappointing in 1660-1662. In 1662, the government farmed the collection
of the customs revenue and excises. Under fiscal decentralization, particular items of
revenue became more important in securing loans than the government's total nominal
income. For example, when the City of London lent to the government, it did not receive
payment from the Exchequer but directly from the collector of specific items of revenue
which had been assigned as security. 285 The royal government thus did not have a
chance to build institutions which could aggregate its ordinary revenue to raise credit
directly.
Tax farmers, as the historian Robert Ashton has pointed out, were important suppliers of
short-term credit to the government.286 In 1667, new financiers, particularly the two
most powerful goldsmith bankers Sir Robert Viner and Edward Backwell, became
farmers of the customs. They accepted deposits from merchants, gentry, and
professionals in both London and the provinces and were therefore more able than
previous tax farmers to provide better terms of farming to the royal government.
Meanwhile, their creditworthiness in the markets was enhanced by the regular tax
revenue at their disposal interest-free prior to its transfer to the government (ranging from
a quarter to half a year). As tax farmers had a close relationship with government, short-
284 In June 1660, the total cash available to the Exchequer was only E141 while the monthly charge of the
inherited army and navy was £100,000. Cited from Glenn 0. Nichols, "English Government Borrowing,
1660-1688," Journal ofBritish Studies, Vol. 10, Issue 2 (May 1971), p. 89 and Chandaman, The English
Public Revenue, p. 196.
285 Nichols, "English Government Borrowing, 1660-1688," p. 89.
286 The financial function of big tax farmers in the early Stuart period that Robert Ashton discussed applies
to those of the Restoration as well. See Robert Ashton, "Revenue Farming under the Early Stuarts,"
Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 8, Issue 3 (1956), pp. 311-313.
137
term loans to government departments were the most profitable and secure investment for
them to attract deposits from creditors.287 Government reliance upon big tax farmers thus
had a strong self-reinforcing tendency. Major tax farmers utilized both lending to the
government and possession of the collected revenue as a liquid asset to strengthen their
power in the financial markets. They thus could offer terms of lending to the government
with which ordinary financiers were unable to compete. As a result, the government
found it harder to find alternative sources of credit to rid itself of its dependence upon tax
farmers.
Fiscal decentralization also affected the government's deficit financing of issuing
Exchequer tallies in anticipation of its future income. 2 88 As the royal government did not
centrally manage its ordinary income, it turned the responsibility of redeeming the
Exchequer tallies over to treasurers of government departments. Upon receiving tallies,
the treasurers had to either sell them or use them as security to borrow cash from private
financiers. In this situation, private networks of treasurers in both the government and
the financial markets were more important than government institutions in securing the
redemption of tallies. 289 The informal and privately-based redemption of the Exchequer
287 In the case of Backwell, more than 90 percent of his investment in 1666 was lent to the government.
See Henry Roseveare, The Financial Revolution, 1660-1760 (London: Longman, 1991), p. 20.
288 The restored royal government issued both the tally of sol and the tally ofpro on its anticipated income
to the treasurers of government departments for their current spending. The former was guaranteed by a
particular source of revenue; it could not be sold or assigned to others and thus had low liquidity. The
latter, in comparison, could be sold or assigned to others and thus had high liquidity. Yet it was not secured
by any specifically assigned item of government income and its redemption at the Exchequer was highly
uncertain if their holders did not have right connections in the government. On the use of tallies for deficit
financing in the early Stuarts, see Robert Ashton, The Crown and the Money Market, 1603-1640 (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1960), pp. 48-50. For their use in the Restoration period, see Chandaman, The English Public
Revenue, pp. 287-294.
289 For example, Sir Stephen Fox, the Paymaster of the Guard in 1661 and later the Paymaster of the forces
and garrison and of the royal household, was able to have his tallies cashed at the Exchequer on time and he
thus profited handsomely in the process of handling government expenditures. See Christopher Clay,
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tallies thus limited the amount that the government could issue to treasurers of
departments. As such, Exchequer tallies could neither prompt fiscal centralization nor
help the government end its reliance upon tax farmers for credit.
The second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67) fully exposed the financial inability of the
English government. As the impending war tightened credit in the markets, London
financiers who lacked confidence in the government's creditworthiness refused to
provide fresh credit to the already indebted royal government. 290 The English
government in 1665 was forced to adopt the Order system proposed by Sir George
Downing, a Teller at the Exchequer. 29 1 The main goal of Downing's proposal was to
raise credit directly from the public by issuing a new government credit instrument, the
Treasury Order bearing an interest rate of 6 percent. The Treasury Orders were secured
on a parliamentary supply of E1.25 million in two years and they could be sold or
assigned in the markets. Their semi-annual payments through the Exchequer were made
according to a strict chronological order determined by the date when the subscribers
paid their money into the Exchequer. In less than two years, the Order system raised
nearly E200,000 from about 900 subscribers.292
Public Finance and Private Wealth: The Career of Sir Stephen Fox, 1626-1716 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978),
particularly chapters 3 and 4.
290 Seaward, The Cavalier Parliament and the Reconstruction of the Old Regime, pp. 239-240, and p. 303.
291 Downing had some practical experience in public finance under the Protectorate government and had
observed first-hand how the Dutch government established its creditworthiness by efficiently managing its
tax revenue and thus could borrow easily from the financial markets. For the early background of Sir
George Downing and its relevance to his invention of the Order system, see Jonathan Scott, "'Good Night
Amsterdam'. Sir George Downing and Anglo-Dutch Statebuilding," English Historical Review, Vol.
CXVIII, No. 476, (April 2003): 334-56.
292 Henry Roseveare, The Treasury 1660-1870: The Foundations of Control (London: Allen & Unwin.,
1973), p. 18 and pp. 24-26.
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As the English government could not mobilize the necessary financial resources to fund
the Second Anglo-Dutch War, it soon suffered a humiliating defeat. This, however, was
insufficient to force the government to overhaul its financial institutions, particularly
when the end of the war removed the pressure to increase military spending. Although
the Commons in December 1666 established the Commissions of Public Accounts to
audit the accounts of extraordinary supplies which Parliament had granted for the war
effort, this political strategy did not imply an attempt to fundamentally reform public
finance. On the one hand, the highly informal way of using Exchequer tallies and the
absence of standard bookkeeping in government departments seriously restricted the
effectiveness of the audit of the Commons. 293 On the other hand, the Commons was
mainly interested in finding scapegoats for the defeat.294 The royal government might
have appealed to both fiscal retrenchment and new loans from private financiers rather
than choose to radically reform its financial institutions.
However, the royal government could not receive any fresh credit in 1667 to cover its
deficits because the financial markets had not yet recovered from the disruptions of the
war, the Great Plague in 1665, and the fire of London in 1666. Its average yield of
ordinary revenue fell to £686,000 a year between 1665 and 1667, while the annual deficit
stood at some £600,000.295 Nor could it seek higher advances from tax farmers as their
contracts had not expired yet. 296 As peace was resumed, it could hardly request
293 As Roseveare has pointed out, in the case of the navy it is extremely difficult for the Commons to tell
fraudulent activities from the necessary methods to maintain the operation in practice. Ibid., pp. 52-3.2 94 J. R. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century (London: Longman, 1996), p. 96.
295 Chandaman, The English Public Revenue, pp. 211-212; Seaward, The Cavalier Parliament and the
Reconstruction of the Old Regime, p. 317.
296 1673 in the Hearth tax, 1671 in the Customs, and 1668 in the excise. See Chandaman, The English
Public Revenue, pp. 215-216.
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extraordinary revenues from Parliament. The royal government thus had no option but to
extend Downing's Order system to meet its spending needs. In contrast to the Orders
issued during the war, which were secured by parliamentary extraordinary supplies, the
newly issued Orders were safeguarded by the crown's ordinary revenues. Between 1667
and 1670, the amount of the issued Orders stood at a level of some £1.2 million a year.297
As the English historian Chandaman has emphasized, these Orders were fictitious credit
instruments because there was no lenders' money actually paid into the Exchequer in
advance. Meanwhile, Chandaman has also argued that they resembled paper notes as
they were issued in small denominations for ordinary transactions in the economy.298
However, there was one big difference between the fictitious Treasury Orders and paper
notes. The Orders were interest-bearing short-term credit instruments, which had to be
redeemed on their due dates (usually a year) at the Exchequer. In contrast, paper notes
could have a longer term. As long as the government ensured their convertibility, paper
notes could continue to circulate, and their holders did not need to redeem them in the
short run. Moreover, subscribers to the Orders were limited to wealthy financiers and
merchants. In comparison, the government could issue a larger amount of paper notes if
they were used in general transactions in the economy. In this sense, the potential for the
government in issuing paper notes was much bigger than that in issuing Treasury Orders.
The former might lead to inflation, but mild inflation which reduced the government's
debt burden did not immediately threaten the survival of the government. In contrast,
excessive issue of Treasury Orders which had to be redeemed within a year could lead to
297 Ibid., p. 216 and p. 219.
298 Ibid. p. 297; Nichols, "English Government Borrowing, 1660-1688," p. 99.
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bankruptcy of the government. Both the pressure on and urgency of the royal
government to redeem the short-term Treasury Orders were significantly greater than to
ensure the convertibility of paper notes.
The massive floating of fictitious Treasury Orders from 1667 thus constituted a credit
crisis for the royal government. As these newly issued Orders now were secured by the
crown's ordinary revenue rather than the parliamentary supplies, its direct consequence
was to force the royal government to reform the institutions which managed the ordinary
revenues so as to ensure timely redemption. In June 1667, Charles II appointed a new
Treasury Commission consisting of young and competent officials such as Sir Thomas
Clifford, Sir William Coventry, and Sir John Duncombe. Sir George Downing was
appointed as Treasury Secretary. The appointment of these officials, who had no
aristocratic background but did have practical experience in managing financial affairs,
was a result of the dire situation of government finance. 299 The regular "pipeline-like"
redemption of the issued Orders according to their consecutive dates of issue significantly
affected the direction of institutional changes implemented by these Treasury
Commissioners.
In order to increase the amount of money available to ensure the punctual redemption of
the issued Orders at the Exchequer, the Treasury Commissioners needed more central
management of the crown's expenditures so as to reduce chances for speculation and
avoid arbitrary spending. Meanwhile, as the Exchequer was responsible for redeeming
299 Howard Tomlinson, "Financial and Administrative Developments in England, 1660-88," in J. R. Jones
ed., The Restored Monarchy, 1660-1688 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979), pp. 96-7.
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the due Orders, the Treasury Commissioners had to not only increase the crown's
ordinary revenue but also ensure its speedy transmission into the Exchequer. This meant
that they had to centralize the management of both accounts and actual cash flows. From
1667 on, the Treasury Commissioners established a meticulous book-keeping system in
government departments, ordered speedy transfer of the collected tax revenues into the
Exchequer, and demanded weekly certificates from spending departments to allow for
regular checking of accounts.3 o In the course of these institutional reforms, the Treasury
came to be more independent from the Privy Council and the Secretaries of State, and
had more power to discipline the management of the finance of the royal government. 301
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of these important administrative reforms was limited in
practice as the Treasury did not have the political authority to control the level of
departmental spending, which was crucially important to implement retrenchment
policies so as to increase the surplus to redeem the Treasury Orders.302 Although the
ordinary revenue increased from less than E650,000 a year in 1665-7 to E954,000 in
1669-70, the total government debt rose to nearly E3 million by 1670.303 On the eve of
the Third Dutch War (1672-74), the value of outstanding Orders was more than E1.1
million, and their repayment would have reduced the government's disposable revenue to
less than E400,000.304 In January 1672, the government announced it was postponing
300 For the details of these reforms, see Roseveare, The Treasury 1660-1870, pp. 22-36; Chandaman, The
English Public Revenue, pp. 213-214; Stephen B. Baxter, The Development of the Treasury, 1660-1702
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 180-184.
301 Tomlinson, "Financial and Administrative Developments in England, 1660-88," pp. 98-9.
302 Roseveare, The Treasury 1660-1870, pp. 27-8.
303 Chandaman, The English Public Revenue, p. 220.
304 Ibid., p. 226.
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repayment for one year and would pay 6 percent interest. 305 This decision was a severe
blow to the four goldsmith bankers/tax farmers who had bought Orders in the markets at
great discount and thus held up to 80 percent of the total outstanding Orders in 1672.306
Instead of an intentional default, the Stop of the Exchequer was mainly caused by the
government's inability to use its current income to meet both it current spending and the
payment of its outstanding short-term debts. 307
Although it was crucial for the Treasury Commissioners to increase the royal
government's income, they were subject to the political constraint of Parliament and the
traditional separation between the ordinary and extraordinary revenues. Throughout the
Restoration period, additional income from increasing the customs duties or the excise
rates, as well as the monthly assessment, was carefully safeguarded by Parliament as
308
extraordinary revenue. Nonetheless, the Commons in this period did not succeed in
overseeing the accounts of the crown's ordinary revenue. 309 The royal government had
full discretion to decide the specific methods used in collecting the crown's ordinary
revenues. In this light, an extensive approach to increasing government income by
broadening its tax base was not available to the royal government. It thus had to turn to
305 Nichols, "English Government Borrowing, 1660-1688," pp. 100-101.
306 Among them, Robert Vyner held 32 percent, Edward Backwell 22.5 percent, the Meynells 19 percent,
and Colville's successor 6.5 percent. Cited in Roseveare, The Financial Revolution 1660-17, p. 22.
307 After 1674, the royal government managed to make interest payments on this debt out of its ordinary
revenue. See J. Keith Horsefield, "The 'Stop of the Exchequer' Revisited," Economic History Review, new
series, Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 1982): 511-28.
308 Chandaman, The English Public Revenue, pp. 47-49. For the political significance of parliamentary
control over the granting of extraordinary revenues, see Henry Roseveare, The Treasury 1660-1870, pp. 54-
56 and J. R. Jones, Country and Court: England, 1658-1714 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978),
pp. 192-6.
309 Roseveare, The Treasury 1660-1870, p. 54.
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"intensive means,," i.e., to maximize the receipts from the already settled ordinary
revenues of the customs, excises on liquors, and the hearth tax.
In regard to the collection of the crown's ordinary revenues of the customs, excises, and
the hearth tax, the floating of fictitious Treasury Orders to some extent reduced the royal
government's reliance upon tax farmers for short-term credit. The pressure to redeem
them forced the government to extract more from the tax farmers. In the renewal of the
contract of customs farming in 1670, when the customs farmers tried to get more
concessions from the government, the Treasury Commissioners decided to directly
collect the customs. A board of six Commissioners, which included the competent Sir
George Downing, was appointed to manage the new centralized collection. This system
inherited the whole framework of local administration and personnel, along with the
manuals of instruction that the farmers of the customs had established. From 1678
onward, the Surveyors-General (later the Commissioners themselves) periodically
inspected the collection in major ports.3 1 0
In comparison, direct collection of excises on liquors all over England was a formidable
task. The excise farm in 1662 was very dispersed as about 75 percent of the country
farms went to local gentry in various regions.3 1 1 The Treasury Commissioners had a
strong incentive to negotiate farming contracts with a few major financiers to reduce the
transaction costs and receive higher rent from farming. Meanwhile, the latter were
interested in using the collection of regular excise revenues to enhance their power in the
310 Ibid., p. 34.
311 Chandaman, The English Public Revenue, p. 54.
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financial markets. A single excise farm was thus to the benefit of both the royal
government and big financiers.
From 1668 on, the government supported the plan of the goldsmith banker William
Bucknall and his associates, who had farmed the London excises, to take over the farm of
country excise which had been previously controlled by local elites. By 1671, the
Bucknall group controlled nearly 75 percent of the entire excise in England.3 12 In 1672,
the Stop of the Exchequer discredited the issue of fictitious Treasury Orders. The royal
government had to use its real income to secure new sources of credit, particularly under
the pressure of the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-4). As it was difficult for the royal
government to get extraordinary parliamentary supplies when the Commons was against
the foreign policy of Charles II, the idea of a total excise farm became very appealing to
the Treasury. From the perspective of the government, a syndicate of financiers who held
the new post of Receiver-General of a single excise farm could use the aggregated excise
revenue to mobilize more credit for the government. For the financiers, the control of the
total excise revenue was very profitable, especially when collectors were required to send
their daily receipts to the Receiver-General.313 The development toward a single excise
farm was not disrupted by fierce power struggles within the government, including the
fall of Clifford as the Chief Treasury Commissioner and the rise of Danby as the Lord
Treasurer in 1673. Private financiers associated with different political patrons shared
312 Ibid., pp. 59-61. For the ousting of local gentry from excise farms between 1667 and 1677, see Hughes,
Studies in Administration and Finance, pp. 148-152.
313 Chandaman, The English Public Revenue, pp. 62-64.
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the same plan of using total excise revenue to raise credit for the government, and their
competition simply gave the government better terms of rent and advance money.3 14
The syndicate of a single excise farm had to confront a serious information asymmetry
problem with their employees who served as "agents" in collecting excises. Edgar Kiser
has argued that the motivation for profit maximization pushed tax farmers to develop
effective organizational methods to monitor the performance of their collecting agents. 315
However, the same concern for maximum profit can lead to three contractual
relationships between the principal and the agent under different distributions of risks.
When the principal is more risk-averse than the agent, he gives a rental contract to the
agent, which is equivalent to the sub-farming of a single excise farm. When the agent is
more risk-averse, a share contract is optimal. When the principal bears all the risk, a pure
wage contract prevails. In order to understand the emergence of bureaucratic
management in excise collection, it is thus important to analyze the risk that the syndicate
had to bear.
The syndicate of excise farmers played an important role in supplying short-term credit to
the royal government, and they bore both financial and political risks. Control of a larger
amount of regular excise revenue as liquid capital enhanced their ability to mobilize
financial resources in the markets, which allowed them to renew farming contracts by
314 In 1673, the group of Sir John James, Major Robert Huntingdon, and Captain Richard Kingdon, who
were associated with Danby, offered better terms for a farming contract than the group associated with
Clifford. For the competition between the James group and Sir Stephen Fox over the control of the
Receiver-General of the excise farm, see Clay, Public Finance and Private Wealth, pp. 98-100.
315 Edgar Kiser, "Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modem Tax Systems: A Principal-Agent Analysis,"
Politics and Society, Vol. 22, No. 3 (September 1994), p. 294.
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offering terms unrivalled by their competitors. This was the financial risk for the
syndicate of excise farmers. Politically, in order to secure government favor and
protection, they had to be able to provide short-term credit whenever the government
demanded. Both risks required them to firmly control the internal cash flows in the
organization of excise farming. Their best strategy was to adopt a wage contract with
their collecting agents. In order to overcome the moral hazard of agents in the wage
contract, the syndicate of excise farmers had to develop the necessary methods to both
motivate and discipline their salaried employees and thus ensure efficiency in collection.
As the syndicate of excise farmers derived profit mainly from using the total excise
revenue to mobilize credit in lending to the government, they did not resist the attempt of
the Treasury in 1674 to send Deputy Comptrollers to check the account books and
vouchers in the country areas and to "issue an independent quarterly report of all excise
receipts" to the Comptroller. This allowed the government for the first time to know the
"precise annual value" of the excise in England.316 In this situation, the bigger actual
receipts of excises than the rent fixed in the farming contract inspired the Treasury to
replace excise farming with direct collection. The organization that the syndicate of
excise farmers had established to manage their salaried agents paved the way for
government direct collection. When the government began to directly collect excises in
1683, it took over the entire organization of the total excise farm. The profits from using
the regular excise revenue as security to raise credits made it easy for the government to
316 Chandaman, The English Public Revenue, p. 64.
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attract some former excise farmers and goldsmith bankers to manage the Excise
Department. 317
In order to improve the management of collection, the Excise Department between 1683
and 1688 endeavored to standardize the methods of gauging, assessing, and book-keeping
in the 886 districts or divisions of excise collection in England. 318 Standardization in
excise assessment and collection was an important means to overcome the principal-
agent problem and make the Excise Department an efficient bureaucracy. First, it
facilitated the supervision and evaluation of excise officers by their superiors, who
regularly circuited to inspect local collection. Second, it made each excise officer
essentially "substitutable" in his post, which paved the way for their regular rotation
among districts. This not only prevented excise officers from colluding with local
interests but also effectively disciplined them by regular mutual checks of collection
accounts. Standardization was thus the crucial means to ensure and maintain the
efficiency of the centralized management of the Excise Department.
Economic conditions in the 1670s and 1680s were favorable to the institutional
development toward central collection of the customs and excises. The yields of the
directly collected customs grew with the expansion of England's foreign trade. The
average annual net yield of the customs rose from the highest rent of E400,000 in the
farming contract of 1670 to £570,000 in 1681-84 and E590,000 in 1685-87.31Q
317 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
318 See Miles Ogborn, "The capacities of the state: Charles Davenant and the management of the Excise,
1683-1698," Journal ofHistorical Geography, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1998), especially pp. 295-306.
319 Chandaman, The English Public Revenue, p. 35.
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Meanwhile, rising real wages and declining grain and malt prices due to good harvests
stimulated domestic consumption, particularly the consumption of beer and ale, the
principal daily beverages at the time. This facilitated the development of large-scale
common brewers, especially in economically advanced eastern and southern England. 2 0
The government also encouraged the development of large-scale brewing houses by
giving them favorable allowances of waste and leakage.m32 For the government, large-
scale brewers reduced the collection cost of excises as they could hardly evade the
inspection of excise officers. They were also better able than small brewers to bear the
burden of high excise rates. As a result, the receipts of excises on liquors were as high as
£620,000 per year between 1686 and 1688.322
Even though the true potential of the customs and excises still remained unknown to the
government which did not have modern institutions to regularly survey the economy, the
rising receipts greatly consolidated the confidence of the royal government in centralized
collection of the customs and excises. In comparison, it was difficult to achieve
administrative efficiency in collecting the hearth tax given the political and
administrative costs of searching individual households. Moreover, the hearth tax was
highly inelastic in the short run even when the economy was growing. The performance
of direct collection of the hearth tax was disappointing in this period, and its net annual
yield only reached £216,000 by 1688.323
320 Clark, The English Alehouse: A Social History, p. 184.
321 Peter Mathias, The Brewing Industry in England: 1700-1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1959), pp. 363-4.
322 Chandaman, The English Public Revenue, p. 75.
323 Ibid., pp. 88-106.
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The new institutions to directly collect the customs and excises that emerged in the 1680s
were to a large extent an unintended consequence of the financial settlement between the
crown and Parliament in 1660-1662. At that time, the estimated yields of the hearth tax
ranged from E300,000 to E million, which were higher than that of the excises. The
royal government thus welcomed the Cavalier Parliament's decision to include the hearth
tax rather than the extended excises in the crown's ordinary revenue.324 Although the
Commons firmly controlled the grant of the direct monthly assessment and additional
excises as parliamentary extraordinary revenue, no one could have anticipated the
productivity of the direct collection of the customs and the excises on liquors.
Between 1685 and 1688, the average annual income of the crown's ordinary revenue rose
to about £1.6 million. 325 It enabled James II to afford to maintain a large standing army
of some 20,000 soldiers, which was the average size of a standing army in contemporary
Europe.326 The crown did not even have to ask Parliament for extraordinary revenues.
As the growing government income mainly came from indirect customs and excises, it
did not generate any direct conflicts of interest between the government and land-owners.
Thus, neither Parliament nor domestic opponents could challenge James 11.327
Nonetheless, there is no apparent sign of an endogenous development toward an
institution of long-term borrowing before 1688. Instead, the Receivers-General of the
324 Seaward, The Cavalier Parliament and the Reconstruction of the Old Regime, p. 111
325 C. D. Chandaman, "The Financial Settlement in the Parliament of 1685," in H. Hearder and H. R. Loyn,
eds., British Government and Administration: Studies Presented to S. B. Chrimes (Cardiff- University of
Wales Press, 1974), pp. 151-152.
326 See John Childs, The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1980), p. 2 and p. 5.
327 In Holmes' words, "it is hard to find evidence that even in the midsummer of 1688, let alone in the
Spring, James was faced with the threat of a rebellion." Geoffrey H. Holmes, The Making ofA Great
Power: Late Stuart and Early Georgian Britain (London: Longman, 1993), p. 177.
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customs and excises were both the official receivers and cashiers of government tax
revenue and private financiers in the financial markets. They used their respective
revenues as security to raise short-term loans from the markets and re-lent to the
government. Instead of seeking permanent liabilities, the royal government in this period
tried to clear its previous debts.328 The traditional idea that a good kingship should be
free from debt remained intact.
III. Credit crisis and the emergence and consolidation of a modern fiscal state: 1689-
1752
The Dutch invasion in November 1688 was a big event in and of itself. As the historian
Jonathan Israel has emphasized, it was caused largely by Dutch strategic calculation in
the fight with Catholic France rather than the domestic opponents of James II in
England.329 When the Dutch brought England into its conflict with France in 1689, no
Englishman could have anticipated that it was the beginning of two almost continuous
and extremely expensive wars, the Nine Years War (1689-1697) and the War of the
Spanish Succession (1702-1713).330 Although the vast majority of Parliament favored a
limited defensive naval war, William III and later Queen Mary adopted the Continental
strategy advocated by the Junto Whigs, which committed English forces to wars both on
land and sea.
328 In Chandaman's estimate, James II spent nearly El million prior to 1688 to clear previous government
debts. Chandaman, "The Financial Settlement in the Parliament of 1685," p. 152.
329 Jonathan I. Israel, "The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution," in Jonathan I. Israel ed., The Anglo-
Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
330 A contingent event - the death of Carlos II, the king of Spain, in 1699 - was vital to the resumption of
conflicts in 1702 as France, the United Provinces, and England were all too financially exhausted to fight
another major war so soon.
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The mounting military spending, heavy taxation, and economic recessions during the
Nine Years War led to severe confrontation between the royal government and
Parliament. As Members of Parliament could not determine the making of foreign
policy, which was the prerogative of the crown at the time, they tried hard to strengthen
their political power by controlling public finance. The Convention Parliament in 1690
not only voted William III and Mary an inadequate ordinary revenue but also voted the
customs, which had been the crown's permanent income since Henry VI, for only four
years. As the historian Clayton Roberts has pointed out, this was an intentional strategy
to ensure the regular presence of Parliament in national politics.33' The Triennial Act
passed in 1694 for the first time guaranteed regular convention of Parliament. More
importantly, Parliament in 1698 passed the Civil List Act to abolish the century-old
separation between the crown's ordinary revenue and the parliamentary extraordinary
revenue, which was the last vestige of the domain state. From now on, the three pillars of
government income (the land tax, the customs, and excises) became regular
parliamentary supplies, and Parliament allocated a lump sum of Civil List (E700,000 a
year) to cover the costs of the royal household and the executive branch of the
government.332 Meanwhile, the Commons in 1690 established the Commissions of
Public Accounts to check the expenditures of major government departments such as the
army and navy, between 1691-97, 1702-04, and 1711-13.
331 The crown's ordinary revenue was set as less than E700,000 a year, which would lead to an annual
deficit of between E200,000 and £300,000 even in peace time. Clayton Roberts, "The constitutional
significance of the financial settlement of 1690," Historical Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1977): 59-76.
332 The Civil List covered the Royal Household, the secret service in diplomacy, and the peacetime
operations of the royal government. See the details in E. A. Reitan, "From revenue to civil list, 1689-1702:
the revolution settlement and the 'mixed and balanced' constitution," Historical Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4
(1970): 571-88. In 1777, Parliament raised the amount of the Civil List to E900,000 a year.
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These important institutional developments, however, did not suffice to result in a system
of long-term borrowing. The fact that the parliamentary taxes had become permanent in
1698 did not imply that they would be used to sustain the state's perpetual debt. The
effect of parliamentary supervision of public finance needs to be put in perspective. In
this period, the biggest obstacle to parliamentary oversight of government spending was
an absence of standardized and unitary bookkeeping in government departments,
particularly in the army and navy, the two biggest spending departments. According to
the reports of the committee appointed by the Commons in 1695 to investigate the
financial management of the army, the regimental accounts were in "endless confusion"
which prevented any kind of reasonable estimate of total accounts. The paymaster of the
army between 1688 and 1702, the Earl of Ranelagh, kept his accounts "extremely general
and vague," not even listing the dates and itemization of particular warrants. 333 In the
case of the navy, the Treasury and the Commons could only receive a very general
estimate of its annual expenditures, and accurate information regarding specific items of
spending thus remained immune to any outside inquiries. The navy could issue its own
Navy bills to cover deficits in its current spending before being approved by the Treasury
or Parliament. 334 Under these conditions, parliamentary inquiries into government
accounts soon lost their significance.3 3 5
Parliament after 1688 did not immediately encourage a longer time horizon among
creditors in lending to the English government. The Dutch financial experts who came to
m John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1987) p. 142 and p. 144.
33 See the details in Daniel A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 452-480.
335 Brewer, The Sinews ofPower, pp. 149-153.
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England with William III's army did not introduce new financial methods to raise long-
term credit. The Bank of Amsterdam at the time was mainly a clearing house for trading
merchants, and it did not lend directly to the Dutch government. As in England, the
Dutch government depended upon General-Receivers of various tax revenues for short-
term lending. 3 36 The English government appealed to its familiar methods of raising
short-term credits to meet the needed military expenditures when it entered the war in
1689. It issued Exchequer tallies in anticipation of future tax revenue, which were
similar to the Treasury Orders issued in 1665 as they were assignable but could only be
redeemed at the Exchequer. However, the mounting war expenditures forced the English
government to issue fictitious tallies in 1690 to treasurers of government departments to
meet their spending. These were not backed by any received loans or specifically
assigned revenue and were similar to the Orders issued in 1667.337 From 1688 to 1693,
the total amount of short-term borrowing bearing interest rates of 7-8 percent rose to £15
million, including a lot of bills issued by the Navy, Ordnance, and Victualling board,
which were not secured by any pre-assigned tax revenues.338 These short-term credit
instruments, which had to be redeemed within a year, became heavily discounted in the
markets in 1693-4
This urgency forced the English government in 1693 to seek long-term credits such as
long-term borrowing and the issue of paper notes, which had been discussed in England
336 Marjolein 'T Hart, "'The Devil or the Dutch': Holland's Impact on the Financial Revolution in England,
1643-1694," Parliament, Estates and Representation, Vol. 11, No. 1 (June 1991), pp. 50-52.
337 P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit
1688-1756 (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 351.
338 The amount of short-term borrowing is calculated from Table 53, ibid., p. 344.
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since the 1680s. 339 However, the low creditworthiness of the government at the time led
to poor performance of the tontine, the lottery, and the single-life annuities, the three
methods that it used to directly raise long-term credit from the public. 34 0 Despite high
interest rates (ranging from 6 percent to 14 percent) and the security of loans on
parliamentary taxes, the government could only raise £1.3 million between 1693 and
1697.341 In addition to direct borrowing from the public, the English government also
arranged long-term loans from corporations that received monopolies in overseas trade or
issuing banknotes. These loans were redeemable as the government could repeal the
charter by returning the principal of the loan. In this way, the government raised £2
million from the New East India Company in 1698.342
In contrast to the New East India Company, the lending from the newly chartered Bank
of England in 1694 represented an important monetary experiment with paper notes.
Between 1691 and 1693, the English government received at least three proposals of
issuing bills as legal tender, including the one from the early promoters of the Bank of
England. Yet Parliament found the idea of floating paper notes too risky.343 It granted
the Bank of England a charter as a note-issuing corporation in return for a long-term loan
of £1.2 million at 8 percent to the government, which was made in banknotes issued by
the Bank. Four-fifths of the Bank's initial capital stock consisted of the government's
339 For various proposals in England in regards to creating paper credit to either increase the government
income, to replace coin, or to stimulate trade between 1680 and 1697, see J. Keith. Horsefield, British
Monetary Experiments: 1650-1710 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 114-122.
340 Among these methods, the English preferred annuities rather than tontines. See David R. Weir,
"Tontines, Public Finance, and Revolution in France and England, 1688-1789," Journal ofEconomic
History, Vol. 49, No. 1 (March 1989): 95-124.
341 Calculated from Table 2 (No.1, No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, No. 6, and No. 7) in Dickson, The Financial
Revolution in England, pp. 48-49.
342 Ibid., p. 49.
343 Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, p. 126.
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outstanding tallies, which were discounted in the markets at over 30 percent at the time.
In this way, government short-term tallies were converted into banknotes which were
long-term credit instruments. Meanwhile, as the Bank of England was a fractional note-
issuing bank, the pressure to maintain the convertibility of issued banknotes was smaller
than that to ensure the redemption of all outstanding tallies. Nonetheless, the English
government's initial experiment with paper notes was tentative. It did not give the Bank
the exclusive right to issue banknotes, let alone make them the legal tender.344
Meanwhile, the credibility of the banknotes in the early years of the Bank was also low
due to the low ratio of cash reserves. In 1697, the Bank had to temporarily suspend the
convertibility of its banknotes.34 s
The Bank of England's issue of banknotes on the face value of heavily discounted
government tallies aroused much suspicion and even hostility in both Parliament and the
royal government. In 1696, the "country party" consisting of both moderate Whigs and
Tories which dominated the Parliament attempted to charter a national Land Bank. They
planned to provide long-term loans to the government with banknotes backed by specie
and the tangible wealth of land. Nonetheless, as the proposed Land Bank required cash
instead of heavily discounted tallies to subscribe the stocks, this plan could not even get
started while the market was glutted with the heavily discounted tallies; and the recoinage
in 1696-7 caused a severe scarcity of cash in England.346 The failure of the Land Bank
344 Roseveare, The Financial Revolution, 1660-1760, p. 37.
34s In 1696, it fell to 12.8 percent in the spring and even 2.7 percent by the autumn. See Horsefield, British
Monetary Experiment, p. 264.
346 For the support of Parliament and the royal government for the proposed Land Bank, see Dennis Bubini,
"Politics and the battle for the Banks, 1688-1697," English Historical Review, Vol. 85, No. 337 (October
1970): 693-714.
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prompted the government to issue its own paper credit, the interest-bearing Exchequer
bills. The government sought cooperation from some provincial bankers to spread their
use in areas outside London. To facilitate their circulation, the Exchequer bills were
issued in small denominations (E10 and £5). In order to stabilize their value, the
government in 1697 set the limit of outstanding Exchequer bills at no more than £2
million. 34
The low credibility of the English government's long-term borrowing between 1693 and
1697 was largely due to its inability to extract adequate tax revenues to service its rapidly
rising debt. Parliament granted various levies of direct taxes on both real and personal
property, such as the Aid, the monthly assessment, the poll tax, and even duties on
marriages, births, burials, houses, and hawkers. Due to the administrative and political
difficulties in assessment and collection, the levy of direct tax in the 1690s fell upon the
assessed landed property in both country and town, and Parliament gave up the effort to
extract revenues from personal income. 348 Although Parliament rejected the scheme of
general excise, it raised extra rates on existing excises and added new items into the list
of excises (such as sea-borne coals, salt, and spices). Nonetheless, severe economic
recessions, disruptions of foreign trade, and the cash scarcity caused by the recoinage in
1696 greatly reduced the receipts from both excises and the customs. 34 9 The
mismanagement of the new excise commissioners that William III put onto the Excise
3 For the initial issues of the Exchequer bills, see Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England, pp. 368-
372.
348 j. V. Beckett, "Land Tax or Excise: the levying of taxation in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
England," English Historical Review, Vol. 100, No. 395 (April 1985): 285-308.
349 For the severe disruption of England's foreign trade, see D. W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of
William III and Marlborough (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), chapter 2. On the sharp reduction of
domestic consumption, see William J. Ashworth, Customs and Excise: Trade, Production, and
Consumption in England, 1640-1845 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 113-4.
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Board and political purges of excise officers further reduced the efficiency of excise
collection. 350
When the Nine Years War ended in 1697, the English government had E12.2 million in
unfunded short-term liabilities and E5.1 million funded long-term borrowings. 351 This
was an enormous debt for a government whose annual total income was around E4
million in the 1690s and E5 million in the 1710s. In contrast to the Protectorate regime
which collapsed under a total debt of about E2.2 million in 1659, the English government
in the 1690s could seek help from powerful financiers to settle its debts. Religious
toleration in England after the Glorious Revolution also attracted Protestant refugees to
bring to England not only their wealth but also financial innovations in long-term
borrowing and international financial networks.352 Dissenters and nonconformists were
vital to joint-stock companies such as the Bank of England and the New East India
Company, both as directors and investors. 353 These powerful joint-stock companies,
particularly the Bank of England, replaced the General-Receivers of the customs or
excises in providing credit to the government. In this situation, the government was more
concerned about how to extract more revenue to service its debt. In the collection of
350 Brewer, The Sinews ofPower, p. 74 and p. 94; Hughes, Studies in Administration and Finance, pp. 192-
4.
35' B. R. Mitchell, Abstract ofBritish Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962),
;2401.
Larry Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 10-12.
3s3 Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 139.
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excises, the Treasury after 1697 worked hard to improve efficiency in the collection of
excises and strengthen the centralized management of the Excise Department.354
Nonetheless, the path toward long-term borrowing was by no means irreversible in 1697.
Among the joint-stock companies, the East India Company provided long-term credit to
the government in return for a monopoly of the trade with Far East. Once it received the
charter, it did not need to take extra risks to take over the government's unfunded short-
term debt. Inherent fluctuations in overseas trade also limited its ability to expand long-
term lending to the government. In comparison, the Bank of England had more potential
to convert government short-term debt into long-term liabilities. In 1697, Parliament
renewed its charter to 1719 and guaranteed it as the only note-issuing bank authorized by
Parliament. In return for this privilege, the Bank added £1,001,171 into its capital stock,
among which four-fifths came from government tallies at their face value (even though
they were discounted at 40 percent in the markets) and the rest came from the Bank's
own banknotes. Its banknotes also ceased to be interest-bearing bills and became real
banknotes. 355 In the same year, Daniel Defoe suggested that the Bank increase its capital
to E5 million, issue banknotes worth £10 million, and establish branches in every town in
England so as to remit money to and from London.356 In this scheme, the Bank would
become a real bank of England rather than the "Bank of London," which concentrated all
354 John Brewer, "The English State and Fiscal Appropriation, 1688-1789," Politics and Society, Vol. 16,
No. 2-3 (September 1988), p. 367.
355 J. H. Clapham, The Bank ofEngland: A History, volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1945), pp. 22-23; A. Andreades, History ofthe Bank of England: 1640 to 1903, 4d* edition (London: Frank
CASS, 1966), pp. 111-2.
356 Cited from Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, p, 140.
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its business in metropolitan London. If Parliament made its banknotes the legal tender,
the Bank could greatly increase the amount of banknotes.
However, the Bank in the late 1690s remained a private "investment trust" which profited
mainly from lending to the government. Parliament did not offer the status of legal
tender to its banknotes, which had to compete with the banknotes issued by other private
financiers and Exchequer bills in the markets. This restricted the further expansion of the
Bank by the method of "engrafting" the government's outstanding tallies in peaceful
years. Although the Bank was well-known as a Whig-dominated institution, it refused in
1697 to hold another £10 million government tallies as its capital stock, which was
proposed by Montagu, the Chancellor of Exchequer and a major Whig in the
government.35 7 Business calculation outweighed political alliance as the Bank did not
have a ready market to increase the issue of its banknotes and the government did not
have sufficient revenue to secure these tallies.
Meanwhile, politics compounded the issue of government debt. When the Nine Years
War ended in 1697, the "country party" which consisted of both the Tories and the
"country Whigs," was dismayed at both corruption and mismanagement in the
government's war finance. 358 These land owners were also resentful of economic
recession, high interest rates, and heavy taxes on landed property. In their eyes,
m Henry Horwitz, Parliament, Policy and Politics in the Reign of William III (Newark: University of
Delaware Press, 1977), pp. 187-8.
358 For example, cashiers of the government departments often made handsome profits by using the heavily
discounted Exchequer bills at their par value to pay taxes. See David Ogg, England in the Reigns ofJames
1I and William 111 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 88-89; Dickson, The Financial Revolution
in England, p. 416.
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government borrowing was simply a transfer of the landed wealth to a small group of
financiers. The land-owners in 1697 could not know that the rising revenue in future
could come from the customs and excises rather than the land tax. They could not know
that the future interest rate on the government's long-term borrowing would fall to as low
as 3 percent. In this situation, land owners preferred rather to clear the principal of
government debt.
Between 1697 and 1701, the Commons passed a series of acts to cut down the scale of
the standing army and expenditures and reduce the influence of government financial
officials in Parliamentary debates. 359 Meanwhile, the magnitude of government debt in
1697 made the clearance of the principal at least a possible option. In 1698, the English
government had £12.2 million of unfunded short-term borrowings and E5.1 million
funded long-term debts. 360 As both the domestic economy and foreign trade recovered,
the net tax revenue of the government rose to more than E4 million while government
expenditures were cut to £3 million in 1700. [Figure 3-1] In 1701, the amount of
unfunded short-term and funded long-term debt was reduced to E9.4 million and £4.7
million respectively. 361
359 Henry Horwitz, Parliament, Policy and Politics in the Reign of William III, chapters X and XI.
'* B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, p. 401.
361 Ibid., p. 401.
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Fig. 3-1 English government's total net income and expenditure: 1692-1799
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Source: B. R. Mitchell, Abstract ofBritish Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1962), pp. 386-391.
However, the War of the Spanish Succession completely changed the situation. When
this war ended in 1713, the total debt of the English government had risen to 48 million.
The long-term borrowings included £12.5 million "irredeemable" annuities (the longer
annuities ended in 1792-1807 at 9 percent, the shorter ones ended in the 1740s at 7
percent) and £27.5 million "redeemable" loans owned to both the public and the three
government-chartered corporations, the Bank of England (E3.37 million), the East India
Company (£3.2 million), and the South Sea Company (E9.2 million). Even so, there was
still a total of £7.5 million of unfunded short-term debts such as the Exchequer bills and
the bills issued by the Navy, Ordnance and Victualling Board to meet their spending.36 2
The magnitude of the total debt in 1714, whose annual interest payments consumed more
3 2 Roseveare, The Financial Revolution, 1660-1760, pp. 52-3.
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than half of the annual government expenditures, thus forced the English government to
find some means to live with its debt perpetually. The direction of problem-solving was
quite clear to actors; they had to convert the remaining short-term unfunded debt into
long-term liabilities and reduce annual interest payments.
Meanwhile, few disputed the importance of tax revenue to the credibility of government
long-term borrowing. Despite deep divergence over foreign and religious policy, both
the Tory and Whig ministries came to rely more upon the indirect customs and excises
rather than the direct land taxes to raise government income. 363 The increasing reliance
upon the customs and excises to raise tax revenue continued after 1713. [Figure 3-2] The
pressure to extract reliable indirect tax revenues to service government long-term debts
motivated the English government to improve efficiency in collecting excises. Party
conflicts prompted the Excise Department to become a neutral administrative department
after 1717 as the Treasury wanted reliable revenue; excise officers for their part wanted
to avoid being purged for taking a wrong political line.3
363 The Whig ministry put candles in the excise list in 1710. In 1711, the new Tory ministry added hops,
hides, and water-borne coal, and in 1712 soap, paper, starch, printed calicoes, hackney chairs, cards, and
dice. See T. S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations in England, 1700-1800 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1959), p.2 8 .364 Brewer, The Sinews ofPower, p. 75; Hughes, Studies in Administration and Finance, pp. 272-3.
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Fig. 3-2 Sources of English government's total net income: 1692-1799
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1962), pp. 386-388.
Even though the path toward perpetual liabilities sustained by indirect taxes became
irreversible after 1713, there still remained two distinct ways of doing this. One was to
convert it into perpetual annuities with lower interest rates, on which the government
only needed to make interest payments. The other was to transform it into paper notes
used in the economy, which made their holders de facto creditors of the state. Prior to
1713, the English government had experimented with both these methods of raising long-
term credit.
During the War of the Spanish Succession, the position of the Bank of England in public
finance underwent significant changes. It became the major short-term lender to the
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government, and took government tallies as securities. 365 In return for its rising role and
thus bigger risk in providing government short-term financing, the Bank actively sought a
monopoly in note-issuing so as to rid itself of competition in the issuing of banknotes. 366
In the renewed charters in 1708 and 1713, Parliament granted it the right to be the only
corporation with more than six partners in the business of banking. Moreover, when the
Bank began to underwrite Exchequer bills issued by the Treasury in 1707, it not only
removed one major rival to its banknotes but also consolidated its importance to the
government's short-term finance.367 As the vast majority of its capital stock came from
exchequer tallies or bills, government's punctual clearing of these outstanding tallies and
bills was vital for the Bank to secure the credibility of its banknotes. Therefore, the Bank
was quite selective in taking over government debts, and it had little interest in holding
short-term bills which were not secured by pre-assigned parliamentary revenues, such as
the Navy, Ordnance, and Victualling bills.
In this situation, the Tory government in 1711 chartered the South Sea Company to
convert some E9.5 million outstanding Navy, Ordnance, and Victualling bills at their
nominal value into redeemable long-term annuities at 6 percent. The South Sea
Company could use the annuities as security to raise capital in the markets. In return for
this, Parliament granted it a monopoly of trade with the Spanish Empire. As Larry Neal
has emphasized, the South Sea Company represented an important method to settle
unfunded government debt. Even though the South Sea Company did not have any
365 Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England, p. 416.366 When the Bank of England experienced a major financial crisis in 1707, private financiers rejected the
Bank's notes so as to weaken its power in the financial market. Andr6ades, History of the Bank of
England, p. 120.
367 Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England, pp. 373-376.
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profitable overseas trade, its stock-holders could always benefit from both the annuity
payments from the government and the liquidity of Company stocks, which could be
freely transferred in the securities market. The poor performance of the South Sea
Company after its founding was mainly due to government inability to make punctual
annuity payments to stock holders of the Company. As the government's fiscal condition
improved after the end of war in 1713, the stock of the South Sea Company gradually
reached its par value in 1716.368
Therefore, when the English government invited the South Sea Company and the Bank of
England to bid for the right to convert the remaining £31 million of irredeemable and
redeemable annuities into redeemable annuities included in their stocks in 1717, there
were two different ways for the government to live with perpetual liabilities. These two
chartered corporations offered distinct approaches to establishing an institutional linkage
between tax revenue and the state's perpetual liabilities in the financial markets. The
South Sea Company represented the path of perpetual annuities, the Bank of England that
of floating paper notes. This business was profitable as the English government had
demonstrated its ability to raise tax revenues from indirect sources from 1713 on. Both
companies were well connected; the Bank actually had more favor within the government
due to its financial services during wartime.
The Bank, however, could only pay the government a maximum of E5.4 million for this
right while the South Sea Company offered E7.6 million. Meanwhile, the Bank in its
proposal set the nominal value of its stocks in exchange of the assets of government
368 Larry Neal, The Rise ofFinancial Capitalism, p. 91.
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creditors, which meant the Bank would take 25 years to extinguish the government
debt.369 In contrast, the South Sea Company refused to set such a ratio in advance, and it
therefore could propose to convert the same amount of government debt within 5
370
years. The scheme of the South Sea Company was certainly more attractive to the
government. But why did the Bank not offer better terms in the contest for the right to
convert the huge amount of government debt? To answer this question, we need to
examine the contemporary socio-economic conditions.
The issue of banknotes was the most important business for the Bank of England. Yet its
issued banknotes amounted to a mere £1.5 million in 1700, and this number only grew to
£4 million in 1750. In the same period, the amount of coin in the economy rose from £7
million to £18 million. 37 1 Meanwhile, the monetary stock in England was estimated to be
around E14.5 million in 1700 and £30 million in 1750. In this light, there was a huge
potential for the Bank of England as a fractional reserve bank to increase the amount of
banknotes if the notes could circulate in the whole English economy instead of only in
metropolitan London.
Nonetheless, the path of floating paper notes was full of business and political risks. The
Bank of England in 1719 had not opened any branch outside of London, even though the
idea of a "national bank" having branches in major cities to remit money and circulate
369 For the details of the Bank's proposal to gradually convert government debt, see William R. Scott, The
Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720, volume III
(Bristol: Thoemmes, [1912]1995), pp. 305-6.
370 Ibid., p. 306.
371 Forrest Capie, "Money and economic development in eighteenth-century England," in Leandro Prados
de la Escosura, ed., Exceptionalism and Industrialization: Britain and Its European Rivals, 1688-1815
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Table 10.2, p.2 2 4 .
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notes had been discussed in England since 1696.372 Even in mid-eighteenth century
London, major goldsmith bankers did not have large deposits in the Bank of England.373
As goldsmith banks were not corporations, they could legally issue their own banknotes.
Meanwhile, the Bank of England in the first half of the eighteenth century was far from a
public bank which managed the transmission of tax revenue and official funds. For
example, the Paymaster General of the Forces and the Navy Treasurer did not put their
funds in the Bank of England.374 Although the Bank had expressed interest in taking
over the remittance of tax revenue, it did not succeed due to the resistance of private
bankers.375 In this light, the Bank of England as a private corporation would have
confronted mounting political opposition if it attempted to behave like a public bank
which transmitted tax revenue and government spending, and issued banknotes as the
legal tender.
As the Bank of England chose to retain the status quo in 1720, it could not expand the
issuing of its banknotes to the level determined by the monetary demand of the English
economy. It thus did not have much advantage over the South Sea Company in the
bidding for the right to convert government debt. At this point, the South Sea Company
held E 11.7 million in redeemable annuities and the Bank of England E3.4 million. The
profit in note-issuing seemed to be the major factor that prevented the Bank of England
from out-bidding its rival. If the Bank of England was to engraft the £31 million of
372 Clapham, The Bank ofEngland: A History, volume I, pp. 105-6.
373 Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England, p. 390.
34 It was only in the 1780s that the Bank of England began to manage the funds of the Paymaster General
of the Land Forces and the Treasurer of the Navy. See J. E. D. Binney, British Public Finance and
Administration, 1774-92 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 147.
37 Ward, The English Land Tax in the Eighteenth Century, p. 48.
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government debt into its capital stock within 5 years, it would have to enormously
increase the issue of its banknotes. But how could the markets in the short run absorb the
swelling number of banknotes so as to avoid their depreciation? The Bank could hardly
expect a sudden huge expansion in the volume of transactions (both domestic and
foreign) in London and its surrounding areas, which might demand more banknotes as the
medium of transactions.
The South Sea Company could have taken a gradual approach to convert government
debt, including the long-term irredeemable annuities which the government could not use
the threat of repaying the principal to force their subscribers to accept lower interest rates
before the fixed expiration dates. Nonetheless, the irredeemable annuities did not
constitute an insurmountable obstacle for the South Sea Company to use its newly issued
stocks to make the holders of irredeemable annuities "voluntarily" exchange their assets
into stocks, which bore an interest of only 4 percent after 1727. As Larry Neal has
pointed out, these had very low liquidity as they could only be traded in whole rather than
in part; and the transferring and cashing procedures at the Exchequer were slow and
cumbersome. In contrast, if they were converted into corporation stocks, they had high
liquidity as they could be traded in the securities market. 376 This may have been one
important incentive for the holders of irredeemable annuities to exchange them for the
stocks of government-chartered corporations. Moreover, the government could prompt
this transition by deliberately delaying their interest payments at the Exchequer as
ordinary holders of irredeemable annuities did not constitute a powerful political group.
In fact, one factor that prompted the creditors of the 1710 Lottery Loans to convert their
376 Neal, The Rise ofFinancial Capitalism, pp. 93-94.
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assets into the stocks of the South Sea Company in 1717, even at a lower interest rate,
377was the arrears of the government in making interest payments. Apparently, this way
to convert irredeemable annuities into redeemable annuities would take a long time.
In practice, however, the necessary time to convert irredeemable annuities into the stocks
of the South Sea Company was greatly reduced by the infamous South Sea Bubble in
1720. The rising value of the stocks of South Sea Company made it to issue more stocks
to exchange the assets of the holders of irredeemable annuities who were enticed by the
rapidly rising values of Company stocks between January and June.378 When the Bubble
burst in same year, the effect was to dramatically change the composition of government
debt, as 80 percent of the irredeemable annuities and 85 percent of the redeemable
annuities had been converted into stocks of the South Sea Company. These were turned
into perpetual annuities at 3 percent in 1727.379 From now on, England moved
irreversibly in the direction of building an institutional linkage between the state's tax
revenue and the interest payments on its redeemable long-term annuities.
When the interest rates were low in the markets, the English government could force
holders of redeemable annuities to accept lower interest rates by a credible threat of
repaying the principal of debt. The opportunity cost for creditors who refused this offer
was to find new investment opportunities for their money. Once the English government
377 Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England, p. 87.
378 Their prices kept rising from £128 in January to the peak of E950 (recorded price) in June, and then fell
to E155 in December in 1720. On the background and impact of this financial fraud, see Julian Hoppit,
"The myths of the South Sea Bubble," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 12 (2002): 141-
65. For the analysis of this financial fraud and the behaviors of investors, see Richard S. Dale, Johnnie E.
V. Johnson, and Leilei Tang, "Financial markets can go mad: evidence of irrational behaviour during the
South Sea Bubble," Economic History Review, Vol. 58, No. 2 (May 2005): 233-71.
379 Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England, p. 134.
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had demonstrated its ability to extract rising revenues from indirect customs and excises
to make punctual interest payments to its annuitants, the stocks of its redeemable
annuities became an ideal investment for small investors. Their low interest rate was
compensated for by their remarkable security and liquidity in the markets. 380 Extraction
of reliable and elastic tax revenues from the indirect customs and excises now became
vital to a self-reinforcing process: demonstrated punctual interest payments attracted
more subscribers of perpetual annuities, which motivated the government to maintain
efficiency in collecting excises. The outcome of this self-reinforcing process came in
1752 when the English government consolidated its long-term debt into the famous
"Three Percent Consol," the redeemable perpetual annuities bearing an annual interest
rate of 3 percent.
The distribution effects of these institutions, which consolidated after the 1720s,
significantly contributed to their stability. The increasing reliance upon the customs and
excises to raise government income greatly mitigated tensions with land owners. 38 1 The
Whig ministry continued to use the reduction in land tax as a political strategy to appease
the Tories. In comparison, ordinary consumers fell victim to the collective action
problem and were unable to resist the rising excises.382 The low interest rate on the
government's long-term borrowing also reduced the conflicts of interest between the
380 Neal, "The finance of business during the industrial revolution," p. 165 and pp. 172-3.
381 Beckett, "Land Tax or Excise," p. 305.
382 Big anti-excise protests occurred in 1733 when Sir Robert Walpole tried to use extra excise rates on
imported tobacco and wine to replace their tariff duties. They were instigated mainly by wealthy tobacco
merchants who had benefited from smuggled tobacco, rather than by ordinary consumers. On the role of
big tobacco merchants in this "excise crisis", see Paul Langford, The Excise Crisis: Society and Politics in
the Age of Walpole (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975); on the role of American tobacco planters in these protests,
see Jacob M. Price, "The Excise Affair Revisited: The Administrative and Colonial Dimensions of a
Parliamentary Crisis," in Stephen B. Baxter, ed., England's Rise to Greatness, 1660-1763 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983).
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monied class and land owners who had blamed high mortgage rates on high interest rates
due to government borrowing in the 1690s and 1700s. The distribution effects of the
institutions of the modern fiscal state that emerged in the 1730s also explains why the
efficiency of the Excise Department described by Brewer was an exception rather than
the norm in the English government in the eighteenth century. As long as there were
sufficient revenues to make punctual interest payments on perpetual annuities, neither
Parliament nor the government had the political motivation to further improve efficiency
in public finance. The management of the land tax declined considerably after the 1720s,
which led to widespread under-assessment and evasion.383 The collection of the customs
was damaged by patronage politics, sinecures, and the ensuing mismanagement. 3 84
Socio-economic conditions in the first half of the eighteenth century were favorable to
the English government's experimentation with various means of long-term credit. In
contrast to the economic recession, bad harvests, scarcity of coins, and disruption of
foreign trade in the Nine Years War, the Wars of the Spanish and Austrian Successions
did not disrupt England's foreign trade with the Americas, even though they greatly
raised the level of government debt. England's foreign trade expanded steadily after the
1700s. In particular, the re-export of goods from North America and India to European
markets via England began to grow rapidly and accounted for 40 percent of total exports
by the 1750s. [Figure 3-3] Rising volumes of foreign trade in this period contributed
significantly to the rise of the customs revenue, even though the collection of the customs
remained inefficient and mismanaged.
383 Ward, The English Land Tax in the Eighteenth Century, chapter VII.
384 See Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, pp. 31-32; Brewer, The Sinews of Power, pp.
101-2.
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Fig. 3-3 England's imports, exports, and reexports: 1697-1792
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Source: B. R. Mitchell, Abstract ofBritish Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1962), pp. 279-281.
The steady expansion of the domestic economy made it able to bear the rising excise
rates on major consumer goods, particularly beer and ale. In the collection of excises, the
scale and concentration in the production or wholesaling of excisable goods significantly
affected efficiency. The bigger producers or wholesalers, the less able they were to evade
excise officers, and the more likely to bear higher excise duties. Take the excise upon
beer as an example. This contributed a quarter of the total excise revenue in the first half
of the eighteenth century. The size of common brewers of beer in London had been
growing since the late seventeenth century. In the 1720s, technological innovations in
beer brewing led to the development of mass production and distribution of beer in
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London and the larger provincial towns. 385 As small brewers were driven out of the
market and the big common brewers increasingly controlled retail outlets, it became
much easier to collect the excises on beer.3 86 High excise rates and allowances favorable
to big producers thus constituted high barrier of entry into the brewing industry. In this
sense, the government and big beer brewers divided the monopolistic rent in the
production and distribution of beer at the cost of ordinary consumers, the former got
excise revenue while the latter received the remaining monopolistic rent. 387 The same
trend toward bigger size of production also occurred to the production of salt.388
In comparison, the Excise officers found it hard to collect excises from small and
dispersed producers. For example, due to the dispersed nature of malting, higher malt
duties turned out to be counterproductive as excise officers were unable to overcome the
ensuing evasion. 389 For the same reason, the efficiency of excise collection in the
provinces was noticeably lower than that in metropolitan London. 390 Likewise, excise
officers found it difficult to extract excises from gin consumption as there were millions
of scattered distilleries. 391 Due to widespread evasion and smuggling, duty was paid on
only 44 percent in the 14 million gallons of gin consumed in England in 1736.392
385 By 1748, more than 40 percent of beer in London was produced by the twelve biggest common brewers.
See Mathias, The Brewing Industry in England, p. 26.
386 For the development of big brewers' control of retailing channels, see Clark, The English Alehouse: A
Social History, p. 184;
387 As William Ashworth has pointed out, "many of the larger members of the brewing industry were
against the abolishing the excise duties and the licensing system in 1830." See Ashworth, Customs and
Excise, p. 220.
388 Ibid., p. 238.
389 Mathias, The Brewing Industry in England, p. 342.
390 Ibid., p. 342.
391 There were two million distilleries in UK in 1714 and this number reached five million by 1735. See
Haydon, The English Pub: A History, p. 89.
392 Ibid., pp. 95-6. For various methods to evade the excise duty levied on distillers, see Ashworth,
Customs and Excise, pp. 226-9.
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At the same time, the dominance of London in England's inland and foreign trade and in
the financial markets significantly shaped England's path toward the modem fiscal state.
There was a segment of wealthy financiers and investors in London who had enough
resources to take enormous amounts of the heavily discounted government short-term
bills for future speculative profits between the 1690s and 1710s. These factors provided
the necessary time to experiment with various schemes to convert short-term borrowings
into long-term debt. As the domestic market in the first half of eighteenth-century
England was not fully integrated, the tremendous government borrowing in this period
did not attract investors from the whole country. 393 Instead, some 90 percent of the
60,000 subscribers to the English government's stock of long-term annuities in the 1750s
lived in London and the south-east. 394 Meanwhile, the international financial markets
between London and other major financial centers in Western Europe (particular
Amsterdam) had been integrated in the early eighteenth century. 395 As a result, the
percentage of foreign holdings of the English government's long-term borrowing rose
from 10 percent in 1723-24 to 20 percent by 1750.396 Moreover, the Bank of England
began to play the role of the lender of last resort for international finance in Western
393 Integration of the financial markets in England did not appear until the second half of the eighteenth
century. See Moshe Buchinsky and Ben Polak, "The Emergence of a National Capital Market in England,
1710-1880," Journal ofEconomic History, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 1993): 1-24; Julian Hoppit, "Financial
Crises in Eighteenth Century England," Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 39, Issue I (February
1986), pp. 52-56.
394 Roseveare, The Financial Revolution, p. 68.
395 For the financial integration between London and Amsterdam in the early eighteenth century, see Neal,
The Rise ofFinancial Capitalism, chapter 3. On the dense networks that London bankers established with
their merchant-agents in discounting bills of foreign exchange in the London-Amsterdam nexus, see Larry
Neal and Stephen Quinn, "Networks of information, markets, and institutions in the rise of London as a
financial centre, 1660-1720," Financial History Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (April 2001): 7-26.
396 Ibid., p. 74.
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Europe in as early as in the 1720s, more than a century before it played the same role for
the English domestic economy. 397
The position of London also significantly facilitated the English government's endeavors
to achieve fiscal centralization. This was apparent in the collection of the customs as
more than half of England's foreign trade went through London in the eighteenth century.
In the collection of excises, London was also heavily regulated due to its importance to
excise revenue, and about 18 percent of all excise field officers worked in London in the
late eighteenth century. 398 The geographic concentration in the receipts of excises was
also considerable as some 80 percent were collected in either London or its neighboring
counties and cities such as Hertford, Surrey, Bristol, Rochester, Suffolk, and Norwich. In
contrast, the North, the Midlands, and Wales contributed only 20 percent. 399 The
concentration of the excise collection in the most developed region in England made it
much easier for private bankers in London (who were often tax receivers) to collaborate
with excise collectors in the provinces to remit the collected excise revenue through
secure and speedy bills of exchange drawn on London.4 0 0
IV. Conclusion
397 Eric S. Schubert, "Innovations, Debts, and Bubbles: International Integration of Financial Markets in
Western Europe, 1688-1720," Journal ofEconomic History, Vol. 48, Issue 2, The Tasks of Economic
History (June 1988), pp. 304-5.
398 Miles Ogborn, Spaces ofModernity: London's Geographies, 1680-1780 (New York: Guilford, 1998), p.
194.
399 Of the 80 percent, London itself accounted for one-third. T. S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations in
England, p. 29.
400 D. M. Joslin, "London Private Bankers, 1720-1785," Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 7,
Issue 2 (1954), p. 169. According to Hughes, the remittance of excise revenue by bills of exchange seems
to have become the norm in the 1700s. Hughes, Studies in Administration and Finance, p. 214.
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The process of institutional development in England between the 1640s and 1750s ended
up with the institutions of the modem fiscal state. These used centrally collected customs
and excises to service the government's massive perpetual annuities. However, the
functions and distributional effects of these institutions, which contributed significantly
to their stability, can hardly be invoked to explain how they emerged and consolidated.
Historical actors' efforts to build new institutions are constrained by socio-economic
conditions that they cannot manipulate in the short run. The self-reinforcing process
between punctual interest payments and increasing confidence in the English
government's long-term borrowing, which became evident after the 1720s, depended
heavily upon the development of financial markets in London and increasing scale in the
production of major excisable goods. It could not unfold when the necessary socio-
economic conditions are not available, as illustrated by the institutional development in
the 1650s. Even though the path toward perpetual liabilities became irreversible after
1713, the overwhelming concentration of financial networks in London and its
surrounding areas significantly shaped the path of institutional development toward
perpetual annuities rather than paper notes.
Meanwhile, this institutional development was a process with multiple possible
outcomes, such as fiscal decentralization and dependence upon tax farming in the early
1660s and a fiscal state which did not actively seek long-term borrowing in the 1680s.
Each of these could "lock-in" historical actors, who were groping in uncertainty for
solutions and could not know ex ante the institutional features of the modern fiscal state
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as it emerged after the 1720s. The external shocks that break these "lock-in" equilibria
are not the result of actors' strategic calculations to initiate new institutions. Nor can they
suffice to determine the direction of subsequent institutional development. In this
situation, the credit crises which resulted from events, such as the massive issue of
fictitious Treasury Orders between 1667 and 1672 and the enormous amount of unfunded
short-term credit bills between 1689 and 1713, become important for us to understand the
specific direction of institutional development. They not only forced state actors to
experiment with various institutional arrangements but also tested their "effectiveness" at
solving urgent problems. During this process of overcoming a crisis common to all state
actors, effective elements, competent officials, and relevant experience accumulated
continuously in spite of power struggles within the government. Once these elements
were sufficient to yield a self-reinforcing process, the path toward the observed outcome
became ineluctable: centralized collection of excises and the customs and the modern
fiscal state.
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Chapter 4 Uncertainty, Credit Crisis and Institutional Development in Late
Tokugawa and Early Meiji: 1853-1871
I. Introduction:
By the early 1890s, the Japanese government had not only built centralized institutions to
collect taxes and manage government spending but also safeguarded the convertibility of
the banknotes issued by the Bank of Japan. These institutions of a modem fiscal state
contrast sharply with the monetary chaos, fiscal decentralization, and low
creditworthiness of paper notes issued by various domain governments only two decades
earlier. How shall we explain this institutional outcome given the uncertainty and opacity
of institutional development faced by political actors in the Meiji Restoration of 1868?
Can we use an actor-centered approach to explain this achievement? It is true that the
coming of the western powers after 1853 led to a widespread sense of crisis among
political actors in Japan, and they shared the common aim of protecting Japan's
sovereignty and independence. The defeat in military conflicts with western powers in
the early 1860s stimulated both domain governments and the shogunate (Bakufu) to
introduce western weapons, reform military organizations, send officials and students to
study in western countries, and so on.401 Both the Bakufu and major domains such as
Satsuma and Ch~shiU endorsed the same slogan of "rich state and strong army" (fukoku
kydhei). The similarity of Bakufu and domain modernization policies prior to 1868 has
led some historians to claim that a different result in the civil war between the Bakufu
401 See a succinct discussion of these similar modernization programs in major domain governments and
the Bakufu in Marius B. Jansen, "The Meiji Restoration," in Marius B. Jansen, ed., The Cambridge History
ofJapan, volume 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 345-53.
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and Satsuma-Choshn would not have mattered as the winner would implement the same
modernization policies and continue to learn from the west. From this perspective,
uncertainty in institutional development in early Meiji is not a severe problem because
consensus over the direction of future institution building prevailed even among
conflicting political actors in power struggles.
Such characterizations of the Meiji Restoration make it hard to understand why Satsuma
and Choshii took up arms to overthrow the Bakufu in the first place. If both sides truly
shared the same modernization program and attitude toward the west, why did they go to
a civil war? Moreover, most contemporary political actors in Japan were keenly aware of
the threat of the western powers, which could only be exacerbated by the outbreak of
civil war. If political leaders in Satsuma and Ch6shnd were truly concerned about national
security, how could they launch the war against the Bakufu, which did not appear as if it
would be a quick campaign in 1868?
The historiography of the Meiji Restoration in recent decades casts new light on these
questions by stressing the fundamentally different ideas, agendas, and institutional
designs among major competing political camps in the 1860s. Although there were
advocates of the institution of assembly in both reforming domains and the Bakufu,
political conservatives in the Court and Satsuma and Ch6shni were in favor of imperial
despotism. The armed conflict that toppled the Bakufu and established the Meiji regime
402 This view is often seen in recent characterizations of the Meiji Restoration. For such examples, see
Philip D. Curtin, The World and the West: The European Challenge and the Overseas Response in the Age
ofEmpire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 163; Peter Duus, Modern Japan, second
edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), p. 85.
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in 1868 did not produce one political group or coalition which could immediately
dominate future institutional development. Nor did it erase the previous divergences
among major rival political groups. Power struggles existed not only between the
Satsuma and Ch6shii factions, which controlled the central government after 1868, but
also between them and a group that demanded representative institutions to guarantee
more "public discussion" (kogi) in the process of policy making. Even among the
westernizing officials, there were significant divergences about the priorities and speed of
transplanting foreign models into the different socio-economic circumstances of Japan.
Therefore, the Meiji regime cannot be seen as a coherent political entity. Power struggles
did not take place among political actors who shared the same ideas and institutional
blueprints. When divergences among major political camps have significant impact on
the distribution of political power and interests, some actors are willing to use force to
attain their end. Such a background is crucially important to understand the opacity and
uncertainty in the early years after the Meiji Restoration. As no political camp in early
Meiji had the necessary power to dictate subsequent institution building, the deep
differences among political actors over institutional development imply multiple possible
outcomes. This makes it difficult to explain the rise of a particular institutional outcome
over time.
This is particularly true in public finance where there were quite different models in the
west. In addition to examining western models, the reforming leaders in the Meiji regime
such as Ito Hirobumi also tried to find useful experiences in Japan's past for building new
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403institutions. For example, important officials of public finance in the early Meiji
government such as Yuri Kimimasa and Okuma Shigenobu were "fiscal experts" in their
respective domain governments. The mercantilist economic policies which various
domain governments had implemented to encourage production and commerce in the late
Tokugawa period were important legacies for the early Meiji government, particularly in
its efforts to float paper notes.404 However, the mercantilist practices of domain
governments to organize business monopolies to control the production and sale of major
commodities within domains also resulted in inefficiency and government deficit. Critics
called for bringing more business competition and private initiative into production and
commerce.405 Moreover, it remained highly opaque in early Meiji whether the
mercantilist policies previously implemented in domains would work for the national
economy of Japan. In this light, historical experiences themselves were not sufficient to
dispel the uncertainty in institutional development in public finance at the time.
Fierce power struggles among political factions also complicated institutional
development. Institutions and policies in public finance bear the brunt of the conflict of
interests both within government and between the state and society. In the early stage of
institutional building, the probability of making mistakes was high. When there were
403 Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2003).
404 For an emphasis on the continuity between mercantilist economic policies in domain governments and
the economic policies of early Meiji, see Luke S. Roberts, Mercantilism in a Japanese Domain: The
Merchant Origins ofEconomic Nationalism in 18th-century Tosa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998); Nishikawa Shunsaku and Amano Masatoshi, "Shohan no sangy6 to keizai seisaku [The industrial
and economic policies of domains]," in Shinbo Hiroshi and Sait6 Osamu, eds., Kindai seich6 no taid6
[Gathering Momentum for Modern Growth], volume 2 of Nihon keizaishi [The Economic History of Japan]
(T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1989), pp. 206-10.
405 Hirakawa Arata, "Chiiki keizai no tenkai [The development of a regional economy]," in Iwanami kiza
Nihon tsishi, Vol. 15 (kinsei 5) (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 139-43.
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major political rivals waiting to take advantage of policy mistakes made by those in
power, the political cost appeared quite high for actors who initiated institutional
experimentation. Meanwhile, legitimation of the new Meiji regime did not dispel
uncertainties in institutional development. For example, legitimation through
international power struggles demanded massive military expenditures; yet rising
taxation could destroy the weak domestic political basis upon which the new regime
rested. In this situation, even if we characterize the institutional development in public
finance in early Meiji as a trial-and-error process, we should not take for granted that
experiments with different institutional arrangements and policies which implied quite
different directions of institutional development would necessarily result in continuity or
accumulation in institution building along one particular direction.
In this chapter, I examine the evidence of continuity and accumulation in the institutional
development in public finance in spite of significant ideological and political differences
among major political actors. I argue that this was largely caused by the credit crisis of
non-convertible paper notes, which was an unintended consequence of the civil war in
1868-9. The mounting expenditures that the new Meiji regime had to dispense before it
was able to mint sufficient new currency and build the necessary taxing institutions in the
early years of the Restoration forced the Meiji government to continue its reliance upon
paper notes. Although the origin of this credit crisis was exogenous to subsequent
institutional development in public finance, the convertibility of the issued paper notes
constituted a common problem as it significantly affected not only the operation but also
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the legitimacy of the new regime. The credit crisis of paper notes thus exerted long-
lasting effects on institutional development.
Regardless of which political faction came to power, it had to face the same problem of
how to secure the value of paper notes, to which the creditworthiness of the new regime
was tied. The severity of the credit crisis, which threatened the survival of the Meiji
regime, significantly constrained available policy options. Meanwhile, it provided an
opportunity for some young but capable officials such as Okuma Shigenobu, Inoue
Kaoru, and It5 Hirobumi, as well as former Bakufu officials, such as Shibusawa Eiichi, to
quickly rise to power and play vital roles in public finance. It also effectively protected
westernizing officials in the Ministry of Finance (Okurash6) from political purges
mounted by conservatives in the politically turbulent years after the Restoration. Thus,
the credit crisis not only prompted officials of public finance to experiment with various
institutional elements and policies but also facilitated a continuous accumulation of
effective institutional experiments and personnel.
The structure of this chapter is follows. In section II, I describe the power struggles
among major political actors who had divergent ideas, interests, and institutional
preferences in the period between 1853 and 1868. Uncertainty in the power struggles
produced an unintended consequence, the excessive dependence upon non-convertible
paper notes by the early Meiji government. In section III, I discuss features of
contemporary institution building and argue that neither westernization nor centralization
was inevitable in the period immediately after the Restoration. In section IV, I explore
185
how the credit crisis of paper notes prompted actors to experiment with various
institutional elements and produced a particular path of institutional development in a
context of multiple possible outcomes. In particular, I examine the accumulation of
effective institutional arrangements in public finance in spite of fierce power struggles
within the government. Section IV concludes.
II. Uncertainty, divergence in institutional designs, and the origin of the credit
crisis: 1853-1868
The early modern state formed in eighteenth-century Japan was characterized by a dual
sovereignty. The Bakufu as the central government administered the political system,
monopolized state power in foreign affairs and coinage, and even put the Court under its
firm control and supervision. Yet during the same period, the scholars of the nativist
school (kokugaku) developed a theory (taisei ininron) which considered the political
authority of the shogun as delegated by the Emperor, the dejure sovereign. This vision
of the ultimate source of political power had significant implications as it provided a
legitimate framework for criticism of policy mistakes by the Bakufu.406
In the early nineteenth century, both domestic and foreign factors increased the political
ascendance of the Court. The inadequate ability of the Bakufu to handle fluctuations in
the economy and social dislocations made the Court an attractive alternative symbol to
406 As early as 1744, about 20,000 peasants gathered in Ky6to to appeal to the Court to reduce the heavy
land taxes levied by the Bakufu. During the Tenmei Famine in 1787, some 10,000 people prayed in the
direction of the Court for good harvests. Oguchi Ynjiro, "Kokka ishiki to tenno [State consciousness and
the Emperor]," in Iwanami koza Nihon tsishi, Vol. 15 (kinsei 5) (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 207-
8.
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express discontent with and criticisms of the Bakufu. 407 The Mito School, the most
influential intellectual movement in Japan during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, emphasized the role of the Emperor as the sovereign and advocated that the
Court become the means to unite the Japanese in response to increasing domestic
instability and threats from the west (sonnaron).408 Nonetheless, the urgency to
strengthen maritime defense in the 1830s and 1840s did not strike a fatal blow to the
existing political system. The Emperor in theory "delegated" the affairs of national
defense to the Bakufu, which in turn mobilized domain governments, particularly those
located in strategic locations such as Ch6shUi, Satsuma, and Mito, to strengthen defense.
Nonetheless, this political system was under great strain following the arrival of Perry's
fleet in 1853. When the Bakufu in 1854 consulted with daimyos about their attitudes
toward the opening of Japan, replies varied significantly. The hardliners, such as the
lords of Ch~sh, Tosa, Kuwana, and Mito, wanted to use force to expel the foreigners.
The majority of daimyos, including the lord of Satsuma, were concerned about the
military superiority of western powers and thus preferred to avoid immediate conflict.
They proposed the opening of some ports as a means of appeasement, which would give
the government time to prepare militarily. The lords from the domains where the so-
called "western learning" (mainly via the Dutch) had flourished, such as Sakura,
Tsuyama, and Nakatsu, considered Japan's trade with the west an unavoidable trend in
407 In the well-known Oshio Heihachir6 revolt in 1837 in Osaka, Oshio openly used the exclusion of the
Court from politics as a point of critique. Harold Bolitho, "The Temp6 crisis," in Marius B. Jansen, ed.,
The Cambridge History ofJapan, volume 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 167.
408 Bit6 Masahide, "Sonn6 j6i shis6 [The thought of revering the Emperor and expelling the barbarians]," in
Iwanami kiza Nihon rekishi, Vol. 13 (kinsei 5) (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1977), pp. 78-80.
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the new international circumstances. They advocated enriching Japan through active
participation in foreign trade.409
As the Court and the Bakufu split over the issue of opening and the treaty terms with
western powers, the division among domain governments became de-stabilizing.
Realistic concessions that the Bakufu made to western powers simply provided
ammunitions for anti-foreign elements in the domains and the Court to attack the Bakufu.
For example, the first commercial treaty that the Bakufu council negotiated with the
American in 1857 had better terms than those in the treaty that Western powers imposed
on China after the Opium War.410 Nonetheless, the draft of the treaty and the agreed
opening of Yokohama, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hy6go (Kbe) aroused much opposition
among influential political figures such as Tokugawa Nariaki, the most prominent
hardliner in the Bakufu, and the lords of Satsuma, Mito, and Ch6shi, as well as among
the broader ranks of samurai. Emperor K6mei in 1858 refused to approve the treaty.
Foreign pressure forced the Bakufu to sign the treaties with the Americans, Dutch, British,
French, and Russians without imperial sanction. This act, however, clearly violated the
"delegation theory of political authority" and immediately made the Court the rallying
point for anti-foreign radicals. The alignment of loyalty to the Emperor with the
expulsion of westerners greatly damaged the Bakufu's legitimacy. In 1860, anti-foreign
409 Ono Masao, "Daimyo no ahen sens6 ninshiki [Daimyos and the knowledge about the Opium War]," in
Iwanami k5za Nihon tsishi, Vol. 15 (kinsei 5) (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 299-310.
410 Although both had a fixed 5 percent tariff rate on exports and the creation of consular courts, the Bakufu
did not grant American businessmen or missionaries the right to travel freely in Japan, nor did it allow
most-favored-nation status. See Marius B. Jansen, "The Meiji Restoration," in Marius B. Jansen, ed., The
Cambridge History ofJapan, volume 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), footnote 11 in p.
316.
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radicals dominated the Court and mounting calls to "immediately expel the western
barbarians" reached a peak in 1863 when Emperor K6mei ordered the repeal of the
treaties and the expulsion of foreigners by force (hayakujdi). Radicals in Ch6shi, the
stronghold ofjdi activists, bombarded western ships. Clashes also broke out between
Satsuma and the British. For the anti-foreign radicals, the Bakufu should be toppled if it
opposed the Emperor'sfjdi order.41 The retaliation by four of the treaty powers - Britain,
France, Holland, and the US - forced the realistic hardliners in Satsuma to collaborate
with the Bakufu to purge anti-foreign radicals in Ch~shU, Mito, and the Court so as to
avoid the possibility of even more humiliating treaties that would inevitably come after
military defeat.
By this point, the Bakufu had clearly ceased to be the undisputed representative and
guardian of the "public interest" of Japan. Both the Court and major "outside" daimyos
(tozama) became involved in the making of foreign policy, which was unprecedented in
the Tokugawa period. Although powerful daimyos failed to establish an institution, such
as an assembly of lords, to formally participate in policy making, the Bakufu had to take
seriously their opinions regarding treaties.412 Meanwhile, the Bakufu was unable to
mobilize domain troops if daimyos considered the action not to be in the national interest,
as illustrated by the fiasco of the second punitive expedition against Choshii in the
411 See the succinct account of these anti-foreign movements in Peter Duus, Modern Japan, second edition,
pp. 72-4. On the plan to overthrow the Bakufu, see Yasumaru Yoshio, "1850-70 nendai no Nihon: ishin
henkaku [Japan between the 1850s and 1870s: restoration and change]," in Iwanami kdza Nihon tsishi,
Vol. 16 (kindai 1) (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1994), pp. 20-2 1.
412 Sasaki Suguru, Bakumatsu zeiji to Satsuma han [Satsuma and the Politics in Late Tokugawa] (T6ky6:
Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 2000), pp. 281-6.
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summer of 1866.413 This failure, as the historian Conrad Totman has pointed out,
formally marked the end of the Bakufu's political dominance.4 14 In the autumn of 1866,
Matsudaira Shungaku, a powerful Tokugawa relative and former lord of Fukui, proposed
that the Bakufu return sovereign powers in diplomacy, command of the daimyos, and
coinage to the Court and that policy decisions be made consequent upon "public
discussion" among representatives from domains and the Bakufu, instead of by the
Bakufu alone. Shungaku's plan was supported by Satsuma, the most powerful domain at
the time.4 5 How to establish alternative political institutions thus became a pressing
problem for political actors in late 1866.
At the same time, they were also split over the implementation of the signed treaties.
Major leaders of the realistic hardliners, such as Kido Takayoshi of Choshi and Okubo
Toshimichi and Saig6 Takamori of Satsuma, rejected the radicals' demand for
"immediate expulsion of western barbarians"; yet they considered the treaties that the
Bakufu had signed a "national dishonor." In their view, once Japan became militarily
prepared, it should have the autonomy to decide whether to open ports and to revise the
unequal treaties with the West.4 16 When the British and French envoys in March 1867
requested the opening of Hyogo according to the signed treaties, leaders of Satsuma
proposed that the Court should be in charge of diplomacy and important foreign policies
should be decided upon the basis of "public discussion" among the Court, the Bakufu,
413 Most daimyos, particularly those in southwestern Japan, refused to follow Bakufu orders because they
considered this campaign to go against national security at a time when Japan was under threat from
western powers. For a discussion of this point, see Aoyama Tadamasa, Meiji ishin to kokka keisei [The
Meiji Restoration and State Formation] (T6ky6: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2000), pp. 211-21.
414 See Conrad Totman, The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1980), chapter 8.
415 Aoyama Tadamasa, Meiji ishin to kokka keisei [The Meiji Restoration and State Formation], pp. 233-4.
416 Sasaki Suguru, Bakumatsu zeji to Satsuma han [Satsuma and the Politics in Late Tokugawa], p. 220,
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and great lords.417 However, the western powers did not give time for the Japanese to
settle their internal divisions. In June 1867, the Bakufu had to agree to open Hy6go
before obtaining the agreement of the great lords. This decision severely alienated the
lords and became a turning point for re-alliance of major political actors. 4 18
At this moment, Japan's future political institutions remained highly opaque as there
were three major political camps with different ideas, agendas, and blueprints. The first
was the Restoration Camp, consisting mainly of the anti-Bakufu Court nobles, and
hardliners in Satsuma and Ch6shii. Many of these Court nobles, including Iwakura
Tomomi, had been had been purged and disciplined for their support of the anti-foreign
radicals in 1860-4. They returned to the Court after a general pardon was issued at the
succession of the new Emperor Mutsuhito (the future Meiji Emperor) in February, 1867.
Politically, this was a highly conservative camp as it planned to restore an imperial
government in which the Emperor governed with the aid of his ministers. It was willing
to use force to overthrow the Bakufu.
The second camp is often referred as the Camp for Assembly (k5gi seitai) in the recent
historiography of the Meiji Restoration. Leaders of this camp included Yamauchi Y6d5
(lord of Tosa), and Matsudaira Shungaku (lord of Fukui). It also had some prominent
westernizing thinkers such as Yokoi Sh6nan from Echizen. They were in favor of a
system resembling "monarchical constitutionalism." The Emperor would be sovereign,
yet important policies were to be made by a bicameral legislature (giiin). The Upper
417 Aoyama Tadamasa, Meiji ishin to kokka keisei [The Meiji Restoration and State Formation], pp. 240-2.
48 W. G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 269.
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House would be an "assembly of daimyos" and the Lower House made up of "competent
and virtuous" people regardless of their social status. 4 19 In the meeting with Sir Harry
Parkes in September 1867, Goto Shojiro from Tosa expressed an interest "to adopt in
Japan the English-style parliament and constitution." 420 In the summer of 1867, Satsuma
and Tosa reached an agreement that state power should return to the Court (6seifukko),
and Japan should seek new treaties with western powers. However, the leaders of Tosa
did not want to overthrow the Bakufu but planned to let the shogun join the future
legislature along with other lords.42 The Assembly Camp also represented the interest of
many daimyos as the proposed bicameral legislature provided them an institutional basis
to participate in national politics.
The third camp was the Bakufu, which was working out its own scheme for Japan's
future political institution. Bakufu officials who had returned from studying in Holland,
such as Nishi Amane and Tsuda Mamichi, planned to preserve the Bakufu as the
administrative institution and build a new bicameral legislature. The Upper House was to
be an assembly of daimyos and the Lower House composed of samurai-representatives
from each domain. The shogun was the real sovereign, in charge of not only
administration but also the Upper House, while the Emperor became a nominal sovereign
with no real political power but only ritual authority. 422
419 Cited in Sasaki Suguru, "Taiseih~kan to t6baku mittyoku [Returning power to the Emperor and the
secret imperial order to overthrow the Bakufu]," Jinmon gakuho, No. 80 (March 1997), p. 4.
42 Inoue Katsuo, Bakumatsu ishin seijishi no kenkyi [Studies in the Political History of late Tokugawa and
Early Meiji] (T6ky6: Hanawa Shob6, 1994), p. 343.
421 See the emphasis on the key difference between Tosa and Satsuma in Sasaki Suguru, "Taiseihokan to
tdbaku mittyoku [Returning power to the Emperor and the secret imperial order to overthrow the Bakufu],"
p. 14.
422 Tanaka Akira, "Bakufu no t6kai [The fall of the Bakufu]," in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi, Vol. 13
(kinsei 5) (T6kyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977), pp. 338-42.
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While the Restoration Camp was actively mobilizing troops for a coup to topple the
Bakufu, leaders of the Assembly Camp were worried that a civil war between the Bakufu
and Satsuma-Ch6shii would invite western intervention and thus threaten the security and
independence of Japan. In their view, there was no big difference between a Court under
the control of the Bakufu and one manipulated by Satsuma and Ch6shl. The idea of a
bicameral legislature formed the common ground for the Assembly Camp to reach
compromise with the Bakufu, especially when the latter agreed to be demoted to an equal
status with other great daimyos in the future legislative institution. In November, 1867,
the shogun Yoshibonu agreed to return "sovereign power" to the Court after months of
negotiation with representatives of Tosa and Echizen, two leading domains in the
Assembly Camp. On January 3, 1868, Yoshibonu formally consented to resign and to
return the Bakufu's large territories to the new imperial government. If these plans were
carried out, the Restoration Camp would lose any legitimate excuse to use force against
the Bakufu. 423
Given the differences among these three political camps, the political stakes were huge
and concrete. How these power struggles played out had significant bearings on
subsequent institutional development in Japan. Coalition between the Assembly Camp
and the Bakufu would greatly strengthen the political power of the advocates of a
bicameral assembly, particularly if they had enough time to take over the Bakufu's
administrative machinery and competent bureaucracy. This would have been a nightmare
423 Haraguchi Kiyoshi, Nihon kindai kokka no keisei [The Formation of the Modem State in Japan] (T6ky6:
Iwanami Shoten, 1968), p. 35.
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for the conservatives in the Restoration Camp. Fear of such a scenario may explain why
the military leaders of Satsuma were desperate to provoke conflict so as to find an
"excuse" to attack the Bakufu. Provocation by Satsuma troops soon led to a fight with
the Bakufu forces in Toba-Fushimi on January 27, 1868. The ensuing anti-Bakufu
military campaigns, which lasted for more than a year (boshin sense), were thus hardly a
well-planned one in advance.
For the Restoration Camp, there was an optimal sequence to take over political power.
As the Bakufu had formally agreed to turn its vast territories over to the newly
established imperial government, the Restoration Camp should have taken control of this
important tax base before hostilities began.424 Or the Restoration Camp should at least
have taken the Mint before commencing military action. The Mint was not only a
symbol of the sovereign power, but also an important source of revenue. If the Bakufu
refused to turn the Mint over to the Court, then there would be a legitimate reason for the
Restoration Camp to use force. The fact that the Restoration Camp did not take this
sequence indicates how pressing the political situation had become.
One direct consequence of launching the war prior to securing financial resources was
that the Restoration Camp was totally unprepared to fund its military campaigns. As the
restored imperial government had little creditworthiness in the financial markets at the
beginning, it could hardly borrow from big merchants. By June 1868, it only received
230,000 ryd in Osaka and 17,250 ryd in Ky6to through "forced loans" (goydkin). Yet the
424 In January 1868, the estimated rice output of the territory under the Court's control was only 100,000
koku, compared to 8 million koku in the Bakufu's territory.
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estimated expenditures of the Eastern Expedition against pro-Bakufu troops exceeded 3
million ry6.425 As a result, by June 1869 the Meiji government had issued 48 million ryd
of non-convertible paper notes denominated in gold (dajdkansatsu), most of which was
used to meet the government's fiscal needs.426 This exigent fiscal measure aroused
strong opposition even within the Restoration Camp; but there was no plausible
alternative.42 The origin of the credit crisis of paper notes was thus an unintended
consequence of the complicated power struggles in 1868 and exogenous to subsequent
institutional development in public finance.
III. Multiple possible outcomes and the unintended consequences of abolishing
domains: 1868-1871
The military victory in the Toba-Fushimi battle gave the Restoration Camp more power
to politically dominate the Assembly Camp which had been advantageous prior to this
battle.428 Nonetheless, the Meiji Restoration in 1868 as an event did not erase the deep
divergences over the future direction of institutional development between the
Restoration Camp and the Assembly Camp. From the very beginning, the institution
building of the Meiji regime was rife with internal power struggles among political
groups having divergent agendas, ideas, and interests.
425 Fujimura Thru, Meiji zaisei kakuritsu katei no kenkyi [A Study of the Process of Building the Public
Finance of the Meiji Regime] (T6kyo: Chtio Daigaku Shuppansha, 1968), p. 14.
426 More than 60 percent was used to dispense the Meiji government's expenditures, 20 percent was lent to
various domain governments, and 14 percent was used to "encourage businesses" (kangyd). Calculated
from Sawada Akira, Meiji zaisei no kisoteki kenkyai: ishin tosho no zaisei [A Study of the Foundation of
Public Finance of the Early Meiji Regime] (T6ky6: H6bunkan, 1934), p. 121.
427 Fujimura Thru, Meiji zaisei kakuritsu katei no kenkyai [A Study of the Process of Building the Public
Finance of the Meiji Regime], pp. 27-28 and p. 38.
428 See Haraguchi Kiyoshi, "Meiji shonen no kokka kenryoku [The State Power in the Early Meiji]," in
Taikei Nihon kokkashi [A History of the State in Japan], volume 4, kindai 1 (T6ky6: T6ky6 Daigaku
Shuppankai, 1975), pp. 80-2.
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Leaders of the Assembly Camp attempted to advance the agenda of establishing a
legislative institution which would represent the interest of domain governments and
secure their participation in national politics. In June 1868, Fukuoka Takachika (from
Tosa) and Soejima Taneomi (from Hizen) drafted the Proposals of Political Foundation
(seitaisho), which called for a separation of powers among the administration, legislation,
and jurisdiction as the fundamental political principle of Japan. Leaders of the Assembly
Camp, such as Yaman~chi Y6d6 (lord of Tosa) and Akizuki Tanetatsu not only evaluated
various legislative systems in western countries but also invited former Bakufu officials
who had studied western constitutionalism, such as Kanda Takahira, Kat6 Hiroyuki, and
Tsuda Mamichi, to join their cause. On April 18, 1869, a deliberative institution
(kgisho) based upon the model of the Lower House in Holland was established.429
However, political conservatives in the Restoration Camp endorsed the idea of "imperial
sovereignty," i.e., the divine authority of the Emperor as the ultimate source of state
power and legitimacy. They had no interest in any kind of representative assembly.
Military victories in 1868-1869 gave them more power to affect the institution building in
the new Meiji regime. When the pro-Bakufu troops were completely repressed in June
1869, Court nobles and leaders of Satsuma and Ch~shii cam to control the new institution
of the Council of State in the central government. They reorganized the kogisho as a
mere consultative organization (renamed as shaigiin, "House of Deliberation") that had no
authority in policy making. They expelled prominent figures in the Assembly Camp such
429 Yamazaki Yfik6, "K6gi chnshutsu kik6 no keisei to h6kai [The formation and collapse of the institutions
of public discussion]," in It5 Takashi ed., Nihon kindaishi no saikochiku [The Reconstruction of the
Modem History of Japan] (T6ky6: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 1993), pp. 60-61.
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as Yaman6chi Yd6, Akizuki Tanetatsu, Kat6 Hiroyuki, and Tsuda Mamichi from the
shaigiin. Anti-western Court nobles such as Ohara Shigenori dominated the shaigiin and
turned it into a forum to attack officials who advocated learning from the west.4 30
At the same time, anti-foreign radicals who had been mobilized by the Restoration Camp
to overthrow the Bakufu persecuted Japanese Christians and attacked foreigners. 4 3'
Strong reaction from western powers forced the leaders of the new Meiji regime to
continue the former government's appeasement policies, which in the past had been
severely criticized by the Restoration Camp. In this situation, anti-foreign radicals turned
their anger toward the westernizing officials in the Meiji government and prominent
advocates of western learning. Yokoi Sh6nan, a famous westernizing thinker, was
assassinated on February 15, 1869. Omura Masujir6, a proponent of a western-style
conscript army, was killed in the same year. Many high-ranking officials in the Meiji
government, such as Sanj6 Sanetomi, Soejima Taneomi, and Ohara Shigenori, were
openly sympathetic to the assassins.43 On the whole, the early Meiji was not a regime
that was eager to learn from the west.
4 3 0 Kasahara Hidehiko, Meiji kokka to kanrydsei [The Meiji State and Bureaucracy] (T6ky6: Roshoh6,
1991), p. 41.
431 On February 4, 1868, samurai soldiers from Bizen attacked foreigners in K6be. On March 8, samurai
soldiers from Tosa domain attacked French soldiers in Sakai. In May, the Meiji government arrested more
than one hundred Christians in Nagasaki. From November onward, the persecution of Christianity spread
to eighteen domains, including Saga and Satsuma, and by February 1870 more than 3,400 Christians had
been put into prison. See Miyaji Masahito, "Haihan chiken no seiji katei [The political process of
abolishing the domains]," in Banno Junji and Miyaji Masahito eds., Nihon kindaishi ni okeru tenkanki no
kenkya [Studies of the Transition Period in the Modem History of Japan] (T6ky6: Yamagawa Shuppansha,
1985), pp. 70-71.
432 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
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In regard to the relationship between the center and domain governments, the Meiji
government did assert its sovereign power in monetary issues. For example, it succeeded
in persuading Satsuma and Tosa to stop counterfeiting Bakufu coins and forbade domain
governments from issuing their own paper notes.433 It also prohibited domain
governments from borrowing from foreigners without the approval of the center.434
However, the central government at the time did not have the necessary fiscal and
military capacities to initiate full-fledged centralization. Without full control of the
institutions of taxation to extract revenues from the former Bakufu territories, it could not
retain the troops that had been mobilized in the anti-Bakufu campaigns as a standing
army. As a result, these samurai soldiers were sent back to their respective domains,
even though It6 Hirobumi had proposed that the Court should select from them
"competent soldiers" to form a central army. 4 35
Military decentralization in early Meiji was thus worse than that of the late Tokugawa
period, as the Bakufu had at least had its own large army. In this situation, the central
government could hardly take over the tax bases of domain governments. Major domain
governments could obstruct fiscal and military centralization. For example, domains
with large numbers of samurai troops, such as Satsuma, Ch~sh, Saga, Tosa, Kurume,
and Akizuki, rejected the central government's request to turn half of their military
433 Niwa Kunio, Chiso kaiseih5 no kigen: kaimei kanryd no keisei [The Origin of the Reform Laws of Land
Taxation: The Formation of the Enlightened Bureaucrats], pp. 62-63 and p. 75.
434 Matsuo Masahito, Haihan chiken no kenkya [Research on the Abolishing of Domains] (T6ky6:
Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 2001), pp. 81-84.
43s Senda Minoru, Ishin seiken no chokuzoku guntai [The Army of the Restoration Regime] (T6ky6: Kaimei
Shoin, 1978), p. 56.
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expenditures over to the center.436 In late 1870, Yamagata Aritomo, who had just
returned from investigating the military system in Europe, had to admit that it was
premature to replace military decentralization with a centralized conscription army.43
At the same time, domain governments initiated various reforms to reduce expenditures
by cutting the stipends of their vassals and the size of their samurai armies. Domain
governments in Tosa, Hisai, and Wakayama proceeded to replace samurai-based domain
438troops with peasant recruits. Domain governments in Tosa, Hikone, Choshii, Fukui,
and Yonezawa issued bonds to dissolve their obligations to provide hereditary stipends to
samurai vassals. 4 39 In October 1870, the conference on reforming domain institutions
held in Tokyo finally reached an agreement that the level of the military budget of
domain governments should not exceed 9 percent of their rice output (reduced from the
originally proposed 18 percent), half of which was to be sent to the center and half kept to
support their own domain armies. 440 Although domain rulers ceased to be hereditary and
had to be nominated by the central government, the central government did not penetrate
into the administration of domains. The center itself turned its attention to strengthening
the administration and reforming the taxation system in the territories that it inherited
from the Bakufu. At this point, leaders in the center did not consider the abolition of the
436 Banno Junji, "Meiji kokka no seiritsu [The formation of the Meiji state]," in Nihon rekishi taikei,
volume 4, Kindai, No. 1 (Toky6: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 1987), p. 274.
43 Senda Minoru, Ishin seiken no chokuzoku guntai [The Army of the Restoration Regime], p. 162.
438 Ibid., p. 116 and pp. 180-8.
439 Tosa adopted this method in November 1870, the other four domains between May and August in 1871.
All occurred before the abolition of the domains. See Senda Minoru, Ishin seiken no chitsuroku shobun:
tenn5sei to haihan chiken [The Restoration Regime's Commutation of the Stipends of Lords and Samurai:
The Emperor System and the Abolishing of the Domains] (T6ky6: Kaimei Shoin, 1979), p. 421.
440 Ibid., p. 116.
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domains a practical strategy.441 Fiscal centralization was far from inevitable in Japan in
1868, even though the sovereign power of the center in matters such as monetary
unification and administrative conformity was accepted by domain governments.
The political situation in 1870 was thus similar to a federal system with a unified
monetary and legal system in which domain governments retained much autonomy in
reforming their governance according to their respective past customs and current
circumstances.44 2 As the central government did not have a large-scale standing army
between 1868 and 1871, it did not have the power to impose centralization upon domain
governments, particularly those such as Satsuma, ChoshU, and Tosa that still had sizeable
troops. Concerns of national security and defense did not push the Meiji government to
centralize the army as this end could be achieved with military and fiscal
decentralization. In contrast to England after the Glorious Revolution in 1688, where the
protection of Protestant succession and the war against Catholic France remained an
effective means to legitimate the new regime, it was financially impossible for the new
Meiji regime to use international warfare to justify itself. In February 1869, fiscal
conditions forced it to reject Kido's proposal to invade Korea. For the same reason, the
Meiji government tried hard to avoid direct confrontation with the Russian over the issue
of the Kurile Islands.443
441 Takahashi Hidenao, "Haihan chiken ni okeru kenryoku to shakai" in Yamamoto Shir6 ed., Kindai Nihon
no seito to kanryd [Political Parties and Society in Modem Japan] (Toky6: Somotosha, 1991), p. 23.
442 On the attempt to imitate the American federal system in the first years of the Meiji Restoration, see
Inoue Katsuo, Bakumatsu ishin seijishi no kenkyfi [Studies in the Political History of late Tokugawa and
Early Meiji] (TMky6: Hanawa Shob6, 1994), p. 411.
443 Fumoto Shinichi, "Ishin seihu no hoppo seisaku [The Northern Policy of the Restoration Regime],"
Rekishigaku kenkyal, No. 725 (July 1997), p. 25, particularly footnote 86.
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Nonetheless, this balance of power between center and domains was disrupted by anti-
foreign radicals. The problem became more severe when financially exhausted domain
governments, particularly Satsuma, Ch6shn, and Tosa, began to cut the numbers of their
domain troops in 1869. Thousands of samurai soldiers who were dissatisfied with the
terms of their demobilization fled to Kurume, Kumamoto, and Akita, whose daimyos
were well-known for their endorsement of the immediate "expulsion of foreigners." In
October 1870, these domains actively colluded with anti-foreign Court nobles such as
Toyama Mitsutsune and Otagi Michiteru and planned to launch a "Second Restoration"
to reverse the appeasement policy and purge the "wicked" westernizing officials from the
central government.444 On February 1871, radicals assassinated Hirosawa Saneomi, a
senior leader and an important advocate of a western-style conscription army in the Meiji
government. The central government, which only had a small-scale army, had to request
the lords of Satsuma, Ch6sh, and Tosa to send troops to protect it from the attacks of
radicals. On March 30, 1871, some 8,000 samurai soldiers from the three domains came
to T6ky6 to form the imperial army. A new round of power struggles broke out in the
center.
The realistic hardliners such as Saig6 Takamori and Okubo Toshimichi from Satsuma
thus were powerful figures in the central government. In addition to protecting the
central government and containing anti-foreign radicals, they had their own political
agendas. Saig6 Takamori considered the westernizing projects, such as railway building,
444 Miyaji Masahito, "Haihan chiken no seiji katei [The political process of abolishing the domains]," pp.
104-107. See the details of the political crisis of the Meiji regime in 1870 also in Shimoyama Sabur6,
Kindai tenn~sei kenkyijosetsu [A Study of the Tenn6 System] (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1976); Sat6
Shiger6, Kindai tennosei keiseiki no kenkya [The Study of the Formation Period in the Tenno System]
(T6ky6: San'ichi Shob6, 1987).
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"mindless imitations" of the west; he believed they were wasteful and responsible for
government fiscal difficulties.445 He particularly disliked westernizing officials in the
Ministry of Finance, such as Okuma Shigenobu, Inoue Kaoru, and Shibusawa Eiichi. In
Saig5's view, these "vulgar officials" did not understand the importance of "virtue" but
only knew how to calculate interest.44 6 According to SaigO and Okubo, the correct ways
to overcome the government's fiscal difficulties were to reduce government expenditures
by "stopping the projects of railway and steam power" and eliminating "redundant
officials," by which they mean Okuma, Inoue, It6 and the former Bakufu bureaucrats
employed by the Ministry of Finance.447 In response, Kido Takayoshi, the leader of the
Ch~shin faction in the center tried to protect these officials so as to consolidate his own
power base.
Meanwhile, Itagaki Taisuke from Tosa and officials from domains such as Higo,
Tokushima, and Yonezawa formed a political group which demanded "fairness and
impartiality" in policy making. Aiming to break the control of the central government by
Satsuma and Choshii, they called for the establishment of a national institution which
could represent the interests of other domains.448 The wrangling over the institutional
441 Ishii Takashi, "Haihan no katei ni okeru seikyoku no d6k6 [Political trends in the process of abolishing
the domains]," originally published in Tdhoku Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkya Nenp6, No. 19 (July 1969).
Reprinted in Matsuo Masahito ed., Ishin seiken no seiritsu [The Establishment of the Restoration
Government] (T6ky6: Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 2001), p. 268; Fukuchi Atsushi, Meiji shinseiken no kenryoku
kdzo [The Power Structure of the New Meiji Government], p. 6.
446 Fukuchi Atsushi, Meiji shinseiken no kenryoku kz6 [The Power Structure of the New Meiji
Government], p. 8.
447 Ibid., p. 18; Niwa Kunio, Chiso kaiseih6 no kigen: kaimei kanry6 no keisei [The Origin of the Reform
Laws of Land Taxation: The Formation of the Enlightened Bureaucrats], p. 235 and pp.239-40.44 8 Matsuo Masahito, Haihan chiken no kenkya [Research on the Abolishing of the Domains], pp. 282-291.
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design of the center lasted for a few months and ended up with an abrupt decision to
abolish the domain system on August 29, 187 1.
At this moment, institutional development in public finance was not determined by the
outcome of the power struggles among major political groups only. Different
institutional designs put forward by various political factions in the government were
now subject to one common constraint, the credit crisis in the form of the paper notes
upon which the Meiji government depended. In the next section, I examine how the non-
convertible paper notes which started as an exigent fiscal measure in the civil war of
1868-1869 developed into a credit crisis, to which both the legitimation and
creditworthiness of the new Meiji regime were closely tied.
IV. The credit crisis of paper notes and its impact on institutional development
The Meiji government depended heavily on the issue of non-convertible paper notes
(dajokansatsu) to fund the wars against pro-Bakufu troops, which amounted to 48 million
ryd by June 1869. At the time, the monetary system in Japan was in complete chaos.
Coins minted by the former Bakufu, Bakufu currencies counterfeited by some domain
governments, particularly Satsuma, Tosa, and Saga, paper notes issued by domain
governments (hansatsu), and foreign currencies such as the Mexico dollar circulated in
the opened ports.450 It took time to establish a new unified monetary system and to mint
449 On the role of these reforming domains in the decision to abolish the domains, see Takahashi Hidenao,
"Haihan chiken ni okeru kenryoku to shakai," pp. 59-64; Matsuo Masahito, Haihan chiken no kenkyai
[Research on the Abolishing of the Domains], pp. 295-9.
450 By 1869, 208 kinds of paper notes issued by various domain governments were in circulation, which
amounted to 24 million Yen. Fujimura Thru, Meiji zaisei kakuritsu katei no kenkyfi [A Study of the Process
of Building the Public Finance of the Meiji Regime], p. 102.
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new currencies. In July 1869, the Meiji government announced the exchange of all
government paper notes for newly minted currency by the end of 1872. As it had to meet
spending needs while gradually taking over tax collection in the former Bakufu
territories, it had no option but to continue to rely upon paper notes. [Table 4.1]
Table 4.1: Percentage of issued paper notes in the Meiji government's total income:
1868-1872
No. 1: Jan. 1868 to Jan. 1869 72.6 %
No. 2: Feb. 1869 to Oct. 1869 69.5
No. 3: Nov.1869 to Oct. 1870 25.5
No. 4: Nov.1870 to Oct. 1871 10.0
No. 5: Nov.1871 to Dec. 1872 35.3
Source: Fujimura Thru, Meiji zaisei kakuritsu katei no kenkyfi [A Study of the Process of Building the
Public Finance of the Meiji Regime] (T6ky6: Chii6 Daigaku Shuppansha, 1968), pp. 154-155.
The formidable problems of how to stabilize the value of the paper notes, meet
government spending, and achieve monetary unification provided an opportunity for
officials who had previously demonstrated ability in managing finance and paper notes in
domain governments to rise to the center. In order to overcome the financial difficulties,
officials in the Ministry of Finance experimented with various methods. These included
collaborating with privileged merchants to circulate government paper notes, generating
revenue through government-owned enterprises, and extracting taxes from both direct
and indirect sources. The first two methods were essentially measures that various
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domain governments had used under the name of kokueki economic policies in the late
Tokugawa period. For example, a domain government lent its paper notes to privileged
merchants, who formed business monopolies (sh5h kaisho or kokusan kaisho) to
organize the production of local commodities and then sell them to the central markets in
Osaka, Ky6to, and T6ky6 to earn hard currency. Political power per se could not dictate
the course of institutional development as both the socio-economic circumstances and
state-society interactions significantly influenced the effectiveness of implemented
institutional arrangements.
Yuri Kimimasa, who was responsible for the original issue of Meiji paper notes, was
recommended by the lord of Echizen to the central government for his prior success in
managing paper notes for the domain government of Echizen. 45' Yuri first established
the Bureau of Commerce (shohoshi), which was staffed by government officials and
managers from big merchant houses such as Ono, Mitsui, and Shimada. These privileged
merchants took out loans from the government in government paper notes and were
granted monopoly rights to organize the production and export of major Japanese export
452goods, such as raw silk and tea. However, Yuri's policies did not work at the national
level. The privileged merchants could not compete with the traditional commercial
guilds (kabunakama), which had built dense commercial networks with local traders,
producers and farmers.4 s3 Moreover, they could not monopolize exports due to the
451 Sawada Akira, Meiji zaisei no kisoteki kenkyai: ishin tosho no zaisei [A Study of the Foundation of
Public Finance of the Early Meiji Regime], p. 115.
452 Mamiya Kunio, "Sh6h6shi no soshiki to kino [The organization and functions of Shoh6shi]," Shakai
keizai shigaku, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1963): 30-58.
45 Yunoki Manabu, "Hyogo shasha to ishin seihu no keizai seisaku [The Commercial House of Hyogo and
the Economic Policy of the Restoration Government]," Shakai keizai shigaku, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1969), p. 17.
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opposition of foreign merchants. 454 The paper notes of daj6kansatsu were discounted at
some 60 percent in T6ky6, Osaka, and Ky6to and could not even circulate in the
provinces.45 Yuri had to resign in March 1869.
Okuma Shigenobu, Yuri's successor, also had experience of managing paper notes and
rescuing the finances of the domain government in Saga. 456 When Okuma was in charge
of the financial affairs of the Meiji government, he asked some privileged merchants in
major ports opened to foreign trade and in commercial centers to form the Finance
Companies (kawase kaisha). The government lent paper notes to these Companies,
which in turn issued commercial bills and lent these bills to the business monopolies that
had been established by domain governments (shoh6 kaisho or kokusan kaisho).4 " As
the Meiji government forbade domain governments to issue paper notes, Okuma
attempted to utilize these business monopolies to circulate the paper notes issued by the
central government. Nonetheless, the business monopolies of domain governments could
not compete with private businessmen, particularly in the most profitable businesses of
454 Shimbo Hiroshi, Nihon kindai shiny5 seido seiritsu shiron [The History of the Establishment of the
Credit System in Modem Japan] (Toky6: Ynhikaku, 1968), p. 16. Nakamura Naoyoshi also emphasizes
that the semi-official, semi-private nature of Tsiihoshi and the concentration of its lending on lords were the
main reasons for its failure. See Nakamura Naoyoshi, Okuma zaisei no kenkyfl [A Study of the Policies of
Public Finance of Okuma] (T6ky6: Azekura Shob6, 1968), pp. 29-30.
4ss Yamamoto Yiiz6, "Meiji ishinki no zaisei to tsiika [Finance and currency in the Meiji Restoration]," in
Umemura Mataji and Yamamoto YUzo, eds., Kaiko to ishin [The Opening of Japan and the Restoration],
volume 3 in Nihon keizaishi [The Economic History of Japan] (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1989), p. 129.
456 In 1864, Okuma and other samurai officials in Saga opened trading houses in Osaka and Nagasaki to
promote the sales of commodities made in Saga and used the monies earned to back up the paper notes
issued by the Saga government. Nakamura Naoyoshi, Okuma Shigenobu (Tokyo: Yoshikawa K6bunkan,
1961), pp. 27-28.
45 Shimbo Hiroshi, Nihon kindai shiny5 seido seiritsu shiron [The History of the Establishment of the
Credit System in Modern Japan], p. 32.
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tea and raw silk.458 The government also interfered in the management of these Finance
Companies and required them to lend to the government.459
Under pressure to increase government income, westernizing officials in the Ministry of
Finance also tried to use state enterprises in railways, silk weaving, and mining to earn
profits. This policy represented the fiscal principle of the domain state and was against
the trend of increasing private entry into the mining of gold and silver which had begun
in the late Tokugawa period. 460 The fiscal concerns of state enterprises put the
government in direct conflict of interest with private businessmen. In order to
monopolize profits from mining, the Meiji government excluded entries of not only
foreigners but also Japanese private businessmen. Likewise, the Meiji government tried
to monopolize railway building and rejected the railway project between T6ky6 and
Yokohama proposed by Yokohama merchants in November 1869.461 Nonetheless, these
state enterprises in modern industries became a huge financial burden. Instead of turning
a profit, more than 10 million yen had been spent on railway building by 1871, including
4.8 million in loans at 9 percent borrowed from the British Oriental Bank.462 Political
458 Ibid., p. 33.
459 Okuma later admitted the inefficiency and mismanagement of officials of the Bureau of Promoting
Commerce. See Okuma Shigenobu, "Proposal to build offices of credit" (1875), Okuma monjo, volume 3,
A11, p. 161.
460 See the emphasis on the fiscal purpose of government-owned enterprises in modem industry in the early
Meiji in Yamamoto Hirofumi, "Shoki shokusan seisaku to sono syfisei [The early industry-promotion
policy and its revision]," in And6 Yoshio, ed., Nihon keizai seisaku shiron (6) [The History of Economic
Policy in Japan], volume I (T6ky6: T6ky6 University Press, 1973), p. 23; Nagai Hideo, Meiji kokka keiseiki
no gaisei to naisei [The External and Domestic Politics in the Formation Period of the Meiji State]
(Hokkaid6 Daigaku Shuppankai, 1990), pp.220-2;
461 Okada Shunpei, "Meiji shoki no ts-i3ka ky6kyi! seisaku [The policy of monetary supply in the early
Meiji]," p. 22.
462 Nagai Hideo, "Shokusan K6gy6 seisaku no kich6: kanei jigy6 o chiishin to site [The basic tune of the
industry-promotion policies]," p. 225.
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conservatives attributed the fiscal difficulties of the Meiji government to these
westernizing projects.
Although officials in the Ministry of Finance initiated various institutional elements of
public finance, their effectiveness was largely determined by socio-economic
circumstances in Japan, such as dense business networks which private economic actors
had developed in organizing the production and sale of commodities. The Meiji
government simply could not replace these social resources in the economy by its
privileged merchants. Nor could the Meiji government control the domestic market as it
wished. For example, the government's order on June 28, 1868 to forbid the use of
private banknotes and commercial bills issued by private bankers caused a huge panic in
Osaka. Although the government repealed the prohibition within the month, several
well-established banking houses in Osaka, including the famous Konoike House, went
bankrupt; and the highly developed financial networks centered in Osaka were almost
destroyed.463
In regard to taxation, the unequal treaties made it impossible for the Meiji government to
raise revenues by charging higher customs duties. It thus had to first depend upon taxes
extracted from the former Bakufu territories. For this reason, many former Bakufu
officials who were experienced in local administration were retained to continue the
collection of taxes. 4 4 Under the pressure of fiscal difficulties, Okuma did not allow
463 Umemura Mataji, "Meiji ishinki no keizai seisaku [The economic policies in the period of Meiji
Restoration]," Keizai kenkyfi, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1979), p. 36.
464 Sekiguchi Eiichi, "Min-Kura bunri mondai to Kido Takayoshi [The issue of the separation of the civil
affairs from the Ministry of Finance]," Hdgaku, Vol. 39, No.1 (March 1975), p. 42.
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reduction in or exemption from land taxes in spite of poor harvests in 1868 and 1869.465
These harsh measures caused large-scale peasant riots in Hita, Shinshi, and Fukushima.
Local magistrates, who bore the brunt of the protests, demanded "benevolent policies" so
as to consolidate the legitimacy the new Meiji regime.466 Peasant resistance to land taxes
prompted officials of public finance to tax the commercial sectors so as to reduce the
burden of land taxes. In March 1869, the Guidance for the Administration of Cities and
Prefectures of the central government clearly stated that "as commerce prospers, the
commercial taxes should be gradually collected [and] we could expect a great success
when the methods of taxing commercial sectors are ultimately formulated."4 67
The credit crisis of paper notes had a great impact on the operation of the fiscal system of
the newly established Meiji government. In order to quickly receive the collected
revenues, the government on January 1869 ordered 50 traditional bankers (ry~gaesh6),
including the Ono, Mitsui, and Shimada houses, to transmit tax revenues and government
expenditures. After the abolition of the domains in 1871, they served as the
government's money transmitters (kawasekata) and extended their networks to the whole
468
country. Private financiers also facilitated the government's efforts to convert the land
465 Matsuo Masahito, "Ishin kanryosei no keisei to Daj6kansei [The formation of bureaucrats of the
Restoration regime and the Council of State]," in Kindai Nihon Kenkyikai, ed., Kanrydsei no keisei to
tenkai [The Formation and Development of Bureaucracy], volume 6, Nenpd Nihon kindai kenkyfl (T6ky6:
Yamagawa Shuppansha, 1986), p. 18.
466 Sekiguchi Eiichi, "Min-Kura bunri mondai to Kido Takayoshi [The separation of the Ministry of Civil
Affairs and the Ministry of Finance and Kido Takayoshi]," Hogaku, Vol. 39, No.1 (March 1975), pp. 43-
47; Matsuo Masahito, "Meiji shonen no seijy6 to chih6 shihai [The political situation and local governance
in the early Meiji]," Tochi seido shigaku, No. 91 (April 1981), p. 48.
467 Senda Minoru and Matsuo Masahito, Meiji ishin kenkyfijosetsu: ishin seiken no chokkatsuchi [An
Introduction to the Study of the Meiji Restoration: The Territories under the Direct Administration of the
Restoration Government] (Toky6: Kaimei Shoin, 1977), pp. 253-4.
468 In April 1872, the total number of prefectures where the Ono house had offices and branches (or
planned to do so) was 35, Mitsui, 13; and Shimada, 8. See Iwasaki Hiroshi, "Kokuritsu ginko seido no
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tax collected in rice into money as their branches received the rice from peasants and sent
bills to their headquarters in T6ky6. Although the Ministry of Finance ordered them to
send the collected taxes on the 15 th and the last day of each month to T6ky5 by bills of
exchange, they still benefited from having government funds and revenues at their
disposal even for brief periods.469 The relatively stable flows of government revenue and
funds enhanced the reputation of these private banks in the markets; and the government
avoided the burden of transporting species.
In contrast to the failed experiment with government enterprises or government-run
financial intermediaries, the issue of paper notes was a success story. The Ministry of
Finance relied upon the coercive power of the state to circulate government paper notes
in the domestic economy. On the one hand, it excluded "competing money" and thus
created a demand for its paper notes. For example, in September 1869, the Meiji
government prohibited the use of specie in domestic transactions, and it used government
paper notes (dajokansatsu) to exchange all sorts of paper notes issued and coins minted
by previous domain governments. 470 On the other hand, government paper notes also
provided a standard medium which could reduce transaction costs for economic actors
who had suffered from the monetary chaos of the 1860s.
seiritsu to fuken kawasekata [The establishment of the national banking system and the money-transmitters
of cities and prefectures]," Mitsui bunko ronso, No. 2 (March 1968), p. 215.
469 Ibid., p. 212.
470 Okada Shunpei, "Meiji shoki no tsnika ky~kyGi seisaku [The policy of monetary supply in the early
Meiji]," in Okada Shunpei ed., Meii shoki no zaisei kinyi seisaku [The Fiscal and Financial Policies in the
Early Meiji] (T6ky6: Seimeikai S6sho, 1964); Niwa Kunio, Chiso kaiseiho no kigen: kaimei kanryo no
keisei [The Origin of the Reform Laws in Land Taxation: The Formation of the Enlightened Bureaucrats],
p. 67.
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The economic circumstances in early Meiji were beneficial to the circulation of
government paper notes. The civil war in 1868-9 did not significantly disrupt the
domestic economy. After Shogun Yoshinobu peacefully surrendered Thky6 to the Meiji
government, battles of limited scale were fought in regions that were marginal to the
Japanese economy. The expanding exports of Japan after the opening of ports to foreign
trade greatly stimulated the domestic economy and the development of interregional
trade. The Meiji government thus benefited from an economy of scale in issuing paper
notes that was not available to the more limited domain governments. By mid-1870,
paper notes began to be used according to their face value, even though the government's
specie reserves were far from sufficient to sustain convertibility.47 ' [Table 4.2] In order
to consolidate trust in government paper notes, Okuma publicly promised to make them
convertible by 1872. Success on circulating non-convertible paper notes in the domestic
economy then in turn posed a new challenge - how to establish the necessary institutions
to ensure their convertibility.
471 Yamamoto Yiiz6, "Meiji ishinki no zaisei to tsaka [Finance and currency in the Meiji Restoration]," p.
133.
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Table 4.2: Cash reserves of government paper notes between 1868 and 1871
(Unit: 1,000 yen)
Year Government paper notes Specie reserves Reserve ratio %
1868 24,037 -- 0
1869 50,091 2 0
1870 55,500 4 0
1871 60,272 191 0
Source: Harada Mikio, Nihon no kindaika to keizai seisaku [Economic Policies and the Modernization of
Japan] (T6ky6: Thyo Keizai Shinp6sha, 1972), p. 174.
The institutional environment prevailing in the central government was favorable to
experimenting with new institutional arrangements. The Council of State did not have
effective control over government ministries, particularly the Ministry of Finance. In
September 1869, the Ministry of Finance became the most powerful ministry when it
incorporated the Ministry of Civil Affairs so as to strengthen its supervision over tax
collection in the territories of the former Bakufu. Okuma gathered many young
westernizing officials such as Inoue Kaoru and Ito Hirobumi around him. Moreover, he
invited many former Bakufu bureaucrats who had rich administrative experience in
managing public finance to join him. The most prominent of them was Shibusawa Eiichi.
Among the 13 members of the Office of Reform, the think-tank of the Ministry of
Finance, nine were former Bakufu bureaucrats. Under the leadership of Shibusawa, the
Office of Reform formulated plans on a wide range of issues such as monetary
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consolidation, fiscal centralization, the postal system, the metrological system, household
registration and management, and corporation laws. 47 2
Ministry of Finance officials also came under attack from conservatives, not only for
their westernizing standpoints but also for their policy mistakes. Conservatives in 1870
were shocked by a foreign loan of E3 million that these officials tried to secretly borrow
for railway construction in Japan. 473 Domain governments disliked the heavy-handed
measures they adopted to circulate paper notes issued by the center. Leaders in the
central government, Okubo and Hirosawa Saneomi, worried that the Council of State was
losing control over the increasingly powerful Ministry of Finance. In August 1870,
Okubo separated the Ministry of Civil Affairs from the Ministry of Finance and put it
under his control. Nonetheless, Okuma, Inoue, and It6 continued to manage financial
affairs. Kido and Okuma also managed to take the bureaus of mining, railway, and other
modernization projects out of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and establish a new Ministry
of Industry in December 1870.
Interestingly, the issue of paper notes protected westernizing officials in the Ministry of
Finance. Although Saig6 and Okubo originally planned to purge westernizing officials in
the Ministry of Finance in the institutional reform in 1871, they had to take into account
the government's dire financial situation. Financial experts such as Tani Tetsuomi and
Tsuda Izuru, who came to the center with Saig6's troops, did not have much experience
472 Niwa Kunio, Chiso kaiseihd no kigen: kaimei kanry5 no keisei [The Origin of the Reform Laws of Land
Taxation: The Formation of the Enlightened Bureaucrats], chapter 3.
47 This loan was first arranged secretly so as to avoid the opposition of conservatives. See the details in
Tatewaki Kazuo, Meiji seihu to Eikoku Tdyd Ginkd [The Meiji Government and the British Oriental Bank]
(T6ky6: Cha6 K6ronsha, 1992), pp. 74-96.
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in managing paper notes in Satsuma, an economically backward region. 474 The
reforming domains could not recommend anyone to replace Okuma other than Yuri
Kimimasa, who had resigned because of his mismanagement of paper notes in 1869.
Iwakura, who was a political ally of Saig6 and Okubo in the Council of State, had to
admit that Okuma had to be kept in the Ministry of Finance in light of the issue of paper
notes.47 Okubo himself even refused to be the Minister of Finance, unless Okuma and
Inoue agreed to be his aides.476 As a result, the issue of paper notes constrained power
struggles in the center in 1871, and westernizing officials such as Okuma, Inoue, and
Shibusawa continued to take care of financial affairs throughout the political whirlwind.
In fact, even if political conservatives had replaced all these westernizing officials, the
new officials in the Ministry of Finance would have faced the same problem of how to
secure the value of the issued paper notes.
IV. Conclusion:
In the period between 1858 and 1871, there was no unilinear trajectory toward
centralization in public finance. With the collapse of the Bakufu, political actors with
different interests, ideas, and blueprints for national institutions formed and re-formed
their coalitions under changing circumstances. There was no "strong state" to impose
474 Before the end of counterfeiting Bakufu coins in September 1869, the annual profit that the domain
government in Satsuma received from this practice was 1.5 million ryd, which was its largest item of
revenue. Cited from Niwa Kunio, Chiso kaiseiho no kigen: kaimei kanryd no keisei [The Origin of the
Reform Laws of Land Taxation: The Formation of the Enlightened Bureaucrats], p. 10.
47 From Iwakura's letter to Sasaki Takayuki, dated June 1871. Cited from Sekiguchi Eiichi, "Haihan
chiken to Min-Kura gappei: rususeihu to Okurasho (1) [The Abolishing of the domains and the merging of
the Ministries of Civil Affairs and Finance, part 1]," Hogaku, Vol. 43, No. 3 (December 1979), p. 308.
476 Shibusawa recalled many years later, "Okubo was not only unfamiliar with financial affairs but also
found their principles difficult to understand." Cited in Niwa Kunio, Chiso kaiseih5 no kigen: kaimei
kanryd no keisei [The Origin of the Reform Laws of Land Taxation: The Formation of the Enlightened
Bureaucrats], p. 251.
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modem institutions upon the society from above. Western learning remained politically
controversial among major leaders of the Meiji government. Moreover, western models
did not provide tools that the Meiji leaders could easily adopt to solve the specific
problems they faced.
This was also a period characterized by a high degree of institutional malleability.
Various institutional arrangements were implemented. Their fates were determined not
only by politics but also by the socio-economic environment, as attested by the repeal of
the Bureau of Commerce and the Exchange Companies. The political institutions of the
central government also experienced several reshufflings during these years, most
notably the separation of the Ministries of Finance and Civil Affairs.
In a situation of high uncertainty and institutional malleability, no one could foresee the
outcome of the complex and interactive games underlying political struggle. As a result,
events and reactions to them often produced unintended consequences which
significantly affected subsequent institutional development. Neither the Meiji
Restoration in 1868 nor the abolition of the domains in 1871 was a well-planned
decision. The contingency and unintended consequences of major events are well-
illustrated by the Meiji government's original issue of and increasing reliance upon non-
convertible paper notes.
These paper notes, it must be stressed, represented a credit crisis only of the central
government. They did not constitute a general economic crisis. Nonetheless, the Meiji
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government's excessive dependence upon them to satisfy its fiscal needs made it difficult
for political conservatives to build a coin-based public finance. Ironically, it also ended
up protecting the capable westernizing officials in the Ministry of Finance from being
ousted, which gave them a chance to learn from their institutional experiments in public
finance. In the next chapter, I examine how this credit crisis continued to have long
lasting effects on the unfolding of a process of institutional learning which ended with the
establishment of the modern fiscal state in the late 1880s.
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Chapter 5: Credit Crisis, Institutional Learning, and Japan's Path toward a
Modern Fiscal State: 1871-1895
I. Introduction:
Ever since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the convertibility of the issued paper notes had
been a pressing problem for the government. This credit crisis became more serious after
the abolition of the domains in 1871 for two reasons. First, the central government took
over both the expenditures and debts of domain governments before it had developed
institutions to extract taxes from the whole country. As a result, the Meiji government
had to issue more paper notes to cover its spending. Second, and more importantly, the
rising price of gold in the international markets after 1874 made it extremely difficult for
the Meiji government to attain the convertibility of paper notes denominated in gold.
This was an unforeseen consequence of its decision to adopt the gold standard in June
1871 as no one in the government could have anticipated the steady rise of gold prices in
the international markets when many European countries adopted the gold standard in the
1870s. The Meiji government could do little to prevent the flow of gold out of the
country now that it was open to the international economy.
In this chapter, I examine how this credit crisis shaped the process of institutional
development toward the modern fiscal state in a context characterized by uncertainty and
multiplicity of possible outcomes in the period between 1871 and 1895. The new central
government in 1871 faced formidable challenges: how to build administrative institutions
and how to consolidate the legitimacy of the new regime. Significant divisions remained
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among major political groups over the appropriate direction and the necessary speed of
subsequent institutional development. As the Japanese historian Banno Junji has pointed
out, state actors at the time contended over three options to legitimate the new regime:
foreign aggression, economic development, and creation of a parliamentary system.47 7
Each had different implications for institutional development in public finance.
While military decentralization was compatible with national defense, an offensive
strategy might demand more centralization in mobilizing financial resources, including
tax collection. Large-scale military expansion, particularly a rapid modernization of the
navy which aimed to challenge China's dominance in Korea, did not start until 1882. In
the 1870s, the credit crisis of paper notes forced the Meiji government to reject a plan to
invade Korea and focus instead on how to build the necessary institutions to ensure the
convertibility of paper notes. In this light, war preparation was not the cause for
centralization in the collection of taxes achieved by 1880, particularly in collecting
indirect taxes on alcohol production.
Meanwhile, government officials drew quite different lessons from western experience.
For example, after visiting western countries for more than a year with the well-known
Iwakura Mission, Okubo Toshimichi, one major leader of the Meiji government, began to
support westernizing programs for economic development. Nonetheless, Kido
Takayoshi, the other principal leader, had a different change of mind after this visit. In
his view, the wealth and strength of the west could not be achieved overnight. He
4 See Banno Junji, Kindai Nihon no kokka kos6, 1871-1936 [Plans of the State in Modem Japan, 187 1-
1936] (Toky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), chapter one.
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criticized the "impatient and reckless" westernizing officials in the Ministry of Finance
and advocated a slower yet more stable tempo in the attempts to overcome the fiscal
deficit and promote economic development. 478 His view was not unreasonable when we
consider the social resistance and various problems that a rapid centralization had
produced.
Besides the speed of development, officials of public finance had different diagnoses of
and prescriptions for economic difficulties such as the massive gold drainage. In regard
to the issue of paper notes, there was no single obvious model for the Japanese to choose.
For example, there were three different banking systems in the west: the decentralized
national banking system in the US; the centralized British model; and the Belgian system
which mixed central banking with investment banking. It was not easy for the Japanese
officials at the time to decide which model would work in the particular socio-economic
circumstances of Japan. None of them could predict with any certainty the possible
interactions between the borrowed model and the financial networks already in existence
in Japan. Such interactions significantly affected the result of institutional
transplantation.
Institution building in public finance after 1871 was a highly political process as it
affected not only the distribution of interests in the society but also the relationship
between the center and local governments. This is particularly true as government paper
notes had become the standard medium of transactions throughout the economy by 1871.
478 Fukuchi Atsushi, Meiji shinseiken no kenryoku kdzd [The Power Structure of the New Meiji
Government] (T6ky6: Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 1996), pp. 122-123.
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As Banno Junji has emphasized, the Meiji government in the 1870s chose to use the
success of its economic policies to legitimize itself and defeat the political demand for
establishing a parliamentary institution. 479 However, policy mistakes stimulated the
opposition in the form of the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement (jiya minken und6).
This movement was a continuation of the Assembly Camp in the 1860s. While it was
originally dominated by ex-samurai, in the late 1870s rich peasants began to participate in
this political movement in significant numbers. These political pressures not only
affected power struggles within the Meiji government but also influenced policy making
and the course of institutional development in public finance. The central government
after abolishing the domains thus had neither coherence nor autonomy to dictate
institutional development. How shall we explain the specific institutional outcome of the
modern fiscal state which emerged in the late 1880s and was consolidated in the early
1890s against this background of uncertainty, political maneuvering, and the multiplicity
of possible outcomes?
In this chapter, I argue that the particular credit crisis of paper notes denominated in gold,
instead of a general agenda of promoting economic development, was the key factor that
determined the actual substance of Meiji economic policies in the 1870s. The central
concern of these policies was to increase the government's stock of gold, through both
import-substitution and promotion of export to the west. At the same time, the credit
crisis changed the risk distribution between the center and local governments and forced
the central government to speed up centralization in tax collection and the management
479 Banno Junji, "Seikan rons6g6 no 'naijiha' to 'gaiseiha' ['Wealth' vs. 'Power' in Early Meiji]," in Kindai
Nihon Kenkyaikai ed., Bakumatsu ishin no Nihon [Japan in the Late Tokugawa and Meiji Restoration],
volume 3 of Nenp6 kindai Nihon kenky7 (Toky6: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 1981).
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of government spending. In particular, the Meiji government established a centralized
bureaucracy for assessing and collecting indirect taxes upon sake by 1880. As a common
problem for state actors, this credit crisis led to a continuous accumulation of effective
institutional arrangements even though they might be implemented by political rivals.
Even when new officials came to take charge of the Ministry of Finance, they could still
learn from both the policy mistakes and successes of their predecessors as they all had to
confront the issue of how to safeguard the value of paper notes.
As useful institutional elements and practical experience in managing public finance
accumulated over time, actors in the late 1870s reached consensus in regarding the
direction of institutional development. They agreed that it was necessary to build a
central bank to manage the issue of paper notes. Nonetheless, this does not imply that the
establishment of the central bank was an apolitical technical issue. On the contrary, I
argue that the complicated conflicts of interest between the state and society, along with
power struggles within the Meiji government itself, are crucial to understanding the
highly deflationary measures that Matsukata Masayoshi, the new Minister of Finance,
implemented in 1882. The ensuing profound deflation in the period between 1882 and
1885, known as the Matsukata deflation, was by no means an unavoidable price that had
to be paid to curb inflation.480 Once it began, however, this deflation significantly
dictated the policies of the Bank of Japan, which centered on how to mitigate the
480 For the received view of the Matsukata deflation as the unavoidable price to pay to curb inflation, see
Jackson H. Bailey, "The Meiji Leadership: Matsukata Masayoshi," in W. H. Wray, ed., Japan Examined:
Perspectives on Modern Japanese History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983); Steven J. Ericson,
"'Poor Peasant, Poor Country!' The Matsukata Deflation and Rural Distress in mid-Meiji Japan," in Helen
Hardacre and Adam L. Kern, eds., New Directions in the Study of Megyi Japan (Leiden: Brill, 1997);
Muroyama Yoshimasa, Matsukata zaisei kenky-a [A Study of Matsukata's Policy in Public Finance]
(Ky6to: Mineruva Shob6, 2004).
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deflationary effects, and its interactions with domestic financial markets between 1884
and 1895.
In section II, I examine the deepening of the credit crisis in the 1870s and its impact on
the making of economic policy. In section III, I discuss the accumulation of effective
institutional elements between 1871 and 1880, which prepared the way for the building of
a modem fiscal state in Japan. In section IV, I analyze the debates over gradual and
radical approaches to curb inflation and their political implications. I argue that the
Matsukata deflationary policy was neither optimal nor inevitable way to attain the
convertibility of paper notes. I then explore how the deflation significantly influenced
the actual process of building the Bank of Japan between 1881 and 1895. Section V
concludes.
II. Deepening credit crisis: 1871-1880
The new central government took on the debts of domain governments and the stipends
of peers and samurai as its own responsibility after the abolition of the domains on
August 29, 1871.481 It issued 24.44 million yen in paper notes to exchange for all the
paper notes issued by domain governments.482 Although peer and samurai stipends had
been greatly reduced in previous reforms, they still cost the government 18.94 million
yen in 1873, accounting for some 30 percent of government annual spending. There was
481 The Meiji government took over only half of a total debt of 78.13 million yen of domain governments.
It paid 4 million yen cash to clear loans from foreign sources. For the debt of 12.82 million yen which had
accrued between 1868 and 1872, it issued bonds bearing an interest rate of 4 percent and planned to repay
them in 25 years. As to the 11.23 million yen debt which had accrued before 1842, it decided to return it
without interest in 50 years. Cited from Yamamoto Ynz6, "Meiji ishinki no zaisei to tstka [Finance and
currency in the Meiji Restoration]," p. 147.
482 Ibid., p. 150.
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thus little dispute among the leaders of the new central government over the plan to issue
bonds to dissolve its obligation to pay the hereditary stipends of ex-samurai. The only
question was the speed of bond redemption.
In order to legitimize the new central government, the Iwakura Mission left Japan on
December 23, 1871 to negotiate with western powers for a revision of the unequal
treaties, and particularly for a resumption of sovereignty in deciding customs duties. 4 83 it
planned to use this strategy to distinguish itself from both the appeasement policy of the
former Bakufu and the expulsion of westerners espoused by the radicals. Moreover, the
Ministry of Finance considered the receipt from the customs duties an important source
of income, especially when the central government had not yet established institutions to
collect domestic taxes.484 However, this mission was totally unrealistic due to the
resistance of the western powers.
As the abolition of the domains was not well-planned in advance, the new central
government was saddled with much increased liabilities before it had developed the
necessary institutions to tax the national economy. In this situation, the new central
government planned to raise a loan of 3 million pounds (equivalent to 30 million yen) at
7 percent from America to clear its liabilities to ex-samurai and peers. However, this
attempt failed as America was not yet a major capital-exporting country and the Meiji
483 Suzuki Eiki, "Iwakura shisetsudan hensei katei e no ashitana shiten [A new perspective on the formation
process of the Iwakura Mission]," Jinmon gakuhd, No. 78 (March 1996), p. 43.
84 As early as in December 1871, Inoue Kaoru and Yoshida Kiyonari had pointed out the urgency of
charging higher customs duties so as to not only raise government revenue but also reduce the burden of
land taxes on peasants. Inoue Kaoru and Yoshida Kiyonari, "On reforming the domestic taxation,"
(November 1871), cited in Nakamura Masanori et. al., eds., Keizai kdsd5 [Economic Schemes], volume 8 of
Nihon kindai shiso taikei (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), p. 145.
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regime had little creditworthiness in the international capital markets.485 The Meiji
government only managed to borrow a loan of 10 million yen at 7 percent in 1873 from
the British Oriental Bank, the major foreign bank in East Asia at the time. In 1874 and
1875, a total of 142,858 samurai received 16.56 million yen in Stipends Bonds (bearing
an annual interest rate of 8 percent) and 20 million yen in cash to abandon their
"entitlement" permanently. 486 As most of the recipients of Stipend Bonds sold them for
cash and quickly fell into poverty, the Meiji government was forced to suspend this
policy in March 1875.487
Iwakura and Kido strongly advocated a more gradual approach to settling the stipends of
ex-samurai as it involved the livelihood of some 2 million ex-samurai and their family
members. This was the most educated segment of the population. With the
establishment of tax institutions and the subsequent growth of revenues, the Meiji
government would have been able to create more employment opportunities for ex-
samurai in public education, police, and civil administration. Considering the political
situation in the mid-i 870s, a gradual settlement of the stipend issue of ex-samurai seemed
a reasonable method, especially for a new government that desperately needed to
establish its legitimacy after abolishing the domains.
The political situation that the Meiji regime faced in 1873 and 1874 was very similar to
that in the initial years of the Restoration. Dire fiscal conditions forced Okubo
485 Senda Minoru, "Meiji rokunen shichibu ritsuki gaisai no boshni katei [The process of raising a foreign
loan at a 7 percent interest rate in 1873]," Shakai keizai shigaku, Vol. 49, No. 5 (December 1983): 445-70.
486 Calculated from table 19 in Fujimura Toru, Meiji zenki kosai seisakushi kenkya [A Study of the History
of Bond Policy in the Early Meiji] (T6ky6: T6y6 Kenkyisho, 1977), p. 85.
487 Ibid., p. 86.
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Toshimichi, Iwakura Tomomi, and Kido Takayoshi to ally together to reject the hard-
liners' attempt to legitimize the new regime by invading Korea.488 As a result, radicals
plotted to use force against the central government, as shown in the samurai rebellion in
Saga in 1874. The realistic hardliners were dissatisfied at the government's westernizing
projects which had caused severe deficits. Saig5 Takamori resigned and went back to
Satsuma in 1873. Meanwhile, Shimazu Hisamitsu, former lord of Satsuma and a
prominent political figure in the Meiji Restoration, urged the government to implement
"fiscal retrenchment" to overcome the fiscal difficulties. 489
Westernizing officials in the Ministry of Finance were also concerned about the fiscal
deficit caused by these various modernization programs. As the Ministry of Finance did
not have the authority to control government spending, Inoue Kaoru and Shibusawa
Eiichi, who were in charge of public finance while the Iwakura Mission was abroad,
resigned on May 1873. They published a protest letter which for the first time exposed
the fiscal situation of the Meiji government to the public: in addition to the 10 million yen
fiscal deficit in 1873, the total government liabilities, including domestic and foreign
borrowing and paper notes, amounted to 120 million yen.490 Mutsu Munemitsu, the
Head of Taxation, also resigned to protest the fiscal difficulties caused by the
government's ambitious plans to "implement westernizing projects in jurisdiction,
488 Banno Junji, "Seikan rons6g6 no 'naijiha' to 'gaiseiha' ['Wealth' vs. 'Power' in Early Meiji]," in Kindai
Nihon Kenkykai ed., Bakumatsu ishin no Nihon [Japan in the Late Tokugawa and Meiji Restoration],
volume 3 of Nenp5 kindai Nihon kenkya (T6ky6: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 1981).
489 Banno Junji, "Meiji kokka no seiritsu [The Establishment of the Meiji State]," pp. 74-5.
4 90 Inoue and Shibusawa, cited from Banno Junji, "Meiji kokka no seiritsu," in Umemura Mataji and
Yamamoto Yfiz6, eds., Kaikd to ishin [The Opening of Japan and the Restoration], volume 3 in Nihon
keizaishi [The Economic History of Japan], p. 72.
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education, military, and industry simultaneously, without paying heed to the appropriate
sequence." 491
Meanwhile, Itagaki Taisuke, Eto Shinpei, Goto Shojir6, and others in January 1874 called
for the establishment of a parliamentary system so as to ensure that major policies were
based upon wider consensus. Their demand was not only echoed among some samurai
and even commoners who were concerned about government debt but also supported by
the legislative branch of the Council of State (sain).492 In response, Emperor Meiji
issued a decree in April 1874 promising a constitutional monarchy in future. Given the
dual pressure of fiscal and political difficulties, it would not have been unreasonable to
slow down the tempo of modernization and the settlement of the samurai stipends to give
the government more time to build institutions to collect taxes from a broader array of
sources. However, the Meiji government's policy options in 1874 were constrained by
the massive amount of paper notes already circulating in the economy. Fiscal
retrenchment itself did not directly address the problem of how to secure the
convertibility of paper notes. The government's promise in 1869 to ensure convertibility
by newly minted currencies before the end of 1872 only exacerbated the situation.
After carefully reviewing both the silver and gold standard as options for the new
monetary system, the Meiji government in May 1871 decided to adopt the gold standard
491 Mutsu Munemitsu, cited in Fukushima Masao, Chiso kaisei no kenkya [A Study of the Reform of Land
Taxation] (T6ky6: Y~ihikaku, 1970), p. 99, footnote 2.
492 For the proposals from ordinary samurai and commoners in 1874 to establish a parliamentary system to
supervise public finance, see Makihara Norio, Meii shichinen no daironsd: kenpakusho Kara mite kindai
kokka to minshi [The Great Debates in 1874: The Modem State and the People Viewed from the Proposals
from the People] (T6ky6: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 1990), pp. 32-6.
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and set the value of one Japanese yen as equivalent to 1.5 grams of gold.493 As the Mint
could not prepare a sufficient amount of coin to exchange the issued paper notes, the
government in January 1872 exchanged all the old paper notes with new ones printed in
Germany. The new, high-quality paper notes could not postpone the convertibility of
paper notes forever. Nonetheless, the price of gold began to rise steadily when Germany
became the second country after Britain to switch to the gold standard in 1871 and the US
followed suit in 1873.494 As the official price of gold in Japan remained almost
unchanged between 1871 and 1883, gold flew massively out of Japan. [Table 5.1 and
Table 5.2] In 1874, gold had disappeared from the Japanese market and the government
could only mint silver currency.495 Massive gold drainage thus greatly enhanced the
difficulty of ensuring the convertibility of paper notes.
493 The Meiji government had decided to adopt the silver standard in December 1870. Yet when It6
Hirobumi returned from investigating the American monetary and financial system in 1871, he persuaded
the Meiji government to adopt the gold standard so as to follow the "general trend" in the west. See the
details of the policy change in Mikami Ryaz6, En no tanj6 [The Birth of Yen] (T6ky6: T6y6 Keizai
Shinp6sha, 1989), pp. 2 10-1.
494 For the discussion of the establishment of the gold standard in the international markets in the 1870s, see
Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 17-18.
495 Okuma Shigenobu, "The second annual report of the Ministry of Finance," (July 12, 1877), Okuma
monjo, volume 3, A1567, p. 276.
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Table 5.1: The exchange rates between gold and silver:
Years Market exchange Japan's Japan's
rates in London Market rates Official rates
1871 15.57 15.55 16.01
1872 15.63 15.55 16.01
1873 15.92 15.55 16.01
1874 16.17 15.48 16.01
1875 16.59 15.85 16.17
1876 17.88 16.82 16.33
1877 17.22 16.43 16.33
1878 17.94 17.03 16.17
1879 18.40 17.87 16.17
1880 18.05 17.22 16.17
1881 18.16 17.58 16.17
1882 18.19 17.40 16.17
1883 18.64 17.82 16.17
Source: Yamamoto YUz6, "Nai ni shihei ari gai ni bokugin ari [Paper money for domestic transactions and
Mexican dollars for foreign trades]," Jinmon gakuh5, No. 55 (September 1983), p. 44.
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Table 5.2: Outflows and inflows of gold specie in Japan:
Years Outflows of gold (unit: Inflows of gold (unit:
1,000 yen) 1,000 yen)
1872 2,685 ---
1873 2,614 2,014
1874 8,127 3
1875 (the first half) 7,139 25
1876 2,854 884
1877 6,212 ---
1878 6,164 26
1879 5,896 727
1880 2,113 0
1881 1,523 1
1882 1,183 1
1883 1,141 142
Notes:
Gold included: the new and old gold currencies of Japan, foreign gold currencies, and gold bullion.
--- : No information.
Source: Yamamoto Yiizo, "Nai ni shihei ari gai ni bokugin ari [Paper money for domestic transactions and
Mexican dollars for foreign trades]," Jinmon gakuho, No. 55 (September 1983), p. 40.
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1871-1883:
In this situation, the Meiji government could have switched back to the silver standard.
However, there were two obstacles. Politically, it was under pressure from the opposition
movement for a parliamentary polity organized by the leaders of the Assembly Camp
such as Itagaki Taisuke and Got6 Shojir6. As the advocates of the parliamentary system
had long criticized the "arbitrariness" of policy making, switching from the gold to silver
standard would have provided them new ammunition. 496 Economically, if the Meiji
government promised to ensure the convertibility of paper notes with silver currency
according to their denominated gold value, it would greatly increase the already heavy
burden of government liabilities.
Officials of the Ministry of Finance were well-aware of the danger of gold outflows. 497
Nonetheless, in 1874 and 1875 they still considered it a feasible option to use active
government policy to increase stocks of gold to guarantee the convertibility of paper
notes. Most proposals discussed within the Ministry of Finance in this period concerned
how to increase Japan's stock of gold rather than had to switch to a silver standard. As
Okuma put it, "since deficits in international trade have to be covered by specie ... if the
current situation continues, even if we mint a mountain of specie, it would all flow
overseas and domestic specie disappears, which immediately affects the credibility of
paper notes." 498 Typical measures discussed within the Ministry of Finance included:
496 In fact, "Ch~rei bokai" (a decree issued in the morning is changed in the evening) was one of the most
frequent critiques of the Meiji government's policy making.
497 In Okuma's words, "the use of paper notes depended solely on the guarantee of specie in gold....
[Therefore] the outflow of gold will ultimately ruin the credibility of paper notes and put the country in
danger." Okuma Shigenobu, "Memorial in regard to the custom revenues" (20 July 1875), Okuma monjo,
volume 3, A2341, p. 117.
498 Okuma Shigenobu, "On rectifying the sources of state revenues and building the foundation of pubic
finance" (January 1875), Okuma monjo, volume 3, A7, p. 104.
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1. To increase exports to the European and American markets so as to earn gold.
2. To reduce imports and the number of foreigners employed by the government.
3. To organize direct exports so as to use the gold earned to directly pay the interest on
the government's foreign debts.
4. To increase tariff levels and to ask foreigners to pay customs duties in gold rather
than in silver currency. 499
These measures were similar to the mercantilist economic policies many domain
governments had implemented to earn coins from the central markets in Osaka, Kyoto,
and Toky6 to stabilize the value of their issued paper notes in the late Tokugawa period.
A few officials in the Ministry of Finance, such as Matsukata Masayoshi and Kawaji
Kand6, noticed that the rising price of gold in the international market might be the main
cause of gold outflow from Japan. Matsukata even considered the alternative silver
standard. But he still concluded that the measure most urgently needed was not adoption
of a silver standard but collection of the customs in gold.500 Kawaji Kand6 proposed to
raise the price of gold in Japan but did not take into account the impact of this policy on
the convertibility of paper notes denominated in gold and its deflationary effect on the
domestic economy. 501
499 Okuma Shigenobu, "Memorial on clarifying sources of revenue and building the foundation of public
finance" (January 1875), Okuma monjo, volume 3, A7, pp. 104-105. Matsukata Masayoshi, "Proposal on
preventing the outflow of specie" (September 1875), Matsukata Masayoshi kankei monjo: hokan (T6ky6:
T6y6 Kenkyfisho, 2001), p. 33.
s00 Matsukata Masayoshi, "Proposal on preventing the outflow of specie" (September 1875), Matsukata
Masayoshi kankei monjo: hokan, p. 31, p. 36, and p. 38.
501 Kawaji Hirodf, "On the outflow of species: Memorial to Okuma, October 1875)" Okuma monjo,
volume 4, A3415, pp.112-113, p. 114.
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The desire to increase gold stocks determined the substance of the program of "fostering
industry and promoting enterprise" (shokusan kdgyoi) that the Meiji government
introduced in 1875 under the leadership of Okubo Toshimichi. Previous industrialization
programs by the Ministry of Industry, which imported modem industries such as railways
and steam-powered raw silk filatures, etc., were harshly criticized for causing fiscal
deficits. In Matsukata's view, the Japanese government would be bankrupt before
realizing the big profit that these "grand projects might promise in future."50 2 Okubo also
complained that the foreign experts who worked for the Ministry of Industry "simply
wanted to implement whatever they have learned and paid no attention to the Japanese
government's fiscal condition."50 3
The new shokusan kogy5 program aimed to increase the gold stocks in Japan by
encouraging exports to the west to earn gold and by reducing outflows of gold by import-
substitution. It was not, at least in this period, a general policy of export-promotion and
import-substitution. The convertibility of paper notes denominated in gold made the
government give special priority to "direct exports" (chokuyushutsu) rather than general
exports to the western markets. Government officials and political merchants organized
the transportation and marketing of the exported goods to the European and American
markets in order to firmly hold on to the gold earned through their sale.504 The
government encouraged import-substitution in the cotton textile, woolen textile, and
502 Matsukata Masayoshi, "Proposal on encouraging the foundation of the country [agriculture] and cutting
expenditures that are not urgently needed" (to Okuma, 1873), Okuma monjo, volume 2, A968, p. 2.
503 Okubo Toshimichi, "Proposal on administrative reform" (December 1876), Okubo Toshimichi monjo,
volume 7, p. 447.
504 See the proposal in Okuma Shigenobu and Okubo Toshimichi, "On the cooperation of the Ministries of
Finance and Internal Affairs," (November 1875), Okuma monjo, volume 3, A2410.
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sugar refinery industries by choosing technologies that utilized domestic rather than
imported raw materials. 50 5 Okuma also turned the stipends of ex-samurai into
compulsory commutation bonds (kinroku kosai), of which up to 172 million yen was
issued between 1875 and 1877. The Meiji government used these bonds as capital to
invest in various projects of import-substitution and government-organized "direct
exports."
Instead of achieving its ambitions, the shokusan kogy6 program produced some severe
political and economic consequences. The market values of commutation bonds for ex-
samurai fell sharply as the government investments in infrastructure and the government-
targeted sectors failed to generate the anticipated profit. This triggered the largest of the
samurai rebellions (seinan sensa) in 1877. In order to repress it, the government had to
issue 27 million yen in paper notes and borrow 15 million yen in banknotes from the No.
1 National Bank.506 Unemployment among ex-samurai continued to be a serious social
issue even after the samurai rebellion was put down in 1877. Among the 12.7 million
yen in "enterprise-promotion" bonds that Okuma raised that same year to invest in
infrastructure, transportation, cotton textiles and agriculture, 3 million yen were aimed
directly at solving this problem and relieving their poverty.507 Its political aim was, in
505 Nagai Hideo, "Shokusan k6gy6 seisaku no kich6: kanei jigy6 o chiishin to site [The basic tune in the
industry-promotion policies]," originally published in Hokkaid5 Daigaku bungakubu kiyo, no. 10,
November 1969. Reprinted in Nagai Hideo, Meii kokka keiseiki no gaisei to naisei [The External and
Domestic Politics in the Formation Period of the Meiji State], p. 241.
506 Yamamoto Ynz6, "Meiji ishinki no zaisei to tsaka [Finance and money in the Meiji Restoration]," in
Umemura Mataji and Yamamoto Ynz6, eds., Kaik5 to ishin [The Opening of Japan and the Restoration], p.
158.
507 Ochiai Hiroki, Meiji kokka to shizoku [The Meiji State and the Samurai] (T6ky6: Yoshikawa K6bunkan,
2001), p. 218.
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Iwakura's words, to "gain the loyalty of ex-samurai for the state" and to prevent them
from being "contaminated by European radical thoughts of freedom."5 08
The failure of government-organized direct exports made Okuma realize in July 1877 that
it made little sense for Japan to stick to the gold standard given the lower price of
silver.509 On May 27, 1878, the Meiji government permitted the Japanese silver yen,
which was previously minted for international trade only, to be used in domestic
transactions and payment of taxation. 1 Japan thus returned to a de facto silver standard.
Meanwhile, Kawase Hideji, the Head of the Office of Encouraging Business in the
Ministry of Finance, pointed out in July 1879 that the important thing for Japan was not
to try to substitute imported goods which foreigners were much more skillful in making
but to increase the exports that were "appropriate to Japan's land and people."51'
However, the previous massive issue of paper notes led to inflation, which became a
serious problem in 1879. Although Japan was now on the silver standard, the amount of
paper notes in the economy made the convertibility of paper notes with silver currency a
difficult task.
In the 1870s, the Meiji government failed in its attempt to use mercantilist economic
policies to reverse Japan's position in the international economy and maintain the gold
standard in Japan. Nonetheless, the credit crisis of paper notes in this period forced the
508 Iwakura Tomomi, "Proposal on helping the enterprises of peers and samurai" (July 1878), cited in
Ochiai Hiroki, Meii kokka to shizoku, p. 216.
509 Okuma Shigenobu, "The second annual report of the Ministry of Finance," (July 12, 1877), Okuma
monjo, volume 3, A1567, p. 267.
510 Cited from Harada Mikio, Nihon no Kindaika to keizai seisaku: Meii kogyoka seisaku kenkyai
[Economic Policy and Japan's Modernization], p. 146.
51 Kawase Hideji, "Proposals on public finance" (July 5, 1879), in Okuma monjo, volume 2, A980, p. 103.
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officials in the Ministry of Finance to not only centralize collection of revenues but also
ensure their speedy transmission to the center. Peasants' resistance to raising land taxes
forced the Ministry to find politically less sensitive means to raise revenue through
indirect taxes, particularly those levied upon sake and liquor. In the next section, I
examine these institutional developments, which laid a solid foundation for Japan's last
step in the building of the institutions of the modern fiscal state in the 1880s.
III. Credit crisis and continuity in institutional development in public finance: 1871-
1880
The Meiji government was overwhelmingly concerned about how to raise its tax revenue.
As it was deprived of the rights to increase receipts from the customs by raising the tariff
duties, it had to focus on domestic sources for revenue. Efforts to collect land taxes more
effectively encountered a formidable information problem when it came to assessing the
proper value of land. The Meiji government's original plan was to collect land taxes in
both urban and rural areas according to the assessed market value. However, the land
market in Japan, particularly in rural areas, had not developed to such an extent that the
government could easily find out the market value of each piece of land. A more
practical option was to levy according to the estimated productivity of rural lands. But
accurate estimation still required officials to be very familiar with local customs and
circumstances.512 The "avoidance system," which required that a prefectural (ken)
512 See the detailed discussion in Yamamura Kozo, "The Meiji land tax reform and its effects," in Marius
B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman eds., Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986), pp. 3 8 7 -3 8 8 .
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governor come from different region than his post, made this more difficult.m' More
importantly, extraction of land taxes encountered serious resistance and even riots. As a
result, the Meiji government in 1876 had to reduce the rate of the national land tax from 3
percent to 2.5 percent and the rate of the local land tax from 1 percent to 0.5 percent.
The situation was quite different for indirect taxes. After the abolition of the domains in
August 1871, officials in the Ministry of Finance made it clear that the principal goal of
future tax reforms was to increase indirect taxes, particularly those levied upon alcohol,
soy sauce, and tobacco.5 In January 1875, Okuma pointed out that the government
should depend upon indirect taxes on consumption to raise income as they were
politically easier to extract.5 15 [Fig. 5-1] He even planned to impose heavy sale taxes on
all imported items as an alternative to charging higher customs duties. 516 Although this
plan did not work out in practice, it showed how important the collection of indirect taxes
had become to the Meiji government.
513 Fukushima Masao, Chiso kaisei no kenkya [A Study of the Reform of Land Taxation] (T6ky6:
Yihikaku, 1970), p. 108.
5 14 Niwa Kunio, "Chiso kaisei to nogy6 koz6 no henka [The reform and land taxes and the changes in the
structure of agriculture]," in Kajinishi Mitsuhaya, ed., Nihon keizaishi taikei, volume 5 Kindai (6) (Tky6:
T6ky6 Daigaku Shuppankai, 1965), p. 236.
s.s Ibid., p. 104.
516 See this plan in Okuma Shigenobu, "Memorial on clarifying sources of revenue and building the
foundation of public finance" (January 1875), Okuma monjo, volume 3, A7, p. 104.
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Fig. 5-1 Composition of tax revenues of the Japanese government: 1868-1900
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Source: Hundred- Year Statistics ofthe Japanese Economy (T6ky6: Hosokawa, 1966), p. 136.
Meanwhile, the institutions to collect tax revenues from alcohol became more centralized
over the period from 1871 and 1880. In 1871, the central government had no other
means but to rely upon local magistrates and to collect duties upon alcohol based upon
the average prices self-reported by producing houses. Starting in 1872, the central
government began to conduct surveys and field-investigations to compile statistical data
on the national economy, such as total population, volume of foreign trades, total yield of
taxation, etc For the collection of taxes levied upon alcohol, the central government
established a centralized bureaucracy in 1877, which not only set up branches in major
517 This was a Japanese version of "political arithmetic," and former Bakufu officials such as Tsuda
Mamichi and Mitsukuri Rinsh6who, who had studied statistics in Holland, made important contributions to
these efforts. See Haga Shoji, "Meiji Ishin to seihy6 no hensei [The Meiji Restoration and the making of
statistical data]," Nihonshi kenkya, No. 388 (December 1994): 49-74.
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regions of alcohol production but also sent officials to check accounts and assess the
actual output of producing houses. In consequence, the Ministry of Finance was able to
fully centralize the collection of alcohol taxes in 1880 without involvement of local
magistrates. Thus the government could not only charge license fees upon each brewing
house but also levy duties directly upon the amount of alcohol output as assessed and
checked by the officials of the Bureau of Taxation in the Ministry of Finance. Local
inspectors in various regions used uniform book-accounting and record-keeping methods
and were subjected to the supervision of their superiors. 518 The elasticity in the yields of
alcohol taxes was illustrated by a sharp rise from 3.5 million to 4.5 million yen after the
government improved its method of collection in 1878.519 This institutional development
enabled the Meiji government to avoid over-reliance upon direct taxes such as land taxes
which were politically sensitive and administratively difficult to collect.
In regard to the operation of public finance, the Meiji government had relied upon private
bankers to transmit both collected revenue and government funds. This method
contained some inherent risks, as the official money was often lent out as short-term
loans for profits. For example, when the government needed money to fund its
expedition to Taiwan in the autumn of 1874, major private banks which had remitted
government funds were totally unprepared. The Ono and Shimada houses went bankrupt
for they could not take back all the government deposits that they had lent out in mining,
518 See Fujiwara Takao, Kindai Nihon shuzdgydshi [A History of Sake Brewing in Modem Japan] (Ky6to:
Mineruva Shob5, 1999), pp. 88-109.
519 lkegami Kazuo, "Meijiki no shuzei seisaku [The tax policies on sake and liquor in the Meiji era],"
Shakai keizai shigaku, Vol. 55, No. 2 (June 1989), p. 193.
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manufacture of raw silk, real estates, etc.5 20 The Mitsui house barely escaped bankruptcy
by getting an emergency loan from the British Oriental Bank.52 1 The government lost the
money it had deposited in Ono and Shimada. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Finance
continued to allow major private banks such as Mitsui and Yasuda, as well as the national
banks, to transmit government money.522 The government demanded that these private
banks provide collateral for the deposited official funds.52 3
As the central government bore the risk of the credit crisis of paper notes, it had a strong
motivation to centralize the management of spending by local governments and major
central government departments. In 1873, Inoue and Shibusawa introduced double-entry
bookkeeping into government finance and ordered all government offices and prefectural
governments to regularly submit their account books and their budgets for the next year
to the Ministry of Finance for inspection.524 In February 1876, in order to put
government spending under firmer control by the Ministry of Finance, Okuma ordered
government offices and prefectural governments to return any surplus to the Ministry of
Finance and announced that government spending would be disbursed from the Ministry
520 When the Ono house declared bankruptcy, it had only 20,000 yen cash and 110,000 yen bonds and land
deeds while its total liabilities were 7.5 million yen, including 4.5 million yen in government deposits.
Kat6 K6zabur6, "Seish6 shihon no keisei [The formation of the capital of political merchants]," in
Kajinishi Mitsuhaya, ed., Nihon keizaishi taikei, volume 5 Kindai (jd) (T6ky6: T6ky6 Daigaku Shuppankai,
1965), p. 143.
521 The Mitsui Bank borrowed three times in 1874 from the Oriental Bank; these loans amounted to 1
million pounds. Cited in Tatewaki Kazuo, Meiji seihu to Eikoku Tdyd Gink6 [The Meiji Government and
the British Oriental Bank] (T6ky6: Chn6 K6ronsha, 1992), pp. 156-7.
522 Sugiyama Kazuo, "Kinya seido no s6setsu [The establishment of the financial system]," in Kajinishi
Mitsuhaya, ed., Nihon keizaishi taikei, volume 5 Kindai (jd) (T6ky6: T6ky6 Daigaku Shuppankai, 1965), p.
210.
523 In Meiji Japan, the national bank (kokuritsu ginkd) was a direct translation of the American "national
bank" and it was thus not a state-owned bank but a private bank which received from the government the
privilege to issue its banknotes.
24 Ikeda K6tar6, "Kankin toriatsuka seisaku to shihonshngi no seiritsu [The handling of government funds
and the establishment of capitalism]," Okada Shunpei ed., Meiji shoki no zaisei kinya seisaku [The Fiscal
and Financial Policies in the Early Meiji] (T6ky6: Seimeikai Sosho, 1964), p. 161.
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of Finance. This was a major step toward a centralized system in supervising and
managing government spending.525
The magnitude of the credit crisis also affected the Meiji government's efforts to build a
central bank in 1871. There was a consensus among officials in the Ministry of Finance
that the government must seek cooperation from private financiers to ensure the
convertibility of the paper notes. They were aware of the decentralized national banking
system in the US and the centralized approach taken in Britain. It6 Hirobumi considered
the American model to be a "peerless method" whose adoption would "lay down the
foundation of a rich country." 26 Nonetheless, officials in the Office of Reform in the
Ministry of Finance, such as Shibusawa Eiichi and Maejima Hisoka, preferred the British
example where the Bank of England as a central bank monopolized the issue of
banknotes.s27 In 1870, Yoshida Kiyonari, who had spent seven years in England to study
the English financial system, returned to work for the Ministry of Finance; he also
recommended the Bank of England as the better model.5 28
On February 20, 1871, Okuma and Inoue planned to establish the Bank of Japan along
the British lines. In August 1871, Inoue and Shibusawa urged the Mitsui and Ono
Houses to jointly form a "bank of gold notes," where 60 percent of its capital would be in
525 Ibid., p. 164.
526 Cited from Senda Minoru, "Kinsatsu shobun to kokuritsu ginko [The redemption of gold notes and the
national banks]," Shakai keizai shigaku, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1982), p. 35. The books and brochures published
by the Government Printing Office of America, as well as the US National Currency Act (June 3, 1864)
were also translated into Japanese. Ibid., p. 32.
527 Their knowledge of the Bank of England mostly came from Elements ofPolitical Economy written by
Arthur Latham Perry, which had been translated into Japanese. Ibid., p. 32.
528 Nakamura Naoyoshi, Okuma zaisei no kenkyii [A Study of the Policies of Public Finance of Okuma]
(Toky6: Azekura Shob6, 1968), p. 38.
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specie and the remaining 40 percent in government paper notes. 529 This failed as the two
banks were unable to prepare the necessary specie reserves to guarantee the convertibility
of the 80 million ryd (denominated in gold) of paper notes. In this situation, the Ministry
of Finance decided to take up It5's proposal to follow the American national banking
system with the aim of dividing the burden of maintaining the convertibility of paper
notes among many discrete national banks.
On December 15, 1872, the government issued the National Bank Act which required a
national bank to lend government paper notes at 6 percent in return for the government-
granted privilege to issue an equivalent amount of convertible banknotes. Yet the
scarcity of gold led to poor performance. By 1876, only four national banks were
established, and the total amount of their banknotes fell from 1.36 million yen in June 30,
1874 to 62,456 yen in June 30, 1876.530 In August 1876, Okuma revised the National
Banking Act, which reduced the required ratio of specie in the capital of a national bank
from 40 percent to 20 percent and allowed national banks to convert their banknotes with
government paper notes, instead of specie. Between 1876 and 1879, the number of
national banks increased from 4 to 153, and the amount of issued banknotes jumped from
1.74 million yen to 33.93 million yen.53' The revised National Bank Act basically
converted the government's massive debts into defacto non-convertible banknotes issued
529 Senda Minoru, "Kinsatsu shobun to kokuritsu gink6 [The redemption of gold notes and the national
banks]," Shakai keizai shigaku, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1982), pp. 41-42.53 0 Nakamura Naoyoshi, Okuma zaisei no kenkya [A Study of the Policies of Public Finance of Okuma], p.
45.
531 Yamamoto Yaz6, "Meiji ishinki no zaisei to tska [Finance and money in the Meiji Restoration]," p.
155.
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by national banks, and the government strictly controlled the total amount of banknotes
that could be issued by national banks.m
Although inflation became serious after 1879, the Meiji government possessed most of
the institutional elements necessary to build a central bank for public finance. The
government had established a centralized institution to supervise the spending of
prefectural governments and government ministries. It had also created a centralized
bureaucracy to effectively assess and collect taxes on alcohol production. At this
moment, the main institutional defect in public finance was the fact that the central
government still did not have an institutional ability to use its aggregate income to
regulate the domestic financial markets. In 1880, national banks and major private banks
handled up to 85 percent of government tax revenues and expenditures.m They not only
received tax revenues but also made disbursements upon orders from the Ministry of
Finance. These banks could utilize the period during which they held government money
to profit by providing low-risk, short-term credit in the financial markets." 4 The
Ministry of Finance itself also lent government cash reserves directly to important
merchants to generate more income for the government.53 5
When the government attempted to truly centralize cash flows in its fiscal system and
thence establish a central bank in 1881, both domestic and international economic
532 The government set 34 million yen as the upper limit in the issue of banknotes by national banks. For
the conversion of government debt into banknotes in the new National Bank Act, see Imuta Yoshimitsu,
"Nihon gink6 no hakken seido to seihu kinyia [The institution of note-issuing of the Bank of Japan and
public finance]," Shakai keizai shigaku, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1972), pp. 125-6.
m Sugiyama Kazuo, "Kinya seido no s6setsu [The establishment of the financial system]," p. 210.
53 Teranishi Jnr6, Nihon no keizai hatten to kinyia [Japan's Economic Development and Finance] (T6ky6:
Iwanami Shoten, 1982), p. 58
5 Ibid., p. 59.
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conditions were favorable. According to a market investigation conducted by the Osaka
Chamber of Commerce in 1879, peasant purchasing power had increased due to the
reduction in the rate of land taxation in 1876 and the depreciation of paper notes. The
general prosperity in rural areas attracted many urban migrants, stimulated domestic trade,
and increased imports that met the needs of the rural sector even though imports of
foreign luxuries had decreased.536 The growing domestic economy, illustrated by the
increase in sake production, provided an important tax base for the government to extract
indirect taxes.
In an economy with vibrant inter-regional trading, national banks and other major private
banks such as Mitsui and Yasuda quickly established a nation-wide correspondence
network to transmit money across time and region. 537 In order to promote the circulation
of banknotes issued by different national banks in Japan, Shibusawa Eiichi, the head of
the No. 1 National Bank, organized a bank association to coordinate the business
activities of member banks. In particular, he was interested in introducing the institution
of the "clearing-house" from the US and Switzerland, which would clear liabilities and
redeem bills issued by various member banks.538 In Osaka, another Bank Association
was formed in 1880 which consisted of 15 major national banks and the Mitsui Bank. It
played an important role in coordinating bill-discounting and exchange of banknotes
536 Godai Tomoatsu, "Reply to the inquiry about the protection tariffs" (October 5, 1879), in Godai
Tomoatsu denki shiry6 [The Biographical Materials of Godai Tomoatsu], volume 2, pp. 254-63.
537 The number of correspondence among the 150 national banks and the Mitsui and their respective
branches increased from 10 in June 1877 to 1,027 in June 1880. Cited from Tsurumi Masayoshi, Nihon
shiny6 kik6 no kakuritsu: Nihon gink6 to kinya shijd [The Establishment of a Credit System in Japan: the
Bank of Japan and the Financial Market] (T6ky6: Yhikaku, 1991), p. 104.
538 Ibid., pp. 110-2.
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among member banks.539 These business networks formed among major banks thus
prepared a solid basis upon which to build a central bank.
As for the international economy, the adoption of the gold standard throughout the west
resulted in silver inflows into East Asia after the mid-i 870s. The falling value of silver
was not only an alternative to a "protective tariff' for Japan but also beneficial to Japan's
exports. In June 1879, the Office of Customs in the Ministry of Finance asked the
Chamber of Commerce in T6ky6 and Osaka to investigate the impact of imported goods
on the Japanese economy and to report to the government about an appropriate level of a
protective tariff. The two Chambers concluded independently that protection tariffs were
unnecessary and the import of cotton yarn, sugar, and iron was beneficial to the Japanese
economy and consumers. 540
The above section has examined the continuous accumulation of effective institutional
elements in public finance and of experience in managing financial issues among the
officials in the Ministry of Finance during the 1870s. However, the same decade also
saw numerous policy mistakes which greatly affected the process of building of a central
bank in the 1880s. In the next section, I discuss the complex politics surrounding the
establishment of a central bank, even though there was little dispute over the direction of
this institutional development.
539 Ten member banks were Osaka-based and two were T6ky6-based. Tamaki Norio, Japanese Banking: A
History, 1859-1959 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 45.
540 Cited from Miwa Ryoichi, Nihon kindai no keizai seisakushi teki kenkyfl [A Historical Study of
Economic Policy of Modern Japan] (T6ky6: Nihon Keizai Hydronsha, 2002), p. 47.
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IV. Politics and Japan's last step toward a modern fiscal state: 1880-1895
By 1879, past errors in policy had produced serious political consequences which eroded
the political basis of the Meiji government. Inflation, particularly the rising price of rice,
greatly troubled the urban population, particularly those who depended upon fixed
incomes such as ex-samurai. More ex-samurai joined the Freedom and Popular Rights
Movement. In March 1880, 114 representatives of the Association of Patriots, whose
members had reached 87,000, gathered in Osaka and presented the Meiji government
with a petition for the establishment of a parliamentary system.541 In this influential
proposal, the representatives expressed their concern about the "numerous national debts,
over-issuing of paper notes, and the rise in prices." They demanded that "tax issues
should not be determined by the government only but should be discussed by all the
Japanese people, and [thus] a parliament should be established."5 42
Peasants benefited from a defacto tax reduction due to the rising price of rice and the
depreciation of paper notes, which they used to pay taxes. Nonetheless, rich farmers and
local merchants in rural areas increasingly demanded participation in local governance,
particularly in issues such as taxation and infrastructure construction. In regard to
national politics, they also called for the establishment of a parliament. The political
activism of rich farmers and rural merchants from 1878 onward expanded and
541 Masumi Junnosuke, Nihon seijishi [A Political History of Japan], volume 1 (T6ky6: T6ky6 Daigaku
Shuppankai, 1988), p. 185
542 Cited in Harada Mikio, Nihon no kindaika to keizai seisaku: Meiji kogyoka seisaku kenkya [Economic
Policy and Japan's Modernization] (T6ky6: T6y6 Keizai Shinp6sha, 1972), p. 162.
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strengthened the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement. The number of petitions and
proposals for a parliamentary institution jumped from 7 in 1879 to 85 in 1880.543
Previous policy mistakes also split the central government. Okubo Toshimichi and
Okuma Shigenobu were the two main architects of the shokusan kagy6 program. After
the assassination of Okubo by a discontented ex-samurai on May 14, 1878, Okuma had to
bear the brunt of the critique of inflation within the Meiji government. He thus
desperately needed to curb the falling value of paper notes so as to defend his position.
In April and May 1879, he ordered the release of 2.4 million yen in silver from the
government cash reserves to the market to stabilize the exchange rate between paper
notes and silver cash.544 This measure was ineffective, and Okuma had to reduce the
amount of paper notes in circulation. On June 29, 1879, he planned to generate a fiscal
surplus and publish the amounts of the surplus and the resulting reduction in paper notes
in newspapers so as to safeguard public confidence in the government paper notes.545
However, these measures did not improve the situation quickly enough to satisfy his
critics in the government.
In February 1880, Iwakura Tomomi and It6 Hirobumi orchestrated an institutional reform.
One major goal was to strengthen the role of the Cabinet, which consisted of the
Ministers of the State, the Minister of Right, and all the Junior Councilors of the State. A
543 Emura Eiichi, Jiyi minken kakumei no kenkyfi [The Study of the Revolution of People's Rights
Movement] (Toky6: H6sei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1982), p. 92.544 Harada Mikio, Nihon no kindaika to keizai seisaku [Economic Policy and Japan's Modernization], p.
149.
545 Okuma Shigenobu, "On four measures in public finance," (June 29, 1879), Okuma monjo, volume 3,
A15, p. 344, 348, and 359.
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new Committee of Public Finance which included Okuma Shigenobu, It6 Hirobumi, and
Teraji Munenori was established to take the place of the Ministry of Finance in making
policy proposals, and major decisions were to be made upon consensus of members of
the Cabinet. Meanwhile, the Meiji Emperor after 1880 became more actively involved in
the making of government policies.546 The political cost that Okuma and the Ministry of
Finance paid for prior mistakes was to lose their dominance in the formation of financial
policy.
At the same time, the value of paper notes kept falling. On February 28, 1880, the
Ministry of Finance used 3 million yen in specie from government cash reserves as
capital to form the Yokohama Specie Bank. Okuma hoped that this bank could not only
attract deposits of specie but also earn it from abroad through organizing the exports of
silk, tea, and the like. However, most of the loans were made through political
connections and ended up as bad loans.547 At the end of 1880, Inoue Kaoru, Godai
Tomoatsu, and Maeda Masana proposed to the government a grand plan which consisted
of a Bank of Japan, an insurance company, and a trading company to encourage exports.
In this plan, the Bank of Japan lent the government's fiscal surplus and a part of specie
reserves to the trading company for it to organize the export of raw silk and tea. The
insurance company provided the necessary services. 548 However, the dismal
54 6Asukai Masamichi, "Kindai tenn6z6 no tenkai [The unfolding of the image of Emperor in modem
Japan]," in Iwanami koza Nihon tsaishi, volume 17 (kindai 2) (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1994), pp. 236-44.
547 Yoshihara Tatsuyuki, "Meiji zenki chiki no Yokohama sh6kin gink6 [The Yokohama Specie Bank in
the Early and Middle Meiji]," in Sh6da Kenichir6, ed., Nihon ni okeru kindai shakai no keisei [The
Formation of a Modem Society in Japan] (T6ky6: Sanrei Shoten, 1995), p. 262.
548 Kokaze Hidemasa, "Okuma zaisei matsugi ni okeru zaisei rongi no tenkai [The development of the
discussions on public finance in the later period of Okuma's public finance]," in Hara Akira, ed., Kindai
Nihon no keizai to seiji [The Politics and Economy in Modem Japan] (T6ky6: Yamagawa Shuppansha,
1986), pp. 14-21.
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performance of the Yokohama Specie Bank made similar plans to directly acquire specie
from the overseas market less appealing. In April 1880, the government released another
3 million yen in specie to the market to stabilize the value of paper notes without avail.
As a result, the ratio of government specie reserves to the total amount of paper notes in
circulation in 1880 was as low as 4.5 percent. [Table 5.3] In this situation, how to reduce
the amount of paper notes in the economy became the focal issue.
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Table 5.3: Total amount of government paper notes and banknotes (unit: 1,000 yen)
Source: Harada Mikio, Nihon no kindaika to keizai seisaku [Economic Policies
Japan] (T6ky6: T6y6 Keizai Shinp6sha, 1972), p. 174 and p. 229.
and the Modernization of
The principal cause of inflation was the Meiji government's expansionary financial
policies and its disposition to issue paper notes to cover fiscal deficit. [Fig. 5-2] The
increasing amount of paper notes led to the hoarding of silver, which further devaluated
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Year Government Supplemental Banknotes Total Specie reserves Reserve
paper notes government ratio %
notes
1868 24,037 24,037 -- 0
1869 50,091 50,091 2 0
1870 55,500 55,500 4 0
1871 60,272 60,272 191 0
1872 64,800 3,600 68,400 14,709 21.5
1873 77,281 1,100 1,362 79,743 14,819 18.6
1874 90,803 1,100 1,995 93,898 18,483 19.7
1875 91,284 7,788 1,420 100,492 14,664 14.6
1876 93,323 11,824 1,744 106,891 15,171 14.2
1877 93,323 11,961 13,353 119,150 15,115 12.7
1878 119,800 19,618 26,279 165,697 17,837 10.8
1879 114,191 16,118 34,040 164,349 9,967 6.1
1880 108,412 16,528 34,426 159,366 7,166 4.5
1881 105,905 13,000 34,397 153,302 12,699 8.3
1882 105,369 4,000 34,385 143,754 16,730 11.6
1883 97,999 0 34,276 132,275 25,876 19.6
the notes. [Fig. 5-3] The falling value of paper notes in the markets thus forced the Meiji
government to stop using paper notes to cover its fiscal deficit. In May 1880, Okuma
proposed to sell state enterprises and to stop subsidies to primary schools so as to turn
fiscal deficit into surplus. But what to do about the 121 million yen in government paper
notes that were already circulating in the economy? At this moment, there were three
main options: to exchange them all with silver cash; to gradually reduce their amount and
thus stabilize their value; and to sharply reduce their amount and resume their face value.
Given the pressure of opposition movements and increasing petitions to establish a
parliament, each option had different political implications. Thus the choice of which
approach to take was not determined by economic reasoning alone but was complicated
by power struggles within the government and conflicts of interest.
Fig. 5-2 The amount of paper notes:1868-1895
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Source: Hundred-Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy (Tokyo: Hosokawa, 1966), p. 166.
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Fig. 5-3 Exchange rates between paper notes and silver yen
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Source: Yamamoto0Y.z6 "Nai ni shihei ari gai ni bokugin ari [Paper money for domestic transactions and
Mexican dollars for foreign trades]," Jinmon gakuh-, No. 55 (September 1983), p. 49.
In May 1880, Okuma presented to the Cabinet a bold plan which aimed to achieve the
convertibility of paper notes immediately by borrowing from the international market. In
this proposal, entitled "On changing the currency system" (also known as the "Specie
Exchange Plan"), Okuma argued that it was nnrealistic to expect the progress of domestic
production and the implementation of a protective tariff to resume a possible balance in
international trade in the short run. He then proposed to raise a foreign loan of 10 million
pounds (equivalent to 50 million Japanese silver yen) at 7 percent in London. Combined
with the 17.5 million in specie available in the Ministry of Finance, the government could
exchange 78 million yen in paper notes from the market at a silver/notes exchange rate of
1: 1.16. The remaining 27 million yen in paper notes still in the economy would be
absorbed by banks, which used paper notes to exchange for government bonds in return
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for the privilege to issue the same amount of banknotes. After this exchange, Okuma
expected that hoarded specie would reappear in the market. As to the annual interest
payment of 3.68 million yen, Okuma proposed to increase tax rates on sake and liquor,
which were expected to generate extra revenue of 6.62 million yen per year.549
Okuma's proposal aroused great debate among the members of the Cabinet.
Conservatives such as Iwakura Tomomi criticized it as "selling Japan to foreigners." It6
Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru, and Sano Tsunetami worried that such a massive foreign loan
would bring a heavy interest burden and incur strong criticism from the government's
opponents. Representatives from the army and navy all supported Okuma's plan for it
did not cut current military expenditures.550 Matsukata Masayoshi admitted Okuma's
plan was "sound from the economic perspective." Yet he considered it "radical and
dangerous" and proposed a gradual approach to increase specie reserves and reduce the
amount of paper notes.55' As the Cabinet could not reach an agreement, Emperor Meiji
made the final decision to reject Okuma's plan in June 1880.
Although Okuma was overly optimistic about the ability of the Meiji government to
borrow from the international markets and unaware of the extra burden that would result
from the rising pound in the future, there were two important policy concerns in his
scheme. First, Okuma appealed to devaluation of currency rather than government
549 Okuma Shigenobu, "On changing the currency system" (May 1880), Okuma monjo, volume 3, A18, pp.
447-450.
ss0 Muroyama Yoshimasa, Kindai Nihon no gunji to zaisei [Public Finance and the Military in Early
Modem Japan] (T6ky6: T6ky6 Daigaku Shuppansha, 1984), pp. 28-29.
551 Matsukata Masayoshi, "My humble views on public finance," (June 1880), in Matsukatahaku zaisei
ronsakusha, reprinted in Okubo Tatsumasa, ed., Matsukata kankei monjo, supplementary volume (T6ky6:
Dait6 Bunka Daigaku T6y6 Kenkyajo, 2001), p. 529 and p. 535.
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intervention as the main method to curb Japan's deficit in foreign trade. Second, and
more importantly, Okuma intended to achieve the convertibility of paper notes without
reducing the level of currency in the economy so as to avoid domestic deflation.ss 2 As he
warned explicitly in this proposal, a sharp reduction of paper notes might help recover
their value yet it would produce a serious domestic deflation and thus greatly damage
Japan's domestic commerce and manufacturing.5 5 3 In addition to his understanding of
economic principles, Okuma also knew from a report in July 1879 that the American
government had successfully stopped the depreciation of paper notes and achieved their
convertibility in December 1878 without reducing the monetary level.554
Okuma's concern about the deflationary effect of a "hard-landing" approach to curb
inflation by sharply reducing the amount of paper notes was shared by leaders in the
business community as well. In November 1880, Godai Tomoatsu sent a petition to the
Ministry of Finance on behalf of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce. He pointed out that
an easy way for the government to curb inflation and stop the falling value of paper notes
was to "purposefully cut down the amount of notes." However, Godai warned that such a
man-made scarcity of money would "block the way of financing and increase the interest
rate" and thus "push the Japanese people into an extreme difficult situation." He thus
552 In Okuma's view, outflows of specie caused by deficits in foreign trade would reduce domestic prices
and raise the price of imported goods, and thereafter Japan's exports would increase and its imports
decrease. Consequently specie would flow back into Japan through international trade. Okuma called this
mechanism a "natural way of recovery" (tennen kaifuku) in international trade, which he considered an
"eternal principle" (j6h5) in the economy. Ibid., p. 453.
5 Ibid., p. 454.
5 This report was prepared by Kawase Hideji, an official in the Ministry of Finance. See Kawase Hideji,
"A proposal on public finance," in Okuma monjo, volume 2, A980, p. 98.
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urged the government to take the whole economy into account and adopt a gradual
approach. 555
In regard to the increase of government income, the Meiji government was afraid to raise
land taxes because of the opposition movement. In September 1880, it rejected a
proposal to collect 25 percent of land taxes in rice rather than in paper notes. The Meiji
government was afraid that such a defacto increase in land taxes would arouse peasant
riots and further stimulate the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement.556 As a result,
Okuma and It6 planned to extract 4 million yen from raising the duties on sake, liquor
and tobacco. Moreover, in order increase the fiscal surplus by up to 10 million yen a year,
they intended to greatly cut government expenditures by accelerating the sale of state
enterprises, reducing government purchase of imported goods, and cutting central
government's subsidies to and spending on local infrastructure construction, police and
prisons. 557 This represented a fundamental change of policy regime in public finance, i.e.,
from fiscal expansion to retrenchment.
Activists of the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement welcomed this significant policy
change. In response to the government's attempt to raise tax revenue, they argued that
the Japanese people had the right to demand an immediate establishment of a parliament
so that their representatives could participate in the making of budgets and tax policies.
"5 Godai Tomoatsu, "Views on rescuing public finance," in Godai Tomoatsu denki shiry5 [The
Biographical Materials of Godai Tomoatsu], volume 2, p. 333.
556 Inoki Takenori, "The proposal of land taxation in rice and the adjustment of public finance," in
Umemura Mataji and Nakamura Takafusa eds., Matsukata zaisei to shokusan kogyo seisaku [The
Matsukata Public Finance and the Policy of Fostering Production and Encouraging Enterprises] (T6kyo:
Kokusai Reng6 Daigaku, 1983), p. 108.
55 Okuma and Ito, "On reforming public finance," (September 1880), Okuma monjo, volume 3, A16.
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Otherwise, the new Meiji regime "would be no different from the former so-called feudal
polity, at least on the issue of taxation." 58 The massive retrenchment policy also
significantly affected local politics. As expenditures on local infrastructure and civil
works were now funded by local taxes, rich farmers and local merchants began to
actively participate in local governance, particularly with regards to financial issues.559
The retrenchment programs not only reduced the amount of paper notes but also sent out
a signal to the economy that the Meiji government would no longer issue paper notes to
cover its deficit. The exchange rate of silver yen to paper notes began to fall after
reaching a peak of 1.795 in April 1881, and it stabilized at around 1.63 for a few months.
The price of rice also began to fall after April 1881. Meanwhile, Okura stopped the risky
practice of lending government cash reserves to political merchants and government
enterprises.560 Under these circumstances, few would have expected the value of paper
notes to fall further. When the market became more confident in the value of paper notes,
the hoarded silver specie would gradually reappear, which would further consolidate the
value of paper notes vis-a-vis silver specie.
However, the autocratic Meiji regime did not possess an institution, such as a parliament
that supervised public finance, to consolidate the trust in government's commitment to
558 Oishi Kaichir6, Jiya minken to Okuma Matsukata zaisei [The Movement of Rights and Freedom and the
Public Finance of Okuma and Matsukata] (T6ky6: T6ky6 Daigaku Shuppansha, 1989), p. 246.
559 In an article published in 1882, Fukuzawa Yukichi considered this change a significant deepening of the
Movement of Rights and Freedom as "local farmers and businessmen, who were afraid to raise their heads
before prefectural officials, are now sitting in government halls to supervise proposals of local taxation and
discuss annual budgets." Cited from Masumi Junnosuke, Nihon seijishi [A Political History of Japan],
volume 1, p. 199.
560 Muroyama Yoshimasa, Matsukata zaisei kenkya [A Study of Matsukata's Policy in Public Finance]
(Kyoto: Mineruva Shob6, 2004), p. 127.
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this fundamental change in policy regime. In the absence of a representative political
institution, Okuma and Ito planned to use a central bank to safeguard the value of paper
notes. On July 29, 1881, they jointly drafted a plan which intended to raise a credit of 50
million yen by issuing government bonds and used this as the capital to establish a "big
specie bank" to guarantee the convertibility of paper notes. This "big specie bank" was
to discount the bills of exchange for Japan's foreign trade, manage government revenue
and expenditures, and issue convertible banknotes, "just like the Bank of England in
Britain and the Bank of France in France." 61 In order to quickly raise the needed capital
for this bank, Okuma and Ito decided to allow foreigners to subscribe to its stocks. This
decision was politically less risky than the foreign loan of 50 million yen that Okuma had
proposed in 1880, yet it was still controversial. For example, Matsukata Masayoshi in
September 1881 sent a report to Sanjo Sanetomi, the Minister of the State, which warned
that "the dependence on foreigners' capital [in the bank plan of Okuma and Ito] ... might
achieve convertibility but would cause countless disasters in future and push Japan into a
dire situation similar to that of Egypt, Turkey or India."5 62
The political situation in 1881 was explosive, even though the economic situation was
improving. The Meiji government adopted repressive measures against the mounting
waves of opposition. The number of newspapers that the government closed was as high
as 46 in 1881, compared with 3 in 1879 and 12 in 1880. In April 5, 1880, the
government forbade any political association and gathering if it was considered
561 Okuma Shigenobu and It Hirobumi, "A proposal to issue new government bonds and to establish a
bank," in Okuma monjo, volume 3, A21, pp. 472-474.
562 Matsukata Masayoshi, "On public finance," (September 1881), in Matsukatahaku zaisei ronsakushi,
reprinted in Okubo Tatsumasa, ed., Matsukata kankei monjo, supplementary volume, p. 340.
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"detrimental to the security of the state," and forbade communications or correspondence
among members of prefectural and city congresses. 5 63 However, the political
consequence of the retrenchment policy was to stimulate local elites' increasing political
participation. A coalition of ex-samurai, local merchants, and rich farmers in the
Freedom and Popular Rights Movement would be a serious threat to the regime. In this
situation, Okuma's advocacy of the British model of monarchial constitutionalism ignited
conflict within the government. In the view of Inoue Kowashi, who was drafting a
conservative constitution, the essence of the British constitutional monarchy was a
republican polity of parliamentary sovereignty, in which the monarch was simply a
564puppet. Power struggles culminated in a coup in October 1881, which expelled
Okuma and his followers from the government. Okuma soon organized a "Constitutional
Reform Party" as an opposition party.
After this coup, Matsukata Masayoshi became the Minister of Finance. Right before the
coup, he was asked to prepare a report on public finance to Sanj6 Sanetomi, the Minister
of the State. In this, Matsukata rejected the charge that the government's excessive issue
of paper notes caused inflation. Instead, he argued that the real cause was the
government's insufficient specie reserves, which resulted from deficits in international
trade. The correct solution for the government to stabilize the value of paper notes was to
continue to promote domestic production so as to draw specie through increasing
563 Yokoyama K6ichir6, "Keipotsu chian kik6 no seibi [The arrangement of the institutions of punishment
and security]," in Fukushima Masao ed., Nihon kindai h6taisei no keisei [The Formation of Legal
Institutions in Modem Japan] (T6ky6: Nihon Hy6ronsha, 1981), volume 1, p. 328.
s" Inoue Kowashi, "Letter to It6" (June 1881), cited in Okubo Toshiaki, Meiji kokka no keisei [The
Formation of the Meiji State] (T6ky6: Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 1986), p. 330
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exports.565 For this purpose, Matsukata recommended a new "mechanism of utilizing
money" (kahei unyo no kijiku), which was a central bank supported by savings banks and
investment banks. Savings banks were to channel small deposits into the central bank
through the postal networks. The investment bank would then use these aggregated
savings to make long-term loans with low interest rates (less than 8 percent) to encourage
enterprises in agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation, accepting real estate as
collateral.566 In Matsukata's view, this plan would promote domestic production and
manufacturing without the danger of inflation.567 Obviously, this plan was impractical in
the short run.
As it was impossible to immediately raise government reserves of specie by increasing
exports, Matsukata continued Okuma's effort to reduce the amount of paper notes. For
this purpose, he focused upon the issue of the 2 "d government paper notes, also known as
the supplementary paper notes (yobi shihei). The Ministry of Finance in 1872 began to
issue this kind of paper notes for government spending when it had not yet received the
tax revenues collected in one fiscal year (from July 1 through the following June 30).568
In March and April of 1881, Okuma had set about reducing the issue of these
supplementary paper notes by ensuring that revenues and expenditures from one fiscal
565 Matsukata Masayoshi, "On public finance," (September 1881), in Matsukatahaku zaisei ronsakushi,
reprinted in Okubo Tatsumasa, ed., Matsukata kankei monjo, supplementary volume, pp. 337-8.
566 Ibid., p. 332, p. 334, p. 335.
567 This was the basic scheme of the proposal to establish a central bank in March 1883. See Matsukata
Masayoshi, "On the establishment of the Bank of Japan," (March 1, 1883), in Matsukatahaku zaisei
ronsakushai, reprinted in Okubo Tatsumasa, ed., Matsukata kankei monjo, supplementary volume, pp. 356-
7.
568 Muroyama Yoshimasa, Kindai Nihon no gunji to zaisei [Public Finance and the Military in Early
Modem Japan), p. 68.
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year were not mixed up with those of the next fiscal year. 569 There was no dispute over
the need to reduce the supplementary paper notes. Nonetheless, Matsukata did it in a
very sudden manner which cut the amount of the supplementary paper notes from 13
million yen in 1881 to 4 million yen in 1882 and further to zero in 1883. In other words,
Matsukata reduced the total amount of currency (including banknotes) by 13.7 percent, or
the total amount of government paper notes by 17.6 percent, in less than two years. As
the Japanese historians Fukaya Tokujir6 and Muroyama Yoshimasa have pointed out, this
was the crucial factor that triggered the Matsukata deflation.57 0 [Fig. 5-4]
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Source: Okawa Kazushi, Shinohara Miyohei, and Umemura Mataji, eds., Ch~ki keizai tOkei, volume 8,
Bukka [Long-term Economic Statistics] (T6ky6-: T6ky6 Keizai Shinp6sha, 1967), p. 166 and p. 192.
569 Okuma Shigenobu, "The regulation for the Department of Accounting Inspection and the rules of
government Accounting," (March 1881), in Okuma monjo, volume 3, A2270, p. 465.
*70 Fukaya Tokujir6, Megi seihu zaisel kiban no kakuritsu [The Establishment of the Foundation of the
Meiji Government's Public Finance] (T6ky6: Ochanomizu Shob6, 1995), p. 144; Muroyama Yoshimasa,
"Matsukata defureishon no mekanizum [The mechanism of the Matsukata deflation]," in Umemura Mataji
and Nakamura Takafusa eds., Matsukata zaisei to shokusan k~gy6 seisaku [The Matsukata Public Finance
and the Policy of Fostering Production and Encouraging Enterprise], p. 146.
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The deflationary effect was particularly severe as Matsukata's drastic reduction of the
supplementary government paper notes was totally unexpected. In consequence,
peasants, small landlords, and businessmen who had borrowed from local banks or
financial intermediaries during the prosperity of 1881 were suddenly caught by a rise in
the real interest rate in 1882. The increasing taxation further worsened the situation. The
deflation that started in the spring of 1882 became apparent in early 1883 as a reduction
in peasants' purchasing power and quickly caused a chain reaction affecting the whole
economy. According to a report on the market situation given by the Osaka Chamber of
Commerce on February 23, 1883, the workshops that used imported cotton yam to weave
coarse cotton cloth to meet the demand of peasants prospered in 1880 and 1881, yet most
of them went bankrupt after the spring of 1882. Imported sugar also found few
customers after the spring of 1882, even though most was sold to the countryside in the
previous two years.m In 1883, the total output of sake in Japan fell 35 percent, which
further dragged down rice prices.5 72 [Fig. 5-5] The Osaka Chamber of Commerce also
recognized that the deflation had triggered a vicious cycle. As the people were expecting
further falls in prices, they became reluctant to spend or to invest with their currency.
They simply deposited money in banks or purchased government bonds. 573
571 Godai Tomoatsu, "Reply to the Osaka municipal government's inquiry," (February 23, 1883), in Godai
Tomoatsu denki shiry5 [The Biographical Materials of Godai Tomoatsu], volume 2, pp. 381-2.
572 Godai Tomoatsu, "Reply to the Osaka municipal government's inquiry," (January 19, 1884), in Godai
Tomoatsu denki shiry5 [The Biographical Materials of Godai Tomoatsu], volume 2, p. 484.
53 Ibid., pp. 486-8.
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Fig. 5-5 Total output of taxable sake in Japan: 1872-1900
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Source: Hundred-Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy (T6ky5: Hosokawa, 1966), p. 107.
It remains unclear why Matsukata took such a dramatic approach. He seems not to have
anticipated the impact of domestic deflation. The failure of a military conflict with China
in Korea in July 1882 made the navy and army demand a massive military expansion so
as to improve their position vis-A-vis China's newly modernized navy. In response,
Matsukata in September planned to raise 7.5 million yen in tax revenue annually for this
purpose. However, the falling tax revenues caused by the deflation forced the Meiji
government to not only reduce the scale of military expansion but also avoid direct
confrontation with China over the issue of Korea.574 Had he realized in advance the
74 The actual expenditure on military expansion was cut by 13 percent and 22 percent from the original
plan in 1883 and 1884 respectively. Calculated from Takahashi Hidenao, "Matsukata zaiseiki no gunbi
kakuch6 mondai [The issue of military expansion in the public finance of Matsukata]," Shakai keizai
shigaku, Vol. 56, No. 1 (April 1990), table 3, p. 7. For the Meiji government's non-confrontational
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deflationary effects of his policy, Matsukata would not have planned to fund the military
expansion programs in 1882 solely through the extra income from raising taxes on
alcohol and tobacco. Moreover, when the Bank of Japan began to issue convertible
banknotes in 1885, Matsukata took a gradual approach to reducing the amount issued by
national banks so as to avoid a reduction of the monetary level. This suggests that he
may have learned from the earlier debacle with the supplementary government paper
notes.m In this light, the political consequence of weakening the economic basis of rich
farmers and peasants may not necessarily have been the intension of Matsukata's
financial policies.576
Nor did Matsukata have effective means to deal with the nation-wide deflation. In the
beginning, he refused to admit that falling prices were a serious economic problem. 7
Although he admitted that the expectation of further declines in prices would deter
investment activities, he argued that a complete recovery of the value of paper notes vis-
a-vis specie would cultivate virtues of "industry and thrift" among the Japanese, who
would then engage in "concrete" rather than "speculative" business activities. 578
strategy in the 1880s, see idem., Nisshin senso no michi [The Road to the Sino-Japanese War in 1894]
(T6ky6: T6ky6 S6gensha, 1995), pp. 186-227.
s7s Kamiyama Tsuneo, Meii keizai seisakushi no kenkya7 [A Historical Study of the Economic Policies in
Meiji Japan] (T6ky6: Hanawa Shoten, 1995), pp. 93-94.
576 This view is often implicitly assumed in some important study about the politics of Matsukata deflation.
See an example in Oishi Kaichir6, Jiyi minken to Okuma Matsukata zaisei [Freedom, Popular Rights and
the Public Finance of Okuma and Matsukata] (T6ky6: Thky6 Daigaku Shuppansha, 1989).
"7 In his report to the Minister of the State on November 26, 1883 and his speech to prefectural magistrates
in 1884, Matsukata contended that falling prices simply reflected the recovery of the value of paper notes,
and the "real" prices measured by silver yen remained the same as before. Matsukata Masayoshi, "On the
regulation of the land taxes" (presented to the Minister of the State, November 26, 1883), in Matsukatahaku
zaisei ronsakushi, reprinted in Okubo Tatsumasa, ed., Matsukata kankei monjo, supplementary volume, p.
262; idem., "Reasons for issuing the law of land taxation: to prefectural governors," (1884), ibid., p. 270.
578 Matsukata Masayoshi, "A speech in the conference of prefectural governors in the Ministry of Finance,"
(December 10, 1883), in Matsukatahaku zaisei ronsakushi, reprinted in Okubo Tatsumasa, ed., Matsukata
kankei monjo, supplementary volume, p. 619 and p. 622.
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However, Matsukata could not long maintain confidence in his "deflation-stimulate-
investment" theory in the face of the ongoing economic collapse. In September 1883, he
asked the Ministry of Finance to issue 20 to 30 million yen in short-term bonds in
anticipation of incoming tax revenues to mitigate the seasonal scarcity of currency. He
could have taken such a measure in 1882 as a substitute to the sudden stopping of ,
supplementary paper notes. In order to curb the collapse of rice prices, Matsukata in
October 1883 extended the period for handing in land taxes for a month so as to reduce
the pressure to sell rice at low prices. Although Matsukata had strongly opposed
Okuma's plan to take out foreign loans, lack of domestic investment in a deflationary
economy forced him in 1883 to allow foreigners to subscribe to railway construction
bonds. 579 In 1884 and 1885, he tried to raise foreign credit in Western Europe, but to no
avail. 580
In January 1884, the Osaka Chamber of Commerce urged the government to take
measures to bolster the purchasing power of peasants and to raise investment in
transportation and industry so as to increase the "circulation velocity of currency in the
economy."5 8' It also pointed out that one cause of the scarcity of currency was the 40
million yen in tax revenue which was sent to the Ministry of Finance and stayed in the
government from December to the following February, when it was returned to the
countryside through government expenditures. This report also mentioned that the
central bank in European countries often took measures such as discounting or short-term
579 Kamiyama Tsuneo, Meiji keizai seisakushi no kenkyi [A Historical Study of the Economic Policies in
Meiji Japan], p. 21.
580 Ibid., p. 29.
581 Godai Tomoatsu, "Reply to the Osaka municipal government's inquiry," (January 19, 1884), in Godai
Tomoatsu denki shiry5 [The Biographical Materials of Godai Tomoatsu], volume 2, p. 488.
263
lending to mitigate this seasonal fluctuation of currency in the economy.s2 In
Matsukata's proposal to establish a central bank, he clearly stated that one of its
advantages was the ability to use such means to stabilize the supply of currency when the
"currency went into the treasury in the form of tax revenues."58 3
However, the Bank of Japan that Matsukata established in October 1882 as the central
bank was ill-prepared to perform such functions. Its initial capital was merely 2 million
yen, and its capital only reached 5 million yen in 1883. In contrast, there were 143
national banks and 176 private banks in Japan, which had a total capital of 61.36 million
yen in 1883.584 The number of banks that opened current accounts in the Bank of Japan
was 1 in 1883 and 10 in 1884. The Bank of Japan did not begin to transmit government
revenues and expenditures until July 1883.585 Given these circumstances, the newly
established Bank of Japan had little power over the financial markets in Japan in the
initial two years. What was worse, the post-coup government first used the Bank of
Japan as a political weapon to attack Okuma's "Constitutional Reform Party." As the
funds of this party came mainly from the Mitsubishi Company, the largest seaborne
company in Japan at the time, the Meiji government in January 1, 1883 established a
seaborne company, the Joint Transportation Company (ky~ddunyu kaisha), to weaken
582 Godai Tomoatsu, "Reply to the Osaka municipal government's inquiry," (February 23, 1883), in Godai
Tomoatsu denki shiry5 [The Biographical Materials of Godai Tomoatsu], volume 2, p. 384.
583 Matsukata Masayoshi, "On the establishment of the Bank of Japan," (March 1, 1883), in Matsukatahaku
zaisei ronsakushi, reprinted in Okubo Tatsumasa, ed., Matsukata kankei monjo, supplementary volume, p.
351.
584 Hugh T. Patrick, "Japan, 1868-1914," in Rondo Cameron, Olga Crisp, and Hugh T. Patrick eds.,
Banking in the Early Stages ofIndustrialization: A Study in Comparative Economic History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 248.
585 Yagi Yoshikazu, "Meiji 14 nen seihen to Nihon ginko [The 1881 coup and the Bank of Japan]," Shakai
keizai shigaku, Vol. 53, No. 5 (December 1987), p. 643.
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Mitsubishi.58 6 The Bank of Japan provided 300,000 yen in a timed loan to the Joint
Transportation Company without taking any collateral, which accounted for 46 percent of
its total timed loans in the first half of 1883.587
Restoring the value of paper notes had been the principal goal of Matsukata's financial
policy, and he used the shrinking discrepancy between paper notes and silver yen to
justify his program. 588 However, this achievement itself could do little to alleviate the
damage that deflation inflicted on the Japanese economy, particularly when considering
the vicious cycle it set up, i.e., the expectation of further falling of prices discouraged
investment, and lower investment further pushed prices downward. In the received story,
Matsukata has often been characterized as an advocate of orthodox economics who
rejected government intervention in favor of the market.589 In practice, however, he had
to use government intervention to encourage investment, which a deflationary market
could not automatically accomplish.
Deflation increased the real interest rate and caused a distribution of wealth in favor of
creditors. Yet it also reduced opportunities for profitable investment. This situation
made it easier for Matsukata to issue bonds at low interest rates to raise massive amounts
of capital for railway construction and the modernization of the navy and army. All the
bonds he issued between 1884 and 1889 were over-subscribed. [Table 5.4] From 1886
586 Ibid., p. 637.
51 Ibid., p. 636.
588 Muroyama Yoshimasa, Matsukata zaisei kenkyi [A Study of Matsukata's Policy in Public Finance], pp.
164-172.
589 Henry Rosovsky, "Japan's Transition to Modem Economic Growth, 1868-1885," in Henry Rosovsky
ed., Industrialization in Two Systems: Essays in Honor ofAlexander Gerschenkron (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1966).
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on, Matsukata also used new borrowing at 5 percent to convert the state's old debt with
higher interest rates (6 percent or higher) and thus reduced the annual interest payment by
more than 3 million yen.590
Table 5.4: The Japanese government's long-term domestic borrowings, 1884-1894
Date of issuing Interest Object amount of Actual amount of
bonds rate (%) subscription (million subscription (million
yen) yen)
Nakayama 1884 March 7 5 8.4
Railway
Nakayama 1884 June 7 10 15.3
Railway
Nakayama 1885 July 7 5 14.8
Railway
Navy 1886 July 5 5 16.6
Debt Resettlement 1886 November 5 10 16.5
Navy 1887 March 5 6 8.4
Navy 1888 March 5 2 3.8
Railway 1889 February 5 2 5.4
Debt Resettlement 1889 March 5 5 9.2
Navy 1889 April 5 4 5
Debt Resettlement 1891 August 5 5 5
Debt Resettlement 1892 April 5 6 7.2
Debt Resettlement 1892 July 5 4 5.8
Railway 1893 April 5 1 7.6
590 Muroyama Yoshimasa, Matsukata zaisei kenkyaF [A
210.
Study of Matsukata's Policy in Public Finance], p.
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Railway 1894 February 5 1 4.7
Sino-Japanese War 1894 September 5 30 77
Sino-Japanese War 1894 December 5 50 90
Source: Kamiyama Tsuneo, Meii keizai seisakushi no kenkyai [A Historical Study of the Economic Policies
in Meiji Japan] (Thky6: Hanawa Shoten, 1995), p. 26.
Interest payments on these new loans could not come from land taxes, as the deflation
raised both the real burden of land taxes and the debt burden of rural people. In 1884, the
government had to use force to repress large-scale peasant riots in Gunma, Chichibu, and
other regions. Under these conditions, the Meiji government continued to extract more
revenue from the indirect taxes on alcohol and tobacco. Matsukata's predecessors had
prepared him with effective centralized institutions to collect these taxes. The heavy
taxes on alcohol production, which rose from 2 yen per koku sake produced to 4 yen,
drove many small-scale sake houses out of business. 59' As a result, the concentration in
sake production in Japan rose considerably, which in turn reduced the government's costs
in tax collection. [Table 5.5] The existence of inter-regional markets for sake was
indispensable for the development of large-scale sake production.
591 Yunoki Manabu, Sakazukuri no rekishi [A History of Sake Manufacturing] (Tokyo: Y zankaku, 1987),
pp. 345-6.
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Table 5.5: Ratio of sake houses with different production scales in Japan (unit: %)
Year Below 100 koku 100-1,000 koku Above 1,000 koku
1878 52 47 1
1895 6.8 65.1 28.1
Sources:
The numbers for 1878 are calculated from Table 4 in Fukaya Tokujir6, Meii seihu zaisei kiban no
kakuritsu [The Establishment of the Foundation of the Meiji Government's Public Finance] (Tbky6:
Ochanomizu Shob5, 1995), pp. 188-9. The numbers for 1895 are calculated from Table 3 Nakamura
Takafusa, "Shuz6gy6 no siryoshi [A quantitative history of sake production]," Shakai keizai shigaku, Vol.
55, No. 2 (June 1989), p. 217.
Meanwhile, Matsukata wanted the Bank of Japan to use rediscounting of business bills to
stimulate domestic investment. In February 1884, he even urged the rediscounting of
business bills that had no pre-assigned collateral so as to reduce the use of cash in
transactions. However, business leaders such as Shibusawa Eiichi considered this policy
too risky. As a compromise, the Bank of Japan first experimented with discounting bills
secured by deposited goods or state bonds. Nonetheless, as the Bank did not issue its
own banknotes and was not allowed to use the deposited government money in its
business, this experiment became a fiasco within a few months. 592
Nonetheless, Matsukata in 1885 continued the policy of low discount rates; the annual
rate was reduced from 9.49 percent in 1885 to 4.93 percent in 1886. Moreover, he
ordered the Bank of Japan to accept not only bonds but also corporation stocks in railway
construction, seabome transportation, mining, and textiles as collateral for low-interest
592 Tsurumi Masayoshi, Nihon shinyo kiko no kakuritsu: Nihon ginko to kinyi shijo [The Establishment of a
Credit System in Japan: the Bank of Japan and the Financial Market], pp. 157-77.
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loans. 59 3 In consequence, the lending of the Bank of Japan rose from 16 million yen in
1885 to 105 million yen in 1889; and the lending of national banks from 649 million yen
to 1,414 million yen in 1889.594 The number of corporations formed between 1886 and
1889, most of which were in industry, railway, and mining, was as high as 1,743 and
their capital was 1,086 million yen. Many of the corporation stocks were just partially
subscribed in cash.595 Although the Bank of Japan raised the interest rate in 1888, the
bubble burst in the financial panic of the spring of 1890.
The risky financial policies of the Ministry of Finance between 1882 and 1890 went
against both the model and the practice of central banking in Western Europe.596 Their
implementation, despite criticism within the Bank of Japan and from the business
community, should be viewed against the political background of the deflation which
seriously undermined the legitimacy of the Meiji government. It was politically
important to end deflation earlier rather than later. Nonetheless, as Matsukata set the
parity of paper notes and silver currency as the supreme goal regardless of the economic
consequences, his policy options were quite limited, especially when he could not raise
foreign credit. It is understandable that Matsukata might wish to rely more upon the use
of business bills or corporation stocks as a surrogate for increasing monetary input as it
593 Ishii Kanji ed., Nihon ginko kinyii seisakushi [Historical Studies of the Policy of the Bank of Japan]
(T6ky6: Tbky6 Daigaku Shuppankai, 2001), p. 27.
594 Nakamura Takafusa, "Makuro keizei to sengo keiei [The macroeconomy and post-war management],"
in Nishikawa Shunsaku and Yamamoto Yiiz6, eds., Sangyoka nojidai (ge) [The Age of Industrialization
(Part II)], volume 5 in Nihon keizaishi [An Economic History of Japan] (T6ky6: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), p.
11.
595 Nagaoka Shinkichi, MeUi kyokoshijosetsu [A Study of the History of Financial Panic in Meiji Japan]
(T6ky6: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971), pp. 19-21.
596 It is well-known that the Bank of Japan was established upon the model of Belgium. However, financial
crises caused by a low liquidity ratio had forced the Societd Generale in Belgium to carefully keep its
conventional banking business separate from its long-term investment in big industry as early as 1850. See
Herman Van der Wee and Martine Goossens, "Belgium" in Rondo Cameron and V. I. Bovykin eds.,
International Banking: 18 70-1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 118.
269
mitigated the scarcity of currency yet did not directly affect the convertibility of paper
notes.
As the Japanese historian Banno Junji has pointed out, the financial panic in 1890 made it
impossible for the Meiji government to use economic development as a means to delay
the opening of a parliamentary system, a strategy to which it had appealed since 1875.
When the Japanese Diet was established in 1891, public finance became the focal arena
of political struggles. Representatives demanded lower taxes, increased expenditure on
local welfare and infrastructure, and reduced military spending. 597 Meanwhile,
westernizing officials such as It6 Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru, and Okuma Shigenobu (who
was invited into the government as the Minister of Foreign Affairs) planned to make
significant concessions to western powers in legal affairs in return for a resumption of
sovereignty in the customs. Their main consideration was to increase government
income by raising tariffs on Japan's expanding foreign trade and thus mitigate the tension
over the issue of domestic taxation. This strategy was fiercely resisted by hardliners.
The severe domestic conflict of interests between 1891 and 1895 was greatly relieved by
the military victory over in China in 1894-5 and the post-war indemnity of 360 million
yen that Japan received from China between 1895 and 1898.
Nonetheless, the institutions of the modern fiscal state had emerged in Japan before the
Sino-Japanese war. In the period between 1891 and 1894, even political opponents to the
Meiji government did not demand the dismantling of these new institutions. The
597 Banno Junji, The Establishment of the Japanese Constitutional System, translated by J. A. A. Stockwin
(London: Routledge, 1992), chapter 2.
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advocates in the Diet who were in favor of reducing the burden of taxation did not
question the use of centralized institutions in collecting taxes. Their demand to increase
expenditures on local welfare did not challenge the centralized institution for managing
government finance. The Bank of Japan not only monopolized the issue of convertible
banknotes but also deposited and transmitted government tax revenue and spending.
Moreover, in order to relieve the financial panic in 1890, it played a bigger role as the
lender of last resort. As the Bank of Japan established a wide ranging correspondence
with national and major private banks, it began to regulate the Japanese economy as a
real central bank. By selectively accepting stocks of corporations which had strategic
importance to the Japanese economy, such as the 11 railway companies, Nihon Yusen
(NYK), and Tokyo Marine Insurance, as securities for providing loans, the Bank of Japan
was important in fostering long-term industrial investment without running the risk of
taking company shares as securities in general.
V. Conclusion
The period from 1868 and 1895 is a crucial period for the rise of a modern fiscal state in
Japan. Prior to 1868, we find no origin or cause of the modern fiscal state which was in
place by 1895. Instead, there were divergent institutional designs among major political
camps. Their power struggles led to a highly contingent event, the reliance upon the
issue of non-convertible paper notes in the armed overthrow of the Bakufu in 1868. As
the new Meiji regime was established prior to its possession of tax institutions, it had to
continue its dependence upon paper notes in the initial years after the Restoration.
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The convertibility of huge amounts of paper notes thus constrained the options for
institutional development. It not only helped young and competent westernizing officials
rise to the center of power but also protected them from political purges attempted by
politically powerful conservatives in 1871. The convertibility of paper notes as a
pressing problem to solve also determined the direction of institutional development
between 1871 and 1880 toward centralization in the management of government
spending and the collection of indirect taxes. In the absence of such a pressing credit
crisis, other institutional outcomes in public finance would have been possible, such as a
decentralized fiscal system similar to that found in a federal system. Meanwhile, if the
Meiji government used minted coins rather than paper notes denominated in gold, it
would not have been pressured by rising gold prices in the international markets as it
could easily have turned to minting silver coins. In this situation, the great debates over
the direction and tempo of institutional development would have had different
consequences as there would have been no urgency to use government intervention to
curb gold drainage. The pace of building centralized institutions in public finance would
have been slower when considering the resistance to fiscal centralization.
The economic condition of Japan was also important to sustain the unfolding of the
institutional learning process between 1868 and 1895. The vibrant domestic economy
and expanding exports created a strong monetary demand which could absorb the
government's paper notes even though they were still defacto non-convertible. The
dense financial networks of national banks and other private banks that transmitted
money in speedy bills rather than in cash facilitated the government's attempt to build a
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centrally operated fiscal system. The purchasing power of ordinary consumers and the
development of inter-regional trade in Japan were indispensable to the increasing
concentration in sake production, which was beneficial to government efforts to heavily
extract indirect taxes from sake production.
The process of institutional learning in public finance in this period was also highly
political. For example, inflation caused by the excessive issue of paper notes was
detrimental to the interests of those relying on fixed incomes, particularly ex-samurai. As
a result, the political consequences of previous policy mistakes accumulated in the
process of institutional learning. The role of politics is evident in Japan's last step toward
a modem fiscal state. Although the path toward building a central bank had become
irreversible by 1881, power struggles and the confrontation between society and the state
produced a path characterized by a man-made deflation which was by no means
inevitable. In order to mitigate deflation, the Japanese government had to use the policy
of discounting commercial bills to stimulate domestic investment, even though it had
stopped directly investing and managing enterprises. In the process of implementing this
policy, the Bank of Japan quickly became the real central bank in the late 1890s and the
core institution in the modem fiscal state in Japan.
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Chapter 6 Decentralized Public Finance, Disrupted Domestic Economy, and the
Failure of the Chinese State's Financial Experiments: 1850-1864
I. Introduction:
In contrast to England, which did not have a fiscal state before the English Civil Wars,
and Japan, where the central government did not collect tax revenues from the whole
country until 1871, China in the first half of the nineteenth century had a long history as a
fiscal state. The Qing government (1644-1911) collected tax revenues from the entire
territory under its direct administration (China proper). Although it depended
overwhelmingly upon the receipts from land taxes, some 80 percent of these were
collected in silver by the first half of the eighteenth century. However, this starting
position did not facilitate China's transformation into a modem fiscal state.
As I discussed in chapter 2, the principal cause of the fiscal difficulties facing the Qing
government between the 1820s and 1850s was the state's lack of an institutional ability to
relieve the deflationary effect of massive silver drainage through the opium trade. It
could neither debase its silver currency nor switch to the copper standard. The
financially depleted state could do little to alleviate the nation-wide unemployment,
which led to the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion in 1850. To repress this massive
rebellion and other uprisings that cropped up in various regions during the 1850s, the
Qing government implemented many exigent fiscal measures. These included the issue
of paper notes denominated in both silver and copper cash and the collection of taxes
upon domestic consumption (lin duties), both of which began in 1853. Lin receipts
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quickly became an important source of state revenue which helped the Qing government
put down the Taiping Rebellion in 1864 and the Nian Rebellion in the mid-i 870s.
Nonetheless, the experiment with paper notes turned out to be a fiasco and did not lead to
a process of institutional learning resulting in the centralization of public finance. The
issue of paper notes was repealed in 1864.
The interactions between the state and economy in China in the second half of the
nineteenth century thus illustrate the institutional stickiness of the traditional fiscal state,
even under greatly changed economic and international circumstances. From the 1870s
on, the customs and lgin duties became the major pillars of the fiscal system. These two
indirect taxes were vital in funding various modernization programs such as railway
construction and the introduction of western weapons and warships. Moreover, they
were used to secure short-term foreign loans for military purposes. However, their rising
importance did not push the Qing government to aggregate their receipts so as to
mobilize more financial resources. Instead, they were incorporated into the decentralized
assignment system (xiexiang) in which the Board of Revenue assigned particular items of
the customs or ljin duties from sites of collection directly to places of disbursement
without passing through Beijing. Why did the experiment with paper notes between 1853
and 1863 not trigger an institutional learning process resulting in the centralization of
public finance in China? Why did the short-term borrowing between 1864 and 1894 not
push the Chinese state to further seek long-term credits to enhance its spending capacity?
Why did decentralization of public finance persist in China? These questions are
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crucially important to understanding why a modem fiscal state did not emerge in China
between 1850 and 1911.
The persistence of a traditional fiscal state in China has two implications for the study of
the rise of the modem fiscal state. First, it illustrates that socio-economic circumstances
such as vibrant interregional trade and development of nation-wide financial networks are
is necessary conditions for the unfolding of a temporal process of institutional learning
until state actors come to realize the feasibility of using aggregate tax revenue to mobilize
long-term financial resources. Without this interval, actors who experiment with various
new institutional arrangements cannot grasp the mutually reinforcing effects between
centrally collected tax revenue and the creditworthiness of the state's long-term financial
instruments. Second, it shows that even where socio-economic circumstances are ready
to support institution building toward a modem fiscal state, actors would not
automatically move in this direction if existing institutions are functioning reasonably
well.
In this chapter, I examine the interactions between the state and economy in the Qing
government's experiment with paper notes as a means to raise its income in the 1850s.
The existing literature views the non-convertibility of these paper notes as the principal
reason for the failure of this monetary experiment. 598 Nonetheless, the inconvertibility of
paper notes in practice did not imply that the Qing government intended to issue non-
598 Peng Xinwei, Zhongguo huobishi [A History of Currency in China] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin
chubanshe, 1965), p. 834; Yang Duanliu, Qingdai huobijinrong shigao [A Financial and Monetary History
of the Qing Dynasty] (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1962), pp. 108-10; Peng Zeyi, Shijiu shiji houbanqi de
Zhongguo caizhengyujingji [The Economy and Public Finance in China in the Second Half of the
Nineteenth Century] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), pp. 91-96.
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convertible paper notes in the beginning. The historian Peng Zeyi considered the issue of
non-convertible paper notes and the cast of copper cash with big nominal values
(debasement of copper cash) the means by which the Qing government met its spending
needs at the cost of merchants and ordinary people.599 However, this explanation
overlooks the market-friendly framework that government officials had developed in
making financial and monetary policies in the eighteenth century. As I show in following
sections, officials of public finance at both the central and provincial levels well
understood that circulation in commercial transactions was vital to attain the goal of
issuing paper notes to cover government deficits. Meanwhile, if the Qing government
simply wanted to issue paper notes to raise its income, then it is hard to explain why it
decided in 1855 to replace silver notes with copper notes which had smaller nominal
values.
Even though officials of public finance grasped the importance of convertibility to
boosting confidence in paper notes, this idea itself did not suffice to enable them to build
the necessary institutions. In this light, the existing literature fails to realize that the
process of creating an institutional framework that would safeguard the value of paper
notes was neither determined by government officials nor government policies. Instead,
socio-economic circumstances such as the demand for currency in the market and the
condition of both inter-regional financial networks and long-distance domestic and
foreign trade significantly affected this process of institution building. I argue that the
interactions between a decentralized public finance and fragmented domestic economy
599 Peng Zeyi, Shiiu shiji houbanqi de Zhongguo caizheng yujingji [The Economy and Public Finance in
China in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century], p. 96.
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under the special circumstances of civil war in the 1850s caused the Qing government's
failure to aggregate tax revenue to back up the creditworthiness of its paper notes. These
interactions could not produce a mutually reinforcing institutional development toward a
modern fiscal state.
The geographical location of Beijing makes it unlikely for China to transform to a
modem fiscal state along the English path. For example, the Board of Revenue in 1853
considered issuing the bills of short-term credit (qipiao) secured by anticipated tax
revenue and using them to disburse officials' salaries and government spending. These
bills were similar to the tally of sol issued by the English government in the seventeenth
century. However, officials in the Board of Revenue soon realized that this approach was
impractical as the ongoing civil wars which were being fought in the core economic
areas, such as the provinces in the middle and lower Yangzi regions, disrupted the flows
of both tax revenues into Beijing and domestic trades going through Beijing. In contrast,
the expanding domestic and international trade through London in the 1700s facilitated
cooperation between the central government and big financiers, allowing the state to
convert massive amounts of short-term credits into long-term debt. Meanwhile, the
international - rather than - civil wars that the English state fought after 1689 encouraged
the centralization of tax revenue in London, where it was either remitted to fund the
troops in Continental Europe or to purchase materials to supply the navy.
At the same time, taking the Japanese path of floating paper notes for the whole economy
was not feasible in China in this period. Like the early Meiji government, the Qing
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government turned to paper notes denominated in both silver tael and copper cash to
meet its spending needs. It also tried to mobilize private financiers to set up Official
Money Bureaus (guanqianju) at both central and local levels to help circulate them.
Nonetheless, the outbreak of civil war in the economically core middle and lower Yangzi
River areas made it difficult for the government to mobilize big merchants or financiers
with interregional business networks to circulate these paper notes denominated in silver
(yinpiao). Military needs necessarily consumed most of the collected tax revenues. The
government could not use this money to support the role of Official Money Bureaus as
fractional note-issuing financial intermediaries to ensure the convertibility of government
paper notes.
As government silver notes did not widely circulate in the economy, the government in
1855 decided to increase the issue of paper notes denominated in copper cash (baochao).
This represented a serious effort to replace a silver with a copper standard, an idea which
had been intensively discussed among officials and scholars of the statecraft since the
1820s. However, this decision greatly affected convertibility. The low-value and bulky
copper cash were minted by provincial mints with varied copper content and fineness.
They could serve as the medium for local transactions, but could hardly support the
convertibility of paper notes used across regions. In this situation, instead of becoming a
pressing problem for the central government, convertibility of copper notes was handled
by various local governments, and thus did not trigger any process of institutional
centralization in public finance.
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In section II, I examine the policy framework for monetary and financial issues that the
Qing government had developed over the eighteenth century. It was based upon a
rudimentary understanding of the importance of keeping a balance between supply and
demand in making monetary policies. It also illustrated a clear consciousness that
effective government policies had to come to terms with the operation of a market
economy and the profit incentive of private economic actors. This framework as a policy
legacy significantly informed the financial experiments in the 1850s and suggests that
characterizations of the Qing government as anti-commercial or anti-market in the
nineteenth century are overly simplistic. In section III, I explore the interactions between
the decentralized public finance and fragmented domestic economy during the civil wars
of the 1850s to analyze how they led to the failure to turn the Official Money Bureaus
established at both central and local levels into new financial institutions to circulate
paper notes in the economy. Section IV concludes by briefly comparing with the cases of
England and Japan.
II. Policy legacies in managing finance and currency prior to 1850
Mounting military expenditures and tax arrears forced the Qing government to implement
many financial measures to overcome the unprecedented fiscal crisis after 1850, such as
issuing paper notes and minting copper cash with large nominal values (daqian). The
design and formulation of these experiments was significantly influenced by the Qing
government's previous experience in managing currency and regulating domestic
financial markets. State interactions with the market over the course of the eighteenth
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century contributed significantly to the formation of practical attitudes among
government officials in regard to commercial transactions and profit incentives.
On the issue of currency, before the value of silver vis-ai-vis copper cash rose steeply
between the 1820s and 1850s, the Qing government was overwhelmingly concerned
about the opposite problem: the high value of copper cash in regard to silver. Although
economic circumstances were quite different, the government's focus on how to maintain
the official exchange rate of 1:1000 between silver and copper cash in the markets
remained unchanged. During the reign of the Qianlong emperor (1736-1795), a set of
market-friendly economic approaches in the management of currency emerged. 600 This
had two important characteristics.
Firstly, the government aims to keep a balance between supply and demand rather than
relying upon heavy-handed administrative control by the state. In response to the high
value of copper cash (market exchange rates of 1 tael of silver were around 700-800 wen
copper cash) in the first half of the eighteenth century, the Qing government ordered
provincial governments to open mints and hoped to use the increasing output of newly
minted copper cash to raise the relative value of silver. For the same reasons, the center
also ordered regular exchange of copper cash deposited in local governments with silver
600 In the making of financial and fiscal policies which involved many technical details, decisions were
usually taken following deliberation among officials of the Board of Revenue; and the members of the
Grand Council (-11JtU) and princes joined the discussion of important policies. The personal opinion of
the emperor did not dominate in the process. This is one important feature of the early modem state where
governance had become highly institutionalized.
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in the markets.60' In comparison, interfering measures such as prohibition of
interregional transportation of copper cash and the limiting of copper cash stocked in
private shops (particularly pawnshops) were considered emergent rather than "ever-
lasting" policies to stabilize the exchange rate between silver and copper cash.602
Secondly, the Qing government took a realistic attitude toward profit-making activities in
the markets and accepted that it was simply impractical to force private actors to abide by
government policies that ran against their profit-calculation, especially if the monitoring
cost was formidably high. For example, the Qing government by the mid-eighteenth
century was greatly troubled by the counterfeiting of copper cash (sizhu) when copper
content in official cash was low and melting of cash (sixiao) when it was high.603 In a
memorial in early 1736, Hai Wang, the Minister of the Board of Revenue and of the
Grand Supervisor of Imperial Household (A R M), pointed out that these two
activities were closely related to the market price of copper. In his view, people had
strong incentives to melt copper cash if both copper price and copper content of minted
cash were high; and to counterfeit it if copper content was low in regard to its face value.
601 For a discussion of these policies and the underlying reasoning of supply and demand, see Hans Ulrich
Vogel, "Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800," Late Imperial China, Vol. 8, No. 2 (December
1987), pp. 13-14.
602 These two measures, along with four others, were recommended to provincial governments as "effective
means" to reduce the value of copper cash in Beijing in a decree dated X* *-F E JA. Replies from
Hunan, Hubei, Suzhou, Sichuan, Fujian, and Jiangxi provinces all considered them either impractical (e.g.,
to limit the stocks of copper cash in pawnshops) or unnecessary (e.g., to require the use of silver in large
transactions). The Qianlong emperor admitted in his comments on the memorial from Hunan that these
measures were simply temporary rectifications rather than effective measures in the long run [Tl4H1i*9
4 , UJU2.]. Palace Memorials (A $ 1thif), Box 60, No. 1610-1616, No. 1622-1625, No.
1637-1643, No. 1657-1661, No. 1662-1667, 1746-1750. See Qianlong's comment in No. 1610-1616.
603 Counterfeiting was more frequent when the Qing government began to mint light copper cash (1 qian,
circa. 3.7 g) in 1684 and the melting of copper cash was widespread when the government minted heavy
copper cash (1.4 qian) in 1702. Kuroda Akinobu, "Kenrya no zenitaka [The High Value of Copper Cash
in the Reign of Qianlong]," T5ydshi kenkyai, Vol. XLV, No. 4 (March 1987), p. 694.
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Instead of a state monopoly, Hai Wang argued that the government should lift restrictions
on the copper trade and adjust the copper content in minted cash according to market
prices of copper.604 The Minister of the Board of Revenue Shi Yizhi further pointed out
that a state prohibition of copper trade would result in a scarcity of copper in the market,
which would raise its market price and thus provide more incentive to melt official
copper cash. Shi's economic reasoning was highly appreciated by the Qianlong
emperor.605
As it was impossible to frequently adjust the copper content in minted cash, the question
of how to increase copper supply became the focal issue from the 1750s. For this
purpose, the Qing government implemented many "liberal" economic policies to
motivate private investment in copper mining and the copper trade with Japan. It opened
the state-controlled mining and trade in copper to private merchants which aimed to
increase not only the amount of copper for mintage but also the copper supply for private
needs in the economy. These measures were in alignment with liberal economic policies
in other issues such as the grain trade, which reflected a rising recognition among
government officials that the government policies had to come to terms with the
conditions of supply and demand in the market. 606
604 3 n Palace
Memorials, Box 60, No. 119-124. This famous memorial was later compiled into Huangchaojingshi
wenbian (si!ktifZ ), the canon of the statecraft school in the nineteenth century.
605 The emperor commented: "I am happy to read this discussion... which is clear, comprehensive, and
reasonable. [11iSM3 XW ;2 ... RA Nii!E *l , 'pri PtL!]." Both in JP n% WR~M !!f il
IR G~~E -J --t-b H , Palace Memorials, Box 60, No. 142-145.
606 For the liberal policies in the mining of copper, see Chiu Peng-sheng, "Shiba shiji diantong shichang
zhong de guanshang guanxi yu liyi guannian," Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishiyuyan yanjiusuo jikan, Vol. 72,
Part 1 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2001), particularly pp. 91-104; in the grain market, see Kishimoto Mio,
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As a result, domestic output of copper (mainly in Yunnan province) expanded and met
both the government's increasing need to mint copper cash and the demand for copper in
the market. The dearth of copper and copper cash was relieved after the 1770s and the
market exchange rate between silver and copper cash approached the official rate of
1:1000.607 Under these circumstances, the Qing government altered its previous
tolerance of privately minted copper cash (xiaoqian) when the economy suffered from
scarcity of official cash and began to exchange government minted copper cash for
private copper cash from the market. 608 In so doing, the Qing government explicitly
aimed to reassert the state sovereignty in coinage.609
Despite the emphasis on the official standard of the minted copper cash, the Qing
government in practice adopted a pragmatic approach which allowed certain provincial
"Shinty6 chUki keizei seisaku no kity6 [The basic tune in the making of economic policies in mid-Qing],"
in Kishimoto Mio, Shindai chfigoku no bukka to keizai hendo [The Price and Economic Changes in Qing
China] (T6ky6: Kenbun shuppan, 1997), pp. 289-325; Helen Dunstan, Conflicting Counsels to Confuse the
Age: A Documentary Study of Political Economy in Qing China, 1644-1840 (Ann Arbor: Center for
Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1996), chapter 7. Dunstan also stressed that the influential
liberal thinking in economic affairs alone was insufficient to explain the making of economic policies,
which was influenced by other concerns of the state such as social welfare and fiscal balance. See idem.,
The State or Merchants? Political Economy and Political Process in 1740s China (Cambridge: The
Harvard University Asia Center, 2006).
607 See the increase of copper output and minted cash and the exchange rate between silver and cash in
Hans Ulrich Vogel, "Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800," p. 45 and p. 48-9.
608 In a situation of high value of copper cash in the markets, a degree of e tl t Vti! T A
allowed the use of private and even foreign copper cash for a practical concern of mitigating dearth of cash
in the economy. It further stated that once the supply of official copper cash became sufficient, the use of
foreign copper cash should be strictly prohibited in accordance with sovereignty in coinage [Jk l0044 *].
Palace Memorials, Box 60, No. 2443-4. Twenty years later, a decree of Wt tfk*/ 2\ -
requested provincial governments to use minted copper cash to exchange for privately minted cash
according to the market value of the content of copper in private cash. Palace Memorials, Box 61, No.
2482-84.
609 A decree of ft P1 Y 3 Ht + / ± Rq + stated unambiguously that people's use of private copper cash
was against the law [ Palace Memorials, Box 63, No. 75-7.
284
governments to have different amounts of copper content in the cash they minted. As the
historian Kuroda Akinobu has pointed out, provincial autonomy in the mintage of copper
cash under the coordination of the center mainly resulted from different demands for
copper cash across regions in eighteenth-century China.610 This allowed more room for
monetary experiments. For example, in 1738 the governor-general of Jiangnan and
Jiangxi Na Sutu (M5 M) reported that officials in Suzhou and Jiangxi had found that the
addition of tin in the process of minting could make copper cash (qingqian) less
malleable; this in turn make it more expensive to separate out copper and discouraged the
melting of cash in the markets. 611 The mints in Beijing immediately tried this out but
were not successful. The center then asked the provincial government of Zhejiang to
send some craftsmen who had been involved in the Zhejiang experiment to Beijing for
consult.612 The resulting success caused the Board of Revenue to recommend this
method to mints across the country.613 As the melting of copper cash ceased to be major
problem in the late eighteenth century, the addition of tin in mintage of copper cash was
stopped. Nonetheless, it illustrated co-existence of central coordination and provincial
autonomy in the matter of mintage.
610 Although the official copper content for cash was set as 1.2 mace (1.2 qian, circa. 4.44 g.), the center
allowed the provincial mints in Jiangsu and Hubei to mint copper cash with a copper content of 1 mace (1
qian) and 0.8 mace per wen (eightfen) respectively so as to meet the increasing demand for cash in the two
provinces. Kuroda Akinobu, "Kenrya no zenitaka [The High Value of Copper Cash in the Reign of
Qianlong]," p. 698.
611 See the details of the experiment conducted in Suzhou in iE , # /JJ Q.
Palace Memorials, Box 60, No. 444-7. A similar proposal can be found in a memorial of the same year
from Zhejiang province. TE4IWP RX , ft W|L0 ZtZ * , Palace Memorials, Box 60,
No. 623-5.
612, 
-E 4JJA B , Palace Memorials, Box 60, No. 624-5.
613 
- -f8 , Palace Memorials, Box 60, No. 744-5.
285
Prior to 1850, the Qing government only had limited interaction with the financial
markets. Government fiscal operations remained independent from private financial
markets as collected revenue and assignment of government expenditures were all
transported in silver. Although the Qing government often lent money to merchants for
interest income (fashang shengxi), most such loans came from the Imperial Household
(neiku) founds rather than tax revenue managed by the Board of Revenue. With
increasing numbers of bad loans due to mismanagement and corruption, the Qianlong
emperor repealed this practice in 1775.614 Thereafter, only provincial governments lent
out part of the silver deposited in provincial treasuries to local, well-established
pawnshops for secure interest income to cover expenditures in local public works, local
academies and famine-relief.615
Nonetheless, the Qing government was aware of the development of private financial
markets, particularly the increasing use of credit instruments such as bills of exchange,
banknotes, and promissory notes. In the first half of the nineteenth century, private
promissory notes denominated in copper cash (qianpiao) and issued by money
614 The loans during the reign of Kangxi (1662-1722) mostly went to privileged big merchants of salt and
copper. The Yongzheng emperor (1723-1735) allocated a certain amount as a fund to raise income to
improve the livelihood of banner soldiers stationed throughout the country. See Wei Qingyuan, "Kangxi
shiqi dui 'shengxi yinliang' zhidu de chuchuang he yunyong [The origin and use of the practice of 'interest-
generating silver' during the reign of Kangxi]," Zhongguo shehuijingjishi yanjiu, No. 3 (1986): 60-69;
idem., "Yongzheng shiqi dui 'shengxi yinliang' zhidu de zhengdun he zhengce yanbian [Policy changes
and reforms in the practice of "interest-generating silver" during the reign of Yongzheng]," Zhongguo
shehuijingjishiyanjiu, No. 3 (1987): 30-44. See the mismanagement and the final stopping of this practice
in idem., "Qianlong shiqi 'shengxi yinliang' zhidu de shuaibai he 'shouche' [Decline and repeal of the
practice of 'interest-generating silver' during the reign of Qianlong]," Zhongguo shehuijingjishi yanjiu,
No. 3 (1988): 8-17.
615 According to one memorial in 1853, half of the capital of big pawnshops came from such interest-
generating government money [ j *h Mi% , 2 -- 2 * #%]. Fujian
ETR -~E N, Fif-E* -)JA * i, in Zhongguo renmin yinhang canshishi jinrong shiliaozu, eds.,
Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce) [Historical Materials of the Monetary History of Early Modern
China] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1964), p. 337.
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exchangers, pawnshops, and even stores of rice, salt and groceries became widely used in
daily transactions in cities and major market towns. In 1836, the center asked the
opinions of provincial governors on the issue of private notes. Most replies confirmed
their importance to economic life and considered the prohibition of private notes either
unnecessary or even harmful. Instead, they proposed to better regulate the issue of
private notes so as to ensure their creditworthiness and prevent deliberate fraud.616
Typical measures were to permit only well-established businessmen to issue private notes
and to stipulate that the issue had to be jointly secured by other shops (lianming hubao).
In handling the legal disputes over private notes, the government carefully distinguished
deliberate fraud from the inability to redeem the issued notes due to low liquidity. 617
That the eighteenth-century Qing government accumulated some knowledge of and
competence in managing monetary and financial issues is illustrated by the successful
mitigation of the dearth of copper cash and the ensuing decline of the value of copper
cash in regard to silver around the turn of the nineteenth century. This experience
constituted a "cognitive framework" for officials of public finance in policy making. For
example, when the market value of silver vis-i-vis copper cash rose above the official
616 Wang Yeh-chien, Zhongguojindai huobi yu yinhang de yanjin: 1644-193 7 [The Evolution of Currency
and Banking in Early Modern China: 1644-1937] (Taipei: Institute of Economic Research, Academia
Sinica, 1981), pp. 16-18.
617 If a money exchanger went to the government to declare bankruptcy when he could not cash the issued
notes, the government usually gave him a certain period of time to return the deposited money back to
customers. If he could do so, then there was no legal punishment. If the money was deposited by wage
laborers or ordinary soldiers, the period was limited to two months; in the case of commercial transactions,
the period could be two years. _3'P V 0 , * , AN-1 -J# , Grand
Council Memorial Copies (V RUM I1 Yi), Box 678, No. 147-50. In a financial panic in 1830 when 27
money exchangers were forced to close within a month, they were granted 24 days to clear liabilities before
legal proceedings began. $9A f~]N , IKJII , *i*0- , L t Jt I91J , Grand
Council Memorial Copies , Box 678, No. 386-389.
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rate of 1:1000, the Qing government in 1794 ordered the reduction of the amount of
minted copper cash, stopped mintage temporarily in certain provincial mints, and raised
the ratio of silver in government spending. The basis of this policy was to rebalance the
exchange rate between silver and copper cash by reducing the supply of copper cash and
increasing the stocks of silver in the economy.618
The Qing confidence in the management of currency by balancing the supply of copper
cash relative to silver collapsed after the 1820s when the value of silver continued to rise
even though most mints had stopped operations. As the government only minted token
copper cash and did not have any control of the silver supply in China, government
officials and scholars of the statecraft school in the period between the 1820s and 1840s
strove to increase the use of copper cash in the economy so as to mitigate the pain caused
by the increasing scarcity of silver. In order to let the low-value and bulky copper cash
minted by the government to take the place of silver in large transactions and inter-
regional trade, they appealed to two main methods: issuing paper notes denominated in
copper cash (qianchao) and raising the nominal value of the minted copper cash
(zhudaqian). In response, officials of public finance in the center relied upon past policy
legacies to evaluate these new proposals.
Paper notes with various denominated values were easier to carry than copper cash.
Nonetheless, China had had mixed experiences with paper notes. Whereas their
618 The mintage was temporarily stopped in provinces such as Hubei, Jiangsu, Guangxi, Sichuan, Jiangxi,
Fujian, Hunan Zhejiang, and reduced in Shanxi, Shaanxi, Zhili, and Beijing. The payment of wages for
troops switched to silver instead of copper cash in Guangxi, Sichuan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shengjing, Hubei.
Palace Memorials, Box 63, No. 1071-3, No. 1109-13, No. 1114-8, No. 1130-2, No. 1137-40, No. 1141-7,
No. 1154-7, No. 1169-72, No. 1173-6, No. 1177-9, No. 1181-85, No. 1186-90, No. 1442-5.
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advocates often looked to the positive experience during the thirteenth century under the
Song dynasty, their opponents often referred to the hyperinflation caused by excessive
issue of paper notes in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries under the Ming.
The early Qing government issued a limited amount of paper notes in 1645 to cover
deficits and stopped this practice in 1661 when the government had adequate revenue.
Meanwhile, no advocate of paper notes addressed the practical issue of how to ensure
their convertibility across the country when the copper cash minted by provincial
governments were far from standard. Moreover, officials of the Board of Revenue were
concerned about the lack of mobility of large volumes of copper cash if government
spending in silver was to be disbursed in copper cash. For example, in 1843 the censor
Li Enqing proposed issuing copper notes to disburse the expenditure of 9 million chuan
copper cash (equivalent to 6 million tael of silver in total, 1 chuan = 1,000 wen) for the
river works in Henan province. In his plan, officials of river works would sell these notes
to businessmen for copper cash, and the businessmen could use the notes to buy official
titles (juanna) or could redeem them in the provincial treasury of Henan or with the
Board of Revenue. 6 19 The Board of Revenue rejected it by pointing out that businessmen
would have little incentive to carry bulky copper cash to the bureaus of river works in
Henan to exchange for such an enormous amount of copper notes. 620
The other method involved raising the nominal value of the copper cash by minting
copper cash of 10 wen, 50 wen, 100 wen, 500 wen, and even 1,000 wen denominations, as
619 lop 2a...5 #r 31Y ~ -t + H * , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 1318-20.
620 Quoted in the reply of the Board of Revenue, 02 , WA , %-A = t -H
/\A t A H, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 1342-5.
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shown in a memorial from the governor of Guangxi Liang Zhangju in 1838.621 In
response, officials in the Board of Revenue argued that such a big discrepancy between
the nominal value and actual value of copper content in minted cash would provide great
incentive for counterfeiting activities which the government could hardly curb.622 For the
same reason, the Board of Revenue rejected similar proposals from other officials in the
1840s.623 As the Board of Revenue admitted, the government simply did not possess a
technology to mint copper cash which private actors were unable to imitate. 624
As a result, policy discussions failed to yield any concrete measure to resolve the scarcity
of silver. In 1846, the center once again asked provincial governors for their views on
how to increase the use of copper cash in public finance so as to reduce dependence upon
silver, to no avail.62 s Inaction in monetary policy continued until the breakout of the
Taiping Rebellion in 1850. In November 1851, the silver stock in the center was only
621 Liang explicitly proposed using government copper cash with large nominal values to take the place of
the foreign silver currency circulating in China. He noted that such minted token copper cash would be as
easy to carry as silver currency [WhiI , A I - , 1pli:1 J A _1 V , Tit1R A V J , IFTa
-Io 96 4 t 1 , AAR -4 97 o 4. 4 ,I Tl @I2 . Zhongguo jindai
huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 143.
622 The reply of the Board of Revenue to Liang Zhangju's memorial is found in Zhongguojindai huobishi
ziliao (shangce), p. 144.
623 This proposal was presented by the censor Lei Yixian in 1842, censor Zhang Xiuyu in 1843 and the
Anhui MElWang Zhi in 1846 in ibid., pp. 145-9, pp. 150-3, and p. 155. In rejecting these proposals, the
Board of Revenue made it more explicit that the bigger the nominal value, the more profitable to
counterfeit. Ibid., p. 150 and p. 156.
624 fL) 1gf f*n QJfnT 55
VJJ t 9. Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 150.
625 Most replies considered it impractical due to the high cost of transporting bulky and low-valued copper
cash. See such examples in Palace Memorials, Box 64, No. 172-5, No. 176-9; Grand Council Memorial
Copies, Box 678, No. 1447-50, No. 1512-6, and No. 1522-5.
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1.87 million tael.626 However, in addition to mounting military expenditures, the Qing
government had to spend millions of silver for river works and disaster relief when the
bank of the Yellow River collapsed in Jiangsu province's Feng County. Extraordinary
expenditures quickly rose to more than 20 million tael of silver by 1852. In this situation,
the Qing government on the one hand appealed to someemergent measures such as the
disbursement of silver stocks in the Board of Revenue and even in the Imperial
Household and the sale of nominal official ranks (juanna). On the other hand, it was
forced to try new methods to raise income.
Some of these measures were an extension of previous policies, such as encouraging
private investment in copper and silver mining. For example, the Qing government tried
to encourage merchants to silver or gold in border areas such as Rehe, Chengde,
Mongolia, and Xinjiang. 627 This policy was ineffective as these areas did not have rich
deposits of previous metals. Some proposals were too radical for the Board of Revenue
even in urgencies, such as the mintage of token silver currency to raise fiscal income. In
February 1854, the tutor of the Imperial Academy of learning and Imperial Clan Baoji (
R I1nIlk'II' 4Q) suggested imitating the model of minted copper cash by minting
silver coin (yinbao) so as to profit from the from the difference between nominal value
and the actual value of silver used in mintage.628 In 1855, the governor of Fujian L
626 Cited from the memorial of the Board of Revenue, lib6~± t- t B. Zhongguojindai
huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 171.
627 See the efforts in 1863 and 1864 to find silver mines in these areas in various memorials in Grand
Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 2087-9-, No. 2157-9, No. 2568-70, No. 2835-8, and No. 2842-5.
628 In his proposal, the government would use silver of 1.5 tael to mint silver coins with a nominal value of
5 tael, silver of 2 tael to mint 10 tael coins, etc. MI FPLk %&fTi, FVit E9 W IE -- +f1 , Grand
Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 2557-60.
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Quansun made a similar suggestion. He presented to the center two samples of silver
currency that he had asked craftsmen in Fujian to make. Nonetheless, the Board of
Revenue was afraid that the government could not force the circulation of a new silver
currency in the economy and thus rejected this proposal.629
The most important financial innovation being intensively discussed between 1850 and
1853 was the issue of paper notes.63 0 In contrast to previous policy discussions on paper
notes that focused on how to use issuing of paper notes denominated in copper cash so as
to make the copper standard practical, the government was now more concerned with
how to use paper notes to raise its income. For this purpose, the government was very
interested in issuing silver notes. Proposals considered by government officials all
referred to the use of private notes and bills of exchange in the private financial markets
to illustrate the feasibility of paper notes issued by the state. In their view, if paper notes
issued by a private money exchanger (qianpu) could be accepted in the market, it was
reasonable to anticipate that paper notes issued by the state could as well.631 In
particular, they pointed out two special advantages that the state enjoyed. First, a private
629 See this memorial and the reply of the Board of Revenue in Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce),
pp. 191-4.
630 Officials who proposed the issue of paper notes between 1850 and 1853 included the censor MR,
Fujian A-WIRS, Jiangsu AE63M, and the censor ThIt . The proposal from *tZ" was based
upon consultation with gentry-merchants in Suzhou.
631 In the words of Fujian .A "E -- 2 , $W$$fiLM* 2 IL ))
~F±& , M&M& , i M 20e , M , AA&1 TI)AO "Zhongguojindaihuobishiziiao
(shangce), p. 322.
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bank might close, yet the state would not; second, annual tax collection constituted a
significant channel for private actors to use state-issued paper notes. 632
Officials in the Board of Revenue and provincial governors were aware of both the fiscal
and economic significance of issuing paper notes. In the view of the governor of Jiangsu
Yang Wending, by issuing paper notes in silver, the state could not only double its
expenditures when using the same amount of silver as reserves but also use paper notes to
mitigate the dearth of silver and overcome the decades-long deflation. The ensuing
economic expansion would then further raise state tax income. 633 Officials in the Board
of Revenue were originally concerned about how to attain convertibility of paper notes.
Yet emergent situations forced them to decide to experiment anyway. In February 1853,
the Board of Revenue requested that the emperor direct the censor Wang Maoyin, who
was well-known for his proposal on paper notes in 1850 to the Board of Revenue, to
formulate relevant policies.634 Officials in the Board of Revenue understood that the use
of paper notes in government spending and tax collection was not adequate to ensure
their success; the key was their circulation in the economy. In other words, paper notes
632 According to officials in Jiangsu such as Yang Wending, "[2JM] bM222 ... R A0W7
iE1A , i fZri 2L3 " Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), pp. 333-4. These two advantages had
been emphasized in the debates about state-issued paper notes in the 1830s and 1840s. See details in Lin
Man-houng, "Two Social Theories Revealed: Statecraft Controversies over China's Monetary Crisis, 1808-
1854," Late Imperial China, Vol. 12, No. 2 (December 1991): 1-35.
63 Jiangsu E1 cr 2,"349# , MR -P), WM-W % iik i
o , , *I~Va, iS , &KRIM SAL "Cited from the reply to
Yang Wending's memorial by the Board of Revenue, A* -+ - +~ H F, Zhongguojindai huobishi
ziliao (shangce), p. 327.
634 Due to Wang's proposal to issue paper notes in 1851, the Board of Revenue considered him "well
understand the principles of paper notes [ J 09t , WWEhD1J ,
R , W4 LR... AZ... -APPE& 390 , MME iT , i ]" Memorial of the Board of
Revenue, J~2E*IE T + A , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 310, Vol. 4463, No. 24.
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should facilitate commercial transactions and provide convenience to the people [JDAM
ifAA W].635
In regard to the tempo of this financial experiment, the Board of Revenue first planned to
have Jiangsu provincial government introduce so as to accumulate experience.636
Nonetheless, the acting governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang (W A WON) Wang
Yide pointed out that this was impractical as the paper notes issued by one province
could not be bolstered by inter-provincial trade. Instead, he suggested that the
experiment should be conducted uniformly in all provinces under central coordination. 637
On 26 March, 1853, the Board of Revenue began to issue paper notes in silver
(guanpiao) and in copper cash (baochao) in Beijing. It also established the Bureau of
Silver Notes (guanpiaoju) and the Bureau of Copper Notes (baochaoju) to manage the
two kinds of notes respectively. In June 1853, the Board of Revenue released a limited
amount of copper cash with a nominal value of 10 wen (dangshi daqian) in Beijing and
found them accepted by the markets. 638 Encouraged by this result, it then requested all
provincial governments to adopt similar measures on 7 August, 1853. The aim of this
jj$ , T Go "t*i ±MJ3P n Qi Junzao et. al., "The reply of the
Board of Revenue to the censors He Chun and Wen Rui on the issue of paper notes," +E 3 Z±
-t H, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 1993-200 1.
636 unZao et. al., f - ± -q + F1, Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 327.
637 " VT4 ±u*~~~
o " W ENTON , M -=- k B . Zhongguojindai huobishiziliao (shangce), p. 338.
638 I T n, j j ZtiI h :, Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao
(shangce), p. 215.
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bundle of new policies was not only to meet government spending but also to supplement
silver and copper cash in the economy. As the imperial edict on paper notes stated, even
if government revenue became adequate in future, these paper notes should continue to
circulate. 639 However, the socio-economic circumstances in China at the time were very
unfavorable to efforts to build the institutions necessary to attain these goals.
III. Interactions between the state and market and the failure of institutional
development: 1853-1864
The Taiping Rebellion, which originated in Guangxi province in 1850, became a massive
civil war as the Taiping forces entered Hunan in 1852. The battles between the Qing
army and Taiping forces over the control of Hankou between 1852 and 1856 ruined this
important financial and commercial center which connected the upper and lower Yangzi
River areas. In March 1853, Taiping forces occupied Nanjing and made it their capital.
Battle fields extended to provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangsu. Meanwhile, the
Nian rebellion broke out in northern Jiangsu in 1851 and spread to Anhui and Shandong
in 1852. The Triad rebels from Guangdong and Fujian controlled the city of Shanghai
(except the foreign settlement) from 1853 to early 1855. The Arrow War between China
and the allied forces of Britain and France broke out in Guangdong in late 1856. The
Tianjin Treaty signed in 1858 formally legalized the opium trade. Yet disputes over its
implementation rekindled the war only a few months later, and the allied forces of Britain
and France seized Beijing in 1860. Wars that fought in economically core areas severely
weakened the Qing government's ability to fund its governance in frontier regions. As a
63"M-E ,A ,, I "The imperial decree on issuing paper
notes, iT-J Yi Zt± JE B, Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 352.
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result, Muslims in Yunnan and the Miao people in Guizhou rebelled in 1856, and
Muslims in Gansu and south Shaanxi too up arms in 1862.
The Qing government's efforts to repress these uprisings had a great impact on the
operation of public finance. The expenditures on military campaigns and river works
amounted to more than 30 million tael of silver in the period from 1850 to 1853.
Meanwhile, the flows of tax revenues and government assigned spending were
determined by emergencies in battlefields. A large proportion of collected taxes were
assigned directly to the stations of military supplies (liangtai), including many which
should have been transported to the center (jingxiang). Moreover, civil wars and
widespread disorder severely disrupted the transportation of the collected revenue to
Beijing. As a result, the annual revenue that the Board of Revenue received was far
below the normal level of 8 to 9 million tael silver a year.640 The annual average income
for the Board of Revenue plummeted from 12.4 million tael between 1821 and 1834 to
only 5 million between 1852 and 1861. A large proportion of this income was simply
accounts reported to the center rather than real. 64 1 As a result, the center had to depend
upon the silver stocks in the Board of Revenue to disburse civil and military expenditures
in Beijing and fund its governance in Manchuria. The amount of silver reserves available
to the central government plummeted from around 9 million tael silver in the 1840s to as
640 The tax revenue that reached Beijing was 1.8 million tael silver in 1856, 2.14 million tael in 1857, and
2.7 million tael in 1858. EL'l APl *RJV, Ji*I*t JS -tA , Grand Council Memorial
Copies, Box 679, No. 2002-4.
6" Peng Zeyi, Shijiu shiji houbanqi de Zhongguo caizheng yujingji [The Economy and Public Finance in
China in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century], p. 75.
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low as 190,000 tael silver per year in the period between 1853 and 1864 and remained
below 220,000 tael silver in this period.642
At the same time, economic conditions in Beijing turned quite bleak when the Taiping
forces occupied Yangzhou in 1853 and cut off the transportation of tribute grain
(caoliang) from Jiangxi, Anhui, Hunan, and Hubei to Beijing via the Great Canal. The
population of some 800,000 in Beijing had to rely upon a reduced grain supply from
Jiangsu and Zhejiang which were transported by sea via Tianjin. 643 In the spring of 1853,
the news that the Taiping Northern Expedition Forces were approaching Tianjin caused a
great panic in Beijing. Within a month, more than one hundred money exchangers
closed; others, along with pawnshops, stopped their lending. Many prominent bankers
from Shanxi fled from Beijing and Tianjin. 644 The special socio-economic circumstances
significantly affected the Qing government's efforts to find financial solutions to its
unprecedented fiscal crisis.
As mentioned above, in 1850 the Board of Revenue assigned silver notes worth 500,000
tael of silver for the river works in Feng County in Jiangsu. These notes were issued by
the Official Money Exchanges established and managed by the Imperial Household in
Beijing. The bureau of river works sold these notes to businessmen, who then took them
642 Ibid., p. 77.
643 Ni Yuping, Qingdai caoliang haiyun yu shehui bianqian [The Seaborne Transportation of Caoliang and
Social Changes in Qing Dynasty] (Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian Chubanshe, 2005), pp. 101-2.
644 Huang Jianhui, Shanxipiaohaoshi [A History of Shanxi Bankers], revised version (Taiyuan: Shanxi
jingji chupanshe, 2002), p. 174. In contemporary accounts, "most of the big Shanxi and Shandong
merchants in Beijing had taken their capital back home, and more than one hundred money exchangers in
Beijing were forced to close [* +l)irIIit $1*AVJil ,M i
* (iF F 1 ]. % 4 ,i ~ B ) J)~~ B. Qingdai dangan shiliao congbian,
Volume 11 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984), p. 51.
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to the Board of Revenue to buy official titles. These notes did not bear interest but served
the function of bills of exchange which rid both the government and businessmen of the
burden to transport silver over long distances. 4 5 This method postponed the
government's payment of silver and thus mitigated its fiscal burden in the short run. In
1853, several officials suggested to issue this kind of silver notes to exchange silver with
merchants in Shanxi province.646 The censor Zhang Lihan pointed out particularly that
the Shanxi merchants mostly invested their wealth in businesses scattered across various
provinces. Yet wars had significantly decreased the chances of profitable investment,
which led to a widespread hoarding of silver among Shanxi merchants. He thus proposed
that the government issued officials silver notes to "borrow" silver from merchants in
Shanxi province.647 Nonetheless, the Shanxi governor Heng Chun considered this kind
of "borrowing" impractical as these merchants had already made extraordinary
contributions to the government, yet their business had been severely damaged by the
ongoing wars. 648
645 In 1853 the Board of Revenue requested holders of these bills could only use 60 percent in the total
amount of purchasing the title. W5$Wf6T , $E ±$t %1P $35 . Zhongguojindai huobishi
ziliao (shangce), p. 379.646 Huang Jianhui, Shanxipiaohaoshi [A History of Shanxi Bankers], revised version, p. 191.
nw~g, ±gg15
R , Ediitf, lltN/UL , $ W* f T ." Although Zhang proposed to
issue silver notes (guanpiao) to "borrow" from Shanxi merchants, the nature of the notes in his mind was
closer to paper notes rather than credit of borrowing as these notes could be used to pay taxes or in
commercial transactions [A , , 5@-14#-N4&]." The memorial of the
censor Zhang Lihan, 19E ± - $1Je B, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 2355-7.
"NA E~dii ER~ %%255 , li M E ,itiM**Er, "Shanxi A(KHeng
Chun, A*R*N$ - =+ftA R, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 3220-2. A few months
later, Heng Chun reported to the Board of Revenue that he ordered to print bills of silver (qipiao) which he
planned to exchange silver with merchants next year. Shanxi 3 5 Heng Chun, A*# t + = tA Q.
Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 24-5.
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As civil wars caused a great drop in both tax revenue and the amount of commodities
flowing into Beijing, officials of the Board of Revenue considered it unwise to issue
debentures (qipiao) to pay the salaries of officials and princes in Beijing as they could not
anticipate the regular inflow of tax revenue. 649 Meanwhile, they did not think to pay high
interest rates so as to make government bills of credit, which did not bear interest rate,
more attractive to merchants. Even when the fiscal crisis in 1860 forced the Board of
Revenue to reconsider "borrowing" silver from domestic sources, it still turned to this
kind of no-interest silver bills.650 In the 1850s, the major financial experiment was
"implicit borrowing," i.e., to issue paper notes denominated in both silver and copper
cash which could not only cover government deficits but also circulate in the economy.
The Qing government first decided to issue silver notes (guanpiao) of 120,000 tael in
Beijing in 5 April, 1853 as a trial. If these silver notes could circulate in Beijing, the
center would extend this measure to provinces. 651 One month later, it decided to issue
silver notes worth 2 million tael of silver and distributed them to provincial governments
649 As they admitted, "how could we repay [the bills] at their due dates if the anticipated tax revenues did
not come in future [M ' , AL T N , JkANHW , #A#J , M R X M
2L ? ]." A secret memorial from fWit PE%* Qi Junzao, -E q _t t - H. Zhongguojindai
huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 361. At the provincial level, ML 5* in 1853 also suggested that provincial
governments should issue bills of 500 tael silver to exchange for silver from merchants, yet to no avail. #L
1A4* , R -= -,q t Z 1. Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 2370-2.
650 The Board of Revenue intended to issue silver notes to "borrow" silver in provinces such as Zhili,
Shanxi, Shanxi, Shandong, and so on. Holders of these silver notes, which bore no interest, could redeem
them in silver after five years. The Qing government seemed to consider that it was repressing domestic
rebellions for the benefit of the wealthy, and therefore it should not pay them extra. As shown in the words
of this memorrial, "Tt M 0lt i 3, -9 , ft 5K A , % -hP ) 4, it
$$$- I , 3u-F T *)A , IA3,." 4$A dJP I YT-, rV t + - \ , Grand Council
Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 2920-3.
651 "±1%T-ii ,{-,~-A41i." The Edict to issue official silver notes, A$
~-= + -t B, Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 352.
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according to their varied needs. The denominations of these silver notes were 1 tael, 3
tael, 5 tael, 10 tael, and 50 tael, which were clearly made for the convenience of normal
transactions in the markets. 652 On 17 December, 1853, the Board of Revenue ordered the
issue of copper notes (baochao), in units of 500 wen, 1,000 wen, 1,500 wen, and 2,000
wen respectively. The official exchange rate between the two notes was set at 1:2,000 (1
tael silver note equals to 2,000 wen copper note).653 As conceived by the Board of
Revenue, the silver notes should substitute for silver in long-distance trade and the copper
notes serve for local transactions. 654 But how could the government establish trust on the
face value of these notes in the markets?
The non-interventionist attitude to the market that the Qing government had developed
over the course of the eighteenth century significantly influenced its experiment with
paper notes. Although counterfeiting of government paper notes was declared a capital
crime, the government did not intend to forbid the use of private notes in the economy.655
Meanwhile, the relationship between the center and powerful privileged merchants had
changed fundamentally over the past decades. The merchants who were granted the
monopoly in the copper trade with Japan had gone bankrupt in the second half of the
652 The memorial of the Board of Revenue on the issue of silver notes, A0E -t ViE H, Zhongguo
jindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), pp. 352-9.
653 The memorial of the Board of Revenue on the issue of copper notes, A* iE + - f ± F,
Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), pp. 372-77.
654 " , 1 R i M." f a@@@ @,Zhongguojindai huobishiziliao
(shangce), pp. 359.
655 u 
-
W L rAflrFr79."The imperial decree of issuing paper
notes, )aiE .* +t = , Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 352.
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eighteenth century. 656 The big salt merchants, who held a similar monopoly, were most
powerful in the eighteenth century; yet they had suffered greatly from the rising value of
silver vis-i-vis copper cash since the 1820s. From 1831 onward, the Qing government
abolished the monopoly in selling salt and attempted to sell licenses to any interested
businessmen. 657 In 1853, the Board of Revenue did not consider granting special
privileges to merchants to let them use government paper notes as capital to make profit
in the sectors under their monopoly, as the domain governments in eighteenth-century
Japan did.
The Qing government mainly relied upon government spending and tax collection to
gradually introduce its paper notes into the economy. In 1853, it planned to take three
years to raise the percentage of paper notes in both government spending and tax
collection to 50 percent.658 To attain this goal, the Board of Revenue first used the issued
paper notes to disburse up to 20 percent of officials' salaries, soldiers' wages, and the
funds for river works. Meanwhile, it requested the provincial governments to set up
General Official Money Bureaus (guanqian zongju) in provincial capitals and open
branches in important market towns and cities or the places where major troops were
stationed to sell paper notes and ensure their convertibility. The Board of Revenue also
asked provincial governments to mobilize well-established merchants to manage these
656 As the cost of buying copper steadily rose while the official prices to buy copper remained unchanged,
the big privileged copper merchants could not return the money they borrowed from the government. See
Wei Qingyuan and Wu Qiyan, "Qingdai zhuming huangshang fanshi de xingshuai [The rise and fall of the
famous imperial merchants in the Qing dynasty, the Fan family]," Lishi yanjiu, No. 3 (1981), pp. 140-3.
657 Ho Ping-ti, "The Salt Merchants of Yang-Chou: A Study of Commercial Capitalism in Eighteenth-
Century China," Harvard Journal ofAsiatic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1/2 (June 1954): 130-68.
658 $ Qing Junzao et. al., i- b) H- B, Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce),
p. 373.
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Official Money Bureaus. 659 The crucial element in this monetary experiment was the
transformation of the Official Money Bureaus into financial institutions similar to a
fractional private note-issuing bank which could rely upon certain cash reserves to float a
larger amount of notes. As the Board of Revenue emphasized, the use of official funds as
cash reserves was vital to the success of these Official Money Bureaus.660 However, the
economic circumstances and conditions of government finance at the time made it
difficult for the Qing government to develop these new institutional arrangements to
guarantee the convertibility of issued silver notes and thus facilitate their wider
circulation.
In Beijing, the silver available for the Board of Revenue to spend was extremely
inadequate when the experiment with paper notes started in 1853. According to a
memorial of the Board of Revenue dated 26 September, 1853, it had some 100,000 tael
of silver, which could not even disburse the monthly wages of the banner soldiers
stationed in Beijing. Moreover, it admitted that the anticipated revenues from provincial
governments could only cover 20 percent of the 4.6 million tael of silver in expenditure
by March 1854.661 The emergent fund of 500,000 tael from the silver stocks of the
Imperial Household was only a temporary relief measure for the Board of Revenue. An
extra-income of 670,000 tael silver that the Board of Revenue raised through selling
659(. "[sic] AJUVRUI~M , Tf 4RMI6JAE , A-f +AL2A- ;t , XR5n
hA The memorial of the Board of Revenue on the issue of paper notes, $$
-b + =i F1, Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 354.
660 Wfgrga ) -opd U ,W,*-VM." Ibid., p. 354.
661Ja--- 
-|-|1 , Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce),
pp. 260-1.
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official ranks in Beijing in 1853 was not a regular income or dependable source of
income, particularly once those who could afford to buy official titles had already done
so.662
Meanwhile, as both tribute grains to and domestic trade with Beijing were disrupted, the
demand for silver dropped considerably and copper cash became valuable for the small-
scale transactions of daily life.663 As a result, the value of silver in regard to copper cash
in Beijing plummeted in early 1853.664 Moreover, as private money exchangers closed
and Shanxi bankers left Beijing, there was little commercial lending available to retailers.
This caused serious unemployment among wage laborers in Beijing. In response,
officials urged the government to issue official cash notes and to lend them to retailers
and shopkeepers as substitutes for private notes. 665 In May 1853, the Board of Revenue
established four Official Money Bureaus in Beijing, which used the copper cash released
from the two central mints (baoquanju and baogongju) as cash reserves to issue copper
notes.666 They followed the examples of five note-issuing Official Money Exchangers
662 The amount of money from selling titles that the Board of Revenue received in 1853 is cited from Peng
Zeyi, Shijiu shiji houbanqi de Zhongguo caizhengyujingji [The Economy and Public Finance in China in
the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century], p. 146.
663 , i. " -fV f, )#Et, -))t H B,Zhongguo
jindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 372.
664 According to the observation of the censor Chen Qingyong, the relative value of copper cash in regard
to silver in early 1853 almost doubled, and sometimes people could not even exchange their silver for
copper cash. The memorial of Chen Qingyong, +$E/I2/ tA 1, Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao
(shangce), p. 342.
665 The censor Jia Shixing proposed that the government lend official notes to money exchangers (zhangju)
and pawnshops to resume their normal operation. In his view, "the dearth of private notes provides an
opportunity for the circulation of official notes [V TL %12 , IE R i 24L]." The memorial
of censor Jia Shixing, TAE- T W E +)]- JH, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 2095-6.
666 They were named Qianyu, Qianheng, Qingfeng, and Qianyi.
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which the Imperial Household set up in 1841.667 The copper notes issued by these
Official Money Bureaus could be converted to copper cash but not to silver. In 1854, the
Board of Revenue began to rely upon these copper notes to pay the wages of banner
soldiers in Beijing.
Under the pressure of silver dearth in Beijing, the Board of Revenue imposed some
special regulations on the use and convertibility of silver notes in the beginning of its
experiment with paper notes. It did not allow provincial governments to use silver notes
when they sent tax revenues or other assigned funds to Beijing, yet it did allow them to
use copper cash with large nominal values (daqian, mainly the copper cash of 10 wen in
this case) for the same purpose.668 Moreover, it only allowed silver notes to be
convertible to copper notes or copper cash in the Official Money Bureaus according to
market prices, but not to silver. 669 These regulations were obviously unfavorable to
establishing trust in silver notes in the markets. Yet they did not result from an anti-
market disposition on the part of government officials, nor did they determine the failure
of the silver notes. 670 As the initial restrictions on the use and convertibility of silver
667 They were named Tianyuan, Tianheng, Tianli, Tianzhen, and Xitianyuan. The Imperial Household
allocated them 500,000 tael silver as capital. A BfA fJing Zheng, 3* + - t 2q JJA F,
Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 467.
668 i(93- 
,10 , ~jW*AK The
memorial of the Board of Revenue on the issue of paper notes, lii#f 4-I - $JE # , Zhongguojindai
huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 354.
669 "The silver notes should disbursed from provincial treasuries and copper notes managed by Official
Money Bureaus. Silver notes could exchange with copper notes and copper cash according to market
prices, but with silver [wqf , 'F.tO ##pm T A ,W
)&AM]." Ibid., p. 354.
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notes immediately aroused criticism among government officials in both the center and
provinces, they were subjected to modifications or even major revisions.
The censor Zhang Siheng, the Vice-Minister of the Left of the Board of Revenue (YP pit
140) Wang Maoyin, and the Director-General of the Grand Canal (3iiAM1M)
Yang Yizeng pointed out that these restrictions would destroy the creditworthiness of
silver notes in the markets. 671 The censor Zhang Siheng argued that both the central and
provincial governments should uniformly use silver notes. In this way, official silver
notes could play the role of private bills of exchange which had been stopped due to the
war. Zhang based his proposal upon the operation of private bills of exchange:
merchants came to Beijing to sell goods and took home silver notes, which could be
converted to silver in the prefectural or provincial governments. The government would
thus be freed from the burden of transporting the collected tax revenue to Beijing in silver
and the merchants the burden of taking silver out of Beijing. 672
Yang Yizeng suggested the Board of Revenue should let provincial governments use
silver notes to send tax revenue or other assigned funds to Beijing. In his view, the total
amount of issued silver notes came to less than 10 percent of the annual tax revenue that
671 InZhang Siheng's words, "E f T YE *MZ2 ,
Nn, , RpM~fpT " Yang Yizeng consulted with his subordinates and local gentry and reported to the center
that they all believed that these regulations "would lead to suspicion of silver notes [E nV , -q q
T R , Iti ,]." Wang Maoyin referred to these two officials
to make a case for the convertibility of silver notes. See Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 362,
p. 378, and p. 392 respectively.
672 The memorial of the censor Zhang Siheng, + ~_#Uk - 9 t Z , Zhongguo jindai huobishi ziliao
(shangce), pp. 364-5.
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the Board of Revenue received each year. Moreover, if provincial merchants had
confidence in silver notes, they would continue to use these notes for the sake of
convenience rather than go to Beijing to convert them into silver. The burden on the
center to maintain full convertibility of silver notes would therefore be further reduced.673
In regard to convertibility of silver notes, Wang Maoyin strongly advocated that the
government allow merchants to convert the official silver notes they held to silver at
prefectural governments. 674
However, the alternatives that these officials proposed to enhance the creditworthiness of
silver notes were mostly based upon normal conditions of public finance and domestic
markets. Yet officials of the Board of Revenue had to face the reality that the ongoing
wars had not only severely disrupted Beijing's trade with other regions, particularly
central and northeastern China, but obstructed the transportation of the collected revenue
to the center as well. In response to Wang's proposal to make silver notes redeemable in
silver, the Board of Revenue pointed out that instead of promoting their circulation, this
would lead merchants to exchange their silver notes for government silver which was
already inadequate to meet the government's own needs. As a result, the government
would be left with its paper notes while its silver went to merchants. 675 This reply
673 The memorial of )I 5 JA N *Yang Yizeng, f t *+-)I Y)t B, Zhongguojindai huobishi
ziliao (shangce), p. 378,
674 K=
JyvF. "oF Wn{-il Wang Maoyin, ) R )3 1q)J B . Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p.
392.
fT, FA- f- M 77 A .Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 395.
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illustrated the deep dilemma that the Qing government faced in the initial stages of
issuing silver notes. The purpose of these notes was to cover government deficits. The
trust of economic actors was vital to the scheme of using limited silver stocks to mobilize
larger financial resources in the form of paper notes. But how could businessmen have
confidence in the value of silver notes when they knew quite well that the government
was financially depleted?676 To keep full convertibility of silver notes in such a situation
could very likely result in a rapid exhaustion of government's silver stocks. Yet few
people would trust these notes without a guarantee of full convertibility.
Of course, one way out of this dilemma was to use paper notes only. As the governor-
general of Fujian and Zhejiang Wang Yide proposed, in order to fully benefit from
issuing paper notes, all public spending and tax collection at both the central and local
level should be carried out in official notes only. In Wang's view, this would show the
whole realm that official notes were the only currency and thus create demand for the
677
notes. To convince the center of the feasibility of relying on paper notes only, Wang
Yide reported that the Fujian provincial government had depended completely on the
silver and copper notes issued by the Yongfeng Official Money Bureaus and urged the
center to do the same.678 Wang's proposal was similar to what Okuma Shigenobu did in
676 As the censor Wu Aisheng pointed out, businessmen in Beijing had ready access to the Gazette (39),
which freely copied the memorials on the financial situation of the government. The memorial of the
censor Wu Aisheng, J$ R * R 1 = + F, Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 402.
677 "([sic] T, JA~4a Id ,VJAJ JR~ T*~W 9= i
WAAL ;%1Fk T , AA T -- "The memorial of XiA Wang Yide, JA$
T- = =t-b H. Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 399.
TT%~FN4V f ." R .A _1WfEI N, A* R T =tA H; In regard to
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Japan in 1870. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of Okuma's measure depended crucially
upon his strict prohibition of gold and silver in domestic transactions, which made
government paper notes the only legal currency in the economy. In other words, he used
the coercive power of the state to establish a status of monopoly for government paper
notes when the state did not have sufficient cash reserves to guarantee their convertibility.
However, the Qing government at the time was militarily at a disadvantage. Its prospects
of defeating the Taiping remained highly uncertain as late as in 1860. Given these
circumstances, it is not surprising that the Qing government did not dare to impose its
newly-issued paper notes as the only legal currency.
Nonetheless, there were clear signs to indicate these critiques caused some policy
changes. In regard to the use of silver notes in public finance, the Board of Revenue
actually allowed provincial governments to use them when they transferred money to
Beijing.679 Meanwhile, not all provincial governments obeyed the regulations in regard
to the convertibility of silver notes. For example, the governor-general of Fujian and
government spending in Fujian, Wang pointed out that "
2IT , X W" Tr W 19 -E RN, 9 R t A H . Both in Grand Council
Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 3059-61 and No. 3063.
679 In a memorial from Jiangsu co-authored by M ENYi Liang and ) 1Aiif *Yang Yizeng, they
reported that they would use silver notes issued by the Board of Revenue to replace those issued by the
Jiangsu provincial government in the fund sent to Beijing or other provinces [
A + -i, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 2876-7. In a memorial of Zhejiang A(VE He
Guiqing, there is clear evidence to show that the center accepted silver notes from provinces in sending the
collected tax revenue to Beijing. [R iAM V~25 A , OZ # it N!! : J9, R]AMMi*~J~ %, )4 -
XV , di1 -, 0 A H , WE Pf ]." Cited from the memorial of )*r% (EHe Guiqing, TA *
- ~ +)A F1, Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), pp. 445-6.
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Zhejiang and the governor of Fujian (fMTUM |M i A ) Wang Yide reported that
the Yongfeng Official Money Bureau in Fujian had permitted its silver notes to be
redeemable in silver or foreign silver currency and wanted to continue this practice so as
to safeguard confidence in silver notes.680 Likewise, the provincial government of
Jiangsu permitted government paper notes redeemable in silver at the Official Money
Bureau set up in Suzhou. 681 Meanwhile, the co-existence between the center's sovereign
authority and the practical autonomy of provincial governments in the mintage of copper
cash that we observed in the eighteenth century was now extended to the issue of paper
notes. For example, the center granted a significant degree of autonomy to provincial
governments, which permitted them to print paper notes to meet urgent needs instead of
waiting for the notes issued from Beijing. 682
680 _ N I
SAE I.~E Ofti ,-:f- V9 T- JJ+ H , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 2687-91.
681 "±'a~ 3 j 3
1w." Fill , Eii 3~ifr, )A 8 2i- ft A +J / 9, Grand Council Memorial Copies,
Box 678, No. 3152-4.
682 For example, the Jiangsu provincial government found that the silver notes received from the Board of
Revenue often came in denominations too big (above 5 tael) for ordinary market transactions. It asked the
Zhonghe Official Money Bureau, which was set in the important market town Qingjiangpu, to print silver
notes with smaller units ranging from 1 tael to 5 tael according to the form of silver notes issued by the
Board of Revenue. In the memorial informing Beijing, the governor-general of Liangjiang and the
governor of Jiangsu justified it as "adjustments in accordance to local circumstances" since it would take
months to consult with the center and receive the needed notes from the center. This was approved. [9_
, Y , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 2876-7, fft
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The highly decentralized fiscal operations necessitated by war also gave provincial
governments a large degree of autonomy in financial issues. They thus had enough space
to experiment with new institutional arrangement for the Official Money Bureaus which
were established to use government funds to back up the issued silver notes. Like the
officials in the Board of Revenue, provincial governors were aware of the importance of
commercial transactions to the circulation of paper notes in general. In the view of the
Hunan governor Luo Bingzhang, to allow the people to use paper notes to pay taxes per
se was not adequate to ensure their circulation in the economy. As he pointed out, "only
if merchants accept paper notes in their business can ordinary people have access to paper
notes; only if the people are holding paper notes can the state receive notes in collecting
,,683taxes. Provincial governments also tried to recruit private merchants and financiers to
establish and manage the Official Money Bureaus in both provincial capitals and major
market towns and cities.
In theory, both provincial governments and private financiers could benefit from the
success of this institutional experiment. Private financiers who were recruited to manage
the Official Money Bureau could use regular government fund to enhance their
creditworthiness in the markets. The government could meet its speeding needs if the
Official Money Bureau under the management private merchants could safeguard the
creditworthiness of silver notes and thus facilitate their circulation in the economy.
R _IqRA -RQM,, T3-* MRT-
MJ F, Grand&ounci ; Cpies3, Box 679 N.-1,J1. it 4o*=-
-|-A El, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 604-7.
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Meanwhile, as different provincial governments enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in
conducting this institutional experiment according to their respective economic
circumstances, the likelihood of finding a workable institutional solution is also
increased. If one provincial government had a successful experience, they would report it
to the center; we see this both in the eighteenth century and in the collection of the lijin
duties (the indirect taxes levied upon wholesalers) in 1853.684
In practice, however, the interactions between the decentralized fiscal operation and the
fragmented domestic market under conditions of civil wars in the 1850s were hostile to
the unfolding of a mutually reinforcing process between the state and the market.
Nation-wide interregional trade and financial networks established by the Shanxi bankers
by the 1840s were severely disrupted. These financial networks had connected the major
cities and market towns; they were closely tied to long-distance trade and remitted a large
volume of capital through bills of exchange. In this process, the Shanxi bankers
converted various standards of silver tael used in different regions in China into one
common unit (benping) and thus reduced the transaction costs of long-distance trade.
These private financial services were indispensable to the formation of a unified national
market in China when the state did not provide a uniform silver currency.685 Although
the transportation of tax revenue and allocation of government spending remained
independent of these financial networks, there were cases to show the beginning of
684 The local government in Jiangsu first reported it as an effective way to raise revenue to the center and
the center immediately approved it and requested other provincial governments to adopt the same measure.
See the details in Susan Mann, Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750-1950 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 95-6.
685 There were more than one thousand standards of tael of silver in nineteenth-century China. For the
discussion of Shanxi bankers' conversion of different silver standards and its importance to long-distance
trade in China, see Huang Jianhui, Shanxipiaohaoshi [A History of Shanxi Bankers], revised version, pp.
114-21.
311
connections between the state fund and private remittance networks. 686 However, many
Shanxi bankers in 1853 were forced to close their business in major cities and market
towns such as Beijing, Tianjin, Hankou, Nanjing, Qingjiangpu, and Yangzhou. 687 The
transmission of silver through private bills of exchange became unavailable. 688 Civil war
also destroyed the transportation along the Great Canal and its branch rivers and ruined
domestic trade between northern and southern China. 689 Domestic markets thus became
much more fragmented. 690 The reduced volume of interregional trade in the 1850s thus
led to less demand for the silver notes newly issued by the government.
686 For example, Rishenchang, a well-established Shanxi bank, remitted from Suzhou to Tianjin certain part
of the official fund to transport tribute grains from Jiangsu to Beijing (haiyunjingfei) in 1851 and 1852,
though the amount of each remittance was probably below 100,000 tael silver. Cited from ibid., pp. 169-
70.
687 ibid., pp. 173-4.
688 Two officials pointed out that private remittance through bills of exchange had stopped in both Beijing
and the provinces. The memorial of the censor Zhang Siheng, "Z 2 M , 14E."
fgE /\A = + , Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 364; the memorial of Wang
Maoyin, "M A A -k I E A #JJE Q, Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p.
392.
689 Along the Great Canal in peaceful years, manufactured goods such as cotton cloth, tea, paper, etc. from
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Hubei were sent to the north and grains and soy bean from
Shandong, Henan, and Zhili to the south. For the importance of the Great Canal to the trade between
southern and northern China, see Li Wenzhi and Jiang Taixin, Qingdai caoyun [The Transportation of
Tribute Grains in the Qing Dynasty] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1993), pp. 482-513.
6 90 In Suzhou in 1854, "85**_4,i 2i , 931*49 ! , E , F *DI%2%"15[,A*
MAR , j*99iJid ,ii, )- J -$ i, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No.
3152-4. In Henan in 1854, "31 ix , 7 ", lii At-." ill* R$
t R F ,Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 2857-9; "Mg*M W , K3i0E9 , fi*i%
TILJ4 fi M ." Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 3341-44; "M Anl
* M L*, E J I'M k." %RM*9 3K27TY , fi2*5 iFE ±+ = , Grand Council Memorial
Copies, Box 679, No. 94-8. In Hunan in 1856, " , 1- F A , VIEA k , R T)A, " A
lMA&A 31, fi$ 2a = Y/\ + , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 604-7. In
Fujian in 1855, "*ffRTk , A 46 , _AR4 4iffmai." R WER &
IT', A*-/kIfAVE $ , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 773-6.
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Meanwhile, civil war not only reduced the receipts of tax revenue but also worsened the
already decentralized fiscal system. Given the state of communication facilities, the
center could not have full access to true information about tax collection and spending at
local levels. Nor did it have the transportation capacity to mobilize silver or resources to
its troops according to their different needs in the battlefield. As a result, the center had
little ability to coordinate the revenue transfer among provincial governments,
particularly from wealthy provinces to economically backward areas. In the absence of
such central coordination, which was vital to public finance in times of peace, the
transaction cost for provincial governments to cooperate in fiscal and financial matters
was formidably high. Although the use of silver notes, which were much easier to
transport than silver itself, had the potential to enhance the center's ability in fiscal
coordination, we should not expect these newly introduced instruments be able to play
the role of well-accepted silver notes for public finance. Instead, the decentralized public
finance and fragmented markets of the 1850s were hostile to the institutional experiment
with silver notes.
The dearth of silver was particularly severe in provinces such as Yunnan, Guizhou, and
Gansu, where interregional trade was not well developed and provincial governments
depended heavily upon revenues transferred from other provinces (xiexiang) even in
normal times. Meanwhile, the disruption of transportation by the war significantly
affected the interregional trade in provinces such as Sichuan and Shandong. In these
regions, it was difficult to get ordinary people to use official silver notes whose value was
too big for daily transactions. In the case of Sichuan, the silver notes used in government
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spending quickly went to the Official Money Bureau to be exchanged for copper cash.69'
In consequence, the Official Money Bureaus in these silver poor regions could only issue
copper notes.692 The economically and fiscally isolated Beijing also had to confront the
scarcity of silver. As the private financiers who collaborated with the Board of Revenue
in managing the Official Money Bureaus in Beijing only issued copper notes, they could
not establish financial connections with merchants in other regions of China through the
use of silver notes.
In the coastal and southern provinces which still had access to silver through foreign
trade, the dearth of silver was not as severe as in Northern China. Their Official Money
Bureaus tried to float silver notes, such as Damei in Zhejiang, Zhonghe in Jiangsu,
Baofeng in Jiangxi, and Yongfeng in Fujian. The center permitted provincial
governments in Jiangsu, Fujian, and Zhejiang to issue their own silver notes. Provincial
governments in Zhejiang and Fujian issued silver notes denominated not only in local
standard of silver tael but also in foreign silver currency (yuan).693 Nonetheless, these
Official Money Bureaus were subjected to two constraints in circulating silver notes.
691 a,
Et@ JII) I 4J|V|-Ai, +T1 Z -| R, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No.
164-6. The total amount of silver notes in this case was only 330,000 tael.692 The Official Money Bureaus in Gansu and Yunnan province issued copper notes.
693 As the Zhejiang governor 1 EU pointed out, people in Zhejiang mostly used foreign silver currencies
in commercial transactions and they were not familiar with the unit of kuping tael (9 -7i) in the silver
notes issued by the Board of Revenue. He thus reported to the center that the Official Money Bureau in
Zhejiang would follow the example of Fujian to issue its own silver notes with denominations of both yuan
and local tael.[i , fW ,AfJ5Efftm rii. ,
'R#, )V.#~| - =7JfV R , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 3499-501. The Yongfeng
Official Money Bureau in Fujian issued provincial silver notes denominated in both tael and foreign yuan,
Fujian [2ri~bd @ ]
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Most of the collected tax revenues were assigned directly for urgent military spending.
In this situation, provincial governments did not have many surplus funds to support
these new financial institutions; and their initial capital was often below 100,000 tael of
silver.694 Meanwhile, they had to face the same dilemma in the early stage of issuing
paper notes, i.e., no credibility without full convertibility, yet full convertibility limited
the issue of paper notes. Without an inter-regional financial network, it was difficult for
the silver notes issued by one provincial government to circulate in other provinces. 695
The inflow of silver notes into one province simply increased the burden of its provincial
government to redeem them. For example, the governor of Guizhou, Jiang Weiyuan
explicitly rejected responsibility for redeeming the silver notes disbursed by the Station in
Jiangnan or by other provinces, citing the lack of silver reserves in Guizhou. 696
The Board of Revenue hoped that these Official Money Bureaus could raise their capital
from selling paper notes in the markets, which the people could use to pay up to 50
694 The view of : A X .E RH was representative, "the available silver stocks were inadequate to
meet military spending and therefore there was little surplus fund [for the Yongfeng Official Money
Bureau] [TAT# 4 , M Z iANT , 5 J,2511k ]." -W f4- Lt 3 ~-
+ B9 1, Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 431.
695 f@ U^ *1MAETHI reported to the center that the silver notes issued by the Yongfeng Official
Money Bureau could only circulate in Fujian. [RTRITIP ,,2
fI ,* ]. A MA' IN R 19A 3E H ein , 4 - --.. 9)+ H , Grand Council Memorial Copies,
Box 678, No. 2687-91. The Jiangsu provincial government also reported to the Board of Revenue that it
would only use its provincially issued silver notes within Jiangsu and use silver notes received from the
center to transfer fund to Beijing or other provinces [t4A]2% , Rj(2*@ , V4AMTt Mi4
S , ±L f 1, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 2876-7.
696
(% ,~(ft : f'Mu1i) UH L(M9MYist, -*E E ± t 1, Grand
Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 281-3.
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percent of their taxes to the government. When the people realized the creditworthiness
and convenience of using paper notes, they would begin to use them in commercial
transactions. In this way, the Official Money Bureaus could gradually increase their
capital and issue more paper notes, and thus became real fractional note-issuing financial
intermediaries. Nonetheless, as He Guiqing, the governor of Zhejiang, pointed out, it
697would take a long time to attain this goal. Moreover, in the initial stage of this
institutional building, this potentially virtuous cycle could turn vicious. If the
government could not use paper notes in its spending, it would have less incentive to
accept them for tax payments, and the people would have less confidence in holding or
acquiring government paper notes. The silver notes were trapped in this vicious cycle.
As mentioned above, river work and military expenditures dominated government
spending in the 1850s. In both cases, however, it was difficult to recruit big merchants or
financiers to promote the use of silver notes. As the transportation infrastructure in China
did not allow long-distance trade in bulky, low-value goods, officials of river works had
to use copper cash to purchase construction materials from nearby peasants or small
producers and to pay laborers. 698 They thus had to sell the silver notes to merchants or
exchange them for copper cash, both at great discount rates. These merchants did not
retain the silver notes but sold them to people or officials in neighboring provinces to pay
taxes. Similarly, a large proportion of military spending in the 1850s was on the food for
697 [ , , :] jr~i
fft"JRE , ±Y~~3 F1, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 310, Volume 4464, No.
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soldiers. Only big wholesalers who had close connections with the government had both
the necessary capital and trust in the government to take silver notes in providing grain to
troops. Even though the Qing government often mobilized big merchants to provide
logistical support for its military campaigns in Inner Asia, this was more difficult with
both domestic transportation and grain outputs disrupted by civil war. Instead, troops
scattered across the country thus had to be paid in copper cash which they could use to
buy food in local markets. 699 Henan and Shandong military supply stations had to use
silver to purchase goods from local merchants and could not force them to accept silver
notes. 700 As neither the troops nor local merchants accepted silver notes, the local
governments or bureaus of domestic customs which passed on received revenues to
troops thus did not want to accept silver notes in collecting taxes.70'
Both the Board of Revenue and provincial governments were concerned about the lack of
circulation of silver notes in the markets. Tax collection was the most important channel
for people to use paper notes which had not yet had not fully established their
699 For example, in response to VX)k R N l request to use silver to replace paper notes in funding the
troops in Jiangsu, governors in Jiangsu promised that the notes used to pay soldiers' wages were fully
convertible to copper cash at Official Money Bureaus. "% TLkU, it , M1R f F M"ii.o 9
id A , 2XNt^Mile , 31)l, "aAlJE \, Grand Council Memorial Copies,
Box 678, No. 3314-5.
700 A
:F I9 * P +t R 1 , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 2852-6; "T-1E IW
A ,t 4 H , Grand Council Memorial Copies , Box 310, Volume 4462, No, 56-7.
701 As % observed the use of silver notes, "NtM)LSXK 2 , W 
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creditworthiness. In response, the Jiangsu provincial government on 21 August, 1854
reported to the Board of Revenue that it planned to establish three Official Money
Bureaus in market towns such as Shanyang and Qingjiang and issue copper notes for the
daily transactions and tax payment of small peasants and retailers. 702 These Official
Money Bureaus were not only managed by local merchants, but also received tax
revenues on behalf of the government. 7 03 The Bureaus also requested that private money
exchangers in Jiangsu sell copper notes in the markets.
The Board of Revenue held similar views in regard to the cause of the lack of circulation
of silver notes. They emphasized that the value of silver notes was simply too big for
small peasants to use in paying land taxes. 704 Therefore, the Board of Revenue decided
on 28 March, 1855 to switch from silver notes to copper notes (gaipiao yongchao) in tax
payments of land taxes and to allow the people to pay up to 50 percent of their taxes in
copper notes.705 At the provincial level, the new commercial taxes, the liin duties, had
become increasingly important as an elastic source of government income. However, the
receipts of liin duties were directly assigned to meet urgent military needs and could not
be used to back up the paper notes issued by the Official Money Bureaus. Provincial
702 a 
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governments in economically developed regions did not have much experience in
collaborating with private financial intermediaries to aggregate the receipts of land taxes
paid in copper cash from various regions and then convert them into silver.706 No
provincial government opposed the switch from silver notes to copper ones in collecting
land taxes, even though provincial governments in Zhili and Jiangxi reported that they
would continue to accept silver notes in tax collection until they were exchanged for
copper notes.
Thereafter, government silver notes were only issued for specific purposes. Military
supply stations usually converted them into notes of small denominations (liangtaipiao)
that were accepted in local transactions. Silver notes continued to be sold to people who
wanted to buy official ranks or titles. In certain cases, there were also used to pay debts
owed to the suppliers of military logistical stations.707 There is no evidence of their
being used in market transactions.
This policy change greatly reduced the demand for silver notes in the market. Although
the Board of Revenue planned to implement this policy in Zhili, Shandong, and Henan,
and gradually extend it to other provinces, it immediately affected the use of silver notes
for river works in Jiangsu and Shandong. Officials of river works immediately asked the
706 Silver-melting house (yinhao) which converted the collected land taxes paid in copper cash into silver at
prefectural governments were not involved in interregional business networks as private bankers.
707 "tM3 W 5 7 " in Anhui and Henan, )P:' nn, $F 2±t 2 + , Grand Council Memorial Copies,
Box 679, No. 1773-82. Silver notes issued by the Board of Revenue in 1860 were used to pay suppliers of
TdLVMa in Shandong. "[dIaI] * AinIf FZ+ i. ..
: -|f- ,fr, +±Y -) + R B , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box
679, No. 2964-66.
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center to replace silver notes with copper ones in the annual funds assigned for river
works so that people could use them to pay taxes.708 In order to promote the use of
copper notes, an imperial edict was issued on 22 November, 1855, ordering provincial
governments to set up Official Money Bureaus within three months.7 09 In addition to
disbursing government spending, the Board of Revenue also hoped that copper notes
would complement the use of copper cash so as to alleviate the high value of silver.710
Fiscal deficit, falling volumes of both domestic and foreign long-distance trade, and the
high value of silver converged to force the Qing government in 1856 to implement a de
facto copper standard aided by the use of copper notes, an option which had been
discussed since the 1820s. However, the floating of copper notes further decentralized
public finance.
The conversion of government spending from silver to copper notes meant that both the
central and provincial governments had to issue an enormous amount of copper notes as 1
tael silver was set as 2,000 wen in copper cash. To ensure the convertibility of the issued
copper notes, Official Money Bureaus had to raise their reserves of copper cash in
accordance with the increasing issue of copper notes. However, it was extremely
lI : 1, ) -, + YE F, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box
679, No. 575-7. EZMAJ also switched to copper notes in the same year, see , J
#'$:j -A t A, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 709-11.
709 The imperial edict to urge the establishment of Official Money Bureaus, FAE H f ± Y E 1,
Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 450.
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difficult for the Qing government in the 1850s to increase the mintage of both standard
copper cash (zhiqian) and copper cash with big nominal values (daqian). Both the
central and provincial mints had to face a severe scarcity of copper due to the civil wars.
Most of the annual fund of 1 million tael of silver that the center assigned to the Yunnan
provincial government to produce and procure copper (tongbenyin) were either consumed
by military spending or could not be delivered to Yunnan.71' Moreover, the military
situation cut off the transportation of copper from Yunnan along the Yangzi River and the
Great Canal to northern China. Only Jiangsu and Zhejiang could acquire limited copper
from Japan. The Qing government tried to seek an alternative copper supply from
Mongolia and Korea, but to no avail. 1
The severe scarcity of the copper supply greatly affected both the amount and quality of
copper cash released from government mints. The mintage of copper cash with nominal
values of 1,000 wen and 2,000 wen was soon stopped as they encouraged counterfeiting,
and they were replaced by copper notes.713 Although the government could profit from
minting copper cash with smaller nominal values, such as 5 wen, 10 wen, and 20 wen,
711 In 1855, the Yunnan governor reported to the center that the amount of this fund in arrears in the past
three years was as high as 1.87 million silver. zWA&Tig lJfi , V t f\ T, Grand
Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 302-4. Up to 1857, the total arrears of this fund from Zhejiang
and Jiangxi amounted to 3.20 million tael silver. FA -,$ -t- t R - , Grand Council
Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 1140.
712 The Qing government inquired about whether it could purchase copper from Korea in 1857, but the
natural endowment of copper was poor in Korea. onE Xi, Vt $ J H , 7-1 , It-
fT , )4-$ A + 0J- H, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 1008-11 and No. 1090-1.
713 In Beijing, the Board of Revenue soon realized that the market did not accept copper cash with nominal
values of more than 500 wen and decided to use copper notes as a substitute. "N T A H iffP tA~ff
H, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 2985-6.
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they could not circulate smoothly in the market if there were inadequate standard copper
cash of 1 wen. Yet official mints could not afford to cast copper cash of 1 wen under the
scarcity of copper. Officials of public finance were greatly frustrated by this conflict
between the fiscal purpose of the state and the circulation of copper cash in the market.714
Moreover, both central and provincial mints were forced to often reduce the copper
content in mintage. Scarcity of copper also forced the mints in Beijing, Shanxi, Zhili,
Henan, and Fujian to go as far as to mint iron cash, lead cash, and even iron cash with big
nominal values, which could hardly circulate by their face values in the market.
In addition to this chaos in mintage, it was highly inconvenient to transport a large
amount of copper cash over long distances. This significantly affected the Qing
government's effort to build institutions to ensure the convertibility of copper notes
across regions after it decided to rely mainly upon copper notes rather than silver notes.
This lack of mobility, exacerbated by wars, made it impossible for the center to
coordinate the transfer of copper cash from surplus to deficit regions. Therefore, the
Board of Revenue was unlikely to build centralized financial institutions to ensure the
714 The lack of balance between copper cash of I wen with copper cash of large nominal values is known in
the Chinese monetary theory as -T-A i. Yet the government had no means to resolve it. As the Board
of Revenue lamented in 1854, "RIh niVU14 , #fr K92tRJ, N94 X% , PiIufO1 ;
HJ 8, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 678, No. 3192-4.
715 frankly reported to the center that the reason to reduce copper content in mintage was to
save copper, and his view was representative. "A' t E , E ql-q 79 ,
, \ #±~ t , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 1697-700. See various
copper contents in mintage in Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), pp. 252-9.
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convertibility of the issued paper notes. Instead, it divided copper notes into notes
redeemable in Beijing and notes redeemable in the provinces. The former (jingchao, also
known as changhao in the market) could be used across provinces but were redeemable
only in Beijing. The latter bore the stamp of a provincial treasury (shengchao, also
known as duanhao in the market), and that particular provincial government was
responsible for ensuring their convertibility.716
In Beijing, the Board of Revenue entrusted the five Official Money Bureaus managed by
private merchants, Yuqian, Yufeng, Yusheng, Yuheng, and Yutai, to handle the issue of
both notes. In addition to government spending, the Board of Revenue also hoped that
merchants would buy provincial notes in Beijing and sell them in their respective
provinces. Yet when businessmen carried these notes back to Beijing, the five Money
Bureaus refused to redeem them in copper cash. Officials of the Board of Revenue
justified this by the insufficient cash reserves in Beijing and blamed provincial
governments for not managing copper notes properly.7 17 Both the Director-General of
the Grand Canal (5 pI1J57ME,S) Geng Chang (!!l) and the Director-General of the
Grand Canal [of Shandong and Henan] (5J.E,2%) Li Jun noted that this badly
+ t - 19, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 2554-7.
% ±t -2 J Y 0 , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 1448-50.
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damaged the creditworthiness of copper notes that they received from the center among
businessmen who used to accept copper notes disbursed to them at discount. 7 18 In
response, the Board of Revenue requested two bureaus to set up Official Money Bureaus
to safeguard the convertibility of copper notes that they received as expenditures for river
works. 719 The switch to copper notes thus did not force the Board of Revenue to
centralize tax collection to ensure their convertibility. Instead, the center and provincial
governments had to deal with the problem of copper notes on their own terms in their
respective socio-economic circumstances.
In Beijing, the Board of Revenue did not have enough reserves of copper cash to back the
issued copper notes. It thus had the five Official Money Bureaus, whose names all
started with Yu, take these notes as capital and then used the notes issued by the five
bureaus to pay the wages of banner soldiers. The central government did not have much
tax revenue to collect in Beijing, and it could not receive the necessary raw copper or
copper cash from other regions. Government copper notes could only be exchanged with
notes issued by the Official Money Bureaus in collaboration with the Board of Revenue.
Yet these Official Money Bureaus did not have reserves of cash to guarantee the
718 ,±a V"I -g[sic]p m3
-. Jt, ) t+ H. Both in Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No.
1512-6 and No. 1643-5.
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convertibility of their issued notes. 720 Nor did they have the ability to turn the copper
notes they received as capital for long-distance trade with merchants in other regions,
particularly when Beijing remained isolated from the economic core areas in this
period.72
The mismanagement and poor performance of the five Official Money Bureaus forced
the Board of Revenue in January 1859 to mobilize 50 private money exchangers in
Beijing to circulate government copper notes. Beijing's fiscal and economical isolation
meant these private financiers did not have the necessary capital and business networks to
circulate the copper notes that the Board of Revenue lent to them, and this policy was
abandoned in 1860. The accumulation of copper notes in Beijing thus led to great
discount rates, and in 1860 a copper note of 1,000 wen could not be exchanged even for
100 wen cash in the market. The Board of Revenue on 1 March, 1860 decided to stop the
issue of new notes. Lack of confidence in the issued notes and the conflicts with the
allied forces of Britain and France in Beijing caused a big financial panic in the capital as
people rushed to the remaining nine Official Money Bureaus to exchange notes for
copper cash. The government had little cash reserves to back up the notes in Beijing,
720 ,pi@-I ... r , 
. Zhongguo
jindai huobishi ziliao (shangce), p. 412.
21 When the Board of Punishment handled the liabilities of the two Official Money Bureaus, Yufeng and
Yuqian, officials noticed that their debts were mainly caused by the inability of the businessmen and
financiers to pay back their loans from the two Official Money Bureaus. "[T * $$$ IRI)iMR
X , * -W E RAt TG9r|a]ndR A * , Cmonci M r Copie [sic]Bo 679, N. 1
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which amounted to more than 10 million diao.722 By September 1861, copper notes were
not accepted in market transactions in Beijing.723
Lack of cash reserves also led to plummeting creditability of copper notes in some
provinces. The Fujian provincial government had depended on silver and copper notes
issued by the Yongfeng Official Money Bureaus to meet its spending needs. Yet in 1858,
copper notes of 1,000 wen were worth only 50 wen of copper cash in the market. The
Fujian provincial government in 1860 decided to use silver to exchange the various notes
that it had previously issued, which amounted to 391,600,000 chuan and close the
724Official Money Bureaus. In Shandong, the falling price of silver in 1857 pushed the
725provincial government to collect taxes in silver and not to accept copper notes. The
center was unable to transport the necessary amount of copper cash to the two Bureaus of
River Works in Jiangsu and Shandong to back up the huge volume of copper notes that
they received. When the neighboring provincial governments did not accept the copper
notes assigned for river works in collecting taxes, they became worthless in the
market.726
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723 Peng Zeyi, Shijiu shiji houbanqi de Zhongguo caizhengyujingii [The Economy and Public Finance in
China in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century], pp. 95-6.
724 r NN-f,% ,J I T-=, A 40 J F, Grand Council
Memorial Copies, Box 679, No., 1873-77.
72 1-1q& -M , t J -. , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 1055-7.
726 i
Fl. Both in Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 1623-5 and No. 1953-5.
326
Not all Official Money Bureaus experienced such disasters. For example, up to 1862 the
Tongyuan Official Money Bureau established by the Xuzhou military supply station in
Jiangsu province managed to ensure the convertibility of its issued copper notes by the
receipts from the lijin duties. These notes were used to pay the wages of soldiers
stationed in Xuzhou and could circulate in the adjacent areas. Encouraged by this
experience, the Director-General of Grain Transport (fiiMW) Wu Tang planned to
raise more funds to establish the Tongyuan General Money Bureau in Huai'an with
branches in Shaobo and Qingtao, so as to issue more copper notes to pay the soldiers
stationed in these areas.72 7 Likewise, the Shanxi governor Yingqi also reported that the
copper notes issued by the Official Money Bureau in Xi'an were accepted by local people
and asked the center to allow its continuance.7 2 8 However, these cases of local success in
circulating copper notes did not yield general lessons for the Board of Revenue to design
or implement institutional arrangements to back up the value of copper notes.
Meanwhile, falling silver prices in many regions after 1857 made it possible for the Qing
government to return to its previous dependence upon silver in its public finance. 729 For
example, when the market exchange rates of silver vis-A-vis copper cash fell to 1,200 and
s." ?Ri4, ~r % 19 t , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 3199.
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729 Peng Xinwei, Zhongguo huobishi [A History of Currency in China], p. 832; Wang Hongbin, "Lun
guangxu shiqi yinjia xialuo yu bizhi gaige [On the falling value of silver and monetary reform during the
reign of Guangxu]," Shixue yuekan, No. 5 (1988): 47-53.
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1,700 wen in 1857 in Shandong, the provincial government of Shandong decided to use
only silver in both tax collection and government expenditures.7 3 0 Likewise, the people
in Zhili preferred to use silver to pay taxes when silver prices were lower than the official
level.73' In 1862, the Board of Revenue ordered provincial governments to substitute
paper notes with silver in their tax revenue to Beijing and redeem the issued notes. The
use of paper notes in public finance was completely abandoned by 1867.
Nonetheless, the economic circumstances which had obstructed institutional
developments needed to safeguard the value of official paper notes began to change. The
Qing armies dispelled the Taiping forces from the Hankou area in 1856. The Tianjin
Treaty signed in 1858 opened the areas of middle and lower Yangzi River to foreign
trade. Hankou, Jiujiang, Nanjing, and Zhenjiang became new treaty ports in 1862.
Provincial governments of Jiangsu, Fujian, and Guangdong also raised short-term loans
from foreign banks in China.732 The Imperial Maritime Customs, which was first
established in Shanghai in 1854, quickly expanded to all treaty ports. Under efficient
management by foreign officials in the employ of the Qing government, it became a
reliable source of revenue for the center, even though the level of tariff duty was fixed at
5 percent.
SGrand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 1498-500.
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732 The total amount of the 12 loans between 1861 and 1865 came to 1.88 million tael silver, and the annual
interest rates ranged from 8 percent to 15 percent.
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At the same time, a new form of collaboration between private financiers and the
government began to emerge when the Qing army fought its major battle against the
Taiping rebels in the Lower Yangzi River in the period between 1860 and 1864. In 1860,
the Zhejiang governor Wang Youling not only entrusted supplies of grain and
ammunition to the private banker Hu Guangyong but also deposited official funds in
Hu's bank. Hu continued these services to the succeeding Zhejiang governor Zuo
Zongtang. Like his counterparts in England and Japan, Hu fully utilized his connections
with government to establish himself in the financial markets, and his Fukang Bank
became one of the biggest native banks in China in the 1870s.m
With the gradual recovery of the remittance networks in the late 1850s, there occurred
some cases of remitting part of assigned revenues to Beijing through private financiers
and particularly Shanxi bankers. The earliest remittance was in 1859 when the Customs
of Fuzhou (minhaiguan) requested a private merchant to remit two items, each worth
50,000 tael of silver, to Beijing within a year.734 In 1862 and 1863, the Customs of
Guangdong, Fujian, and Shanghai ( 5 * , A t) , ZO)E), and the provincial
governments of Guangdong, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi began to
appeal to Shanxi bankers to remit funds to Beijing while it still remained slow and risky
m For the rise of Hu Guangyong and his connections with the Zhejiang government, see C. John Stanley,
Late Ch'ing Finance: Hu Kuang-yung as an Innovator (Cambridge, MA.: The East Asian Research Center
of Harvard University, 1961), pp. 9-12.734
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to transport silver bullion to Beijing. Although the amount of each remittance did not
exceed 50,000 tael, the routes of remittance showed that Shanxi bankers had re-
established their financial networks. These connected Beijing with not only coastal cities
such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, and Ningbo, but also interior cities such as
Chengdu, Hankou, Nanchang, and Changsha. 35 This marked the beginning of the
Shanxi bankers' extensive involvement in the remittance of tax revenue to Beijing.
Moreover, it seems that provincial governments had collaborated with Shanxi bankers in
remitting official funds before. 736
IV. Conclusion
The failure of the Qing government to use financial means to overcome its fiscal crisis in
the 1850s illustrates the importance of socio-economic circumstances to the building of
new institutions to connect state tax revenue and the state's involvement in the financial
market. In the initial stage of this interactive process, the probability of making mistakes
was high because the state had not yet established the necessary institutional
arrangements to back up the creditworthiness of its new credit instruments. In this light,
the lack of trust in the paper notes that the Qing government issued and their devaluation
in the market were unavoidable. We also observe similar phenomenon in England and
Japan in the early stages of issuing short-term credit bills or paper notes.
73 Shanxipiaohao shiliao (zengdingban) [Historical Materials of Shanxi Banks] (Taiyuan: Shanxi jingji
chubanshe, 2002), pp. 75-80.
736 When the governor of Jiangxi Shen Baozhen )MA was concerned about the reliability of entrusting
50,000 tael to Xintaihou Bank to remit to Beijing, his subordinates told him that this bank had a good
reputation in Jiangxi in remitting both official and commercial funds. [ W f 9 PIpLgit it , Ai iC
IEJf iiT, ')9 V iA 4 EA9u) iR ]. )ILiM M T , MZ±) i Y l A, cited from
Shanxipiaohao shiliao (zengdingban), p. 80.
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Nonetheless, we observe a mutually reinforcing process in the transformation toward a
modem fiscal state in both England and Japan. In other words, the excessive dependence
of the state on fictitious instruments forced the state to centralize the collection and
management of its tax revenue, and fiscal centralization then raised the state's available
income to safeguard the creditworthiness of its credit instruments in the markets. The
ensuing trust in the state's credit instruments in the markets motivated the state to
strengthen this centralization and further enhance its creditworthiness in the financial
markets. The socio-economic circumstances in China in the 1850s were mainly
responsible for the failure of a similar, mutually-reinforcing process to emerge.
In contrast to London, which was the center of England's domestic and foreign trade and
yielded some 70-80 percent of customs revenues in England, Beijing in the 1850s
remained isolated from the economically developed regions in China. As Beijing was cut
off from tax revenue and long-distance trade, the central government could hardly
mobilize big merchants or financiers to promote its financial experiment. Meanwhile, the
major wars that the English state fought in its transformation to a modem fiscal state
were either at sea or in Continental Europe. In this situation, it was natural for the central
government to centralize its tax revenues in London to supply its troops and navy. In
comparison, the civil wars in China further fragmented an already decentralized fiscal
system, even though the total recorded amount of money that the Qing government spent
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to repress domestic rebellion in the period between 1850 and 1868 was as high as 300
million tael of silver.7 3 7
The Qing government's experiment with paper notes in the 1850s also differed from that
of Meiji Japan, even though inconvertibility was a concern in both cases at the beginning.
The Meiji government at the time did not have to confront a competing regime, and it
was thus better able to impose its paper notes as the only legal currency in domestic
transactions and public finance. In so doing, it removed the possibility for officials who
collected taxes to buy discounted paper notes and use them at their face value in
transferring the collected taxes to the government. Meanwhile, the Meiji government's
attempt to circulate paper notes was sustained by the expanded domestic economy and
exports, particularly the financial networks established by private financiers. Financiers
who cooperated with the state could utilize the regular tax revenues to enhance their
credibility in the financial markets. The government for its part benefited from the
speedy transfer of its collected revenue and the financiers' conversion of taxes paid in
rice into money in economically backward regions.
In contrast, the civil wars in China during the 1850s not only prevented the collected
revenue from being transported to the center but also destroyed existing nation-wide
financial networks. As a result, it was difficult for the Qing government to find powerful
financiers with interregional networks to circulate its silver notes. The provincial
institutions to issue silver notes could not appeal to interregional long distance networks
m This included the spending to repress the Taiping and Nian rebellions, and other rebellions in Southwest
and Guangdong and Fujian. Calculated from Peng Zeyi, Shijiu shiji houbanqi de Zhongguo caizhengyu
jingji [The Economy and Public Finance in China in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century], p. 136.
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to link their financial businesses together. In the absence of financial intermediaries to
float silver notes, the Qing government was forced to deal directly with peasants and
small retailers by relying upon the copper notes. The nature of copper cash, which was
suitable for local transactions only, further reduced the possibility of mobilizing big
merchants to circulate copper notes issued by the state.
Once these constraints in the socio-economic circumstances were reduced by the
recovery of normal business conditions and central control of public finance in the post-
war period, why did Qing China not develop into a modem fiscal state? The Chinese
case illustrates that a vibrant domestic economy with extensive financial networks and
the potential to collect elastic indirect revenues a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
to support the interactive process of building the institutions of a modem fiscal state. In
the next chapter, I will elaborate this point by studying the interactions between the state
and economy in China in the period between 1870s and 1890s.
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Chapter 7 Persistence of the Traditional Fiscal State and the Potential for Fiscal
Centralization in China: 1864-1911
I. Introduction
The socio-economic conditions in China in the period from 1864 to 1894 were quite
different from that of the 1850s. Domestic trade was recovered following the end of civil
wars in economically core areas by 1864. More importantly, the high value of silver,
which had greatly troubled both economy and public finance, began to fall after 1858.
As major western powers went on the gold standard in the mid-i 870s, the price of silver
fell in the international market. A massive influx of silver into East Asia began. The low
value of silver further stimulated Chinese exports to the west. In this situation, the
problem caused by the nature of the Chinese monetary system, which used silver by
weight rather than token silver currency as the standard currency, were not as severe as in
the deflationary period from the 1820s to the mid-i 850s. With the expansion of both
domestic and foreign trade, Shanxi bankers and their newly emerged big bankers in
Zhejiang and Shanghai quickly re-established nation-wide financial networks to transfer
money across regions.
New patterns also emerged in the interactions between the state and private financiers.
Provincial governments increasingly cooperated with well-established private financiers
to remit both tax revenues to Beijing and to transfer funds among themselves. To meet
the urgent military expenditures, such as for the suppression of the Muslim rebellions in
the northwest of China and the re-conquest of Xinjiang between 1866 and 1884, the Qing
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government borrowed huge amounts of money from foreign banks operating in China. It
also became willing to pay interest rates to borrow from Chinese merchants, which
represented a big change in the government's attitude toward domestic borrowing. As
contact with Europe and America increased, government officials acquired more
information about the handling of financial issues such as state bonds and central
banking.
In regard to the composition of government income, significant alterations also occurred
after the 1860s. The receipts from the indirect customs and lijin duties exceeded the
revenue collected from land taxes. Under the supervision of western officials, the
Imperial Maritime Customs quickly became the most efficient bureaucracy in the Qing
government. Receipts from the customs steadily rose even though the tariff level was
fixed at 5 percent by western powers. Management of the collection of the customs in
treaty ports was highly centralized.738 The central government was impressed, and Qing
officials often consulted Robert Hart, the inspector-general of the Imperial Maritime
Customs, over important financial issues.
Nonetheless, the Qing government did not extend such centralized approaches of to the
collection of domestic taxes, particularly the lijin duties which were levied upon
transactions of domestic consumer goods. Nor did centralization of the customs alter the
decentralization of broader fiscal operations. Even in the case of customs revenue, the
Board of Revenue only received 40 percent into its own coffers, while it assigned the rest
to be transferred directly from places of collection to the areas where it would be spent.
738 Stanley F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast: M. Mullan, 1950), chapters X and XI.
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For liin duties, both collection and allocation remained decentralized. This remained
true even as annual government income rose from 40 million tael silver in the 1840s to
80 million in the 1880s. Why were the decentralized institutions of public finance so
sticky in China even under new socio-economic circumstances? Particularly since the
Qing government in the 1870s decided to modernize its army and navy, construct
railways, and build arsenals and shipyards, why did not it try to centralize its tax revenue
to mobilize more financial resources for these major projects?
In this chapter, I argue that the persistence of a traditional fiscal state in China did not a
result from political conservatism on the part of Qing government.739 Instead, it should
be viewed as the outcome of interactions between the existing fiscal institutions and
socio-economic circumstances of the late nineteenth century. This process significantly
affected state actors' efforts to perceive and search for alternative institutions in public
finance. In particular, the failure in the 1850s to develop the necessary financial
institutions to float paper notes forced the central government to return to the use of silver
and copper cash in the postwar reconstruction of public finance. As the center did not
possess the financial means to speedily allocate expenditures to meet spending needs
across China, the decentralized assignment fiscal system which allocated tax revenue
from provinces of collection directly to destinations of spending was superior.
739 See the discussion of political conservatism during the Tongzhi Restoration between 1862 and 1874 as
leading to following decline of the Qing dynasty in the classic study by Mary C. Wright, The Last Strand of
Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1957).
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The reliance of the center upon administrative methods to coordinate inter-provincial
transfer of revenue and expenditures via decentralized fiscal institutions was self-
reinforcing. Without the institutional ability to move fund rapidly, the central
government had to give considerable autonomy to provincial governments so that they
could better respond to local circumstances and emergenciesin governing the large
territory of China. It could hardly obtain accurate information about tax collection and
necessary spending needs at the local level, a fact which further increased the bargaining
power of provincial governments vis-i-vis the center in fiscal issues. Meanwhile, the
Board of Revenue could still rely upon the decentralized fiscal institutions to meet urgent
speeding needs. Under such circumstances, state actors did not actively search for
alternative institutions in public finance.
Centralization in public finance required the center to use speedy credit instruments such
as paper notes or bills of exchange to transfer revenue and expenditure between the center
and provinces. However, advocates of adopting these means in public finance at the time
had to confront the suspicion and even hostility of government officials who still had
fresh memories of the paper notes fiasco of the 1850s. Without an equally severe fiscal
crisis, the Qing government had no motivation to risk a repeat, even with their growing
knowledge of western models of public finance. Yet without the use of credit
instruments, the center simply could not centralize its public finance. Officials who were
unfamiliar with financial issues such as paper notes or state bank could still hold
important posts in the Board of Revenue. Instead of overhauling the fiscal institutions,
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officials of public finance were more concerned with the scarcity of copper cash which
greatly affected the domestic economy beginning in the 1880s.
The persistence of a traditional fiscal state thus illustrates the outcome of socio-economic
circumstances being ready to support institutional development toward a modern fiscal
state yet no factor such as a credit crisis existing to push state actors move toward that
direction. This implies a counterfactual argument, i.e., had a credit crisis occurred, a
process of institutional learning toward centralized institutions in public finance would
have happened and China would have become a modern fiscal state. In order to show
that this is reasonable, I use the indemnities to Japan in 1895 as a proxy to the credit
crisis and examine whether we subsequently see discernible features of institutional
learning similar to those fund in the initial stage of the transformation to a modern fiscal
state in England and Japan.
In section II, I describe how the political authority of the center allowed it to continue its
reliance upon the decentralized assignment system to meet new challenges between 1864
and 1894. Then I examine the obstacles to fiscal centralization and the debates among
government officials over proposals to issue state bonds and establish a state bank. In
section III, I discuss the institutional arrangements for collecting the indirect liin duties
and examine the potential of and limits to fiscal centralization in China. Finally, I discuss
the implications of the institutional development after 1895 for the formation of a modern
fiscal state in China. Section IV speculates a possible outcome of a modern fiscal state.
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11. Central power, fiscal decentralization, and persistence of a traditional fiscal state
After the suppression of the Taiping rebellion in 1864, the central government began to
reduce the autonomy of provincial governors in fiscal and military matters which the
center had been forced to grant during the time of war.74 0 For example, between 1853
and 1864, provincial governments could borrow from foreign merchants before receiving
approval from the center. After 1864, they had to receive formal approval from the
center prior to foreign borrowing. 74 1 The assertion of central authority over foreign
borrowing was further strengthened by the centralized management of the Imperial
Maritime Customs. Without the agreement of the inspector-general of the Imperial
Maritime Customs, no provincial government could assign the collected customs revenue
as security for a foreign loan. 742 Central control also freed foreign banks from the risk of
default by provincial governments. As normal information flows were restored in peace
time, no provincial government could hide the fact of large foreign loans from the center.
The Board of Revenue began to regain its lost control over fiscal operations. This was
particularly the case in the collection of lijin duties as provincial governors had been
740 The historian Liu Kwang-ching has pointed out that the central government after 1864 exerted
unambiguous political control over the nomination and tenure of provincial governors and firmly controlled
the allocation of military expenditures. See Liu Kwang-ching, "Wanqing dufu quanli wenti shangque [A
reexamination of the power of provincial governors during the late Qing]," in Liu Kwang-ching, Jingshi
sixiangyu xinxing qiye [The Statecraft Approach and the New Enterprises] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye
gongsi, 1990), pp. 243-97. Hosomi Kazuhiro also noted out the Board of Revenue after 1885 could assert
the central authority by controlling the allocation of naval expenditures. Hosomi Kazuhiro, "Ri K6sh6 to
kobu [Li Hongzhang and the Board of Revenue]," T~yashi kenkyfi, Vol. LVI, No. 4 (March 1998): 811-38.
741 On the assertion of central authority in foreign loans and the coordination of inter-provincial revenue for
interest payments after 1864 in Ma Linghe, Wanqing waizaishiyanjiu [A Study of the History of Foreign
Loans in the Late Qing] (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2005), p. 43 and p. 53.
74 "[f*]#],)ft ~ 2 , WQ , RYPIJTEI 04if." Cited from the
memorial of Prince Gong, [] f3 A t = A E1, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 679, No.
3489-92; Zhongguo renmin yinhang canshishi, ed., Zhongguo qingdai waizhaishi ziliao: 1853-1911
[Historical Materials of Foreign Debts in the Qing Dynasty] (Beijing: Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 1991),
p. 34.
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granted full autonomy over collection and spending. Nonetheless, the Board of Revenue
in 1861 began to strengthen its supervision of lijin duties. It required provincial
governors to regularly report the amounts of collected lijin, the number and location of
each liin collecting station, and the names of personnel. In 1872, the Board further
standardized the form of lijin accounts reported to the center. By 1874, most provincial
governments sent the required accounts to the Board of Revenue, twice a year from
provinces in the economic core areas and once a year from more remote provinces.
Based upon these reported accounts, the Board of Revenue decided how to allocate the
receipts from lijin duties for various purposes across regions. In this sense, the amount of
lUin which provincial governors reported to the center was subjected to the reallocation
of the Board of Revenue and thus should not be considered local or provincial taxes.743
Nonetheless, the restoration of central supervision over the fiscal system in the post-war
period had to come to terms with the increasing expenditures in provinces which the
Board of Revenue could not satisfy in its allocation of funds. The center thus had to give
a certain degree of fiscal autonomy to provincial governments, as they bore the brunt of
responsibilities in reconstruction of local infrastructure, maintenance of local order and
defense, provision of social welfare, and so on. With the emergence of this provincial
fiscal operation independent from central supervision (waixiao), a new fiscal division of
labor appeared between the center and provinces.744 However, this did not represent the
743 See Susan Mann, Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, pp. 103-4.
744 See Zhou Yumin, Wanqing caizheng yu shehui bianqian [Public Finance and Social Change in the Late
Qing], p. 242.
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rise of regionalism or the collapse of central authority in public finance.745 Although
provincial governments constantly bargained with the center over the distribution of tax
revenue, they shared the same fundamental concern for the state interest. As the state
interest included both national defense and maintenance of domestic order and welfare,
provincial governors could openly reject the center's attempt to extract more revenue by
emphasizing their responsibilities in local governance.
For example, when the conflict with France forced the Qing government to increase
spending on seaborne defense in 1884, the Board of Revenue ordered the provincial
government of Shaanxi to hand over to the center the 10-20 percent of the collected lijin
duties which had previously been retained locally. In response, Bian Baoquan, the
provincial governor of Shaanxi, pointed out that it was a normal practice for provincial
governments to retain such a proportion for local expenditures. Bian argued that this was
by no means embezzlement as the retained ljin revenue was used for public purposes
within provinces. Bian thence refused to obey the order of the Board of Revenue. In his
view, the Board of Revenue simply did not have the means to allocate sufficient funds
punctually to meet all sorts of local, extraordinary expenditures. Moreover, Bian argued
that domestic governance was as important as national defense in terms of the state
interest and therefore the center should not use defense as an excuse to extract revenue
745 The collapse of the centralized fiscal system in the late Qing is a claim made by many Chinese
historians. In fact, this refers to the collapse of the fiscal system that had formed by the mid-nineteenth
century, but does not necessarily entail a lack of central authority in fiscal matters in the post-Taiping
period. For examples of this claim, see Wei Guangqi, "Qingdai houqi zhongyang jiquan caizheng tizhi de
wajie [The collapse of the centralized fiscal system in the late Qing]," Jindaishi yanjiu, Vol. 31, No. 1
(1986):207-30; Chen Feng, "Qingdai zhongyang caizheng yu difang caizheng de tiaozheng [The
adjustment of the relationship between the center and local governments in public finance]," Lishi yanjiu,
No. 5 (1997), pp. 111-4; He Lie, Lijin zhidu xintan [A New Exploration of the Institution of Lijin] (Taipei:
Shangwu yinshuguan, 1972), pp. 157-160.
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746and sacrifice the necessary expenditures for provincial governance. The center could
hardly refute such an eloquently justified argument; the Board of Revenue had to concede
and only required Bian to send in item-by-item accounts of this particular expenditure.
Bian rejected this request by pointing out that it made no sense for the Board of Revenue
to check the specific accounts of provincial expenditures. 747 Other provinces also
considered it impractical for the Board of Revenue to supervise expenditures for
provincial purposes.748
As this new fiscal division of labor emerged, no provincial governor attempted to
challenge the central authority in public finance. What was at issue was how the central
government managed the revenue that provincial governors had agreed to pass to the
center. Even with the same amount of revenue, a centralized institution could improve
the efficiency of fiscal management and enhance the fiscal capacity of the center.
Because the Qing government had large territories under its administration, a necessary
condition for centralization of public finance was the means to disburse expenditures
747 
-! *J-f
746 ff ' -MVMkA~, , ** P,,T [sic] ftLiWA - , V*9LWLnf
+/ H, Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 695-9.
EN) W5 Af, ±I - JEf 4J- I, Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 722-4.
748 For the example of Jiangsu, see Iwai Shigeki, Chaigoku kinsei zaiseishi no kenkyfi [A Study of the Fiscal
History of Early Modem China] (Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004), p. 136.
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speedily. However, the Board of Revenue at the time of post-war reconstruction did not
have such necessary financial means.
The failure of the financial experiments in the 1850s discredited government paper notes.
Although two officials in 1860 proposed using paper notes to cover the deficit of the
central government, the Board of Revenue instead decided to return to the use of silver
and copper cash. 749 As peace returned to the economic core, the Board of Revenue was
able to order provincial governments to send revenue in silver to the center; annual
submissions rose from 8 million tael in the 1860s to 13 million in the 1880s. Meanwhile,
in order to mitigate the severe scarcity of copper cash in the capital, the Board of
Revenue in 1867 ordered provincial governments in Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi,
Zhejiang, and Guangdong to transport copper cash to Beijing. Despite the inherent
difficulty in transporting bulky copper cash, these provincial governments still managed
to send in a total of 1.37 million chuan of copper cash by 1869 (1 chuan = 1,000 wen)."'
In 1887, the censor Xie Zuyuan proposed re-establishing the Official Money Bureaus to
issue copper notes to relieve the tight credit in Beijing at the time. The Board of Revenue
cited the fiasco of recruiting private financiers to circulate copper notes in the 1850s in
rejecting this proposal.75'
749 The two proposals were made by the censors Meng Chuanjin and Zhou Hengqi in P -IN ± - P. See
Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (xiace), pp. 627-32.
750 Calculated from the numbers in Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (xiace), p. 515. The number for Hunan
is cited from the memorial of the Hunan governor Liu Kun, IJ$ / E- 3 -- + 1, Grand Council
Memorial Copies, Box 679, No. 3510.
751 The memorial of Xie and the reply from the Board of Revenue are in Grand Council Memorial Copies,
Box 680, No. 565-7 and No. 572-4 respectively.
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In contrast to the center's non-involvement in the financial markets, provincial
governments from the 1862 onward increasingly collaborated with private bankers to
store and remit government funds. With the recovery of domestic long-distance trade and
the expansion of China's exports, the number of cities that were connected by the nation-
wide financial networks under Shanxi bankers rose from 27 in the 1840s to 54 in the
1880s. The new, large-scale banks in Zhejiang and Shanghai such as the Fukang bank
and the Yuanfengrun bank also established their own webs of inter-regional
remittance.752 In addition to receiving deposits and providing credit to merchants, the
major banks began to get involved in public finance. Imperial Maritime Customs offices
in cities such as Shanghai, Ningbo, Hankou, and Fuzhou and liin collection stations often
designated particular private banks to deposit the collected revenue and remit it to
destinations of spending upon government orders.m Meanwhile, these private financial
networks began to remit revenues from provincial governments to Beijing and handle the
funds that the center assigned for transfer between provincial governments. The amount
of remitted revenue from provincial governments to Beijing rose from 19 million tael in
the period from 1862 to 1874 to 63 million in the period from 1875 and 1893.754
This linkage between official funds and private financial networks had great potential.
As the tax revenue from the provinces to Beijing and government expenditures allocated
from Beijing to provinces represented two opposite directions in the flow of silver, the
center's use of remittance to allocate expenditures to provinces could greatly reduce the
7 5 2 Huang Jianhui, Shanxipiaohaoshi [A History of Shanxi Bankers], revised version, p. 203 and p. 208.
753 Song Hui-zhong, "Piaoshang yu wanqing caizheng [Shanxi Bankers and Public Finance in the Late
Qing]," in Caizhengyu Jindaishi Lunwenji (shangce) [Collected Papers on Public Finance and the Early
Modem History] (Taipei: Academic Sinica, 1999), pp. 424-5.
7 5 4 Huang Jianhui, Shanxipiaohaoshi [A History of Shanxi Bankers], revised version, p. 240.
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need to transport silver across regions. The collaboration between the government and
private bankers was mutually beneficial. The speed of government funds transfer was
much faster and more predictable than the transportation of silver bullion. Private banks
which remitted government ftinds could profit from the time interval (ranging from one
month to three months) during which they held these monies interest-free before turning
them over to the government. The possession of regular government funds also increased
their creditworthiness in the financial markets. Meanwhile, the government could, if it
chose, extend these domestic financial networks by entrusting private banks with the
remittance of government revenue in provinces such as Anhui, Shanxi, and Shandong,
which still used the transportation of silver to send revenue to Beijing before 1894. More
importantly, such collaboration provided an opportunity for the center to mobilize the
nation-wide financial networks to circulate government paper notes in the economy, an
option not available in the 1850s. However, these potential benefits were far from self-
evident to the Board of Revenue.
As the central government at the time used silver and copper cash to disburse annual
expenditures of more than 3 million tael in Beijing and the surrounding area, it thus
needed to receive revenue from provinces in silver instead of in bills of exchange issued
by private bankers. It did not occur to officials of the Board of Revenue that they could
collaborate with the same group of private bankers who had already remitted large
amounts of tax revenue from the provinces to Beijing to disburse the expenditures that
the central government allocated to provinces. In fact, the Board of Revenue had never
used the method of remittance to allocate its expenditures to provinces. In consequence,
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the banks that remitted revenue from the provinces had to convert the received bills of
exchange into silver in Beijing and then hand the bullion over to the Board of Revenue.
The full benefit of remitting government funds between Beijing and the provincial
governments was thus not realized. As a result, when silver prices were high in Beijing,
the Board of Revenue often forbade private remittance and insisted that provincial
governments send revenue in silver, even though they were aware of the convenience and
speed of remittance. 755
Meanwhile, the remittance of government revenue was subjected to the conditions of the
financial markets. For example, when the financial markets were quite tight in Beijing
during the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, the time needed to remitted silver from Jiangxi to
Beijing rose from the usual 40 days to 60 days and the remittance charges almost
doubled. Although the Board of Revenue urged the provincial government of Jiangxi to
remit some 230,000 tael to Beijing, De Xin, the Jiangxi governor, reported to the Board
of Revenue that it was even faster to transport silver to Beijing directly.756 Instead of
being able to use financial policy to mitigate tight credit in the financial markets, the
Qing government's fiscal operation itself was constrained by their fluctuations,
particularly when private bankers had to hand over silver to the Board of Revenue.75 7
The method of partial remittance from provinces to Beijing co-existed with transportation
755 Huang Jianhui, Shanxipiaohaoshi [A History of Shanxi Bankers], revised version, pp. 266-72.
756 qaft 
-*FT -a t
-4j3)9 Z-- E, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 1156.
757 This may explain the extremely small amount of remitted revenue to Beijing in 1878 and 1884, when
there were two major financial panics in China. For the variation in the amount of remittance to Beijing
see Song Hui-zhong, "Piaoshang yu wanqing caizheng [Shanxi Bankers and Public Finance in the Late
Qing]," p. 199.
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of silver and did bring about fundamental institutional changes in the operation of public
finance.
The use of silver instead of credit instruments significantly affected the attitude of the
Board of Revenue toward the financial markets and the risk of depositing government
fund in private banks. For example, the Fukang bank established in the 1860s had
become the biggest native bank in China by the 1880s. When it went bankrupt in
December of 1883 due to its excessive investment in the export of raw silk, it owed more
than 1.59 million tael to both the provincial and central governments.758 Instead of using
regulations to better supervise the private banks that held large amounts of tax revenue
and official funds, the Board of Revenue simply prohibited the private remittance of
government monies. This policy was futile as the remittance of revenue to Beijing was
resumed when the financial panic ended in 1885. Nonetheless, this attempt showed the
disposition of the Board of Revenue to separate tax revenue and private financial
markets, even at the cost of sacrificing the speed of transfer.
The unwillingness of the Board of Revenue to become involved in the financial markets
is also apparent in its rejection of a proposal to establish a joint-stock state bank in China.
This idea was put forward in the summer of 1885 by William Keswick and MA, two
British businessmen of the Jardine, Matheson & Co, one of the largest foreign merchant
houses in China. It was modeled on the Bank of England and was to deposit the collected
758 The number is cited from the memorial of Zhejiang governor Liu Bingzhang, + t H E,
Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 443-5.
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customs revenue, issue banknotes that could be used to pay taxes, and manage the
reception of revenue and disbursement of expenditure on behalf of the Board of Revenue.
The initial capital of 10 million tael would be raised through stock subscription in
China.759 Li Hongzhang, the governor-general of Zhili and one of the most important
officials of the time, supported this plan. The Empress Dowager Cixi was in favor of it
too. 760 Yet the Board of Revenue fiercely objected. The foreign presence in this plan
also instigated strong opposition among officials in Beijing, who even called for the
impeachment of Li Hongzhang. 761
Nonetheless, the Board of Revenue could still have accepted the scheme of a state bank,
which could greatly enhance the spending capacity, while disallowing the participation of
foreign capital. Such an approach would have helped the Board of Revenue meet rising
military expenditures. The Qing government spent a total of some 80 million tael for its
military campaigns to re-annex Xinjiang in the period from 1875 to 1884. The Sino-
French War between December 1883 and June 1885 cost it about 30 million tael.762
3lo X W Di f ""ff1, RY3V-9h t b E, Grand Council Memorial
Copies, Box 680, No. 409-410.760 Aware of the opposition of the Board of Revenue to Li's proposal, the Empress Dowager Cixi asked
officials of the Board of Revenue to "carefully deliberate this proposal as Li Hongzhang held that such an
official bank could offer great benefits ([f M-] $M$1 r ,A~9j , *$W, f&)."
Cited from the memorial of the Board of Revenue, --F1 t , Grand Council Memorial
Copies, Box 680, No. 389-94.
761 See Li Hu, Zhongguojingjishi conggao [Collected Essays in the Economic History of China]
(Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1986), pp. 242-44; Wang Jingyu, "Luelun Zhongguo tongshang
yinhang chengli de lishi tiaojian jiqi zai duiwai guanxi fangmian de tezheng [On the historical conditions of
the establishment of the Imperial Bank of China and its characteristics in foreign relations]," Zhongguo
jingjishiyanjiu, No. 3 (1988), pp. 95-7.
762 The numbers are from Zhou Yumin, Wanqing caizhengyu shehui bianqian [Public Finance and Social
Change in the Late Qing], p. 267 and p. 271.
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Given these circumstances, why did the Board of Revenue not try to mobilize capital
from Chinese merchants or financiers to create a state bank? It is therefore important to
examine the specific reasons other than hostility to westemers that the officials of the
Board of Revenue used to reject the proposal of a state bank.763
In their review of the proposed state bank, officials in the Board of Revenue conflated the
concept of a state bank with private banks and often cited the bankruptcy of two major
private banks, the Fukang in 1883 and the Oriental in Shanghai in 1884, to illustrate the
dangers of depositing state funds in banks. Meanwhile, they revealed a deep suspicion of
the credit instrument of banknotes and their role in public finance. They did not realize
that the substitution of silver bullion by banknotes could greatly change the operation of
public finance and lay the basis on which to build centralized institutions. Nor did they
consider the possibility that such a state bank in Beijing could complement the private
remittance infrastructure upon which several provincial governments relied to send
revenue to Beijing. Instead, they were worried about the danger of using banknotes in
public finance, and they often referred to cases of devaluation of paper notes in the US
and Russia and their failure in 1850s China.764 In their view, it would be a huge disaster
765for the state if these banknotes lost creditworthiness in emergent situations. Even
Prince Chun, who agreed to set up a state bank to raise loans for the state, refused to give
763 The major officials in the Board of Revenue in 1885 were , I ?%@
i
7"' J IffT pfd, Y6t±-4J# tb t , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 414 and No.
420.
765 ", 2R. 
_7q
R, -iTtL." The memorial of the Board of Revenue, A ± + + b , Grand Council
Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 389-94.
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it the privilege of managing public finance. He particularly insisted that the bank should
hand over silver to the Board of Revenue if it was to conduct remittance of revenue to
Beijing in future.766
This rejection was to a large extent the result of a lack of financial knowledge among the
officials of the Board of Revenue. However, there were also powerful officials such as
Li Hongzhang who understood the importance of having a state bank to both the
economy and the state. In his report to the Board of Revenue in regard to the proposal of
the two British merchants, Li Hongzhang pointed out that the depression which followed
the financial panic in 1883-4 was not in the interest of the government. Li urged
imitation of the western experience, where establishment of state banks stimulated the
circulation of currency in the markets. Li wanted the proposed state bank to be a
fractional note-issuing bank with a cash reserve ratio of one-third and with western
machines to print high quality banknotes.767 Sheng Xuanhuai, who came from a family
of wealthy native bankers and was an important official who promoted modern
enterprises such telegraph, railway, and mining, was well-known for his knowledge of
western affairs and financial matters. As early as 1882, he had proposed to Li
A R,0 3 A)-:0 -± ." The memorial of Prince Chun, Y t-+ )1,. ±- a, Grand Council
Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 386-7.
767 q# I 3 JM r -F
SA~Iit. [sic] 40Ii P|4ti-R. . .f JW $. [Ri $$] W NI* E9Z-2f1J&4
W1W." i* , Y0E + -$ (month unknown), in Zhongguo diyi lishi
danganguan, eds., Guangxuchao zhupi zouzhe [Imperially rescripted palace memorials of the Guangxu
reign] ff-Ml-iM, volume 91, p. 675.
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Hongzhang the creation of a big bank to remit official funds by telegraph. 768 In 1887, Li
Hongzhang sent three officials, Sheng Xuanhuai, Zhou Fu, and Ma Jianzhong, to
negotiate a bank plan with the American merchant E. S. K. de Mitkiewicz who
represented the Philadelphia Syndicate and the Silver Ring in the US. This was not
designed as a state bank, yet it planned to raise low-interest rate loans when needed by
the Qing government. 769 This plan was also aborted due to the strong opposition of the
Board of Revenue.
The Court accepted the decision of the Board of Revenue, yet it also protected the
advocates of a state bank from attacks by censors. Prince Chun particularly pointed out
that they were mainly concerned with how to overcome the fiscal difficulties caused by
the huge military spending and foreign loans in the Sino-French War of 1884. In his
view, state bank proponents shared with officials of the Board of Revenue the "same idea
of serving the state, even though their ways differed." 770 After rejecting the proposal to
use financial means to enhance the spending capacity of the state, the Board of Revenue
768 Wang Erh-min, "Sheng Xuanhuai yu Zhongguo shiye liquan zhi weihu [Sheng Xuanhuai and the
protection of the interests of Chinese enterprises]," Zhongyang yanjiuyuanjindaishisuojikan, No. 27 (June
1997), p. 26.
769 According to Li Hongzhang, the American merchants were trying to find a better investment
opportunity for American silver when the US went on the gold standard. "VAH UNU; Mm
] E E i % 1]i, VtREE 2±Z t + + , Grand Council Memorial Copies,
Box 680, No. 670-3.
fJo UVI# ,K E-." ~E , t±-t --A, Grand Council Memorial Copies,
Box 507, No. 2034-5.
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turned its attention to how to extract more tax revenues (kaiyuan) and cut unnecessary
expenditures (jieliu), the fiscal creed of the traditional fiscal state.
Typical explanations of this episode in the literature have used the conservatism of the
Board of Revenue in financial issues to explain the failure to establish a state bank in
China. But given the presence of a range of ideas about public finance, it is more
important to ask how officials who knew little about banking could still occupy the
important posts on the Board. Why did the Court not promote officials such as Sheng
Xuanhuai to take charge of public finance? To answer these questions, we need to
examine how officials of the Board of Revenue at the time used decentralized fiscal
institutions to meet rising speeding needs.
Nominally, the Qing fiscal system was highly centralized as the Board of Revenue
directly supervised all the collected tax revenue and expenditures of local governments.
The Board of Revenue appealed to two main methods to simplify its fiscal
administration. First, it set fixed quotas for tax collection and expenditures for
prefectural governments, which helped discipline the performance of prefectural
magistrates when it was difficult for the center to accurately assess its tax base and
monitor local governments.m Second, the Board of Revenue relied upon an account-
reporting procedure to determine the allocation of the annual revenue remaining after
deducting the quotas for prefectural governments. In the winter season, each provincial
771 Although Edgar Kiser and Xiaoxi Tong rightly points out the difficulty of the center to monitor local
government in public finance in late imperial China, they neglect the importance of fix quotas to reducing
the information cost in bureaucratic management. See Edgar Kiser and Xiaoxi Tong, "Determinants of the
Amount and Type of Corruption in State Fiscal Bureaucracies: An Analysis of Late Imperial China,"
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (October 1992): 300-3 1.
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government was required to send its next year's estimated expenditure (donggu) to the
Board of Revenue. Upon approval, the Board assigned the expenditures to provincial
governments for the next year, with one disbursal in the spring and the other in autumn
(chunqiubo). Provincial governments also needed to send their accounts of annual
expenditures to the Board of Revenue for an item-by-item audit (zouxiao).772
Practice, however, was highly decentralized. In absence of a nation-wide financial
network in eighteen-century China, the actual transfer of government revenue and
expenditures was conducted by transportation of silver bullion, which was extremely
time-consuming in a pre-modern society. In this situation, the central government did not
aggregate all its annual income to Beijing but retained a large proportion in treasuries at
provincial level or even in prefectural governments in strategic locations. In this way, the
Board of Revenue could save the cost and time of transporting silver by assigning the
stored revenue directly to destinations of spending. 773 By the mid-nineteenth century,
this fiscal operation had become dysfunctional as it could not respond properly to the
rising extraordinary expenditures of local governments and tax arrears caused by the
rising value of silver.774 However, what the Board of Revenue restored after 1860s was
such a decentralized fiscal system.
772 Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reforms in Eighteenth-Century Ch'ing
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 15-8.
7" Peng Yuxin, "Qingdai tianfu qiyun cunliu zhidu de yanjin [The development of the system to retain and
transportation of land taxes in the Qing dynasty]," Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu, No. 4 (1992): 124-33;
774 Iwai Shigeki, "Shindai kokka zaisei ni okeru ch06 to chih6 [The center-local relationship in the fiscal
system of the Qing dynasty]," Toyshi kenkyzi, Vol. XLII, No. 2 (September 1983), pp. 338-40.
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In regard to the total annual income of some 80 million tael, which the Board of Revenue
received regular accounts of collection from provincial governments, only 15 percent or
so were actually sent to Beijing. For the rest, the Board of Revenue allocated their
expenditures according to various needs across regions. Some were spent within the
province of collection, some were assigned for purposes in other provinces, and the rest
were stored in various treasuries waiting for future assignments from the Board of
Revenue. The fixed quotas in both tax collection and ordinary expenditures thus greatly
reduced the administrative difficulty involved. Board of Revenue officials thus did not
necessarily require extensive financial experience to fulfill their ordinary duties.
To deal with extraordinary expenditures, for which the Board of Revenue could no assign
quotas in advance, two conditions had to be met. First, the Board of Revenue needed to
know the exact amount of funds stored in treasuries scattered across the provinces after
disbursing all the ordinary expenses. Second, when the Board of Revenue ordered the
transfer of particular items of fund stored in specific local treasuries, the assigned money
had to still be available. In the new circumstances after the 1860s, these two
prerequisites were not always satisfied.
In the 1860s, the Qing government set about reducing the supplementary levies and
official quotas of land taxes in the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Zhejiang,
and Anhui.775 In addition to a paternalist concern for local welfare in the aftermath of
775 Liu Kexiang, "Shijiu shiji wushi zhi jiushi niandai qingzhengfu de jianfu he qingfu yundong [The efforts
of the Qing government to reduce land taxes and settle land taxes in the late 19 h century]," Zhongguo
shehui kexueyuanjingji yanjiusuojikan, volume 7 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1984), pp.
315-21.
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war, it was important for the Board of Revenue to set realistic quotas which prefectural
magistrates could meet when collecting land taxes. But the Board of Revenue could not
anticipate the fluctuations in the yields of land taxes caused by nature. Moreover, the
revenue from lijin duties levied upon commercial transactions varied year by year
according to the changing conditions in the markets, which were beyond the control of
the government. 776 In regard to government spending, provincial governments had to
confront all sorts of these extraordinary expenditures in local governance which the
Board of Revenue could hardly address in its annual allocation of expenditures.
Variations in tax collection and spending by local governments thus eroded the ability of
the Board of Revenue to operate effectively. Considering the number of items of specific
tax revenue, treasuries to store official funds, and purposes of disbursements, the Board
of Revenue, which did not have computer and real-time telecommunications, quickly lost
track of available revenues in this complicated decentralized fiscal operation.777 Fiscal
chaos resulted as the state tried to link specific items of revenue to meet particular
purposes of spending across regions. In contrast, a centralized fiscal institution would
have enabled financial officials to allocate expenditures from a sum of income aggregated
from various sources of revenue, thus avoiding the unnecessary trouble of matching
particular items of income to specific purposes of spending.
776 Luo Yudong, Zhongguo lijinshi [A History of Lijin in China] (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1936),
pp. 29-33.
777 This phenomenon is well-known to fiscal historians. See the discussion in He Lie, Qing xiantong shiqi
de caizheng [The Public Finance of the Qing Government in Reigns of Xianfeng and Tongzhi] (Taipei:
Guoli bianyiguan, 1981), pp. 402-4.
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While this decentralized fiscal system functioned poorly, it still worked well enough.
The center did not completely lose its control over public finance. The fiscal muddle
described above was not sufficiently pressing to force the center to search for alternative
institutions. When there were emergent needs, such as military spending or return of
foreign loans, the Board of Revenue could still order provincial governors to send the
assigned amount of revenue to destinations of spending. Provincial governors might then
have to remove revenue from sources other than those designated by the Board of
Revenue to meet these demands. Both the provincial governments and the offices of the
Imperial Maritime Customs in Guangdong and Fujian provinces often borrowed from
domestic banks.778 In consequence, the Qing government could afford its Xinjiang
campaigns, fight an expensive war with France, and build a modern navy strong enough
to contain conflict with Japan in the 1880s.
However, the assignment of ordinary expenditures in this decentralized fiscal system was
quite a different story. Provincial governors often delayed the shipment, reduced the
amount, or even ignored the assignment from the Board of Revenue. For example, for
the total of 8 million tael of revenue designated to Beijing in 1886, the Board of Revenue
only received 4 million tael on time, and some 2.8 million tael were in arrears. 779 Of the
annual ordinary expenditure of 4 million tael for the navy which the Board in 1880
assigned from the lijin revenues from Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi and the customs
revenue from Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou, the amount of money that the
778 Huang Jianhui, Shanxipiaohaoshi [A History of Shanxi Bankers], revised version, p. 244.
779 The memorial of the Board of Revenue in Xf Y ~ T- Y -q Y H E, Cited from ibid., p. 252.
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navy actually received every year never exceeded 3 million.780 Because the
decentralization of fiscal operations deprived the Board of Revenue of the ability to
possess the accurate information about revenue and available silver stocks, the central
government could do little to improve this situation.
During the three decades between 1864 and 1894, the decentralized assignment fiscal
institution in China did not encounter any crisis which it could not handle. Given the
geographic location of Beijing and the territory of China, military campaigns in frontier
regions did not motivate the Board of Revenue to centralize tax revenue as it could still
assign revenue from collecting provinces directly to the troops. Neither did foreign
borrowing change matter. The Board of Revenue could simply assign revenues from
provinces directly to treaty ports such as Shanghai to make interest payments to foreign
banks.
Since a fiscally decentralized system lacked elasticity in yielding more financial
resources, the central government avoided to fight prolonged and expensive wars, as
shown in the Sino-French war in 1884. The main purpose for the Qing government to
build a western-style navy in 1874 and to upgrade it in the 1880s was to contain Japan,
and it rejected proposals to attack Japan in 1885 by emphasizing the huge cost of a naval
war. After 1888, there was an informal alliance between China and Japan. Japan did not
challenge China's dominance over Korea, while China accepted Japan's annexation of
Ryukyu (today's Okinawa) and supported Japan's efforts to revise unequal treaties and
780 Zhou Yumin, Wanqing caizhengyu shehui bianqian [Public Finance and Social Change in the Late
Qing], pp. 269-70.
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resume sovereignty in its customs. 781 The threat of Russia to Manchuria in 1890 was still
far from a crisis which would force state actors to search for new fiscal institutions.
The decentralized fiscal institution was thus quite stable in the current international
circumstances. When the flooding in Zhengzhou in 1887 forced the center to spent
extraordinary funds of 12 million tael over four years for river work and disaster relief,
the Board of Revenue in 1887 decided to stop purchasing warships and weapons from the
west.782 The extravagance of the Empress Dowager Cixi caused great annoyance to the
officials on the Board of Revenue, yet it was by no means the cause of fiscal
decentralization. The thrifty of the ruler would have had little impact on the operations of
public finance when considering the stickiness of the decentralized fiscal institution at the
time.
The Board of Revenue was not against financial or monetary innovations in general. In
the 1880s, it permitted provincial governments in Guangdong, Hubei, and Jilin to use
western technology to mint token silver currency (yinyuan). In response to a nation-wide
dearth of copper cash, it also let provincial governors use steam-powered machines to
mint a new style of copper cash (tongyuan). Moreover, the Board of Revenue permitted
provincial governors in Jiangsu and Henan to re-establish Official Money Bureaus to
781 Nishizato Kiyuki, "Rei Shosh6 [Li Shuchang ] no tainichi gaik6 ronsaku to sono shnhen [Issues
surrounding the strategy toward Japan proposed by Li Shuchang]," T5yashi kenkya, Vol. LIII, No. 3
(December 1994): 443-79.
782 This amount was mainly disbursed from the silver stocks held by the Board of Revenue and the revenue
originally designated from the provinces to Beijing.
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issue copper notes to alleviate the scarcity of copper cash in local markets. 783
Nonetheless, without a severe fiscal crisis, the Board of Revenue had little motivation to
re-introduce paper notes in public finance. Moreover, the devaluation of paper notes and
its social consequences in Japan, which the Chinese embassy reported to the center, may
have further strengthened the bias against paper notes. However, without the use of
credit instruments in public finance, it made no sense to even conceive of centralization.
The persistence of the traditional fiscal state in China under the new socio-economic
circumstances in the period between 1864 and 1894 thus attests to the stickiness of
decentralized fiscal institutions. We do not know what kind of institutional development
might have occurred if there were a credit crisis during this time. Several questions
remain. What was the potential of the Chinese economy at the time to yield more tax
revenue if the Qing government faced greater spending demands? To what extent could
the Qing government rely upon its administrative institutions to realize this potential?
Was it possible for the Qing government to achieve fiscal centralization and to build a
modern fiscal state if it were subjected to a huge credit crisis?
III. Potential and limit in fiscal centralization and the beginning of an institutional
learning process after 1895
783 The Tongyuan Official Money Bureau was re-established in 1881 in the city of Qingjiang in Jiangsu
province to issue copper notes to mitigate a dearth of copper cash. , 6@tWAt ± t ,
Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 311. The provincial government in Henan set up the Yuli
Official Money Bureau in 1888 to issue copper notes for the use of river work in Zhengzhou. IN , A
Y E nT -- A + t H S, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 749.
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In the period between 1864 and 1894, the annual income of the Qing government mainly
came from land taxes, the customs revenue, and lijin duties.784 After the suppression of
the Taiping, the Qing government tried to extract more revenue from land taxes by
conducting nation-wide land surveys. However, the information problem was
insurmountable as local gentry and clerks in prefectural governments had little incentive
to reveal the accurate information of landed wealth to the center.785 As a result, the
annual yield from land taxes stood at the level of 30 million tael when the quota system
for collecting land taxes was decided. We observe similar inelasticity in collecting land
taxes in England and Japan during their transformation into modern fiscal states.
From the 1870s onward, the Qing government had realized that it could only depend
upon the customs and lijin duties to meet rising expenditures. The Board of Revenue was
particular impressed by the efficiency and reliability of the Imperial Maritime Customs.
Yet the 5 percent tariff duty fixed by western powers severely restricted the potential of
the customs in yielding more revenue. However, like the Meiji government, the Qing
state was independent from foreign intervention in the collection of indirect taxes levied
upon consumer goods, lijin duties. After 1860, foreign merchants could pay a
supplementary tariff duty of 2.5 percent at treaty ports (zikoushui) and were thence
exempted from the payment of liin duties within China. Yet the Qing government had
full autonomy in regard to the rate or the method of 1iin collection over domestic
consumer goods.
784 The selling of official ranks was only an exigent fiscal measure and its actual yield was far below the
anticipated amount.
785 For information and administrative cost in land survey between 1860s and 1890s, see Liu Kexiang,
"Shijiu shiji wushi zhi jiushi niandai qingzhengfu de jianfu he qingfu yundong [The efforts of the Qing
government to reduce and settle land taxes in the late 1 9th century]," pp. 348-9.
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As did the excise in England, lijin duties started as exigent fiscal measures in the civil
wars. In the post-war era, their collection was continued as they were indispensable to
both central and provincial governments in meeting the increasing military and domestic
786
expenditures. Imposition of liin was justified by the principle of equity in taxation as
it was levied upon commercial sectors which had been lightly taxed before. Government
officials also appealed to the Confucian creed of treating agriculture as the fundamental
basis of society to legitimate the collection of lijin, noting that it reduced the burden of
land taxes upon peasants.787 The rates of liin usually ranged between 2 and 10 percent.
As lijin became formal taxes, the collection offices in each province became specialized
official institutions, which were independent from prefectural magistrates and were
subject to the supervision of the governor and the provincial treasurer. The structural
conditions of the Chinese economy significantly affected the development of these,
particularly the degree of efficiency and centralization attainable.
There were three kinds of lijin duties: lijin levied upon production, transit liin, and
landed liin or liin collected from retailers. 7 88 The administrative difficulty involved
varied greatly. As commodities in the market in China at the time were produced by
numerous small-scale producers, the cost to collect liin duties upon production was
formidably high. Collection of liin duties from small retailers had the same problem.
Therefore, provincial governments mostly targeted big wholesalers or guilds that were
involved in inter-regional trade. Both the information and administrative cost of
786 Luo Yudong, Zhongguo lijinshi [A History of Lijin in China], p. 37.
787 Susan Mann, Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750-1950, pp. 100-1.
788 Luo Yudong, Zhongguo liinshi [A History of Liin in China], pp. 55-7.
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assessing market value and collecting transit lijin were low in the following three cases:
1), when a large amount of a given commodity was packaged and ready for
transportation; 2), when the package passed certain pivotal nodes in the transportation
networks; and 3), when the package arrived in a new market before it was dispatched to
small retailers.
Thus in 1867, the Fujian provincial government repealed lijin duties upon smaller
retailers and only focused upon major consumer goods, particularly tea and opium. 789
Likewise, small businesses in Shanghai were exempted from lijin in 1857 and in Shanxi
in 1862.790 In order to facilitate the collection of lijin on tobacco, which was difficult to
collect from small peasants and businessmen, the Gansu provincial government asked
merchants to form three tobacco guilds in Lanzhou and Jingyuan, two major areas of
local tobacco cultivation. 791 For the big wholesalers, it was difficult to hide commodities
from government inspection and the cost of avoiding the key places in transportation
could be unnecessarily high. Yet they could pass the burden of liin duties to retailers by
raising prices. In this light, the collection of ljin upon wholesalers reduced the tension
A." H],MNi, f )J~it ,Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 297-8.
790 In Shanghai, "[)EM] 'J431-f4 , R-1 H li H , MER [sic] 4 SR K22| t j , /J*
~ 'I' ~~#A ." 1J4±~K W~i,)~t~+ -H, Palace
Memorials, Box 31, No. 2736-40. In Shanxi, "l ... , j
VP V , StWf , IMkI Th." llEE, It% t~ ,Palace Memorials,
Box 32, No. 75-77.
A~& L 4T34R "RRME [sic] ~t ~ R
M." 7 Ed, M $ E2 t)18 , Palace Memorials, Box 31, No. 2800-3.
362
between collecting officials and ordinary consumers or small retailers.792 Meanwhile, big
wholesalers and guilds were often organized and thus more powerful than individual
small businessman. They often had both informal and formal channels to interact with
governors and financial officials at the provincial level. For example, tea merchants could
petition governors to reduce the liin duties imposed on tea by referring to the
competition from the Japanese and Indian tea in the international markets.793 In this
sense, big wholesalers were less vulnerable to extortion by collecting officials.
The collection of liin duties in provinces was typically handled by a hierarchical
bureaucracy staffed by salaried expectant officials, who acquired their title either through
civil examination or purchase. The collection of liin in Hunan is well-known for its
dependence upon members of the local gentry rather than expectant officials. The
historian Lu Yudong in his study of ljin argues that the Hunan approach reduced
corruption as the gentry often came from wealthy families and cared about their local
reputation. 794 Nonetheless, the gentry-collectors in Hunan province were in fact salaried
staff of the liin office, and the Hunan governor Bian Baodi considered it important to pay
them well so as to avoid abuses.795 Entrusting the collection of liin duties to merchant
792 This might explain why the observed anti-liin riots mostly occurred in the late 1850s and early 1860s
when small retailers and producers were directly taxed, while collection between 1875 and 1895 was
generally without incident. On the early anti-liin riots, see He Lie, Liin zhidu xintan [A New Exploration
of the Institution of LUin], pp. 118-9.
793 For such examples in Hubei, Anhui and Jiangxi, see - E
Wfi, Y 4 t - -2 ± -t+A F, Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 700-4; i Y ±
TE Ng _- F, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 489, No. 245-6; 4fJW idMM $2VEitP) )i, A
t11AE= 2 - , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 489, No. 2276-8.
794 Luo Yudong, Zhongguo lijinshi [A History of Lijin in China], p. 87.
795 *g VTai, ± , M
IK #19%. AMR V-r-VVli, AM t T-H _- R F i , Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 854-6.
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guilds, which was attempted in some areas, led to under-taxation. When Li Hongzhang,
the governor-general of Zhili appointed officials to replace the gentry-merchant
collection in 1880 in the city of Tianjin, annual receipt rose from 20,000 to 60,000
tael.796
Due to the importance of lijin revenue, provincial governments had a strong incentive to
oversee the performance of collecting officials. The monthly accounts of collecting
stations or offices had been sent to their supervising offices twice a month, along with the
collected revenue. After aggregating these accounts, the supervising offices sent the
accounts to headquarters in the following month for inspection.7 97 Still, as the volume
and routes of trade in localities varied year by year, it was difficult for headquarters to
evaluate collecting performance. To provide incentives to collecting officials, provincial
governments often reported to the center the names of those who had above average
receipt in collection and awarded them with promotion of official rank and priority to
hold official tenure (It *kA). Meanwhile, collecting officials could only stay in their
posts for three years, and thus their accounts were subject to check of subsequent office
holders. If fraud was discovered, the preceding official was held accountable. 798 The
collecting official was also responsible even if the shortage was caused by collusion
796 
-r E tE , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 488, No. 954-6.
79 7 Luo Yudong, Zhongguo lginshi [A History of Lgin in China], pp. 93-8.798 By this method, the lijin office in Jiangxi in 1863 found that the managing official Wang Yongxu under
-reported revenue, retained fines, and manipulated the exchange rates between silver and copper cash in
reports for personal profit. Wang was deprived of his official title and had to pay back the money.
Memorial of unknown official, :10E V-, Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 206-7.
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between his subordinates and merchants. 799 If the yields of lijin fell, yet market
transactions in a given area were prosperous, that office became the target of
inspection. 800 As the value of a commodity was assessed by different stations and
collecting offices, purposeful under-assessment by one station could be reported by
others. 801
When the yields of direct collection were poor, provincial governors sometimes involved
merchants in collection. One method was to assign a fixed amount to the guild in a
particular sector, say raw silk, the guild then divided the payment among its members.
As the commodity was free from other transit lijin duties after paying this fixed amount,
merchants in coastal areas who exported their goods abroad found it attractive.. 02 The
other method was to farm liin collection out to merchant-farmers who could retain up to
32 percent of receipts as their income.8 03 Professional lijin farmers thus had an incentive
799Ding Yong, the collecting official in the Houli lijin station in Guangdong province was stripped of his
office and had to make compensation of two thousand tael when a shortfall of that amount resulted from
collusion between his inspector and merchants. Only after repaying the money could he recover his official
title. P Tf',Mi2 @1]ff, 6 +t-' A t Y i , Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 868.
800 In a good year for the tea market, the provincial governor of Yunnan became suspicious about the
falling lijin revenue from the office responsible for Simao and Pu'er, two major tea-producing areas. The
inspecting officials then found a discrepancy between the revenue that the collecting official remitted
through the Guangyufeng bank and the amount of money that he actually handed over to headquarters. i
, 0,%IE I -Y Z *, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 488, No. 1849-50.
801 , A ±TF )f] -
A." P9M3tIi, HM Y A A _ Y - H, Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 1327-31. For
example, officials in the lijin station at Huang Caoba in Guizhou province found that a large volume of
Yunnan opium coming from Luo Ping that did not have receipts of paying lijin duties. According this
report, the Yunnan provincial government traced out that the collecting official at the lijin station in Luo
Ping colluded with businessmen and under-assessed the value of their goods. The memorial of the Yunnan
governor Lin Shaonian, AM t+ A *-tY t - B, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 490, No.
1997.
802 Luo Yudong, Zhongguo liinshi [A History of Liin in China], p. 114.
803 By 1886, the collection of liin levied upon imported opium in Hankou and Jiujiang followed the
example of Zhenjiang and switched from direct collection to this kind of merchant farming. )IMiM(iM
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to collect more efficiently. Despite efforts to collect liin, the total lijin revenue collected
from commodities other rather than opium accounted for only 5 percent in the total
commodity value of grains, tea, cotton, and silk cocoons.8 04
Government officials were aware that high duties of lijin were counterproductive as they
simply encouraged countless forms of evasion. 805 For example, Chinese merchants could
pay the supplementary customs duties (zikoushui) under the name of foreigners so as to
avoid paying domestic lijin duties. As the revenue from this supplementary customs
tariff was under the control of the center, provincial governments had to keep duties low
to attract Chinese merchants to pay ljin duties, of which governors could retain in their
hands at least 10 to 20 percent. 806 Competition for ljin revenue among neighboring
provinces through which merchants could chose different routes of trade further
contained the rise of ljin duties.8 07
N, +AE Y R;A~t** , Ad'~iSE-i, Y"t±ZWt±JJA. Both in
Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 488, No. 2633-8 and No. 2811-7. In the case of Hankou, monthly
receipts more than doubled.
804 The receipt of this lijin revenue (baihuo lijin) in 1894 was around 16 million tael. Assuming that
provincial governors retained 30 percent of the collected lijin, the total revenue collected is 16 million/0.7,
which is 22.86 million tael. The total estimated commodity value of grain, tea, cotton, and silk cocoons is
cited from Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming, Zhongguo zibenzhuyifazhanshi [A History of the Development
of Capitalism in China], volume 2 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1990), p. 302.
805 "NE , NWN#PA." PAINE:, 3 ±E $23 Z±t1, F, Palace Memorials, Box
32, No. 814-6; "- E&Vhn , 0 fMvTM." Af-M **, MAtMM19N, ft±E E t
A R, Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 823-5.806 Dai Yifeng, Jindai Zhongguo haiguan yu Zhongguo caizheng [The Customs and Public Finance in Early
Modern China] (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 1997), pp. 136-9.
807 In the collection of lijin duties upon opium in Hunan province, the Hunan governor Zhang Xii told the
Board of Revenue that high liin duty in Hunan simply made merchants to go through the neighboring
Guizhou or Guangxi where duties were low, to reach Jiangxi. OftMRA Y, 6' t t $, Zt/k
R, Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 1544-7.
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Other factors kept lijin rates at reasonable levels. The Qing government often reduced or
even temporarily repealed the lUin duties levied upon the long-distance trade in grain in
years of poor harvests and famine.8 08 Competition from Japanese and Indian tea forced
governors in the tea-producing provinces to reduce lUin duties on tea. For these reasons,
the imposition of lUin did not necessarily lead to excessive extraction of commercial
wealth. Nor did its levy imply an anti-commercial attitude among government officials.
Instead, provincial governors well understood that the revenue from lijin would rise with
an expanding volume of trade. As the Hunan governor Bian Baodi and the Hubei
governor Peng Zuxian put it, the yield from lijin duties depended upon prosperity in the
markets. 809
The dominance of small producers in the Chinese economy and the levy of ljin upon
wholesalers significantly restricted the center's ability to supervise the collection of ljin
in localities. As the Board of Revenue did not possess the necessary institutions to
survey the whole economy independent from provincial governments, it could only
accept the accounts of collected revenue reported by provincial governors. It had no
institutional ability to estimate the potential yield of liin revenue in each province.
Provincial governors themselves did not have this ability either. However, the lack of
808 When famine struck in Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Henan in 1877, the Board of Revenue repealed the lUin
duties on grain for one year. Cited from the memorial of the Anhui governor Yu Lu, Y6 V E ~ + - a
, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 488, No. 475-6. When poor harvest drove up grain prices in Hubei
in 1885, the Hubei provincial government temporarily halted the lijin on the grain trade to attract merchants
to ship grain in from other provinces. See the memorial of the Hubei governor Tan Junpei, Y6 t -
(month unknown), Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 732. The provincial government of Jiangsu adopted a
similar measure in 1888. See the memorial of the governor-general of Jiangsu and Jiangxi Zeng Guoquan,
t -4 +RT (month unknown), Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 1078-9.
809 aPa e i B 3N
,' ML(ECAf, Akt - 42 Y +A 9 , Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 700-4.
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institutional ability to extract maximum lijin duties from the economy does not
necessarily imply that the central and provincial governments had lost control over the
collected revenue. As the lijin collection in provinces was highly institutionalized and
hundreds of collecting and supervising officials were involved, it is unlikely that
provincial governments could effectively collected lijin duties yet only give a small
proportion to the center. The oversight of collecting officials was also institutionalized,
particularly in the inter-personal check of accounts. It is thus unlikely that a large
proportion of the lijin revenue could have been embezzled by collecting officials, even
though there were definitely many cases of misconduct and corruption. In order to
understand how the conditions of the Chinese economy limited the rise of ijin revenue,
we shall examine the efforts made by the Qing government after 1884 when it was
troubled by growing expenditures in defense and river works.
The obvious target for increasing ijin revenue was opium, the biggest consumer good in
China at the time. Through difficult negotiations, the Qing government in 1877 finally
made the British government to agree to an imposition of an additional consumption duty
(yangyao liin) of 80 tael on every 100 jin of imported opium. A number of Guangdong
merchants petitioned the center to let them form a company in Hong Kong to monopolize
the import of Indian opium into China. Li Hongzhang, the governor-general of Zhili,
supported this plan as it greatly facilitated the collection of the additional and substantial
duty on imported opium.810 Although this plan was impractical given the opposition of
810 In Li Hongzhang's view, such a company could not only effectively collect the heavy duties on
imported opium but also save the huge costs to collect duties after the imported opium was dispatched
across China. i -)i| ±fk -, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 488, No.
1327-9.
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foreign opium merchants, it showed that government officials understood clearly that it
would be most effective to collect lijin duties from big warehouses before the goods had
been dispatched. As Yang Changjun, the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang,
pointed out to the center, that it was easier to collect the additional consumption duty on
imported opium when it passed the Customs as a whole, and it was hard to prevent
evasion once it became scattered after entering China.81' For this reason, the center
decided in February 1887 to have the Imperial Maritime Customs, rather than provincial
governments, collect this additional duty on imported opium. 8 12
The Qing government also attempted to raise receipts from the lijin duties levied upon
domestic opium. On 2 June 1890, the center consulted provincial governors about the
feasibility of increasing this duty from the current 30 tael per dan on opium transported
by land and 40 tael upon opium transported by river to 110 tael per 100 dan as Robert
Hart suggested. The center also asked them to come up with methods for improving the
yields from domestic opium in their provinces and ordered them to send separate
quarterly accounts of the ijin revenue collected from domestic opium to the Board of
Revenue.
In response, provincial governors, particularly in provinces where there was no opium
cultivation, opposed this measure. In their view, a heavy liin duty on domestic opium
M ,F .]A t, 1 ~)hJ Q, Grand Council Memorial Copies,
Box 488, No. 3005-7.
812 The historian Dai Yifeng is right to point out that this case illustrates the central authority in fiscal issues,
yet he neglects the common concern to prevent tax evasion that is shared by both the center and provinces.
See Dai Yifeng, "Wanqing zhongyang yu difang caizheng guanxi [The fiscal relationship between the
center and provinces in the late Qing]," Zhongguojingjishiyanjiu, No. 4 (2000), pp. 53-4.
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was impractical as it would simply be undermined by illegal traffic in opium, which was
a high-value, light, and easy-to-hide commodity. In addition, governors of provinces
with significant opium cultivation such as Yunnan and Sichuan pointed out that it was
almost impossible to collect high opium taxes from small peasants.is Nonetheless, some
governors did put forward methods about how to increase the receipts from domestic
opium. For example, the Hubei provincial government established a specialized office in
the Yichang prefecture to manage the collection of-lgin duties on Sichuan opium, much
of which passed through Yichang to enter Hubei.814 Liu Bingzhang, the governor-
general of Sichuan, proposed converting various transit lijin levied upon domestic opium
by offices or stations scattered in various regions into one uniform tax levied on major
wholesalers in major opium-producing provinces. After paying this single tax, merchants
were free from paying transit ljin on opium in any other province. As Liu pointed out
explicitly, this collection method could help the center to manage the collection of opium
taxes. 815
This scheme represented an important step toward centralization in collecting lgin duties
on domestic opium. The center then let the Jiangsu provincial government, which had
made a similar proposal, to experiment with this new method of collection (tuyao
813 Lin Man-houng, "Wanqing de yapianshui [Opium taxes in the late Qing]," Siyu yan, Volume 16, No. 5
(1979):
Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 1335-41. The Hubei provincial governments also reported the special
accounts of collecting domestic opium to the Board of Revenue. Lu Yudong is wrong to say that provincial
governors always hide the accounts of domestic opium from the center.
815 "[±§q59, E|- 10 n Ei Ple M s B , No 14078 .
WEATmit0  MMP9 fti'-3;X
1K." 99I.2 A N A_/6A±±+)JU 19,Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 1407-8.
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tongjuan). A special collecting office (tuyao tongjuanju) was established in Xuzhou, one
major area of opium cultivation. It issued licenses to opium merchants and levied a
uniform opium duty upon them. After paying this in Xuzhou, these merchants were not
liable for any other transit duties in Jiangsu province, including the major lijin collection
offices in Nanjing, Suzhou, and Shanghai. The center even asked the troops stationed in
Xuzhou to protect the transportation of opium by the licensed merchants.8 16
In the collection of lijin duties upon domestic opium, the center and provincial
governments thus understood the importance of economies of scale to tax collection, i.e.,
the bigger the scale, the more difficult to evade taxes, and the easier for the government
to extract more tax revenue. We observe the same consideration in the collection of beer
excises in England and the sake taxes in Japan, where the emergence of big merchants in
the respective goods greatly reduced the cost of central collection and supervision.
However, the result of the experiment in Xuzhou was not very encouraging. The annual
revenue actually collected was some 200,000 tael, lower than the originally anticipated
300,000 tael; and accounted for only 2 percent of the total value of opium produced in
Xuzhou. 817 As opium cultivation was scattered among small peasants, it was impossible
to prevent the illegal traffic of opium among non-licensed merchants. The difficulty of
forming a monopoly for domestic trade of opium in China was thus mainly caused by the
nature of opium trade and production. In 1894, the total tax revenue collected from
domestic opium was 2.2 million tael silver, accounted to only 2.3 percent of the
816 -
- - f, Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 1454-60.
817 - i, A*-± A H, Palace Memorials, Box 32, No. 1843-6.
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estimated total value of domestic opium (94 million tael). 18 In comparison, the Qing
government received 5.2 million tael from collecting the lijin duty upon imported opium
from the Customs, which amounted to 14 percent of the total value of 37 million tael of
imported opium.819 As both provincial and central governments had made great efforts
to raise the receipts from lijin duties, we can safely exclude the possibility that there were
consumer goods other than opium which were produced on a large scale or participated in
inter-regional trade yet evaded the attention of government officials.
Given the socio-economic circumstances in China in 1894, would it have been possible
for the Qing government to centralize its tax collection and mobilize more financial
resources? It is difficult to answer this counterfactual question. Nonetheless, the
indemnity of 230 million tael that the Qing government owed to Japan and which it
decided to return within three years serves a proxy to a severe credit crisis upon the
central government. Neither the Qing nor the Japanese government could have
anticipated the outbreak of this major conflict, which lasted less than two years.
Although the military spending of the Qing government rose sharply during the war, the
Chinese economy was not severely disrupted, in contrast to the civil war of the 1850s. In
fact, there was a boom of private investment in modern industry in Shanghai right after
the end of the war. It was thus a crisis that primarily affected the central government.
818 The estimated total value of domestic opium in 1894 is cited from Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming,
Zhongguo zibenzhuyifazhanshi [A History of the Development of Capitalism in China], volume 2, p. 302.819 Tang Xianglong, Zhongguojindai haiguan shuishou hefenpei tongji [Statistics of the Customs
Revenues and Their Dispense in Early Modem China] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1992), p. 120 and Hsiao
Liang-lin, China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949 (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center of
Harvard University, 1974), p. 52.
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The rapidly rising military spending after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war quickly
exhausted the silver reserves of the Qing government. In addition to curtailment of other
expenditures and extraction of more revenue, the Board of Revenue first borrowed 1
million tael from merchants in Beijing, and the center soon ordered provincial governors
to borrow from Chinese merchants two-year loans at 7 percent. Meanwhile, the central
government in September 1894 had the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
(huifengyinhang) issue stocks in London to raise two loans on behalf of the Chinese state
(Zhongguo guojia), with customs revenue assigned as security. 820 The Qing government
received the first loan of 10 million tael on January 10, 1895. In contrast to previous
foreign loans which were negotiated by provincial governments with the approval of the
center, this was the first time that the central government directly negotiated on its own
behalf.
Provincial governments experimented with various ways to attract domestic loans. In
Zhili, Governor-general Li Hongzhang extended the term of borrowing from two years to
six years with the aim of reducing the burden of interest payments. Meanwhile, the
Customs Office in Tianjin issued stocks to creditors, the value of each stock being 600
tael.82' The lenders in Suzhou and Nanjing received similar stocks of 250 tael issued by
820 fpffj r]1&r4F 1l4R ft -t J1J
A, iti r I $..# 2% 71i"EE f]# @ + IE P t _- H, Grand
Council Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 1067-88.
821 The Custom Offices in Shanghai and Guangzhou seem to have adopted the same method as Li
Hongzhang reported that he followed their precedents in Tianjin. M, +6Z t+ZJ 1
2 t ~ 1, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 1055-9.
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the Customs Office in Shanghai. 2 Provincial governments in Zhili, Jiangxi, and Fujian
entrusted guilds or wealthy merchants rather than government offices with handling
borrowing and interest payments to creditors.823 This kind of collaboration with Chinese
merchants to raise loans for the state was used by Hu Guangyong, the founder of the
Fukang Bank. In September 1878, he organized a company named Qiantai, which
specialized in raising money from merchants in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Suzhou for
lending to the government at 12.5 percent to fund the military campaigns in Xinjiang.
This company raised 1.75 million tael from Chinese merchants; the face value of each
stock was as high as 50,000 tael.8 24 In comparison, the value of stocks of credit that the
provincial governments issued to attract lending from Chinese merchants in 1895 ranged
from 100 to 1,500 tael, which helped attract investment by small creditors. Many
provincial governors emphasized the importance of securing confidence in the initial
stage of domestic borrowing as they were aware that many merchants who had idle
capital were observing whether the Qing government could return punctually. In the
view of the Hubei governor Tan Jixun, if the government demonstrated its ability to
822 WELKA 218r~A %2 , Y =t-4+=h r t- 9, Grand Council Memorial
Copies, Box 680, No. 1304-7.
12 In Fujian, "[40EENM ] Xh 1049ZA4 , *#iW-A, WR , .E NM
A tE , Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 1029-30. In Tianjin, "
TNEwW ." IE E|E?, ZY Ft 3 ZE B, Grand Council
Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 1050-4. In Jiangxi, "M &% k~* ,
, t#" >I IE :, +±t-2 Rt -, Grand Council Memorial Copies,
Box 680, No. 1124-7.824 Xu Yisheng, Zhongguojindai waizaishi tongji ziliao [Statistical materials on Foreign Loans in Early
Modem China] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962), p. 3.
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assign revenue to return the principal and interest punctually, wealthy merchants would
"rise to lend" in future. 825
The attempt at domestic borrowing in 1894 did not immediately prompt institutional
development toward fiscal centralization. Provincial governments borrowed from
merchants separately. This kind of decentralized borrowing could not realize the
potential of raising domestic loans because the merchants who could afford to lend to the
state were mostly concentrated in coastal cities, particularly Shanghai, the financial and
commercial center of China at the time. It was difficult for governors in less developed
provinces such as Shandong and Hunan to find merchants who were able to lend to the
government. The foreign loans by the central government did not necessarily lead to
fiscal centralization as long as the Board of Revenue continued to assign revenue from
provinces of collection to Shanghai to make interest payments to the Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank. With China's defeat and the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki
Treaty in April 1895, the Qing government ordered provincial governments to stop
domestic borrowing as it had to give priority to paying off the huge indemnity to Japan.
We therefore cannot tell what kind of institutional development that domestic borrowing
would have produced if the Sino-Japanese war had lasted longer.
As it was, the indemnity of 230 million tael forced the Board of Revenue to search for
new institutions to raise income. In June of 1895, the censor Guan Shixiang claimed that
825 a iLB~
*-'. 0 , :)I ii%. " 31 rA-1W, 1E il 9JtI, A t -4 2t- 1, Grand
Council Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 1133-5.
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there was no need to fundamentally reform the established institutions (zuzong chengfa);
he advocated reducing government spending to the level of the in mid-eighteenth century
and using the surplus to pay the indemnity. 826 In response, officials of the Board of
Revenue argued that it was important to reform established institutions according to the
changing times. 82 7 This was particularly true when retrenchment could not meet the
needs of indemnity payments, defense, and important projects such as railways,
telegraph, and arsenals. It is clear from their responses that the huge post-war indemnity
and concomitant military expenditures, which could not be handled by the existing
institutions of public finance, constituted a common problem for state actors in China.
The principles of reforms were explicit in the imperial edict of 19 July 1895 which called
for proposals for reform and self-strengthening, i.e., the urgent thing was to raise revenue
for the military and the fundamental means were to encourage commerce and industry. 828
The indemnity thus provides an opportunity for us to observe the institutional changes in
public finance implemented to meet this challenge and to evaluate whether they represent
the early stage of an institutional learning process toward a modern fiscal state
sustainable by the socio-economic circumstances in China at the time.
In regard to financial reform, there were three proposals between April 1895 and January
1896 to establish a state bank, which was to manage the collected revenue and
Cited from the memorial of the Board of Revenue, August 8, 1895, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box
680, No. 1170-7.
" ' , T|%." The memorial of the
Board of Revenue, August 8, 1895, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 1170-7.
828 r ] . 19 July, 1895.
Cited from Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (xiace), p. 636.
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government expenditures at both central and provincial levels, to issue banknotes, and to
raise loans for the state. 82 9 The princes and officials who were in charge of military and
financial issues also considered a state bank the necessary basis for commercial and
industrial development to protect the interests of China against foreigners. They planned
to establish state banks in Beijing and Shanghai first and gradually open branches in
provincial capitals and major market towns. 830 Nonetheless, officials of the Board of
Revenue still did not know how precisely to establish such a state bank. For example,
they wondered how it could deposit official funds in both the center and provinces as
these funds all had specific purposes and thus could not stay in the bank for too long.8 3 1
They thus considered it vital to examine banks in Europe and the US, the contribution of
banking to Japan's rise, and the methods used by the Shanxi bankers. Only then would it
be possible to make the regulations for the official bank of China. 832
In September 1896, Zhang Zhidong and Wang Wenshao, two powerful governors-general
recommended Sheng Xuanhuai, a major advocate of establishing a state bank, to the
center. On 27 May 1897, the Imperial Bank of China (Zhongguo tongshang yinhang)
was founded as a joint-stock bank with a nominal capital of 5 million tael and a paid-in
capital of 2.5 million tael. Among its twelve directors, eight were powerful bankers and
829 See Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (xiace), pp. 635-6, p. 637, and pp. 640-1.
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merchants, including Yan Xinhou, Zhu Baosan, and Ye Chenzhong. By May of 1898, it
had opened branches in Beijing, Tianjin, Hankou, Guangzhou, Shantou, Yantai, and
Zhenjiang.833 The Board of Revenue clearly used the Imperial Bank of China as a pilot
project to see whether it was practical to establish a note-issuing state bank. The
Shengjing general, ftA R1iJ (equivalent to the governor of Fengtian province) in
January 1898 suggested that the Board of Revenue raise capital to establish a central bank
to issue paper notes. In his view, under the current pressing need to raise government
income, there was no speedy method available other than the issue of paper notes; and
without the establishment of a state bank, there was no way to secure the creditworthiness
of paper notes.83 4 In response, the Board of Revenue pointed out that Sheng Xuanhuai
had implemented the proposed plan in Shanghai. The Board of Revenue needed to see
whether it would work out in practice.
In regard to issue of paper notes, officials of the Board of Revenue argued that adequate
cash reserves were vital to their successful issue. Yet the government at the time was
severely short of revenue, as it had to make the interest payment of 23 million tael every
year. In this situation, they wondered whether it was feasible to let the state bank float
paper notes. In particular, they pointed out that the devaluation of paper notes was the
833 For the early history of the Imperial Bank of China, see Albert Feuerwerker, China's Early
Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-Huai (1844-1916) and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard
University Press, 1958), see 225-241.
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cause of the biggest samurai rebellion in Japan in 1877.835 Opponents of a note-issuing
state bank also used the failure of paper notes in the 1850s to make their case. Even
Sheng Xuanhuai admitted that this most recent failure in floating paper notes was a
lesson that should be taken seriously. 836 As late as January 1899, officials on the Board
of Revenue, including the Minister Wang Wenshao, who had supported Sheng
Xuanhuai's effort to establish a state bank, still considered it impractical for the
government to issue paper notes. In their view, paper notes issued by the Board of
Revenue could not circulate in the economy, as attested by the experience of the 1850s.
Moreover, they were concerned that their use in public finance would drive silver out of
China, leaving the government holding worthless paper notes. 837 Banknotes were thus
viewed as a purely private credit instrument with which the state should not get involved.
The deep-seated caution of the Board of Revenue toward banknotes significantly
restricted the performance of the Imperial Bank of China. Designed as a state bank, it
was subjected to the restrictions of a central bank, as it could not invest its capital in
industrial enterprises and real estate. Yet it did not have a monopoly on the issue of
835 JA -V-f
-t2 tPfMarch 23,
1898, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 680, No. 1735-9.
836 Sheng Xuanhuai, "Memorial note on the establishment of an official bank," 31 October, 1896. Cited
from Xia Dongyuan ed., Sheng Xuanhuai nianpu changbian (xiace) [Autobiographical Materials of Sheng
Xuanhuai] (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaotong daxue chubanshe, 2004), p. 541.
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banknotes, which was the most profitable business for the Bank of Japan and Bank of
England before they established their dominance in the domestic financial markets. Even
in the remittance of official funds, the Imperial Bank of China had to compete with
private banks which remitted money for provincial governments and customs offices.
Moreover, it had to hand over silver to the Board of Revenue in its remittance to Beijing.
As the Imperial Bank of China did not have many profitable projects to attract more
subscribers to enlarge its capital stocks, it could only issue limited amounts of banknotes.
In contrast to its reluctance to float state banknotes in both public finance and the
economy, the Board of Revenue was very interested in issuing state bonds to raise
domestic loans. Shortly after the establishment of the Imperial Bank of China, the Zongli
Yamen inquired whether it could provide low-interest loans to the government, as the
Bank of England did for the British government. In reply, Sheng Xuanhuai pointed out
that state loans in the west were raised by the bank on behalf of the state through selling
state bonds in the markets not by using the bank's capital as security. 838 In January 1898,
Huang Siyong, a metropolitan official, proposed adopting this method to borrow from
Chinese merchants. In his proposal, he made it clear that such state bonds should be
assignable in the markets and could be inherited as property. Moreover, the subscription
of state bonds and the interest payment should be entrusted to private banks. In Huang's
view, bonds secured by the state were more trustworthy than stocks issued by private
companies.
838 Sheng Xuanhuai, "Reply to the inquiry of Zongli Yamen," 12 April, 1897. Cited from Xia Dongyuan
ed., ShengXuanhuai nianpu changbian (xiace) [Autobiographical Materials of Sheng Xuanhuai], p. 572.
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The Board of Revenue immediately approved this plan. In January 1898, it decided to
issue state bonds of 100 million tael (named zhaoxin, meaning "great trust") in China.
The value of each bond was 100 tael, bearing an annual interest rate of 5 percent. The
term was 20 years. These bonds could be freely traded in the markets. However, the
Board of Revenue did not entrust the subscription of these bonds to private banks, nor did
it let private banks manage the interest payments. It did not even seek help from the
newly founded Imperial Bank of China in Shanghai. Instead, the Board of Revenue
replied upon administrative institutions to distribute these bonds among provinces. The
responsibility of returning interest payments was thus passed to government treasuries
scattered in Beijing and provinces. Although 10 million tael were raised through both
voluntary and forced subscription, many of them were stored separately in treasuries of
provinces and waited for the Board of Revenue's future assignments.
Considering the highly decentralized nature of Qing fiscal institutions, it was difficult for
the Board of Revenue to take the responsibility of making interest payments for this
domestic borrowing. But by decentralizing management of this domestic borrowing,
they made it extremely difficult to discipline provincial governments to make punctual
interest payments to creditors scattered in various provinces. Moreover, provincial
governments had to give priority to meet their assigned quotas in making annual
installment of 12 million tael after 1896 (plus an additional 5 million tael after the second
loan from Britain and Germany in 1898) to return the loans which China borrowed from
Britain, Germany, France, and Russia to pay the indemnity to Japan. In this situation, it
was hard for provincial governors to safeguard the interest payments to the domestic
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subscribers of the zhaoxin bonds. The resulting chaotic interest payments greatly
damaged the creditworthiness of the Qing government in the markets.
Although the customs revenue was the main security for the foreign loans, the Board of
Revenue divided the annual installment of 12 million tael (17 million tael after 1898)
among provincial governments and offices of the Imperial Maritime Customs.839 The
political authority of the center and the administrative ability of provincial governments
are clearly illustrated by the punctual arrival of installments of annual interest payments
to the Customs Office in Shanghai. The installments for the French and Russian loans
had to arrive in Shanghai at the end of the third and ninth month every year; and those for
the British and German loans at the end of the second, fifth, eighth, and eleventh months.
The Board of Revenue ordered the Customs Office in Shanghai to send separate accounts
on the received quotas from provincial governments, and to report to the Board by
telegraph as soon as the assigned funds arrived in Shanghai. The Board also used
telegraph to press provincial governments if there were arrears in sending the assigned
installments.840 According to the reports of the Customs Office in Shanghai, more than
95 percent arrived on time between 1896 and 1899.841 These punctual interest payments
suggest that the Qing government had the ability to raise long-term loans or to support its
state bank, even if this was not realized.
839 Luo Yudong, "Guangxu chao pujiu caizheng zhi fangan [Methods to cover public finance in the reign of
the Guangxu emperor]," in Zhou Kangxie, ed., Zhongguojindai shehuijingjishi lunji (xiace) [Collected
Essays in the Socio-Economic History of Early Modem China] (Hong Kang: Zhongwen shudian, 1971), p.
245.
The memorial of the Board of Revenue, At = t A/) Y t E, Grand Council Memorial Copies,
Box 507, No. 2428-30.
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Box 507, No. 2796-8; September 21, 1900, Grand Council Memorial Copies, Box 507, No. 3087-9.
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The return of the foreign loans constituted a pressing problem which forced both
provincial and central governments to enlarge tax base and improve efficiency in tax
collection. However, it was difficult for the government to extract more from the transit
liin levied on interregional trade. The major items in long-distance trade were all
agricultural goods, particularly tea, grains, and cotton, whose consumption did not have
the inelasticity of addictive consumption goods such as liquor and beer. The competition
of Japanese and Indian tea in the international market made it impossible to raise liin
duties on the Chinese tea. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Shimonoseki not only opened more
treaty ports in China but also allowed foreigners to set up enterprises in the treaty ports
areas. In this situation, Chinese merchants increasingly chose to pay the additional tariff
(zikoushui) at treaty ports rather than the transit liin duties. Foreign businessmen who
manufactured goods in China also pressured the Qing government to repeal the transit
lijin.
The Qing government consequently began to search for alternative methods to collect
indirect taxes. One option was to raise the tariff duties and thus repeal domestic lijin
duties. Officials in the Board of Revenue and the Zongli Yamen had discussed this
method in 1896. But its implementation had to be approved by the western powers. The
collection of liin duties upon immobile producers was constrained by the small scale of
production of major consumption goods in China. Only Zhili, Sichuan, Jilin, and
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Fengtian managed to collect taxes from liquor producers, and the annual receipts did not
exceed 1 million tael in one province.842
As mentioned earlier, the tax levied upon domestic opium was an early target for
centralized collection. After 1895, the Board of Revenue attempted to extend this
method from Xuzhou to major provinces of opium production and trade and to collect
uniform opium duties upon congregated volumes of opium. The center promoted
officials who had demonstrated ability in collecting lijin duties, such as Ke Fengshi in
Guangxi and Chen Yiluo in Jiangsu, to take charge of collection. Branch offices sent
their monthly accounts to supervising offices in the province, which then sent account
reports to the center every three months. 84 3 The total revenue collected from domestic
opium rose from 2.2 million tael in 1894 to 9.3 million tael in 1907, of which the center
retained 3.7 million tael and the rest was assigned to provincial governments.844 Yet
both illegal traffic and nation-wide movement against opium smoking in the 1900s
checked the further rise of revenue from domestic opium.
IV. A modern fiscal state as a possible outcome
The institutional changes caused by the payment of indemnity to Japan after 1895 thus
allow us to speculate about the two scenarios of China's possible transformation into a
842 The annual receipts of liquor taxes were 630,000 tael in Sichuan in1906, and 800,000 tael Zhili in 1902,
and 500,000 tael in Fengtian. See He Hanwei, "Qingmo fushui jizhun de kuodajiqi juxian [The expansion
of and limits to tax collection in the late Qing]," Zhongyang yanjiuyuanjindaishi yanjiusuojikan, No. 17
(xiace) (December 1988): 69-98.
843 For the discussion of this process toward centralization, which was sped up by the Boxer indemnity of
1900, see He Hanwei, "Qingji guochang yapian de tongjuan yu tongshui [Centralization in collecting
opium taxes in the late Qing]," in Xinhuoji: chuangtong yujindai bianqianzhong de zhongguojingji
(Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2001), pp. 560-70.
44 Ibid., p. 570.
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modem fiscal state. The fiasco with the issue of paper notes in 1850s compromised the
path of floating paper notes in the economy. Foreign models were not convincing, both
because historical memory of the earlier fiasco were especially strong in Beijing and
because the examples of other countries offered negative as well as positive experiences
with issuing paper notes.
The Board of Revenue was more willing to accept the token silver currency minted by
machine than the "empty" paper notes. It allowed provincial governments in Guangdong
and Hubei to experiment with this coinage. As the minted silver currency smoothly
circulated in the markets, the Board of Revenue in November 1889 considered it to be
"the badly needed thing for China" and ordered its expansion in Guangdong. 845 Its
acceptance in both market transactions and government finance in Hubei and Guangdong
encouraged the center to recommend its adoption to all coastal provinces in July 1894. In
28 March 1896, the Qing government declared counterfeiting silver currency a capital
crime, ending its long-standing laissez-faire attitude toward silver currency. 846 In
February 1900, Zhang Zhidong, the governor-general of Hubei and Hunan, sent officials
of the Hubei Mint to Beijing to help set up the capital Mint. In the mintage of copper
cash, the center also let provincial governments experiment first. Only when profit from
the mintage of copper cash led to excessive mintage did the center begin to attempt to
take control. In both cases, modern technology provided the means for the Qing
845 pR4r nA -'fi,27 November, 1889. Zhongguojindai
huobishi ziliao (xiace), p. 678.
846 The memorial of the Board of Revenue, 28 March, 1896. Zhongguojindai huobishi ziliao (xiace), pp.
684-5.
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government to achieve conformity in the mintage of silver and copper currency at both
central and local levels.
In contrast to the reluctance to float paper notes, government officials at the time
understood the importance of using its tax revenue to mobilize more financial resources
through borrowing. Like the Meiji government in the same period, the Qing government
only took out foreign loans in urgent situations. Unlike the Meiji government, the Qing
government before 1894 did not have much pressure to try long-term domestic
borrowing. The foreign loans undertaken to fund the military campaigns in the northwest
and Xinjiang between 1866 and 1883 did not trigger any institutional development which
introduced the use of credit instruments into public finance. The borrowed money was
sent to troops on the frontiers in the form of either bullion or supplies. Meanwhile, the
Qing government could rely upon its decentralized institutions to return these loans.
Nonetheless, the economic conditions needed to transform the Qing into a modern fiscal
state along the English path were available in China after the 1880s. Firstly, a stock
market had emerged in Shanghai between 1862 and 1872, and a specialized stock
exchange company (Shanghai gupiao pingzhun gongsi) was founded in October 1882 to
facilitate the transactions of stocks.847 In the period from 1872 to 1883, modern
enterprises in transportation and mining raised total capital of 6.64 million tael through
selling stocks in Shanghai.848 Secondly, there was a large amount of idle capital seeking
investment opportunities in Shanghai and the coastal regions. By 1894, the estimated
847 Tian Yongxiu, "1862-1883 nian Zhongguo de gupiao shichang [The stock market in China: 1862-
1883]," Zhongguojingjishiyanjiu, No. 2 (1995), pp. 58-9.
848 Ibid., p. 64.
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total wealth of some 10,000 compradors that was ready for investment was as high as 200
million tael.849 Yet the interest rates on deposits in both native and foreign banks were
low; for example, the interest rate of a one-year timed deposit in foreign banks in
Shanghai was around 5 percent.
In this situation, the Qing government could have raised more financial resources by
issuing state bonds in Shanghai. In their efforts to borrow from domestic merchants in
1894, government officials knew the importance of entrusting private financial
intermediaries to manage the subscription and interest payments of credit bills for state
borrowing. More importantly, the Qing government had demonstrated its ability to
ensure punctual arrivals of the assigned revenues from the provinces to Shanghai.
Punctual interest payments would make its bonds very attractive to investors in Shanghai
and coastal regions. Nonetheless, considering the geographic distance between Shanghai
and Beijing, the Board of Revenue had to be pushed to try to mobilize the financial
markets in Shanghai for its purposes. Moreover, such pressure needed to last long
enough to realize the mutually reinforcing effects between the punctual interest payments
and the increasing confidence of investors in the bonds of the state. Had the Qing
government used 5 percent of its annual income of 80 million tael in the late 1880s to
serve a perpetual state borrowing at 6 percent, it could have raised 67 million tael. This
amount of money could have supported its original plan to build two more fleets at the
scale of the Beiyang fleet, a plan not realized due to the lack of funds.
849 Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming eds., Zhongguo zibenzhuyifazhanshi [A History of the Development of
Capitalism in China], volume 2, p. 175.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion: Actor, Institution, and Socio-Economic Conditions in the
Rise of the Modern Fiscal State
The emergence and consolidation of new institutions, like other socio-political
developments, is a temporal process requiring decades or even longer. This temporal
dimension implies that there is a considerable time interval between the independent
variables and the final observed institutional outcome that we want to explain. What kind
of causal mechanisms can carry the causal effects across this time span between
independent variables and a dependent variable? How do we locate the origin of such a
temporal causal mechanism? These questions are important ones for the study of
historical causation in the social sciences which use factors prior to the final outcome to
explain it.
Take the building of a house as a metaphor for institutional development. Theories based
upon the independent variables that are too close to the final outcome add little
explanatory value, just like the putting of the last brick tells us nothing about how the
house is designed and how its base was laid down. Causal indeterminacy simply rises
exponentially the farther away that our independent variables are from the final outcome.
The further we go back in time, we find that not only the design of the house but also the
site of the building is open to debate among actors. In extreme cases, even the decision
not to build can be possible if actors simply cannot resolve their differences. In
explaining socio-political development, the vital thing is to identify a mechanism which
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can avoid deterministic explanations that "over-explain" and pure narratives that "under-
explain" the final outcome of institutional development.
In this dissertation, I take the emergence and consolidation of the institutions of the
modem fiscal state as a specific case of fundamental institutional innqvation to address
the general issue of how new institutions come into being, an important issue in
institutional dynamics. The rise of the modem fiscal state results from actors' conscious
efforts to try to bring together different kinds of institutional blocks - both old and new -
into a new system of public finance. Nonetheless, this is only part of the story.
Disagreements among actors over the design of new institutions involve not only their
distributional impact but also their feasibility in practice. Is it possible for the state to
live with its perpetual liabilities, either long-term borrowing or paper notes? Who is
going to shoulder the major burden of taxation? Who is going to benefit from such
perpetual liabilities? Socio-economic conditions significantly constrain different plans of
institutional development. Not every place is suitable to build the same house.
The institutional learning model that I construct based upon detailed historical
examination of the successful cases of England and Japan and the unsuccessful instance
of China attempts to integrate various factors into one temporal causal mechanism.
These included the ideas, cognitive capacities, and interest concerns of actors, their
experiments with various institutional blocks, and the prevailing socio-economic
conditions which they cannot easily manipulate to fit their preferred institutional designs.
This model takes seriously the multiplicity of possible outcomes that are caused by the
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interactions among these factors. It then seeks to explain how the observed outcome
arose from the pool of multiple possibilities inherent in the process of institutional
development.
Existing theories regarding the rise of new institutions have done a poor job of addressing
this multiplicity of possible outcomes. In neo-institutionalist models, actors' strategic
calculations of interest determine their institutional preference. Politically powerful
actors intentionally choose the institutional arrangements which will maximize their
interests. In this light, the rise of new actors, such as the merchant class, becomes crucial
to explain the establishment of new institutions. However, this approach has difficulty
accounting for the creation of centralized institutions which efficiently extract revenue
from indirect sources, particularly from domestic consumption. Based upon interest-
calculation, traditional political elites whose wealth comes mainly from land should not
oppose such institutions. The asymmetry of power implied in the collective action
problem undermines the ability of ordinary consumers to organize politically to safeguard
their interests. In this situation, neo-institutionalist models cannot explain the timing of
the establishment of centralized fiscal institutions to collect taxes upon domestic
consumption. Why does it take decades for political elites, including both the monied
and landed classes, to find these institutions which are favorable to their interests? The
problem with the neo-institutionalist account of institutional development is that it is
ahistorical, i.e., it improperly assumes that actors have perfect information about the
functions and distributional effects of institutions yet to be created.
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As emphasized by the theory of punctuated equilibrium, fundamental institutional
innovation often originates from the breakdown of old institutions which have exhausted
their ability to handle new problems. Their collapse also means a lack of guidance or any
kind of roadmap for actors, who therefore have to search for alternative institutions under
the constraint of huge uncertainties. Neither the rational capacities of actors nor
ideational factors are able to dispel the dense opacity in the early stages of searching for
new institutions. For example, in the initial period of experimenting with new fiscal or
financial institutions, in addition to different interests, ideas, and political agendas, actors
have very different understandings of the intricacies of the financial market and its
relationship with public finance. Their technical competence in regard to the operation of
the financial markets also varies greatly. In an early modern state, even among officials
in public finance, only a few could grasp the operation of credit instruments such as bills
of exchange, banknotes, or paper notes. Moreover, private finance is different in nature
from public finance. The attempt to connect tax revenue permanently with the state's
liabilities in the financial markets, which were dominated by private financers, of course
aroused suspicion, opposition, and even hostility among the majority of government
officials.
Under these circumstances, strategic calculations based upon the interest concerns of
actors are unable to determine the direction of institutional development. When the
distributional effects of the nascent institutional arrangements remain uncertain, actors
may oppose institutions that are in fact in their long-term interest, or embrace others that
turn out ultimately to not be in their favor. In this light, the breakdown of old institutions
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opens up a space for innovation, yet it does not imply any specific direction of
subsequent development. The early stages of fundamental institutional innovation are
thus open-ended. There are competing plans or policy options, each of which implies
different directions of institutional development. Agency matters, yet actors' intentions
and willingness to search for new institutions to replace the discredited ones do not
suffice to guarantee that they will look in the right direction. Power struggles among
actors in the highly political process of institutional development further complicates the
story. When the political cost of failure remains high, actors become risk-averse in
experimenting with new institutional arrangements in public finance. Meanwhile, the
lessons that could have learned from a pioneer's failures may be ignored by successors
who have completely different institutional designs. This situation is highly unfavorable
to attain a "collective learning" among the trials of different institutional arrangements, as
we observe in innovations in science and technology.
The uncertainty inherent in the initial stage of institutional development and the
multiplicity of possible outcomes it entails also causes trouble for the theories of
institutional change found in historical institutionalism. The emergence of new
institutions often has a sequential order. Nonetheless, the unique sequence leading to the
observed institutional outcome is often one seen only in hindsight. When actors are
groping for new institutions in the darkness, they have to face multiple possible
sequences. Sequence analysis of institutional change begs the question of why it is this
particular sequence, rather than the others, that explains the final result. Theories based
upon self-reinforcing effects among the constituent elements of a new institutional
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system provide a powerful means to understand the consolidation of institutions.
However, they encounter a similar problem of timing when we ask how a self-reinforcing
mechanism began.
In the case of state long-term borrowing serviced by reliable revenue collected from
indirect consumption taxes, why did state actors not realize a wonderful self-reinforcing
mechanism between the efficiency in tax collection and the increasing amount of long-
term credit they could obtain from the markets? This problem is more serious when we
consider the multiple possible self-reinforcing processes inherent in a process of
institutional development. For example, instead of a self-reinforcing process between
efficient tax collection and increasing confidence of investors in state long-term
borrowing, it is equally possible at the initial stage that unreliable or insufficient tax
revenues undermine the confidence of creditors in government's long-term borrowing.
The consequent difficulty in raising long-term credits in turn removes the pressure on the
government to reform its institutions of tax collection.
Likewise, the use of credit instruments in the fiscal operation of the state is vital to
centralize the government's fiscal management. The increasing centralization in fiscal
operation then consolidates government officials' confidence in using credit instruments
to transfer revenue and official funds. However, difficulties in stabilizing the value of
credit instruments in public finance may lead government officials to abandon them and
to rely instead upon a decentralized fiscal operation which assigns revenue from sites of
collection directly to destinations of spending. This situation further reduces the
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necessity of introducing speedy credit instruments into state fiscal operations. A self-
reinforcing process can be either a virtuous or a vicious cycle, leading to quite divergent
institutional outcomes.
The problems that historical institutionalists have in explaining the emergence of new
institutions are caused by their inadequate historical examinations of the actual process of
institutional development. As a result, they often neglect the other possible sequences
and outcomes and implicitly take the observed outcome as given. They then
retrospectively find a particular sequence or self-reinforcing mechanism to "explain" it.
The price to pay for doing so is an ex postfacto interpretation of institutional
development, which is in essence equivalent to the mistake of selection bias.
The causal indeterminacy and the openness to multiple possible outcomes in the process
of institutional development are illustrated in the three episodes of institutional
transformation that I examine in this dissertation. In the case of England, the nascent
centralization in tax collection and the state dependence upon short-term credit bills to
meet its spending in the 1650s did not automatically lead to a self-reinforcing process
toward long-term credit. The fiscal decentralization and dependence upon big tax
farmers for credit and collection of taxes between 1660 and 1667 had a strong "lock-in"
tendency. The establishment of efficient and centralized Excise Department in the late
1680s did not necessarily lead to effort to build institutions of long-term borrowing. In
the case of Japan, the need to "learn from the west" and centralize the fiscal system was
by no means an object of consensus among major political actors between 1868 and
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1871. Even when the new central government was established in 1871, there were still
deep divergences over the tempo of institution building. Similarly, in the 1860s it was
still too early to predict China's failure to centralize its fiscal system as important
changes did occurred in its public finance in the 1870s and 1880s. The revenue from the
indirect customs and lijin duties replace that from land taxes as the pillar of public
finance. Provincial governments increasingly collaborated with private financiers to
remit revenue and official funds. The center did not lose its political control in financial
matters and had the necessary authority to mobilize funds to fight international wars.
Seen in this light, a temporal mechanism needs to explain not only the observed
institutional outcome, the modern fiscal states in England and Japan and its failure to
occur in China, but also the non-occurrence of other possible outcomes in the process of
institutional development in each case.
The institutional learning model that I propose in this dissertation provides a temporal
causal mechanism to overcome the causal indeterminacy in the initial stages of
institutional development and account for the observed institutional outcome. This model
hinges on a conjunction of the necessary socio-economic conditions and a credit crisis of
the state. In each case, a credit crisis originated from the unintended consequences of
actors' desperate dependence upon the massively issued fictitious credit bills to meet
government spending, such as short-term bills unfunded by tax revenue or non-
convertible paper notes. It did not result from intentional efforts of actors to build new
institutions and it was therefore exogenous to subsequent institutional development in
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public finance. The origin of this credit crisis thus rules out explanations that are based
upon actors' intentional designs of new institutions.
Nonetheless, the credit crisis constituted a common problem which threatened the very
survival of the state. As the available tools of public finance were unable to deal with the
emergency, it forced state actors to venture beyond the "lock-in" condition of existing
institutions. The nature of the credit crisis also provided an opportunity for officials with
some grasp of the financial world to play important roles in building new institutions in
public finance. Meanwhile, the special nature and the magnitude of the credit crisis
tested the effectiveness of new institutional arrangements which actors implemented.
Therefore, it not only forced state actors to innovate but also facilitated a continuous
accumulation of effective institutional arrangements, practical knowledge among
government officials, and competent financial officials. This remained true in spite of
power struggles among government officials who had quite different political ideas,
agendas, and institutional preferences. When this accumulation reached a self-
reinforcing stage where effective and centralized tax collection secured the
creditworthiness of the state's perpetual liabilities in the markets, either in the form of
perpetual annuities or convertible paper notes, the process of institutional development
moved irreversibly toward consolidation of the modern fiscal state. However, we must
not take this continuous accumulation of institutional learning process for granted. It is
unlikely to occur in absence of the credit crisis, given the existence of alternative
directions of institutional development, such as the lock-in situation of fiscal
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decentralization or the rejection of paper notes based upon previous failures in floating
them.
Socio-economic conditions, which actors could not manipulate to facilitate the
implementation of their favored institutional arrangements, significantly affected the
unfolding of the institutional learning process triggered by the credit crisis. For example,
the scale of production and wholesaling determined in important ways the effectiveness
of attempts to centralize the collection of indirect consumption taxes. The degree of the
development of domestic financial networks and inter-regional trade greatly influenced
the viability of the credit instruments that the state introduced to the markets and shaped
the specific means to build up long-term liabilities of the state. For example, the
existence of resourceful financiers in the economy who are able to hold government's
short-term credit bills longer for future returns is one vital condition for the state to
convert its massive short-term debt into long-term borrowing. Likewise, the smooth
floating of government paper notes throughout the domestic economy depends crucially
upon interregional economic transactions and financial networks which generate
necessary demands for a uniform and convenient medium to reduce transactions costs.
Nonetheless, socio-economic conditions did not determine the direction of institutional
development. The direction toward fiscal centralization, particularly in the collection of
elastic consumption taxes, and long-term liabilities funded by tax revenue, was an
outcome of the institutional learning process. But socio-economic conditions do
constrain the possibility of an institutional learning process. In the extreme situation,
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unfavorable socio-economic conditions may simply prevent it from happening. The
small and dispersed production of consumer goods can greatly hinder the state's efforts to
establish a centralized direct collection of taxes upon domestic consumption. A domestic
economy torn apart by civil war is also highly unfavorable for the state to introduce its
paper notes as the standard medium of exchange. Socio-economic conditions do not
simply allow an institutional learning process to take place but may also effectively shape
its specific path. For example, the overwhelming concentration of financial networks and
wealth in London and its surrounding environs in early eighteenth-century England
significantly tilted the path of institutional learning process toward the direction of
perpetual annuities rather than that of floating the banknotes issued by the Bank of
England.
In each case of England and Japan, a credit crisis resulted from particular events which
themselves did not dictate the direction of subsequent institutional development in public
finance. Yet it triggered an institutional learning process which ended up with the
institutions of the modern fiscal state. The credit crisis in England was mainly caused by
the excessive issue of the unfunded short-term bills that the English government adopted
as exigent fiscal measures. The problem of how to redeem the massive amount of
fictitious Treasury Orders between 1667 and 1672 directly led to fiscal reforms toward
more centralized management of the ordinary revenue. Meanwhile, as the royal
government bore the full risk of redeeming these credit instruments that the state created
in the markets, its contractual relationship with tax farmers increasingly leaned toward a
wage contract, which paved the way for government direct collection of the customs and
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excise. The massive short-term credit bills between 1688 and 1693 constituted another
credit crisis which forced the English government to begin experiments with various
means of long-term borrowing thereafter. The sheer magnitude of government debt in
1713 basically defined the direction of problem-solving in the direction of prolonging the
terms of debt and reducing annual interest payments.
The steady expansion of the English domestic economy and of foreign trade was
necessary to yielding an increasing return effect in the process to centralize the collection
of the customs and excise: rising receipts consolidated the royal government's confidence
in the direct collection of the customs and excise. Likewise, the recovery of the domestic
economy and the take-off of England's foreign trade after the disruptions of the Nine
Years War provided two requisite conditions for the self-reinforcing process in the 1720s,
which led to the successful conversion of the English government debts into low-interest
perpetual annuities. Increasing domestic consumption and the appearance of the mass
production of beer brewing in 1720 was favorable to the effective and centralized
collection of the ever-rising excises. Reliable interest payments then enhanced investors'
confidence in the government bonds of perpetual annuities, even though their annual
interest rates were reduced to 3 percent. The increasing dependence upon indirect
consumption taxes, particularly excises, to service the burden of interest payments of the
government's perpetual annuities greatly reduced the conflict of interests between land
owners and the government.
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The nature of the credit crisis in Meiji Japan was quite different. It started as defacto
long-term state liabilities, i.e., non-convertible paper notes issued by the Meiji
government to fund its war to topple the Bakufu in 1868. The establishment of the Meiji
regime prior to the building of necessary institutions to collect taxes forced the Meiji
government to continue its reliance upon non-convertible paper notes. The decision to
adopt the gold standard in 1870 had one serious, unintended consequence, which was to
greatly exacerbate the credit crisis of paper notes denominated in gold when the value of
gold in the international markets began to rise considerably after 1873. This credit crisis
provided an opportunity for westernizing officials to dominate the search for necessary
financial institutions to safeguard the value of government paper notes, regardless of the
power struggles among different factions. The difficulties involved in handling the non-
convertible paper notes in the domestic economy also shielded them from being purged
by the politically powerful conservatives, even when they made many policy mistakes in
early Meiji. The rise and fall of specific officials responsible for managing government
finance did not affect the continuous accumulation of the institutional arrangements
which contributed to centralization in both tax collection and management of government
finance. These institutional developments paved the way for establishing the Bank of
Japan to monopolize the supply of banknotes as the legal tender in the domestic economy
in the late 1880s.
The growing Japanese economy following the opening to the west and the development
of domestic financial and trading networks were the crucially important to sustaining the
circulation of government paper notes even though they were defacto non-convertible.
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Meanwhile, increasing domestic consumption, particularly the consumption of liquor,
constituted an importance source of revenue for the government to tap. The formation of
a national market in sake not only encouraged sake brewing but also facilitated the
central government's efforts to build up a centralized bureaucracy to assess and collect
the duties levied upon sake brewers after 1872. Nonetheless, as the credit crisis in Japan
was caused by the floating of paper notes throughout the domestic economy, policy
mistakes in handling the issue of paper notes had nation-wide distributional effects.
These in turn stimulated increasing demands for a representative polity. The political
stability of the institutions of the modern fiscal state in Japan in the 1890s was largely
due to the huge indemnity from China in 1895, which greatly increased the financial
resources of the central government vis-i-vis localities.
In comparison to the rise of the modern fiscal states in England and Japan, the failure to
attain a similar transformation in nineteenth-century China illustrates the importance of a
conjunction of necessary socio-economic conditions and a credit crisis to the unfolding of
the institutional learning process. When the Taiping Rebellion forced the Qing
government to issue paper notes to cover its deficits, the conditions in the domestic
economy were highly unfavorable to the government's financial experiments. The civil
wars cut off Beijing's connections with the economic core areas, disrupting both the
transportation of tax revenue to Beijing and the private long-distance trade through the
capital. Moreover, they disrupted the nation-wide financial networks that the Shanxi
bankers had established by 1840 and greatly reduced the volume of long-distance trade.
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As a result, the Qing government could not float short-term bills in anticipation of its
incoming tax revenue. Meanwhile, its fiscal operation became more decentralized as tax
revenues were sent from sites of collection directly to its troops on the battlefields. As
the falling volume of large-scale commercial transactions reduced the demand for silver,
the Qing government in 1855 decided to switch from silver to copper cash notes in its
experiment with paper notes. Its original purpose was to satisfy the increasing demands
of the war economy and thus facilitate the circulation of copper cash notes in the
economy. However, the difficulty of transporting bulky and low-valued copper cash
across regions made it impossible for copper notes to become the uniform currency in the
domestic economy. The issue of paper notes denominated in copper cash thus failed to
stimulate the development of fiscal centralization.
The situation in China between the 1870s and 1890s was just opposite to that between the
1850s and 1860s. The post-war economic expansion provided a stable base for the state
to extract revenues from the customs and domestic consumption taxes, which became the
major pillar of public finance. The revival and development of domestic financial
networks enabled provincial governments to increasingly collaborate with private
bankers to remit tax revenue to Beijing. Under these conditions, there was no pressure to
force the central government to re-experiment with the issue of its own credit
instruments, particularly when the memory of the fiasco of paper notes was so fresh
among political actors. Without credit instruments to speedily transmit government funds
to localities, the central government could only continue to rely upon the traditional
assignment system to designate the direct transfer of monies from sites of collection to
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places of spending. The ability of the decentralized assignment fiscal operation to
support - albeit with some difficulties - the expensive and prolonged military campaigns
in the northwest and Xinjiang between 1866 and 1882, not to mention the building of a
modem navy, further reduced the need to seek alternative institutions. Thus fiscal
decentralization and the center's lack of credit instruments mutually reinforced each
other. This lock-in situation continued until the huge indemnity to Japan after 1895
forced the Qing government to resume the search for new institutions, such as the state
bank and the centralized collection of opium taxes.
The relatively small scale of production of major consumer goods in nineteenth-century
China severely restricted the Qing government's ability to centralize the collection of
indirect taxes levied upon domestic consumption. This contrasted sharply with the elastic
revenues that the English and Japanese governments could extract from the large-scale
production of beer and sake respectively. Meanwhile, the lack of a uniform standard in
the silver currency made it difficult for the state to float silver notes throughout the
domestic economy. Nonetheless, the necessary conditions for the central government to
raise long-term loans were available in late nineteenth-century China. Although the
economy did not allow the establishment of a highly centralized bureaucracy to collect
indirect taxes from major consumer goods, the Qing government did have the
institutional ability to centralize the collection of the customs. More importantly, the
Qing state exhibited the ability to ensure punctual arrival of the annual installments of
some 12 million tael in tax revenue from various provinces to Shanghai so as to pay the
indemnity to Japan.
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As we have seen in the case of England, this ability was vital to encourage investors'
confidence in the state's long-term borrowing. Meanwhile, the necessary conditions for
the state to build up the system of market-based long-term borrowings were satisfied in
China at the time: the stock markets in Shanghai, the practice of issuing short-term bills
of borrowing which could be freely traded in the markets, and a community of investors
who were looking for secure opportunities of investment. Considering the close
connections between the major government officials and big financiers in nineteenth-
century China, it is not far-fetched to suppose that a financial institution similar to the
Bank of England could have emerged in Shanghai in the late 1890s. It could have
managed the subscription and interest payments of the government's long-term
borrowing raised from the markets. Such an institution could have secured political
supporters in Beijing by attracting princes and officials to invest in state bonds. It could
have won the favor of the officials of the Board of Revenue by sending them annual
"gifts," as the Bank of England did to the officials of the Treasury in the eighteenth
century. However, in the absence of an institutional learning process, these elements
remained disconnected and could not form a self-reinforcing process toward the
institutions of state long-term borrowing.
The institutional learning model thus provides a common mechanism to explain different
routes and sequences of developing the institutions of the modern fiscal state in England
and Japan, as well as the failure to do so in China. Moreover, for each case, it explains
why other possible outcomes are not the observed one. Furthermore, it not only takes
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into account exogenous factors in institutional development but also has a built-in
endogenous mechanism to explain the timing of the appearance (or not) of a specific
institutional outcome, i.e., the rise of the modem fiscal state. It explains in detail the
path-dependent processes of the emergence (or not) of the modem fiscal state. In
comparison, conventional theories about the functions and distributional effects of
existing institutions cannot explain the establishment of these new institutions, even
though they are important to understanding their stability.
At the same time, the contribution of the institutions of the modem fiscal state to
enhancing state capacity and stimulating financial development, particularly the
development of the securities markets, casts new light on the role of the state in economic
development in general, and late development in particular. The existing literature of late
development often assumes that in eighteenth-century England, economic development in
general and financial development in particular resulted from the operation of a free
market economy. The state is perceived as playing only a negative role of protecting
property rights. As we have seen, however, the ability of the English state to effectively
collect indirect taxes to service the interest payments of its perpetual annuities was vital
to the development of the contemporary securities markets. Likewise, the Bank of Japan,
which was backed by state tax revenue, was able to encourage long-term investments in
railway building through discounting the bills of banks which accepted stocks of major
railway companies as security. This method of promoting long-term industrial
investment was different from both the state's direct industrial investment and the
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practice of universal banking, the two usual policies to stimulate long-term industrial
investment in the theory of late development.
In contrast, the regular tax revenue of the Qing government remained separate from the
stock markets in late nineteenth-century Shanghai. As a result, there were no securities
such as state bonds to stimulate the steady development of the stock market. Instead, the
dominance of stocks of joint-stock companies whose values varied frequently in the
markets led to fluctuations, which further enticed speculative investments. The functions
of the modem fiscal state in a market economy suggest the institutional causes which led
to the lack of long-term industrial investment in late nineteenth-century China.
Finally, the modem fiscal state possesses a significantly greater ability to affect the
economy and welfare of the whole society through its fiscal and financial policies. It is
therefore not surprising to find that the institutions of public finance become a major
focus to contest for fairness and justice in the making of tax and financial policies. The
regressive nature of public finance greatly agitated social reformers in England in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Likewise, the purpose of the newly established
institutions of the modem fiscal state was bitterly debated in the Japanese Diet in the
early 1890s. Clearly, the path-dependent nature of the process of institutional change
does not imply an end of politics when the path moves irreversibly toward a particular
institutional outcome. Instead, new institutions provide different platforms for politics.
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Archival Sources:
Unless otherwise noted, all box numbers refer to the catalogue number of each microfilm
box preserved in the No. 1 Historical Archives, Beijing.
Palace Memorials Concerning Money and Finance (AM rft-Jf- 2IT MIni):
Boxes: No. 60, No. 61, No. 62, No. 63, No. 64
Palace Memorials Concerning Commercial Taxes (2 T
Boxes: No. 31, No. 32, No. 33,
Grand Council Memorial Copies (|4M5)f):
Concerning Public Finance (from the Jiaqing to Guangxu reign) IEA (1TA #9 ; Y
V):
No. 135, No. 310, No. 361, No. 368, No. 506, No. 507, No. 508
Concerning Commercial Taxes (from the Daoguang to Guangxu reign) A&A (EME
;F 1 - ):
No. 487, No. 488, No. 489, No. 490, No. 491
Concerning Money and Finance (from the Daoguang to Guangxu reign) :li Iit -- ±t
No. 677, No. 678, No. 679, No. 680
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